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Land Warfare Development Centre Army Doctrine Publication AC 71940

Land Operations

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Foreword

CGS Foreword to ADP Land Operations

ADP Land Operations is the British Army’s core doctrine. It provides the framework of

understanding for our approach to combat and to operations. It is the foundation for all of

our tactical doctrine. It recognises that the nature of warfare remains constant: it remains

visceral and violent, characterised by friction, in which the simplest things become difficult;

its outcomes are more often about the effects on peoples’ minds than they are about

physical effects; and it is always about politics. This new edition is necessary because the

character of conflict has evolved significantly due to the pervasiveness of information.

The context is complex and dynamic. We live and fight in a goldfish bowl. There are few secrets

any longer. We have access to multiple audiences and they have access to us. No longer is

there a clear distinction between war and peace. We live in an era of constant competition

and confrontation in which our adversaries exploit the grey area short of combat operations

to seek advantage. There is no boundary between what happens abroad and what happens

at home. Success is more likely to be achieved through non-military or non-lethal means, and

invariably it is the triumph of the narrative that is decisive, not necessarily the facts on the

ground. The battlefield is increasingly decentralized with a premium placed on the talent of low

level leadership and its understanding of the strategic context. And the expectations of military

restraint, as well as the complexity of the legal context, constrain commanders as never before.

The two central ideas in British Doctrine remain constant. The requirement for Mission

Command and the Manoeuvrist Approach has not changed, however the latter is focused

on the enemy – and in this complex and dynamic environment manoeuvre has to take

account of a much broader audience than simply the ‘enemy’. A new idea is therefore

required - this is called Integrated Action. It is a unifying doctrine that requires commanders

first to identify their outcome; second to study all of the audiences that are relevant to the

attainment of the outcome; third to analyse the effects that need to be imparted on the

relevant audience; before determining the best mix of capabilities, from soft through to

hard power, required to impart effect onto those audiences to achieve the outcome.

Put simply, doctrine is not just what is taught, it also captures a set of beliefs – the beliefs

that underpin how we practise our profession. ADP Land Operations should be read by all,

applied at the appropriate level, and used intelligently as the framework of understanding

to inform our Army’s development in this increasingly complex and dynamic context.

CGS

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Preface

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Land Operations is the primary source of doctrine for

UK land operations. Building on the foundations laid by higher-level North Atlantic

Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Defence doctrine, it provides the philosophy and

principles that guide land forces’ approach to operations. As the capstone doctrine

of UK land forces, its philosophy and principles inform the practices and procedures

in the Army Field Manual (AFM) series, handbooks and aides-memoire.

ADP Land Operations is required reading for all land force commanders from sub-unit upwards

and for staff officers working in the land environment. They must explain the doctrine to their

subordinates and so ensure that the whole land force operates in accordance with its principles.

It is also useful for allies, joint staffs, civil servants and civilians working alongside land forces.

Unless otherwise specified, all definitions used in ADP Land Operations are consistent with

those of NATO Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 06, NATO Glossary of Terms.

ADP Land Operations has three parts.

Part 1 establishes the context which informs the fundamentals of land doctrine.

Chapter 1 describes the nature of conflict, of the land environment and

of land forces, how the character of conflict changes, and key aspects of

contemporary conflict. It identifies important implications for land forces.

Chapter 2 examines the UK national context and describes the NATO framework

of operations and relationships within which operations are conducted.

Chapter 3 describes the three components of land forces’

Fighting Power: conceptual, moral and physical.

Part 2 describes the fundamentals of land doctrine.

Chapter 4 explains Integrated Action, a unifying doctrine, which guides

the orchestration and execution of operations whether the task is any

combination of fighting, engagement, security or support.

Chapter 5 describes the Manoeuvrist Approach, the British Army’s fighting

doctrine for the tactical level, specifically focused on the enemy.

Chapter 6 is concerned with Mission Command, the

command philosophy of the British Army.

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Part 3 introduces how operations are conducted. These subjects

are covered in greater detail in the AFM series.

Chapter 7 explains interoperability, how land forces organise for operations, and how

they support and are supported by other components.

Chapter 8 provides general guidance on how operations are planned and conducted

to achieve Integrated Action. It explains the tactical functions, operational art, various

doctrinal frameworks and provides a summary of the tactical activities that contribute to

Integrated Action.

Chapter 9 describes wider aspects of command (in the context of Mission Command),

the characteristics of the commander and staff, how operations are controlled and the

operations process.

Chapter 10 is concerned with sustainment of land operations, its philosophy and

principles and how it is planned and executed.

ADP Land Operations continues the evolution of modern land forces capstone doctrine,

from British Military Doctrine (1989) and its associated ﬁve volumes of ADPs, to ADP Land

Operations (2005) and ADP Operations (2010).

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Contents

FOREWORD i

PREFACE ii

PART 1 - CONTEXT OF OPERATIONS P1

CHAPTER 1 - NATURE AND CHARACTER OF CONFLICT 1-1

Introduction 1-1

The nature of conflict 1-2

The land environment 1-3

Land forces 1-4

The character of conflict 1-5

Implications of the nature and character of conflict 1-8

ANNEX 1A - Principles of war 1-11

CHAPTER 2 - NATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CONTEXT 2-1

Introduction 2-1

UK context 2-1

Campaign authority, legitimacy and legality 2-2

Military frameworks of operations 2-4

Operational relationships 2-8

Joint 2-8

Inter-agency 2-9

Multinational 2-10

Whole force approach 2-12

UK land forces contribution to strategy and joint operations 2-13

CHAPTER 3 - FIGHTING POWER 3-1

Introduction 3-1

The conceptual component 3-3

The moral component 3-8

The physical component 3-13

Readiness, deployability and recovery 3-16

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PART 2 - FUNDAMENTALS

CHAPTER 4 - INTEGRATED ACTION

Introduction

Understanding and the audience

Integration of actions to achieve desired outcomes

CHAPTER 5 - MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

Introduction

Requirements

Psychological impact of the Manoeuvrist Approach

Seizing and holding the initiative

Shaping understanding

Attacking will and cohesion

CHAPTER 6 - MISSION COMMAND

Introduction

Context

Nature of command

Mission Command

Principles of Mission Command

Application of Mission Command

PART 3 - CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 7 - ORGANISING FOR OPERATIONS

