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1
STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF HENNEPIN FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Plaintiff, SENTENCING ORDER AND
MEMORANDUM OPINION
vs.
DEREK MICHAEL CHAUVIN, Court File No. 27-CR-20-12646
Defendant.
This matter is before the Court for sentencing after the jury returned guilty verdicts on
April 20, 2021 on Count I, unintentional second-degree murder while committing a felony,
Count II, third-degree murder, perpetrating an eminently dangerous act evincing a depraved
mind, and Count III, second-degree manslaughter, culpable negligence creating an unreasonable
risk.
Keith Ellison, Matthew Frank, Steven Schleicher, and Jerry Blackwell appeared for the
State.
Eric Nelson and Amy Voss appeared for Defendant Derek Michael Chauvin who was
also present.
SENTENCING ORDER
As to Count I, based on the verdict of the jury finding you guilty of unintentional second-
degree murder while committing a felony under Minn. Stat. § 609.19 subd. 2(1), it is the
judgment of the Court that you now stand convicted of that offense. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. §
609.04, Counts II and III remain unadjudicated as they are lesser offenses of Count I.
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As sentence for Count I:
1. The Court commits you to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections for a
period of 270 months. You are granted credit for 199 days already served.
2. Pay the mandatory surcharge of $78, to be paid from prison wages.
3. You are prohibited from possessing firearms, ammunition, or explosives for the
remainder of your life.
4. Provide a DNA sample as required by law.
5. Register as a predatory offender as required by law.
6. The attached Memorandum Opinion is incorporated by reference.
____________________________________
Peter A. Cahill
Judge of District Court
Digitally signed by Cahill, Peter
Date: 2021.06.25 14:32:07
-05'00'
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated “to establish rational and
consistent sentencing standards that promote public safety, reduce sentencing disparity, and
ensure that the sanctions imposed . . . are proportional to the severity of the . . . offense and the
offender’s criminal history.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.A; see also State v. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d
153, 156 (Minn. 2015) (“The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines promote uniformity,
proportionality, and predictability in sentencing.”). The presumptive guidelines ranges are
“deemed appropriate for the felonies covered by them.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.A.6.
In most cases, the maximum sentence a district court may impose is the top of the
presumptive sentencing range because the sentencing guidelines mandate that district courts
pronounce a sentence within the range on the sentencing guidelines grid. Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.D.1. However, the Sentencing Guidelines recognize there are cases in which the guidelines
sentence may not be appropriate and therefore allow district courts to depart from the
presumptive sentence, although departing courts must articulate “substantial and compelling”
circumstances justifying the departure. Id.; see also State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257,
267, 270 (Minn. 2020); Hicks, 864 N.W.2d at 156; State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 69
(Minn. 2002). “Substantial and compelling circumstances are those demonstrating that ‘the
defendant’s conduct in the offense of conviction was significantly more or less serious than that
typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.’” Barthman, 938 N.W.2d at 270
(emphasis in original); Tucker v. State, 799 N.W.2d 583, 586 (Minn. 2011). When such factors
are present, the judge “may depart from the presumptive disposition or duration provided in the
Guidelines and stay or impose a sentence that is deemed to be more appropriate than the
presumptive sentence.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1. That includes exceeding the top end of
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4
the presumptive range when “there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances.” Id.; State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn. 2009).
For a defendant like Mr. Chauvin with zero criminal history points, the guidelines
presumptive range for unintentional second-degree murder -- the most serious charge of which
Mr. Chauvin was found guilty by the jury and on which he is being convicted and sentenced by
this Court -- is 128 to 180 months, with the presumptive sentence being 150 months.
Consideration of a sentence outside the presumptive guidelines range involves a two-stage
process:
(1) In the first stage, either a jury or the district court must make a factual finding that
there are one or more aggravating factors present in the commission of the crime
apart from the prima facie elements of the charged crime.
(2) In the second stage, the district court is required to explain why the presence of
any such aggravating factors creates a substantial and compelling reason to
impose a sentence outside the presumptive guidelines range.
Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 919-20.
As to the first stage, at the conclusion of the trial and after return of the jury’s verdicts,
Mr. Chauvin agreed to submit the issue of the existence of aggravated sentencing factors to this
Court for decision. The State had urged the Court to find the existence of five aggravated
sentencing factors in light of the evidence presented during the three-week trial between March
29 and April 15, 2021. In the Court’s Verdict and Findings of Fact Regarding Aggravated
Sentencing Factors (Dk #560), this Court found that the evidence at trial proved beyond a
reasonable doubt the following four aggravated sentencing factors:
1
(i) That Mr. Chauvin abused a position of trust and authority;
(ii) That Mr. Chauvin treated George Floyd with particular cruelty;
1
This Court found that the fifth factor urged by the State, that George Floyd was particularly
vulnerable, had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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(iii) That children were present during the commission of the offense; and
(iv) That Mr. Chauvin committed the crime as a group with the active participation of
three other individuals, former Minneapolis Police Officers Thou Thao, Thomas
Lane, and J. Alexander Kueng, who all actively participated with Mr. Chauvin in
the crime in various ways.
The issue now before this Court on sentencing is the second stage: whether any of these
four aggravated factors demonstrates that Mr. Chauvin’s conduct in connection with the offense
for which he has been convicted renders his conduct significantly more serious than that
typically involved in the commission of such an offense, Hicks, 864 N.W.2d at 157 (Minn.
2015), State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 601-02 (Minn. 2009), and therefore supplies a
“substantial and compelling reason” for imposing an aggravated sentence of more than the 180
month top-of-the-guidelines range. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d at 922.
