D
Rebuilding Begins
With Japan’s surrender, the Allies turned to the challenge of rebuilding war-torn
nations. Even before the last guns fell silent, they began thinking about principles
that would govern the postwar world.
THE YALTA CONFERENCE
In February 1945, as the Allies pushed toward victory
in Europe, an ailing Roosevelt had met with Churchill and Stalin at the Black Sea
resort city of Yalta in the Soviet Union. Stalin graciously welcomed the president
and the prime minister, and the Big Three, as they were called, toasted the defeat
of Germany that now seemed certain.
For eight grueling days, the three leaders discussed the fate of Germany and the
postwar world. Stalin, his country devastated by German forces, favored a harsh
approach. He wanted to keep Germany divided into occupation zones—areas
controlled by Allied military forces—so that Germany would never again threaten
the Soviet Union.
When Churchill strongly disagreed, Roosevelt acted as a mediator. He was
prepared to make concessions to Stalin for two reasons. First, he hoped that the
Soviet Union would stand by its commitments to join the war against Japan that
was still waging in the Pacific. (The first test of the atom bomb was still five
months away.) Second, Roosevelt wanted Stalin’s support for a new world peace-
keeping organization, to be named the United Nations.
The United States in World War II 791
“Japan’s staggering losses were enough to force
Japan’s surrender.”
Many of the scientists who had worked on the bomb,
as well as military leaders and civilian policymakers,
had doubts about using it. Dr. Leo Szilard, a Hungarian-
born physicist who had helped President Roosevelt
launch the project and who had a major role in develop-
ing the bomb, was a key figure opposing its use.
A petition drawn up by Szilard and signed by 70
other scientists argued that it would be immoral to drop
an atomic bomb on Japan without fair warning. Many
supported staging a demonstration of the bomb for
Japanese leaders, perhaps by exploding one on a
deserted island near Japan, to convince the Japanese
to surrender.
Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D.
Eisenhower agreed. He maintained that “dropping the
bomb was completely unnecessary” to save American
lives and that Japan was already defeated. Ike told
Secretary of War Henry
Stimson, “I was against it
[the bomb] on two counts.
First the Japanese were
ready to surrender and it
wasn’t necessary to hit
them with that awful thing.
Second, I hated to see our
country be the first to use
such a weapon.”
“The only way to end the war against Japan was to
bomb the Japanese mainland.”
Many advisors to President Truman, including Secretar y
of War Henr y Stimson, had this point of view. They felt
the bomb would end the war and save American lives.
Stimson said, “The face of war is the face of death.”
Some scientists working on the bomb agreed—
even more so as the casualty figures from Iwo Jima
and Okinawa sank in. “Are we to go on shedding
American blood when we have available a means to a
steady victory?” they petitioned. “No! If we can save
even a handful of American lives, then let us use this
weapon—now!”
Two other concerns pushed Americans to use the
bomb. Some people feared that if the bomb were not
dropped, the project might be viewed as a gigantic
waste of money.
The second consideration involved the Soviet
Union. Tension and distrust were already developing
between the Western
Allies and the Soviets.
Some American officials
believed that a success-
ful use of the atomic
bomb would give the
United States a powerful
advantage over the
Soviets in shaping the
postwar world.