Introduction

Interoperabilty

Organisation of land forces

Relationships of land forces to other components and capabilities

The air component

The maritime component

The special forces component

The logistic component

Cyberspace

4-1

4-2

4-4

5-1

5-2

5-4

6-1

6-2

6-4

6-5

6-7

7-1

7-4

7-7

7-8

7-10

7-12

7-15

7-16

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CHAPTER 8 - ORCHESTRATING AND EXECUTING OPERATIONS

Introduction

Operational overview

The tactical functions

Operational art

Doctrinal frameworks

Tactical activities

ANNEX 8A - Basis of understanding

ANNEX 8B - Centre of gravity analysis

ANNEX 8C - Operational themes and types of operations

CHAPTER 9 - COMMANDING OPERATIONS

Introduction

Principles of command

The human components of command

Command relationships

Control of operations

The operations process

ANNEX 9 - UNDERSTANDING RISK

CHAPTER 10 - SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

Introduction

Terminology

Philosophy and principles

Functional groupings

Planning

Execution

INDEX

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

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8-3

8-10

8-12

8-17

8A-1

8B-1

8C-1

9-1

9-3

9-6

9-7

9-9

9A-1

10-1

10-2

10-4

10-5

10-7

11-1

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PART 1

Context of operations

Part 1 provides the context from which flow

the fundamentals of land doctrine. While the

nature of conflict endures, the character evolves.

Certain themes are likely to shape the character

of contemporary conflict into the early 2020s.

These include the continued proliferation and

speed of information, and the instability of a

world characterised by constant competition

between an array of actors, many of whom seek

to undermine the international rules-based order.

As well as through traditional tactics and strategies

in the physical domain, we and our opponents

increasingly use and contest the virtual domain,

through digital media and cyber. The information

age allows adversaries – unconstrained by Western

policy, ethical and legal codes – to exploit our

vulnerabilities in novel ways. It also means that

for UK land forces, and our allies and partners,

tactical success is increasingly difficult to achieve

in purely physical terms. Most importantly, it is not possible to translate tactical success into

desirable political outcomes without gaining favourable consensus among multiple audiences.

Part 1 – Context

 Nature and character of conﬂict

 National and operational context

 Fighting Power

Part 2 – Fundamentals

Integrated Action

Manoeuvrist Approach

Mission Command

Part 3 – Conduct of operations

Organising for operations

Orchestrating and executing

operations

Commanding operations

Sustaining operations

Chapter 1 describes the nature and character of conflict and their implications for land

forces. Chapter 2 summarises the national context and higher level conceptual frameworks,

common across NATO, which aid understanding of the land force contribution to operations.

Chapter 3 explains how the concept of Fighting Power is applied by UK land forces.

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ADP Land Ops

Chapter 1

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Nature and character

of conflict

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CHAPTER 1

Nature and character of conﬂict

Introduction

1-01. The nature and character of conflict are different.

The fundamental nature of conflict does not

change; it is adversarial, human and political.

Yet each conflict has a different character.

1-02. The timeless aspects of land conflict are the

nature of conflict, the land environment, and the

inherent attributes of armies. The character of

conflict changes continuously, as a consequence

of a number of factors, including the politics and

technology of the age, and each conflict’s unique

causes, participants, technology and geography.

Nature and character

of conﬂict

• Introduction

• Nature of conﬂict

• Land environment

• Land forces

• Character of conﬂict

• Implications

• Annex

• Principles of War

When the UK is a participant, our particular political, economic, geographic

and historical position becomes a factor in the character of the conflict that we

experience. Because each conflict is unique, a single description of the character

of contemporary conflict is not possible. But it is important to understand the

factors that influence character, and the general implications of those factors.

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and

commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking;

neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

Carl von Clausewitz

1-03. The concept of the nature and character of conflict informs our approach

to doctrine, force design, education and training. Deductions from the

nature of conflict inform enduring principles and ideas, while those from the

character of conflict allow us to prepare appropriately for the requirements of

contemporary operations. It is essential to draw on both in the right balance.

1-04. This chapter first describes the enduring nature of conflict, the land environment and

armies. It then examines how the character of contemporary conflict is affected by

three particular aspects: the way people communicate; the proliferation and power of

weapons; and evolving strategies and tactics. It concludes with the implications of the

nature and character of conflict for land forces, and, in Annex 1A, the Principles of War.

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The nature of conflict

Unless you know the actual circumstances of war, its nature and its relation to other things,

you will not know the laws of war, or how to direct war and how to win victory.

Mao Tse Tung

1-05. Whether the belligerents are states or other entities, all armed conflict is essentially

adversarial, human (involving friction, uncertainty, violence and stress) and political.

1-06. Conflict is a reciprocal contest of will, in which multiple adversaries and

actors act and react to each other, often unpredictably, in a struggle to succeed.

Adversaries seek constantly to mitigate their own weaknesses, avoid opponents’

strengths, and focus instead on aligning their strengths against weaknesses.

1-07. As human dynamics lie at the heart of all conflict, it follows that the nature of conflict

will continue to be influenced by and represent the entire spectrum of human behaviour,

emotion and capability. As a human activity, it cannot be reduced to scientific templates

and principles, but relies on initiative, enterprise and intelligence. Conflict will always

be a violent contest between humans, marked by friction, uncertainty, chaos, violence,

danger and stress, affecting the participants’ will to fight and function. As social animals

who respond to leadership and friendship, we tend to organise ourselves to fight in

hierarchical groups. Our physiology limits what we can do physically; we cannot go

for long without food, sleep and shelter, for example. Our psychology means that our

decisions and behaviour are informed by our perceptions of what is happening. These

subjective perceptions contribute to the enduring unpredictability of conflict on land.

a. Friction frustrates action; makes the simple difficult; and the difficult seemingly

impossible. Friction may be mental, perhaps caused by indecision, or physical, for

example caused by the effects of violence. While friction can be imposed upon

opponents with great effect, it can also be imposed on us by an adversary or the

environment, or be self-induced, for example by a poor plan, process or organisational

structure.

b. No matter how much information there is in conflict, a ‘fog of war’ that can lead

to uncertainty and chaos will always descend. Chaos might be deliberately used by

enemies, and presents opportunities for the bold to seize.

c. The threat or use of violence is the means by which one side in armed conflict

ultimately seeks to impose their will upon the other. Violence can result in bloodshed,

destruction and human suffering. Applying appropriate violence at the right time and

place can be decisive.

d. Combat can be horrific, and violence, danger, stress, fear, exhaustion, isolation and

privation, or their prospect, adversely affect the will of all those involved. Success in

battle is as often decided by the psychological ability of each side to withstand these

shocks as it is by physical results.