Although this Court found the presence of four aggravating factors, the decision whether
to depart durationally upward and impose an aggravated sentence remains within the Court’s
sound discretion. See Minn. Sent. Guideline 2.D.1 (“A departure is not controlled by the
Guidelines, but rather, is an exercise of judicial discretion constrained by statute or case law.”);
State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 360 (Minn. 2008) (when a court “finds facts that support a
departure from the presumptive sentence, the court may exercise discretion to depart but is not
required to depart”).
I. THE DISPOSITIONAL AND DURATIONAL DEPARTURES REQUESTED BY
MR. CHAUVIN ARE NOT APPROPRIATE.
Mr. Chauvin seeks a probationary sentence (a dispositional departure from the
presumptive prison sentence under the sentencing guidelines) or, alternatively, a downward
durational departure from the presumptive guidelines range for a prison sentence. This Court
concludes neither is appropriate in this case.
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A mitigated dispositional departure (i.e. probation) is not appropriate because there has
been no persuasive showing that Mr. Chauvin is particularly amenable to probation, see State v.
Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308-12 (Minn. 2014), and State v. Love, 350 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Minn.
1984), and because a probationary sentence would be disproportionate and understate the
severity of Mr. Chauvin’s offense. See Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 310-13 (reversing trial court’s
dispositional departure to probation in first-degree criminal sexual conduct case as an abuse of
discretion, rejecting arguments similar to those made by Mr. Chauvin here relying on age, lack of
criminal history, and defendant’s respectful attitude while in court as being far outweighed by
other relevant considerations regarding the severity of the offense).
A “durational departure must be based on factors that reflect the seriousness of the
offense, not the characteristics of the offender.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn.
2016). “A downward durational departure is justified only if the defendant’s conduct was
significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” Id. at
624. A downward durational departure below the “bottom of the box” 128-month sentence is not
appropriate in this case given this Court’s finding of the presence of aggravated sentencing
factors. Mr. Chauvin’s continuing insistence that he believed “he was simply performing his
lawful duty in assisting other officers in the arrest of George Floyd” and was acting “in good
faith reliance [on] his own experience as a police officer and the training he had received,” see
Def. Sent. Mem. (June 2, 2021) at 11, was rejected by every supervisory and training officer of
the Minneapolis Police Department who testified at trial
2
as well as by the jury.
2
This includes MPD Chief Medaria Arradondo, MPD Sgts. David Pleoger and Jon Edwards,
MPD Lt. Johnny Mercil, and MPD Commander Katie Blackwell.
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II. MR. CHAUVIN’S ABUSE OF A POSITION OF TRUST OR AUTHORITY IS A
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPELLING REASON FOR AN UPWARD
DURATIONAL DEPARTURE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE.
The Court of Appeals has held that this aggravating factor supplies a “substantial and
compelling reason” for an upward departure where the defendant and victim are in a
“relationship[] fraught with power imbalances that may make it difficult for a victim to protect
himself” and the defendant abuses his or her position of trust or authority in committing the
crime.
3
State v. Rourke, 681 N.W.2d 35, 41 (Minn. App. 2004), review granted and remanded on
other grounds, 2005 WL 525522 (Minn. App. Mar. 8, 2005). That was the situation here.
Mr. Chauvin was employed as a licensed peace officer by the City of Minneapolis. As
such, he “held a position of trust and authority with respect to the community and its members.”
Verdict and Findings of Fact Regarding Aggravated Sentencing Factors (Dk. #560) ¶ 1(b). The
“trust placed in Defendant included trust that anyone arrested would be treated with respect and
only with reasonable force and that medical needs would be addressed in a timely fashion.” Id.
This Court has already concluded that:
(1) Mr. Chauvin “abused his position of authority” by using unreasonable force to
hold “a handcuffed George Floyd in a prone position on the street”—“a position
that Defendant knew from his training and experience carried with it a danger of
3
Mr. Chauvin argues that “abuse of a position of trust and authority” is not explicitly included
among the aggravated sentencing factors enumerated in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3(b). However, the list of aggravating factors in the guidelines is
expressly noted as nonexclusive, id.; Barthman, 938 N.W.2d at 270; Hicks, 864 N.W.2d at 157
(observing that Supreme Court has occasionally recognized new aggravating factors not included
in the list in the guidelines), and courts have upheld the abuse of position of authority as an
aggravating factor in sentencing a defendant. See State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 475, 482 (Minn.
1992); State v. Carpenter, 459 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1990); State v. Cermak, 344 N.W.2d 833,
839 (Minn. 1984).
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positional asphyxia”—for more than nine minutes and forty seconds, “an
inordinate amount of time.” Id.1(c).
(2) “Defendant’s placement of his knee on the back of George Floyd’s neck was an
egregious abuse of the authority to subdue and restrain because the prolonged use
of this maneuver was employed after George Floyd had already been handcuffed
and continued for more than four and a half minutes after Mr. Floyd had ceased
talking and had become unresponsive.” Id. ¶ 1(f).
(3) Mr. Chauvin “abused his position of trust and authority by not rendering aid, by
declining two suggestions from one of his fellow officers to place George Floyd
on his side, and by preventing bystanders, including an off-duty Minneapolis fire
fighter, from assisting.” Id. ¶ 1(d).
(4) That “failure to render aid became particularly abusive after Mr. Floyd had passed
out, and was still being restrained in the prone position, with Mr. Chauvin
continuing to kneel on the back of Mr. Floyd’s neck with one knee and on his
back with another knee, for more than two and a half minutes after one of his
fellow officers announced he was unable to detect a pulse.” Id.
Here, by virtue of his position as a police officer, Mr. Chauvin “was in a position to
dominate and control” Mr. Floyd. State v. Bennett, 1997 WL 526313, at *3 (Minn. App. Aug.
26, 1997). That “position of control” not only allowed Mr. Chauvin to “manipulate the
circumstances and commit the crime,” id., but also “ma[d]e it difficult” for Mr. Floyd “to
protect himself” from Mr. Chauvin’s and his co-defendant officers’ conduct. Rourke, 681
N.W.2d at 41.