1-08. The use or threat of violence to achieve political objectives has endured through

the ages. Clausewitz’s observation that “war is not merely an act of policy but a true

political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means”

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remains relevant today. Confrontation and conflict involve persistent political competition

and disagreement, which from time to time are manifested in armed violence; all

conflicts are blends of ‘battlefield’ and ‘non-battlefield’ engagements. Conflict is a

means to an end, not an end in itself. The initiation, continuance and termination of

conflict are all political decisions, and so the employment of the military instrument

of power ought to be in pursuit of political objectives. The pervasive nature of politics

in conflict shapes the manner in which operations are conducted by land forces.

The land environment

1-09. The land environment has human, information and physical aspects. Most people live

in towns, cities and villages, and increasingly in coastal regions. There are very few areas

in which no people live; even then, most apparently unpopulated space is a resource

that supports the population in some way. People exist in linguistic, cultural, social, and

political groups with specific identities, usually associated with particular territories.

These territories typically take the form of states, or regions within or between them.

1-10. The significance of territory is, therefore, associated with group identity

and access to resources; it is often rooted in deep cultural and historical

factors as well as in governments’ obligations to provide security for

their people. Competition for territory and resources, and issues such as

injustice and lack of representation are often at the root of conflict.

1-11. Because of its significance, the physical capture and occupation of territory, or the credible

threat to do so, has often been regarded as decisive. But, the ultimate decision is political

rather than physical; people have to decide whether or not to accept the facts on the

ground. Land forces, by dint of their presence among and proximity to the people, provide

an important and usually necessary contribution to achieving these political outcomes.

1-12. The land environment is also shaped by the way that information is exchanged

between individuals, tribes, ethnic and interest groups, and countries. This

communication can be verbal, directly between people, through radio, television,

and online. Human interaction is expanding and accelerating as information flows

in the virtual domain increase. In the new information landscape, any digitally

connected person has the ability to shape public understanding of and consensus for

(or against) a conflict, or be influenced by other actors who exploit these means.

1-13. Terrain in the land environment is varied and complex, with open grassland, cultivated

land, forests, mountains, deserts, jungles, rivers, swamps, urban and littoral areas.

Each creates constraints and freedoms, placing different demands on the people and

equipment that operate within them. Terrain can block or enable communication,

provide cover from detection or attack, and obstruct or enable movement. Movement

on land is impeded by obstacles that land forces must overcome. Land forces have

to be highly adaptable and resilient to operate in these different conditions.

1-14. The land itself can also be altered by human activity. Obstacles can be cleared and

roads built to enable access. Globally, the phenomenon of urbanisation is creating

physically, culturally and institutionally complex cities that are challenging for military

forces operating in them. In the littoral, the complexities of the urban environment for

land forces are amplified. Other strategic trends, including competition for resources,

economic inequality and climate change continue to dictate where and how people live.

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1-15. Climate accentuates the demands of terrain. It also affects visibility,

movement and communication. Climate can bring danger and threaten our

very survival, but it also brings opportunities that sustain life and provide

protection. Night operations can provide cover and the element of surprise,

but strain the ability to retain effective command and control.

Land forces

1-16. The capability of armed forces is often described using the concept of Fighting

Power. Fighting Power consists of three components: conceptual (the ideas behind

how to operate and fight); moral (the ability to get people to operate and fight);

and physical (the means to operate and fight). Land, maritime and air forces all

have Fighting Power, but they have different, yet complementary attributes.

1-17. The nature of conflict and the land environment are timelessly relevant to all land

forces. They inform the concept of land power, and the attributes of land forces

that inform doctrine and force design. Building on these attributes, a land force

needs certain qualities if it is to be able to exercise land power effectively.

1-18. Military power is mainly divided into complementary

maritime, land, air and space power, alongside cyber

Land power

and information capabilities. Land power is the

The ability to exert

ability to exert control within the land environment

control within the land

and to influence the behaviour of actors and the

environment and to

course of events. Air and maritime power can be

inﬂuence the behaviour

applied to the land, but cannot fully control the

of actors and the course

land; this can only be done from within the land

environment by land forces (often with the essential

of events.

support of maritime, air and space power).

1-19. All land forces, regular or irregular, have four inherent attributes. Each attribute has

advantages that can be used, but also disadvantages that have to be avoided or mitigated.

a. The primary attribute of any land force is its people. Land conflict is a human activity,

between individuals and groups of individuals. Each of these participants has their

own perceptions and interpretations of the environment. Land forces, therefore,

are complex organisations, requiring moral as well as structural cohesion and deep

hierarchies of command. They can be difficult to direct, so decentralised command

systems tend to work best. Large numbers of people can also be expensive and lead to

competition with other sectors of society requiring skilled personnel. Land forces are

particularly reliant on high quality leadership, education and training at all levels.

b. Land forces’ presence on the ground means that they operate in close proximity

to people and terrain. Soldiers are able to gain access to people and communicate

directly with them. This gives them the potential to develop detailed understanding of

the human, information and physical aspects of the environment. They can get close

enough to distinguish between different people and groups, adjusting their approach

accordingly. They present a particular kind of threat to adversaries, and are uniquely

able to reassure and secure neutral and friendly people. Land forces can manoeuvre

over ground, or via air or water, to take physical possession of terrain, or they can

physically defend or secure it. The presence of land forces, therefore, is often essential

for success which may only be achievable by fighting. The same presence, however,

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can also disturb local relationships, cause people to feel threatened, and become a

focus for resistance to which land forces are uniquely vulnerable. Sometimes this threat

is mitigated by small or discreet deployments that contribute out of proportion to their

size. To operate effectively, land forces must be able to understand and cooperate with

local actors.

c. The attribute of persistence, the capacity of land forces to extend their presence

in an area for long periods of time, gives land forces the potential to deepen their

understanding of the local context, and develop engagement, control and influence.

Presence and persistence can be highly significant, if matched by political commitment.

Persistent engagement requires sustainment and protection commensurate with the

threats, the distance of the task from the home base and its duration.

d. Land forces have inherent versatility because they consist largely of organised groups

that can relatively easily conduct a very wide range of military and non-military tasks.

So even when optimised for warfighting, land forces can be adapted to support, for

example, stability and non-conflict activities such as humanitarian assistance and

disaster relief.

1-20. Although all land forces display these attributes, it does not follow that they are all

effective on operations. To be effective, land (as well as maritime and air) forces require

certain other qualities including: balance between their human and physical aspects; the

ability to start operations at the appropriate time and place and to continue for as long

as the operation demands; and the right level of force. The key quality which alters

these properties so they are relevant in new and changing situations is adaptability.

1-21. Although land forces are inherently versatile, they must be adaptable to deal with

new and changing situations. Future conflict cannot be predicted accurately, so land

forces must prepare for the most complex and demanding operations but be able

to adapt rapidly to specific operational requirements. Having adjusted to deal with

the new situation, the force must adapt during conflict. Adversaries and enemies

seek to deceive and surprise us, and themselves adapt: if we are to succeed we must

adapt more quickly than they do. Adaptability is explained further in Chapter 3.

The character of conflict

1-22. No two conflicts are the same and none retains a fixed character. Each is the

product of its era and of the particular conditions which apply at the time. The ever-

changing character of conflict is influenced by global political, economic, social, and

technological factors. Significant developments can cause marked changes to the

general character of conflict. Examples include the growth of democracy and the

invention of mass manufacturing. But the most significant impact has often been from

changes in technology, such as gunpowder, the internal combustion engine, wireless

communications, powered flight, nuclear weapons, computers and the Internet.

1-23. In addition, the goals of belligerents, their relative strengths and popular

support, as well as their tactics and strategies, will always differ and so give

each conflict its own unique character. Further, the character of any given

conflict does not remain constant; as a contest of wills, conflicts change over

their duration. Adversaries constantly adapt their tactics and strategies to

gain advantage, whilst technologies evolve and new threats emerge.

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No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of

future conflict. The key is to not be so far off the mark that it becomes impossible to adjust

once that character is revealed.

Professor Sir Michael Howard

1-24. It is not possible to predict the exact character of contemporary conflict, because it is

constantly changing and each conflict is unique and evolves in its own way. Nevertheless,

certain trends and developments are apparent,1 of which global connectivity and the

accelerating flow of information are currently the most important. Although each

conflict must be examined in its own right, three inter-related aspects of contemporary

conflict are clear: the way in which people communicate; the proliferation and

ever-increasing power of physical weapons; and evolving strategies and tactics.

Initially, the Israeli military response to Hezballah [in 2006] was widely seen as justified, but

as time progressed and Hezballah successfully manipulated print, broadcast, and online

media, the world increasingly saw images of civilian casualties (both doctored and real)

and the tide of public opinion turned. There was a widespread sentiment regarding Israel’s

“disproportionate response,” and Israel was not successful in turning this tide.

United States Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis

Decade of War, Volume 1. Enduring lessons from the past decade of operations (2012)

1-25. Rapid and broad communication of messages and ideas flow across physical boundaries

through the virtual domain, energising the causes for which people fight. Adversaries

can develop and exploit recruitment, manipulation, mobilisation and targeting

opportunities, while promoting their own narratives of events, in competition with our

own. Our adversaries can share information and adapt more quickly than in the past.

1-26. Because of the proliferation of information, military activity is often immediately

visible to a local and global audience. The local audience includes enemies, adversaries

and a range of actors, from allies and partners to the local population. The global

audience is unbounded. Each of these groups interprets our activity through their

own lens, and each is influenced by others. Many actors are adept at presenting

military activity to the audience, magnifying, mitigating or altering it to influence

observers’ understanding of what actually happened. This is critically important

to us, our allies and adversaries, because the audience judges whether military

action achieves its political objectives. The impact of physical military activity can

have more immediate, wide-ranging consequences than in the past, for example

more quickly deterring, demoralising or stiffening the resolve of other actors.

1-27. As we and other actors become more and more reliant on sophisticated information

services, so the threat of cyber attack increases. This novel threat has the potential to

disrupt our information services and any systems that rely on electronic control systems.

1 DCDC’s Global Strategic Trends and the Army’s Agile Warrior programme provide detailed analysis of likely future trends.

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1-28. As our military operations become more visible, and come under greater domestic

and international scrutiny and criticism, there is a higher expectation of military

restraint compared with the past. This often leads to legal and policy constraints on

our use of force additional to the requirements of international law. Many of our

actual and potential adversaries do not recognise international law, and do not have

the same constraints. They are able to exploit this situation to their advantage by,

for example, concealing themselves in the population, using tactics and weapons

not available to us, or causing us to be restricted by our own (legitimate) rules.

All planning, particularly strategic planning, must pay attention to the character of

contemporary warfare.

Carl von Clausewitz

1-29. The power of physical weapons continues to increase, and these weapons are

often available to irregular forces. Chemical weapons are used and biological,

nuclear and radiological weapons remain a threat. Fires and explosives continue

to dominate and shape the tactical battlespace, whether, for example, delivered

by long range rocket systems or in the form of improvised explosive devices.

These are what destroy things and kill and injure people; therefore they have the

greatest resonance in the eyes of the participants and observers of conflict.

1-30. Air power remains a critical factor in the successful application of land power,

and space capability is increasingly important. Aircraft are a very powerful

and effective means of delivering fires, and they are a key contributor to

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and sustainment. Those states

able to use space have particular strengths in ISR and communications.

1-31. The proliferation of commercially available technology means that secure

communications, cyber capabilities, and surveillance systems including unmanned

air systems are easily acquired or improvised, even by irregular forces.

1-32. The recent period has seen the emergence of the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’.

This describes strategies that are not new, but which are increasingly employed by

state and non-state actors. Potential adversaries are demonstrating the will and

capability to undermine Western operational capability, resolve and legitimacy

by blending conventional and unconventional forms of conflict, using both

attributable and non-attributable methods. These include posturing, provocation

and persuasion in the physical and virtual domains; subversion; and economic

and cyber warfare, with or without the employment of conventional military

forces. This ‘hybrid’ threat to the international rules-based order can be applied

in a way that remains below formal Western military response thresholds.

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Implications of the nature and character of conflict

(In spite of…changes), the task of the soldier in the front line remains as it has always

been, and the soldierly virtues and skills he needs remain remarkably unchanged. He must

be skilled in the use of his weapons and of ground; he must be alert, steadfast and brave,

and must be able to endure hardship of every kind. He must be prepared to stay where he

is or to move forward in the face of firepower…risking wounds or death, and himself be

prepared to kill.

Field Marshal Car ver

1-33. Certain implications for UK land forces and doctrine can be

derived from the land environment, the nature and character

of conflict and the attributes inherent in land forces.