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Nevertheless, Mr. Chauvin has argued that this aggravating factor does not apply here
because it typically applies only in cases involving “criminal sexual conduct, domestic abuse, or
both, where the victim had a pre-existing relationship with the offender.” Def. Mem. in Opp. to
Upward Durational Sentencing Departure, at 7 (Apr. 30, 2021) (Def. Blakely Brief). But the
Court of Appeals has made clear that this aggravating factor is not so limited. In Rourke, the
defendant made the same basic argument: that “generally, the cases that have used the defendant’s
position of power as an aggravating factor” involved a particular type of pre-existing relationship
between a victim and an “adult authority figure[].” Rourke, 681 N.W.2d at 40. The Court of
Appeals rejected that argument, noting that it had “found no cases that limit the application of
this factor” in that manner. Id. at 41. The Court of Appeals then clarified that the key question is
whether the relationship between the victim and the defendant is one among the many
“relationships fraught with power imbalances that may make it difficult for a victim to protect
himself,” not the existence of a pre-existing relationship or a particular type of offense. Id.
Other cases confirm that this aggravating factor is not limited only to cases in which “the
victim had a pre-existing relationship with the offender.” In Bennett, for example, the Court of
Appeals held that this factor supported an upward departure where the defendant shot a cab driver
with whom he had no pre-existing relationship. 1997 WL 526313, at *3.
4
Similarly, in State v.
House, 1991 WL 42587, at *2 (Minn. App. Apr. 2, 1991), the Court of Appeals affirmed the
application of this factor to a hospital worker “entrusted with the responsibility of protecting
4
Although Mr. Chauvin attempts to distinguish Bennett on the ground that “it was far more
similar to the employment relationship found in other cases . . . than the circumstances in this
case,” the key factors the Court of Appeals relied on in Bennett are present here: Mr. Chauvin
“was in a position to dominate and control” Mr. Floyd, “had authority to tell” Mr. Floyd what to
do, and used his “position of control” to “take advantage of a defined relationship” with Mr.
Floyd and “manipulate the circumstances and commit the crime. 1997 WL 526313, at *3.
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hospital personnel, patients and visitors” and who used that position of trust to assault a victim
with whom he had no ostensible prior relationship.
The case law likewise confirms that this aggravating factor is not limited to cases
involving “criminal sexual conduct” or “domestic abuse.” Bennett was a murder case in which
there were no allegations that the defendant had committed criminal sexual conduct or domestic
abuse. In State v. Campbell, 367 N.W.2d 454, 461 (Minn. 1985), the Supreme Court found
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant “violated a position
of trust” in a murder case where the defendant was not accused of committing criminal sexual
conduct or domestic abuse.
Mr. Chauvin also claims that there is “no case law in Minnesota, precedential or
otherwise, in which a peace officer’s position” has triggered the application of this aggravating
factor. Id. While perhaps true, that observation is unsurprising precisely because successful
prosecutions of police officers in Minnesota have been so rare; research has not disclosed any
prior Minnesota cases in which a police officer was convicted of murder and the State sought an
upward sentencing departure. It is also legally irrelevant. The Court of Appeals made clear in
Rourke that it does not matter if “this particular aggravating factor has not routinely been
applied” to cases involving a particular type of defendant or victim. 681 N.W.2d at 41. So long
as the relationship between an officer and a victim qualifies as a “relationship[] fraught with power
imbalances that may make it difficult for a victim to protect himself or herself,” Rourke makes
clear that this aggravating factor can apply. Mr. Chauvin does not suggest otherwise, and does
not point to any case that forecloses the application of this factor here.
5
If anything, the case for
5
There is a district court decision suggesting that a peace officer’s position of trust and authority
is an appropriate basis for an upward departure. In State v. Arrington, the district court concluded
that the defendant abused the victim’s trust because the defendant, who was not a police officer,
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an enhancement is heightened, not reduced, when a defendant commits crimes while imbued
with the authority of the State, as Mr. Chauvin did here.
III. MR. CHAUVIN’S TREATING GEORGE FLOYD WITH PARTICULAR
CRUELTY IS A SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPELLING REASON FOR AN
UPWARD DURATIONAL DEPARTURE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE.
Mr. Chauvin’s particularly cruel treatment of George Floyd is also a separate
“[s]ubstantial and compelling” basis for an upward sentencing departure. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d at
157; see Minn. Stat. § 244.10 subd. 5a(a)(2) (noting that an aggravated sentence is appropriate if
the “victim was treated with particular cruelty for which the offender should be held
responsible”); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.b(2) (same); Tucker, 799 N.W.2d at 586
(“[P]articular cruelty involves the gratuitous infliction of pain and cruelty of a kind not usually
associated with the commission of the offense in question.”). Here, the cruelty of Mr. Chauvin’s
conduct was “of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense[s] in question.”
State v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 1981). Mr. Chauvin’s “gratuitous infliction of
pain,” Tucker, 799 N.W.2d at 586, and “psychological” cruelty, State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d
142, 146 (Minn. 1982), justify an upward sentencing departure.
This Court has already concluded that:
(1) “[i]t was particularly cruel to kill George Floyd slowly” by inhibiting “his ability to
breathe when Mr. Floyd had already made it clear he was having trouble
falsely told the victim that he was a police officer and used that claimed position to commit the
crime. 2016 WL 102476, at *2 (Minn. App. Jan. 11, 2016). On appeal, the Court of Appeals
declined to decide “whether abuse of trust is a proper aggravating factor here” because the
district court had “relied upon numerous other factors that support[ed] the upward sentencing
departure.” Id. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that the primary arguments against
applying the abuse-of-authority factor in that case were that “impersonating a police officer is a
separate offense,” and that the defendant “was not in a position of trust because he was not a
police officer.” Id. Nowhere did the Court of Appeals or the defendant suggest that the abuse-
of-trust aggravating factor is inapplicable to someone who is actually a police officer.