1-34. There are four functions of Land Power – to fight, engage, secure and support. They draw

on the attributes of Land Forces and can be exercised independently or in combinations.

a. The fundamental capability of land forces is to

ﬁght in the most demanding

circumstances. This capability underpins the other three functions; gives credibility

to deterrence, coercion and containment and other strategies; and is essential for

interventions and territorial defence.

b. Land forces can

engage with a range of actors and audiences, directly and indirectly,

contributing to understanding, influence and conflict prevention.

c. Land forces are particularly able to secure and protect people and places persistently

in the land environment. This includes providing security in support of inter-agency

stabilisation and reconstruction.

d. Land forces can

support and assist state and non-state institutions. They can provide

mass and presence as well as specialist capabilities.

1-35. In a single conflict environment, land forces may simultaneously perform all four

functions (fight, engage, secure, support), integrating different types of operation. For

example, while one element of the force is conducting high intensity combat operations,

others may be engaged in humanitarian relief, counter-insurgency or capacity building.

Each type of operation may also contain the full range of tactical activities – offensive,

defensive, enabling and stability. The relationship between types of operations, activities

and conflict can be visualised as a mosaic of conflict, formed of small pieces, all

of which are required to see the full picture. Each piece of the mosaic represents a

tactical activity or group of activities. This is explained in full in paras 2-16 to 2-18.

1-36. Land conflict today requires a force and soldiers with high contemporary skills. Conflict

involves new technologies, emerging threats, many potential operating environments,

and adversaries and enemies who seek to deceive and surprise us. Within the land

force, a broad range of skills are required, from highly sophisticated technical and cyber

knowledge to proficiency in languages and psychology, to individual physical robustness.

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1-37. Land forces require highly effective leadership. Morale, will, adaptation and

the ability to cooperate with others are all essential requirements of land

forces, and are given strength by leadership throughout the hierarchy and

in all elements of the force. Commanders must inspire confidence and be

decisive and resilient in the face of adversity, judicious and flexible.

We had to arrange their minds in order of battle, just as carefully and as formally as other

officers arranged their bodies; and not only our own men’s minds, though them first; the

minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them; and thirdly, the mind of the nation

supporting us from behind the firing line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the

verdict, and the neutrals looking on.

TE Lawrence

1-38. As the audience’s judgement is an increasingly significant factor in contemporary

conflict, operations must be designed and conducted accordingly. No conflict has a purely

military solution, and overall success requires favourable consensus among a diverse

audience. How we say, how we behave and what we do, influence how we are seen

must be consistent and appropriate. At the margin, a neutral or nearly neutral outcome

of military action can be turned into a success or a failure by how it is perceived.

Loss of hope rather than loss of life is the factor that really decides wars, battles and even

the smallest combats. The all time experience of warfare shows that when men reach the

point where they see, or feel, that further effort and sacrifice can do no more than delay

the end, they commonly lose the will to spin it out, and bow to the inevitable.

BH Liddell Hart

1-39. Because military force is used to achieve political outcomes, it should be consciously

aimed at altering people’s behaviour. The application and threat of force, and the

gaining and retention of physical objectives should be used to affect people’s decision

making in ways consistent with our goals. For this reason, in combat physical destruction

and damage is used to achieve two things: an immediate local reduction in enemy

capability; and more importantly, wider damage to the enemy’s will and cohesion.

The most efficient and often most effective way to achieve this is by creating and

attacking weaknesses to demoralise and disintegrate the enemy, rather than attacking

strength head-on to destroy as much equipment, manpower and materiel as possible.

1-40. As well as fighting and providing security, land forces are in a position to

communicate directly with individuals and groups involved in a conflict.

To change or maintain the behaviour of these actors, land forces should

integrate the use of force with communications in a mutually reinforcing

way. In turn, to achieve political outcomes, they must integrate their activity

with that of the diplomatic and economic instruments of power.

1-41. The particular nature of friction in land conflict, coupled with the necessary organisation

of land forces, has implications for the way in which command is best conducted.

There are a number of methods, but decentralised command is highly effective in

hierarchical land forces operating in a context of friction, uncertainty and chaos. It

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empowers leaders down to the lowest level, enabling subordinate commanders to

rapidly identify and exploit opportunities to achieve their commander’s intent.

1-42. If operations are to be effective, land forces must develop a good understanding

of the important aspects of the operating environment. This requires them

to comprehend the relevant human, information and physical aspects of a

given situation. It is particularly important to understand how to influence and

assess behaviour, and how the audience is likely to perceive our actions.

1-43. Land forces must develop interoperability at a number of levels. Within the force,

different specialist branches must cooperate in the field. The land force must also

cooperate with maritime and air forces, as well as with allies and other agencies.

1-44. It is essential that forces are held at the appropriate readiness so that they

can be prepared appropriately and applied at the right time and place.

1-45. The relative ease with which our activities can be observed, commented on

and interpreted by multiple audiences makes previous operational and non-

operational distinctions less valid. Even relatively minor armed conflicts have

potentially global consequences, for example through diaspora of people with

common identities or transnational economic dependencies. Actions and challenges

at home can have repercussions for deployed forces. Threats overseas can rapidly

migrate to the home base, requiring increased focus by land forces on homeland

resilience and security tasks in support of the civil authority. Moreover, how our

armed forces are perceived when they conduct ‘non-operational’ activity, for example,

training or recruiting, is increasingly likely to influence the operational audience.

The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.

Sun Tzu

1-46. Since the effects of even distant conflicts have consequences domestically and

for the international rules-based order, there is a strategic imperative for land

forces to contribute to improved security in relevant parts of the world. Military

power, complementary to other instruments of state power, can contribute

through early and persistent engagement overseas, capacity building of local

security forces, and by deterrence. In doing so, land forces can develop the

understanding, relationships and outlook necessary should conflict occur.

1-47. Above all, as each of these implications imply, the general character of conflict is

changing rapidly, and the conflicts in which we might be involved are many and

varied, it follows that to be effective, our land forces must be highly adaptable.

Principles of War

1-48. Throughout history, many military thinkers have proposed enduring Principles

of War, based on their assessment of the nature of warfare. These were

intended as guidelines to warfighting. Some thinkers thought that these could

be followed as if they were scientific rules, but the longstanding view now is that

effective land operations, deeply human as they are, are as much of an art as a

science. It follows that there are no rules that guarantee military success, only

guidelines. Despite the changes in the character of conflict, the UK’s Principles

of War remain highly relevant. They are listed and explained at Annex 1A.