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breathing.” Verdict and Findings of Fact Regarding Aggravated Sentencing
Factors (Dk #560) ¶ 2(b).
(2) The “prolonged use” of the prone position was “particularly egregious” because
“George Floyd made it clear he was unable to breathe and expressed the view that
he was dying as a result of the officers’ restraint.” Id. ¶ 1(c).
(3) Mr. Chauvin manifested his indifference to Mr. Floyd’s pleas for his life and his
medical distress by, among other things, “not rendering aid”; by “declining two
suggestions from one of his fellow officers to place George Floyd on his side”; by
“preventing bystanders, including an off-duty Minneapolis fire fighter, from
assisting”; by failing to render aid even “after Mr. Floyd had passed out”; and by
“continuing to kneel on the back of Mr. Floyd’s neck . . . for more than two and
a half minutes after one of his fellow officers announced he was unable to detect a
pulse.” Id. ¶ 1(d).
(4) The “slow death of George Floyd occurring over approximately six minutes of his
positional asphyxia was particularly cruel in that Mr. Floyd was begging for his
life and obviously terrified by the knowledge that he was likely to die but during
which the Defendant objectively remained indifferent to Mr. Floyd’s pleas.” Id.
2(c).
(5) Restraining Mr. Floyd “in the prone position against the hard street surface by
kneeling on the back of Mr. Floyd’s neck with his other knee in Mr. Floyd’s back,
all the while holding his handcuffed arms in the fashion Defendant did for more
than nine minutes,” is “by itself a particularly cruel act.” Id. ¶ 2(d).
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(6) That the “prolonged nature of the asphyxiation” as manifested by the extensive
video evidence presented during the trial was also “by itself particularly cruel.”
Id. ¶ 2(e).
These factual findings provide a “[s]ubstantial and compelling” basis for an aggravated
sentencing departure, because they demonstrate that Mr. Chauvin’s conduct “was significantly
more . . . serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime[s] in question.”
Hicks, 864 N.W.2d at 157. Here, Mr. Chauvin’s actions inflicted “gratuitous . . . pain,” Tucker,
799 N.W.2d at 586, by inhibiting George Floyd’s “ability to breathe when Mr. Floyd had already
made it clear he was having trouble breathing” and after he “expressed the view that he was dying
as a result of the officers’ restraint.” And Mr. Chauvin’s actions caused Mr. Floyd significant
“psychological” distress, Norton, 328 N.W.2d at 146, because “Defendant objectively remained
indifferent to Mr. Floyd’s pleas” even as “Mr. Floyd was begging for his life and obviously
terrified by the knowledge that he was likely to die.”
Mr. Chauvin’s prolonged restraint of Mr. Floyd was also much longer and more painful
than the typical scenario in a second-degree or third-degree murder or second-degree
manslaughter case. The “prolonged nature of the asphyxiation” makes this offense different in
kind than, for example, a near-instantaneous death by gunshot, which is one typical scenario for
this type of offense. Cf. Tucker, 799 N.W.2d at 587-588 (finding no particular cruelty in
second-degree unintentional murder case where defendant “did not shoot [the victim] in a manner
that gratuitously inflicted additional pain”).
The conduct this Court has deemed particularly cruel also occurred over a longer period
and was substantially more painful than a typical third-degree assault, the predicate felony
offense for Mr. Chauvin’s second-degree murder conviction. See, e.g., State v. Dorn, 887
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N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. 2016) (holding that felony assault requires only that the defendant
“intentionally apply force to another person without his consent”). Mr. Chauvin’s conduct went
beyond just inflicting “substantial bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.223 subd. 1. It “kill[ed]
George Floyd slowly”—over the course of almost ten minutes—by inhibiting “his ability to
breathe when Mr. Floyd had already made it clear he was having trouble breathing.” Indeed, Mr.
Chauvin’s continuation of the assault after Mr. Floyd was no longer conscious and no longer had
a pulse—Mr. Chauvin “continu[ed] to kneel on the back of Mr. Floyd’s neck . . . for more than
two and a half minutes
6
after one of his fellow officers announced he was unable to detect a
pulse”—plainly sets Mr. Chauvin’s conduct apart from the typical case involving a felony
assault that results in substantial bodily harm and death to the victim. See State v. Smith, 541
N.W.2d 584, 590 (Minn. 1996) (finding particular cruelty in robbery case in part because the
defendant continued beating the victim after “he was knocked unconscious by the first blow”).
Against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Mr. Chauvin argues that his conduct
was not particularly cruel because the “assault of Mr. Floyd occurred in the course of a very
short time,” and because – he contends -- his conduct “involved no threats or taunting.” But this
Court has already concluded that the assault occurred over “an inordinate amount of time,” that
the video evidence at trial coupled with the trial testimony of medical experts called by the State
demonstrated that Mr. Chauvin’s and his fellow officers’ actions killed Mr. Floyd “slowly,” and
that the prolonged nature of the asphyxiation was by itself particularly cruel. Although Mr.
Chauvin identifies no reason why particular cruelty necessarily requires “threats or taunting,”
6
According to the State’s expert pulmonologist Dr. Martin Tobin in his trial testimony, Mr.
Floyd likely expired at 8:25:16 from his heart attack resulting from oxygen deprivation caused
by the positional and mechanical asphyxia, after which Mr. Chauvin continued to maintain his
position for almost an additional three and a half minutes.
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particularly where Mr. Chauvin “objectively remained indifferent” to the fact that “Mr. Floyd was
begging for life” and was “obviously terrified by the knowledge that he was likely to die,” the trial
evidence demonstrated that Mr. Chauvin did taunt Mr. Floyd by responding dismissively to his
pleas. The video evidence presented at trial captures Mr. Chauvin dismissively responding “uh
huh” at least a couple times in response to Mr. Floyd’s pleas, and also commenting, in response
to his pleas “I can’t breathe” that “[i]t takes a heck of a lot of oxygen to say things.”
Mr. Chauvin also notes that the officers had called for an ambulance and upgraded the
urgency of the request during the course of their restraint of Mr. Floyd. While true, that
argument ignores the evidence that Mr. Chauvin disregarded two inquiries from Mr. Lane about
rolling Mr. Floyd onto his side into the recovery position roughly halfway through the restraint
period after he had concluded that Mr. Floyd had “passed out,” ignored the information from Mr.
Kueng that he was unable to detect a pulse at roughly 8:26 p.m., and ignored the repeated pleas
from several of the onlookers, including Donald Williams and Genevieve Hansen, among others,
over several minutes that Mr. Floyd was no longer breathing and had become nonresponsive.
Rather than ending the restraint when it was obvious that Mr. Floyd not only was no longer
offering any resistance but was in medical distress and starting CPR, Mr. Chauvin instead chose
to continue to restrain Mr. Floyd as he had since Mr. Floyd was initially restrained prone on
Chicago Avenue at 8:19:15 for several additional minutes until the EMS crew rolled Mr. Floyd
onto a stretcher at 8:28:42.
27-CR-20-12646
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/25/2021 2:42 PM
16
IV. THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN AT THE SCENE DURING THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE IS NOT BEING USED AS A SUBSTANTIAL
AND COMPELLING REASON FOR AN UPWARD DURATIONAL
DEPARTURE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
In contrast to the first two aggravating factors discussed above, although this Court found
that children were present during the commission of the offense, the Court concludes the
presence of that factor does not, under all the facts and circumstances of this case, present a
substantial and compelling reason for an upward durational departure. Minn. Stat. § 244.10
subd. 5(a)(13); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.b(13).
The State presented testimony at trial from three young women who were 17 at the time
of the incident on May 25, 2020 (Darnella Frazier, Alyssa Funari, and Kaylynn Gilbert) and a
girl who was 9 at the time (J.R.). Although all four were present on the sidewalk adjoining
Chicago Avenue for portions of the nine minute and a half minute interlude in which Messrs.
Chauvin, Lane, and Kueng restrained Mr. Floyd prone on Chicago Avenue while Mr. Thao
maintained a watchful eye on the on-looking bystanders, none was a victim in the sense of being
physically injured or threatened with injury so long as they remained on the sidewalk and did not
physically engage or interfere with Mr. Chauvin and his co-defendant officers. None of them
had been present when the officers were struggling with Mr. Floyd to get him into the squad car
and only came upon the scene after he had already been subdued and was being restrained prone
on the street. Mr. Chauvin is correct that these young women were free to leave the scene
whenever they wished, were never coerced or forced by him or any of the other officers to
remain a captive presence at the scene, and did not know any of the officers or Mr. Floyd, and
that this weighs against using this factor as the basis for an aggravated departure. This case is
very different from other cases involving children in which courts have found substantial and
27-CR-20-12646
Filed in District Court
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17
compelling reasons to depart upward.
7
Although the State contends that all four of these young women were traumatized by
witnessing this incident, the evidence at trial did not present any objective indicia of trauma. To
the contrary, Ms. Frazier, who recorded several minutes of Mr. Floyd’s restraint on her cellphone
and subsequently posted that video to a social network site (Tr. Exh. 15), Ms. Funari, who also
recorded several minutes of the restraint using Ms. Gilbert’s cellphone (Tr. Exhs. 26-28), and
J.R. are observed smiling and occasionally even laughing over the course of the several minutes
they observed Messrs. Chauvin, Kueng, and Lane restraining Mr. Floyd prone on Chicago
Avenue.
8
In other words, while the presence of children is an aggravated sentencing factor and a
permissible ground for departure for purposes of the first stage analysis, under the second stage
of the analysis, this Court does not find that specific facts in this case are so substantial and
compelling to warrant an upward durational departure on this ground.
7
Those cases typically involve children being present indoors (homes or daycare centers) when
a parent was the victim of a violent felony. See, e.g., State v. Hart, 477 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. App.
1991), rev. denied Minn. Jan. 16, 1992 (double upward departure affirmed in sexual assault case
occurring in victim’s home when her minor sons were present in their bedroom at time of
assault); State v. Profit, 323 N.W.2d 34 (Minn. 1982) (approving assessment that committing
criminal sexual assault in front of children at a daycare center is particularly outrageous).
8
The initial subdual and restraint of George Floyd prone on the street occurs at 8:19:15 p.m.
See Lane, Kueng, and Thao body-worn camera videos (BWC Video), Tr. Exhs. 47, 43, and 49.
At just over three minutes into the restraint, Thao’s BWC video captures Ms. Frazier and Ms.
Funari, standing next to each other, looking at each other and smiling while recording the
incident on their cellphones. See Tr. Exh. 49 at 8:22:25-:30. Shortly after that, Ms. Frazier and
J.R. are observed smiling for several seconds after J.R. comes into view on Thao’s BWC Video.
See Tr. Exh. 49 at 8:22:33-:51. Ms. Frazier and J.R. are seen laughing as Donald Williams
begins engaging in earnest with Messrs. Thao and Chauvin. See Tr. Exh. 49 at 8:23:50-8:24:00
& 8:24:25-:35 p.m. Finally, Ms. Frazier and J.R. are observed laughing out loud about a minute
after the restraint had ended and Mr. Floyd had been loaded into the ambulance. See Tr. Exh. 49
at 8:29:30-:45.