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1-10 |1-10 |

ANNEX 1A

Principles of War

• The Principles of War provide comprehensive considerations at all levels

for planning and executing campaigns and operations. They are not absolute

or prescriptive, but provide a foundation for adversary-focused military activity and

doctrine. With the exception of the master principle, which is placed ﬁrst, the relative

importance of each may vary according to context, and their application according to

judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation. While the UK’s Principles of

War are consistent with the Principles of Operations applied by NATO, there are some

differences. Allied Joint Publication 01 Allied Joint Doctrine lists the principles of Allied

joint and multinational operations.

• Selection and maintenance of the aim. Selection and maintenance of the aim

is the master Principle of War. When conducting military operations, at every level,

it is essential to select and deﬁne the aim clearly. The aim provides a focus for

coordinated effort and a reference point against which to assess progress. A hierarchy

of aims at different levels is required. There should be a strategic aim supported by

a number of operational aims, themselves supported by an array of tactical aims

which are steps on the path towards that strategic aim. Following this principle

prevents unnecessary activity and conserves resources. The overall aim must pervade

subordinate operations so that they contribute to achieving the desired outcome.

In practice, uncertainty, political reality and insufﬁcient initial understanding of a

situation frequently conspire against setting an unambiguous aim from the outset.

Nevertheless, military commanders have an obligation to their subordinates, partners,

allies and political leaders to deﬁne a mission appropriate to their level of command,

based on their detailed understanding of the operational requirement and context. This

same understanding will also avoid blinkered rigidity. It also enables, through Mission

Command, identiﬁcation of when a fresh aim is required as well as, exploitation of

success and adaptation to the ever evolving environment. The maintenance of the aim

ensures that the whole force remains focused on the outcome and every subordinate

on their commander’s intent.

• Maintenance of morale. Morale is a positive state of mind – a will to win – which

depends on strong leadership. It consists of ﬁghting spirit, moral cohesion, discipline,

comradeship, pride in self and unit, conﬁdence in equipment and sustainment, and

a ﬁrm spiritual foundation. High morale enables a land force to ﬁght offensively and

overcome the privations of conﬂict, not only for a single battle or engagement, but for

a campaign. It can inspire an army from the highest to the lowest ranks. Success in land

operations depends as much on moral factors as physical ones.

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• Offensive action. It is through offensive action that a commander seeks to gain

advantage, sustain momentum and seize and retain the initiative. As it is an active

rather than passive approach, it is the primary means open to a commander to

inﬂuence the outcome of a campaign or a battle. Defensive operations that do not

include offensive action are often unsuccessful and rarely tactically decisive. Effective

offensive action relies on high morale and is often a way of gaining ascendancy over

the enemy and the conﬁdence of allies and partners.

• Security. An appropriate degree of physical security and information denial is essential

to all military operations. Security enables (and is in turn enhanced by) surprise and

deception, and is essential in preserving the capability of the force; ultimately it helps

to provide freedom of action. It involves the judicious management of risk, because in

conﬂict it is not possible to protect everything all of the time.

• Surprise. Surprise is a potent psychological weapon, causing shock through

unexpected action in time, space and method. Enabled by security, surprise involves

using secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity or tempo to confuse,

paralyse or disrupt effective decision-making, and undermine an adversary’s cohesion

and morale. Surprising an adversary is a signiﬁcant way of seizing the initiative and

must be central to the design of all combat operations. Surprise is by nature transient,

as shock and confusion recede over time, so its effects should be exploited rapidly and

aggressively. Commanders should anticipate the effects of being surprised themselves

and make appropriate plans to safeguard their freedom of action.

• Concentration of force. Concentration of force requires the decisive, synchronised

application of effort and resource at the critical point in time and space to achieve the

commander’s intent. The nature of the force concentrated will depend on the mission

and will include elements of manoeuvre, ﬁres, information activities and capacity

building. The main effort describes the activity where a commander assigns the

greatest concentration of force. Commanders must accept that concentration of force

on the main effort can, however, create vulnerabilities and will entail economy of effort

elsewhere.

• Economy of Effort. The consequence of concentration of force is economy of effort.

It is impossible to be strong everywhere, so if decisive strength is to be concentrated

at the critical time and place there must be no wasteful expenditure of effort where it

cannot signiﬁcantly affect the issue.

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• Flexibility. Flexibility is the ability to change rapidly, appropriately and effectively

to new circumstances. It comprises the versatility, responsiveness, resilience and

adaptability of the whole force. Versatility is the physical and structural ability to

perform many functions. Responsiveness is a measure of speed of action, reaction and

of how quickly the initiative can be seized or regained. Resilience is the degree to which

people and their equipment remain effective under arduous conditions or in the face of

hostile action. Adaptability embraces the need to learn quickly, to adjust to changes in

a dynamic situation, and to amend plans that, in the light of experience, seem unlikely

to lead to a suitable outcome.

• Cooperation. Military operations are joint enterprises. Their success requires

cooperation between all participants. These include individuals and groups of actors

who may be military or civilian, governmental or non-governmental, national, allied

or from host nations. Within the land force, the cooperation of all arms in combined

arms forces is critical. Cooperation is best engendered through shared training,

which develops interoperability, team spirit and cohesion. It relies upon: mutual trust

and goodwill; unity of purpose, if not command; and common understanding of

responsibilities, capabilities and limitations.

• Sustainability. Sustainability is the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of

combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives without culmination.

Fighting Power, freedom of action and operational success rest on the sustainability

of the force through every stage of a campaign, from force preparation through to

redeployment and recuperation. A rigorous assessment of logistic realities is essential to

operational planning; indeed, it is often the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility of

an operational choice.

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ADP Land Ops

Chapter 2

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National and operational

context

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CHAPTER 2

National and operational context

Introduction

2-01. Chapter 2 expands on the UK national context, introduces the important

concepts of campaign authority, legitimacy and legality, and describes the North

Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) framework of operations and relationships

within which operations are conducted. It concludes with a summary of

the contribution of UK land forces to strategy and joint operations.

UK context

2-02. The UK is a liberal democracy, an island nation in Europe, and a member of

many international political, economic and security-orientated organisations.

Notably, from a security perspective, the UK is a permanent member of the

United Nations Security Council and a member of NATO. Relatively small in size

and population, the UK has global economic, social and political responsibilities,

including for UK dependencies and citizens. Security threats include: terrorism,

cyber attack, international military conflict and the re-emergence of state based

threats, overseas instability, environmental, health and natural hazards.

2-03. In tackling these challenges, the UK government employs three instruments

of power: diplomatic, economic and military, all underpinned by information.