27-CR-20-12646
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/25/2021 2:42 PM
18
V. MR. CHAUVIN’S ACTIONS AS ONE OF A GROUP OF FOUR MINNEAPOLIS
POLICE OFFICERS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE RESTRAINT OF
GEORGE FLOYD IS NOT BEING USED AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND
COMPELLING REASON FOR AN UPWARD DURATIONAL DEPARTURE
UNDER THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
By statute in Minnesota, it is a ground for departure where “the offender committed the
crime as part of a group of three or more persons who all actively participated in the crime.”
Minn. Stat. § 244.10 subd. 5a(a)(10) (emphasis added). The Sentencing Guidelines are similar
but narrower: “The offender committed the crime as part of a group of three or more offenders
who all actively participated in the crime." Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.b(10) (emphasis
added). This inconsistency was created by the Sentencing Guidelines 2012 amendments,
replacing the word “persons” with “offenders.” Although the statute has remained the same, it is
also true that amendments to the Guidelines are effective unless the Legislature by law provides
otherwise.
9
The State seeks to explain the conflict between the statute and Sentencing Guidelines by
stating that the Sentencing Guidelines change was merely “stylistic.” That might be true if the
words “persons” and “offenders” are synonyms. They are not. “Offenders” is clearly a subset of
“persons” and both terms should be given their ordinary meanings.
9
“The commission shall meet as necessary for the purpose of modifying and improving the
guidelines. Any modification which amends the Sentencing Guidelines grid, including severity
levels and criminal history scores, or which would result in the reduction of any sentence or in
the early release of any inmate, with the exception of a modification mandated or authorized by
the legislature or relating to a crime created or amended by the legislature in the preceding
session, shall be submitted to the legislature by January 15 of any year in which the commission
wishes to make the change and shall be effective on August 1 of that year, unless the legislature
by law provides otherwise. All other modifications shall take effect according to the procedural
rules of the commission. On or before January 15 of each year, the commission shall submit a
written report to the committees of the senate and the house of representatives with jurisdiction
over criminal justice policy that identifies and explains all modifications made during the
preceding 12 months and all proposed modifications that are being submitted to the legislature
that year.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 11.
27-CR-20-12646
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19
Although this Court found the three other officers were actively involved in this incident,
the Court made no finding that Officers Lane, Kueng, and Thao had the requisite knowledge and
intent to be considered “offenders.” Minn. Stat. § 244.10 subd. 5a(a)(10); see Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 2.D.3.b(10). This is not to say that there must be a conviction before three other
persons could be “offenders,” only that it was not proven during the trial that Officers Lane,
Kueng, and Thao could be labeled as such.
As this Court has already found two particularly serious bases for an aggravated
durational departure, abuse of a position of trust and authority and particular cruelty, the Court
need not wade into this morass of conflicting law on this issue and come to a definitive
conclusion. In short, the Court bases its decision to depart without regard to this factor.
VI. THE APPROPRIATE PRISON SENTENCE IS 270 MONTHS.
When a sentencing trial court has found that one or more aggravated factors are present,
the court may, in the exercise of its discretion if substantial and compelling circumstances
warrant, impose a sentence that is up to “double the presumptive sentence length.” State v.
Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn. 1981). The existence of a single aggravating factor is
sufficient to justify the imposition of a sentence “double the upper limit of the presumptive
range.” Barthman, 938 N.W.2d at 269, 275; see also State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 624
(Minn. 2016) (“[W]e have affirmed upward durational departures that were based on a single
aggravating factor.”); State v. Gaines, 408 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Minn. App. 1987) (finding double
upward departure appropriate where only one aggravating factor applied). Here, the State is
asking this Court to sentence Mr. Chauvin to 360 months, which represents a double upward
durational departure from the 180 months at the “top of the box” of the presumptive guidelines
range.
27-CR-20-12646
Filed in District Court
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20
Determining the appropriate length of any felony sentence is not a mathematical
calculation. Nor should it be a reflexive doubling
10
of the presumptive sentence once
aggravating factors are proven and found by the Court to be substantial and compelling. Each
sentence should be an application of the law to the facts of the individual case without regard to
sympathy, bias, passion, or public opinion. While every case is different and must be considered
carefully and individually, examination of sentences imposed in similar cases is also relevant if
the Court is to effectuate the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines policy
11
of reducing sentencing
disparity.
Attached to this memorandum is Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission data
from the last ten years
12
analyzing aggravated durational departures imposed throughout
Minnesota for Murder in the Second Degree (Unintentional Killing during a Felony). The data
shows that of all the sentences imposed, 67% were within the presumptive guidelines range. For
a defendant with a criminal history score of zero, which is Mr. Chauvin’s score, the guidelines
sentence is, and has been since 2005, 150 months with a presumptive range of 128 months to 180
months. Any sentence within that range is not a departure.
For all cases where sentences were imposed, 20% of the sentences were aggravated
durational departures and 13% were mitigated durational departures (i.e. departures imposing
10
An aggravated durational departure is generally limited to double the presumptive sentence.
State v. Evans, 311 N. W.2d 481 (Minn. 1981). With the Guidelines applicable in this case,
anything from 256 to 360 would be considered a “double departure” within the limitation
imposed by Evans. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d at 360 (reaffirming the Evans rule despite the
expansion of Guidelines ranges in 2005).
11
“The purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines is to establish rational and consistent sentencing
standards that promote public safety, reduce sentencing disparity, and ensure that the sanctions
imposed for felony convictions are proportional to the severity of the conviction offense and the
offender's criminal history.” Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 1.A.
12
The data covers the years 2010 through 2019 because 2020 data is not yet available.
27-CR-20-12646
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
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21
less prison time than the sentencing guidelines range). The most common aggravated sentence
has been 240 months, followed by 300 months. The average aggravated departure imposed on
defendants with a zero criminal history score is 278.2 months.
Drilling deeper into the actual cases, there are only two cases where the defendant’s
criminal history score is zero, and both “abuse of a position of trust or authority” and “particular
cruelty” were cited as aggravating factors. Unlike the instant case, however, those cases
involved particularly vulnerable victims, specifically, three-year-old children.