The military instrument can be costly and is relatively small; its resilience

depends on its ability to regenerate; and it is increasingly reliant on global

partners rather than on a national, strategic industrial base.

2-04. These geopolitical factors, as well as deductions from the nature and character of

conflict, inform the ways in which UK land forces approach and conduct operations.

a. UK land operations at any scale are almost always multinational, reflecting

relationships with allies and partners, and mitigating the relatively small size of our

land forces. Although capable of acting independently, alliances and partnerships are

fundamental to our approach to defence and security. Collective security is promoted

primarily, but not exclusively, through NATO and enduring bilateral relationships with,

for example, the United States and France. UK land doctrine, therefore, must be

coherent with NATO’s, with exceptions made clear.

b. The UK, like any country, cannot afford to lose the force. A warfighting division

constitutes the centre of gravity of the UK’s land forces. We must seek to apply

strength against vulnerabilities, always protecting the will and cohesion of the force.

c. UK land forces must be ready to deal with a wide variety of threats and conflict

situations. They must be able to adapt rapidly to new challenges, while supporting

Government strategy to prevent conflict and instability. They must be maintained

Note that NATO views information as a separate instrument of power.

See Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01, Allied Joint Doctrine.

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at the right level of competence and readiness. Major operations will be overseas

and almost always multinational. UK land forces must be effective operating within

formations larger than they possess, requiring understanding of and influence within

higher level allied formations.

Campaign authority, legitimacy and legality

2-05. UK Armed Forces are subject to political direction, democratic oversight,

and national and international law. For military actions to be effective in this

context, they must be legitimate and lawful, and be perceived as such.

2-06. Campaign authority is the authority established by international forces, agencies

and organisations within a given situation. It comprises four interdependent factors:

the perceived legitimacy of the mandate; the manner in which those exercising the

mandate conduct themselves, individually and collectively; the extent to which factions,

local populations and others consent to, comply with, or resist the authority of those

executing the mandate; and the extent to which the audience’s expectations are

met by those executing the mandate. Campaign authority is not simply granted to

the mission, but has to be earned and maintained. Without campaign authority, it is

difficult, if not impossible, to convert military success into desired political outcomes.

2-07.

Legitimacy encompasses the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical propriety

of the conduct of military forces. As the justification for using force, and the manner

in which it is applied, legitimacy has collective and individual aspects, both of which

directly affect the utility of force. Legitimacy is based upon inter-related subjective

factors, such as the perceptions and beliefs of audiences, and objective legal matters.

For example, operations are increasingly subject to judicial oversight, reflecting political

responses to domestic expectations, themselves informed by regulated and unregulated

media reporting of military activities. When preparing for and conducting operations,

land forces must understand how their actions may be perceived by a global as well as a

domestic and local audience, ensuring that they act lawfully and ethically at all times.

2-08. The most fundamental and enduring requirement for campaign authority and legitimacy

is that our actions are lawful. The increasing incorporation of evolving Western civilian

norms into our legal system, resulting in increased judicial scrutiny of military conduct,

makes the legal dimension of operations both complex and potentially constraining.

The legal aspects described below are only an introduction to this important subject,

which requires focused study and training prior to and during operations

a. Law and policy are different. Sometimes, constraints are imposed on commanders as

matters of policy, rather than law. Examples of these are rules of engagement (ROE),

and directives for targeting and the handling of captured personnel, which may restrict

military activity even though the law may be more permissive.

b. UK forces, whether overseas or in the UK, operate within a legal framework. All

service personnel, wherever they serve, are subject to Service lawas provided by the

Armed Forces Act 2006. However, in the UK, civilian authorities may exercise primacy.

Soldiers are held legally accountable through the Service Justice System for offences

covered by the Armed Forces Act 2006, irrespective of where the offence is committed.

3 See Joint Service Publication (JSP) 381, Aide-Memoire on the Law of Armed Conﬂict, JSP 383, Joint Service Manual

of the Law of Armed Conﬂict, and JSP 398 United Kingdom Manual of National Rules of Engagement.

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When deployed, various international laws may also apply, including host nation law

and international human rights law. To these may be added rights and obligations

placed on the UK under a United Nations Security Resolution or bilateral/multilateral

agreements such as status of forces agreements, technical arrangements and

memoranda of understanding. On multinational operations, other nations’ forces may

not all be subject to the same legal framework – their applicable domestic laws, for

example, are likely to be different. The legal framework will vary between operations

and at different times and places within a campaign as it progresses.

c. Law governs the use of force in a number of ways. It regulates when states can

resort to using force, for example by sending their troops onto the sovereign territory

of another state. It also establishes how force can be lawfully used once those troops

have been deployed, whether in an armed conflict, on a peacekeeping mission or other

operation. It is important to distinguish between laws that regulate how a state may

act, and those that govern the conduct of individuals and units. Commanders at all

levels are responsible for ensuring that forces under their command operate within the

law. At the same time, each individual remains ultimately responsible in law for their

actions.

Despite the codification of much customary law into treaty form during the last one

hundred years, four fundamental principles still underlie the law of armed conflict. These

are military necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality. The law of armed conflict

is consistent with the economic and efficient use of force. It is intended to minimize the

suffering caused by armed conflict rather than impede military efficiency.

JSP 383 The Joint Ser vice Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict

d. Military operations must comply with the underpinning principles of the law of

armed conflict – military necessity, humanity, distinction and proportionality – so that

they are consistent with the wider ethical considerations from which the law is derived.

As well as governing the use of force, the law of armed conflict also, for example,

provides protections and rights for captured persons and prohibits acts of deception

that amount to perfidy. The basic principles of the law of armed conflict are described

in JSP 383 and summarised below:

(1) Military necessity requires that only the necessary amount of armed force

is applied. This force is controlled, lawful and directed towards achieving the

complete or partial submission of an enemy at the earliest possible moment, and

with the minimum expenditure of life and resources.

(2) The principle of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction

not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.

Also prohibited is the use of weapons, means and methods of warfare of a nature

that cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.

(3) The principle of distinction demands that land forces distinguish between

enemy forces and non-combatants. Non-combatants include civilians and certain

individuals within an enemy force, most notably, for example, medical and

JSP 398 Annex A. 4

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religious personnel. Any intentional direct attack against the civilian population or

civilian objects is prohibited and may amount to a war crime.

(4) Armed forces only use force in proportionality to the military end sought. What

is proportionate can only be judged in the particular prevailing circumstances at

the time. This judgement requires careful deliberation and will be informed at all

stages by considerations of the above three principles by individuals throughout

the chain of command.

e. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are commanders’ directives – in other words policy and

operational guidance – sitting within the legal framework rather than law themselves.