13
The defendant
in 27-CR-18-18213 was originally charged with Murder in the First Degree and pleaded guilty to
Murder in the Second Degree (Unintentional Killing during a Felony) for an agreed-upon range
of 300 to 420 months and was sentenced to 384 months. The defendant in 27-CR-15-25934
pleaded guilty to the charge with an agreed-upon sentence of 300 months. In both cases, the
cruelty inflicted on the children was horrific, even more severe than the cruelty inflicted on Mr.
Floyd.
Mr. Chauvin did not plead guilty, but he cannot be punished for exercising his
constitutional right to a jury trial. Nevertheless, he must be held accountable for the death of Mr.
Floyd and for doing so in a manner that was particularly cruel and an abuse of his authority. In
consideration of all the facts presented at trial, this Court’s experience, and the collective
experience of the entire Court over the last ten years, the Court finds the appropriate prison
sentence for Mr. Chauvin is 270 months.
13
“Particularly vulnerable victim” was not cited explicitly in 27-CR-15-25934 but the case
involved the horrific beating death of a three year-old victim who suffered multiple severe blunt
trauma injuries.
27-CR-20-12646
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22
CONCLUSION
Part of the mission of the Minneapolis Police Department is to give citizens “voice and
respect.”
14
Here, Mr. Chauvin, rather than pursuing the MPD mission, treated Mr. Floyd without
respect and denied him the dignity owed to all human beings and which he certainly would have
extended to a friend or neighbor. In the Court’s view, 270 months, which amounts to an
additional ten years over the presumptive 150-month sentence, is the appropriate sentence.
PAC
14
Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual, Preface p. 2.
27-CR-20-12646
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/25/2021 2:42 PM
Murder Second Degree, subd. 2(1): Sentenced 2010-2019
Source: MSGC Monitoring Data 6/2 /2021 1
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (MSGC) monitoring data are offender-based, meaning cases represent offenders rather than individual
charges. Offenders sentenced within the same county in a one-month period are generally counted only once, based on their most serious offense.
This data request was prepared by the research staff of MSGC in fulfillment of the Commission’s statutory role as a clearinghouse and information
center for information on sentencing practices. This is not a policy document. Nothing in this request should be construed as a statement of existing
policy or recommendation of future policy on behalf of the Commission itself, or as an authoritative interpretation of the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines, Minnesota statutes, or case law.
Information Requested: Sentencing information for Murder 2, 609.19.2(1).
Analysis:
• Sentenced 2010-2019
• Second-Degree Murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1)
• Excludes attempts under Minn. Stat. § 609.17 and conspiracies under Minn. Stat. § 609.175
• Departure rates by Criminal History Score (CHS)
From 2010-2019, 204 offenders were sentenced for completed Second-Degree Murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19,
subd. 2(1). Three of the offenders received a mitigated dispositional departure. The durational departure rates by
criminal history score are displayed in the table below.
Table 1: Durational Departure Rates for 2
nd
Degree Murder, subd. 2(1), Sentenced 2010-2019
Criminal History
Score
Total Received
Prison
Durational Departure
None
Aggravated
Mitigated
90
60 (67%)
18 (20%)
12 (13%)
30
23 (77%)
4 (13%)
3 (10%)
23
12 (52%)
9 (39%)
2 (9%)
17
11 (65%)
3 (18%)
3 (18%)
15
10 (67%)
3 (20%)
2 (13%)
11
9 (82%)
1 (9%)
1 (9%)
15
11 (73%)
3 (20%)
1 (7%)
201
136 (68%)
41 (20%)
24 (12%)
27-CR-20-12646
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/25/2021 2:42 PM
Source: MSGC Monitoring Data 6/2 /2021 2
Four of the 201 offenders who received prison, also received a consecutive sentence. The following analysis focuses on
non-consecutive prison terms. As shown in Figure 1, three offenders received the statutory maximum 480 months.
Figure 1: Pronounced Sentence Duration for 2
nd
Degree Murder, subd. 2(1), that Received an Aggravated
Durational Departure, Sentenced 2010-2019
Table 2 displays the average pronounced prison term for aggravated durational departures by criminal history score. The
following table excludes the four offenders who received a consecutive sentence. For example, 18 offenders at CHS 0
received an aggravated durational departure and a non-consecutive prison term, the average of which was 278.2
months.
Table 2: Average Pronounced Prison Term for 2
nd
Degree Murder, subd. 2(1), Sentenced 2010-2019
Criminal
History Score
Aggravated Durational Departure
Number
Months
0
18
278.2
1
3
364.7
2
8
287.5
3
2
246.0
4
3
333.3
5
1
288.0
6+
2
421.5
Total
37
297.9
1 1
2
1
9
2
1 1 1
2
5
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
204 206 210 216 240 250 252 255 288 290 300 306 330 360 363 384 408 420 432 480
Number of Offenders by Pronounced Sentence Duration
27-CR-20-12646
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
A B C D E F G H I J K
2ND DEGREE MURDER, SUBD. 2(1), THAT RECEIVED AN AGGRAVATED DURATIONAL DEPARTURE: SENTENCED 2010-2019
Year
Sentenced
County Case Number
Total
Criminal
History
Points
Crimin
al
History
Score
Presump
tive
Duration
(months)
Pronounced
Confinement
(months)
Departure Reason 1 Departure Reason 2 Departure Reason 3
Departure
Reason 4
2012 Hennepin CR1115385 0.0 0 150.00 240.00
220 Crime more onerous than
usual offense
710 Shows
remorse/accepts
responsibility
0
0
2017 Aitkin CR161196 0.0 0 150.00 210.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
240 Crime committed in vic
home or zone of privacy
200 Position of authority over
the victim or trust
0
2010 Big Stone 06CR10156 0.0 0 150.00 210.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
240 Crime committed in vic
home or zone of privacy
220 Crime more onerous than
usual offense
0
2019 Dakota HACR18910 0.0 0
150.00 300.00
0 0
0 0
2019 Hennepin CR1823849 0.0 0 150.00 255.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
0
0 0
2018 Hennepin CR1811295 0.0 0 150.00 204.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
120 Particular cruelty 0 0
2019 Hennepin CR1818213 0.0 0 150.00 384.00
120 Particular cruelty
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
200 Position of authority over
the victim or trust
0
2015 Hennepin CR1525934 0.0 0 150.00 300.00
220 Crime more onerous than
usual offense
120 Particular cruelty
200 Position of authority over
the victim or trust
0
2018 Hennepin CR1621960 0.0 0 150.00 360.00
120 Particular cruelty
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
0 0
2019 Hennepin CR1717381 0.0 0 150.00 306.00
120 Particular cruelty
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
0 0
2013 Norman CR1358 0.0 0 150.00 240.00
225 Injury sustained by
vic(s)/psychological impact
245 Crime committed in
presence of children
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
200 Position of
authority over the
victim or trust
2016 Ramsey CR151070 0.0 0 150.00 300.00
120 Particular cruelty
225 Injury sustained by
vic(s)/psychological impact
255 Fled scene/Failed to
render aid
0
2013 Ramsey CR131455 0.0 0 150.00 330.00
120 Particular cruelty
460 Vic
recommendation/acquiesce
nce/vic family
240 Crime committed in vic
home or zone of privacy
220 Crime more
onerous than
usual offense
2019 Red Lake CR18137 0.0 0 150.00 216.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
200 Position of authority
over the victim or trust
0 0
2014 Scott CR1320740 0.0 0 150.00 240.00
240 Crime committed in vic
home or zone of privacy
245 Crime committed in
presence of children
0 0
2017 Stearns CR147529 0.0 0 150.00 240.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
200 Position of authority
over the victim or trust
0 0
2016 Washington CR144091 0.0 0 150.00 432.00
120 Particular cruelty
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
0 0
2015 Yellow Medicine CR15135 0.0 0 150.00 240.00
120 Particular cruelty
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
0 0
2010 Beltrami 04CR10447 1.0 1 165.00 206.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
200 Position of authority
over the victim or trust
0 0
2010 Hennepin 27CR0932901 1.0 1 165.00 408.00
768 No available
transcript/Dep info not
avail/Retired Judge
0 0 0
2017 Hennepin CR173946 1.0 1 165.00 480.00
120 Particular cruelty
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
240 Crime committed in vic
home or zone of privacy
0
2018 Hennepin CR1710794 1.5 1 165.00 204.00
251 Committed crime as part
of a grp of 3 or more
240 Crime committed in vic
home or zone of privacy
0 0
2014 Ramsey CR139183 2.0 2 180.00 240.00
120 Particular cruelty
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
240 Crime committed in vic
home or zone of privacy
200 Position of
authority over the
victim or trust
2019 Hennepin CR1815483 2.0 2 180.00 250.00
120 Particular cruelty 0 0 0
2018 Hennepin CR1725202 2.0 2 180.00 250.00
358 Dangerous offender
statute
0 0 0
2017 Pine CR15728 2.0 2 180.00 480.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
120 Particular cruelty 0 0
2012 Renville CR10445 2.0 2 180.00 240.00
120 Particular cruelty
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
0 0
2019 St. Louis DUCR1972 2.0 2 180.00 240.00
240 Crime committed in vic
home or zone of privacy
450 Recommended by
court services
0 0
2015 Wright CR144840 2.0 2 180.00 240.00
120 Particular cruelty 0 0 0
2018 Washington CR171965 2.5 2 180.00 300.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
240 Crime committed in vic
home or zone of privacy
200 Position of authority over
the victim or trust
0
2019 Wilkin CR18132 2.5 2 180.00 300.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
245 Crime committed in
presence of children
240 Crime committed in vic
home or zone of privacy
0
2012 Hennepin CR1213025 3.0 3 165.00 252.00
450 Recommended by court
services
220 Crime more onerous
than usual offense
0 0
2017 Beltrami CR162097 3.0 3 195.00 396.00
120 Particular cruelty
245 Crime committed in
presence of children
0 0
2019 Hennepin CR1910503 3.0 3 195.00 240.00
120 Particular cruelty
225 Injury sustained by
vic(s)/psychological impact
0 0
2012 Anoka CR113045 4.0 4 210.00
420.00
120 Particular cruelty 0 0 0
2019 Dakota HACR182046 4.0 4 210.00 290.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
460 Vic
recommendation/acquiesce
nce/vic family
120 Particular cruelty
510 Prevent
trauma to victim
from testifying
2019 Hennepin CR1730059 4.5 4 210.00 290.00
120 Particular cruelty
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
0 0
2018 Hennepin CR1718146 5.0 5 225.00 288.00
357 Career offender statute
358 Dangerous offender
statute
0 0
27-CR-20-12646
Filed in District Court
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41
42
43
A B C D E F G H I J K
2014 St. Louis DUCR142603 7.0 6 243.00 480.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
120 Particular cruelty
245 Crime committed in
presence of children
200 Position of
authority over the
victim or trust
2018 Anoka CR173290 7.5 6 243.00 363.00
358 Dangerous offender
statute
0 0 0
2017 Ramsey CR166907 11.0 6 243.00 228.00
110 Victim is particularly
vulnerable
251 Committed crime as
part of a grp of 3 or more
357 Career offender statute 0
27-CR-20-12646
Filed in District Court
State of Minnesota
6/25/2021 2:42 PM
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STATE OF MINNESOTA, Plaintiff, SENTENCING ORDER AND (Minnesota Supreme Court)

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