They are expressed as permissions and prohibitions which govern where armed forces

can go, what they can do and, to an extent, how and when certain actions can be

carried out. They are designed to ensure that action taken by UK forces is lawful and

consistent with government policy. They are also used to enhance operational security,

avoid fratricide and to avoid counter-productive effects which could destabilise a

campaign. ROE do not by themselves guarantee the lawfulness of action; it remains

the individual’s responsibility in law to ensure that any use of force is lawful. ROE do

not restrict the inherent and inalienable right of an individual to act in self-defence.

Military frameworks of operations

2-09. Land forces, as a component of the military instrument of power, conduct operations

within a framework that describe the levels and types of operations. This allows them

to harmonise their contribution to alliance, coalition, national and defence objectives.

2-10. The framework of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare are used to

command, categorise and define military activity. The structure and discipline of these

levels help to maintain a clear integrity of purpose between the state, its armed forces

and their missions. The levels delineate delegated responsibilities for the use of armed

force, but these distinctions are not required to control economic and diplomatic power.

The levels of warfare are not tied to specific military levels of command. Depending

on the situation, corps, division, brigade, battlegroup or unit commanders may all

operate at either the operational or tactical level. It should be noted that the levels,

if they are recognised at all, may be interpreted or applied differently, depending

on the situation, by multinational partners and other government departments.

In highlighting the importance of the strategic level, David Fraser referred to Field Marshal

Alanbrooke as regarding the art of strategy as “…(determining) the aim, which is, or

should be, inherently political; to derive from that aim a series of military objectives to be

achieved; to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the

pre-conditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate; to measure available

and potential resources against the requirements; and to chart from this process a coherent

pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.”

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2-11. The strategic level is the level at which a nation or group of nations determines national

or multinational security objectives, and deploys national, including military, resources

to achieve them. Land forces require an understanding, at all levels, of the evolving

strategic context of their actions. In a globalised, networked battlespace, there are few

situations where tactical activity cannot have strategic consequences. Encompassing

all aspects of national, defence and military strategy, in the planning and execution

of operations, three aspects of strategy are particularly relevant to military forces.

a. A successful national strategy sets out a path, using the diplomatic, economic and

military instruments of power, to achieve government policy goals. Strategy usually

involves collaboration with other nations’ governments and armed forces and other

international organisations. In a multinational context, constituent states have their

own national strategies, which should be coherent with the remainder of the alliance

or coalition. National strategy consists of and should describe interdependent ‘ends’

(objectives of the strategy), ‘ways’ (methods) and ‘means’ (resources).

b. The military contribution to strategy is the application of military resources to

achieve national strategic objectives. During planning for operations, military planners

determine military objectives, identify freedoms and constraints, set out options for

the desired end-state and describe the military approach and resources required. This

enables coherent military advice to be given to UK Government decision-makers by the

Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chiefs of Staff. A decision is then made and the

campaign is conducted.

c. A successful campaign requires a strategic narrative, described in joint doctrine

communication that portrays a story designed to resonate in the mind of the audience

that helps explain the campaign strategy and operational plan. This message must

resonate to those deployed, and the domestic and broader international audience,

including in the conflict region. It will be contested; adversaries will create their own

narratives in support of their goals, or perhaps multiple narratives to confuse the

audience so that our narrative fails to gain traction. A compelling strategic narrative,

reinforced at operational and tactical levels and coherent with actions taken, has the

potential to be decisive in developing favourable public consensus and maintaining

campaign authority.

2-12. The operational level is the level at which campaigns and major operations are

planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres

or areas of operations. The operational level provides the gearing between the

strategic and tactical levels. Joint campaigns and operations are constructed and

directed at the operational level to fulfil national, alliance or coalition strategy. An

operational commander designs, plans, sequences and sustains a campaign according

to the authorised campaign plan. Joint doctrine concentrates on the operational

level, unifying tactical and environmental operations into a coherent campaign

through joint action. Joint action is defined as the deliberate use and orchestration of

military capabilities and activities to affect actors’ will, understanding and capability,

and the cohesion between them to achieve influence.

It is implemented through

the orchestration of information activities, fires, manoeuvre and outreach.

5 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-00, Campaign Execution.

6 Ibid.

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2-13. The tactical level is the level at which activities, battles and engagements are planned

and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units.

It is at the tactical level that troops are deployed directly in tactical activities, using the

tactical functions. Couched in the context of the strategic and operational levels, the

focus of this Army Doctrine Publication is on how tactical land operations are conducted.

Tactics form the steps from which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the

path.

A A Svechin

2-14. British Army doctrine follows the NATO codification of operations themes, types of

operation and tactical activities.

This enhances interoperability

with allies and aids understanding of the mosaic of conflict. Those

relevant to land operations are shown in Figure 2-1.

Operations themes

Warﬁghting

Security

Peace

support

Defence

engagement

Types of operation

Tactical activities

Combat

Stability

• Counter-irregular

activity (Counter-

insurgency, Counter-

terrorism, counter-

criminality)

• Military contribution to

peace support

• Military contribution to

humanitarian aid

• Military contribution

to stabilisation and

reconstruction

• Military support to

Capacity Building

• Non-combatant

evacuation operation

• Extraction

Military aid to the

civil authority

Offensive activities

• Attack

• Raid

• Ambush

• Exploitation

• Pursuit

• Breakout

• Feint

• Demonstration

• Reconnaissance in force

Defensive activities

• Defence

• Delay

Enabling activities

• Reconnaissance

• Security

• Advance to contact

• Link up

• Withdrawal

• Retirement

• Relief of troops in

combat and encircled

forces

• March

• Obstacle breaching

and crossing

Stability activities

• Security and control

• Support to security sector

reform

• Support to initial

restoration of essential

services

• Support to interim

governance tasks

Figure 2-1. Operations themes, types of operation and tactical activities

7 AJP-01. This codiﬁcation replaces the framework of military activities.

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2-15.

2-16.

2-17.

Operations may be assigned or described in terms of particular contextual themes.

These operations themes allow the general conditions of the operating environment

to be understood, informing the intellectual approach, resources available (including

force levels, rules of engagement and force protection measures), likely activities

required and levels of political appetite and risk. There are four themes, aligned

to the functions of land power: warfighting, security, peace support and

defence engagement.

These themes provide a framework for understanding

in general terms the context and dynamics of a conflict. A theme may be set at

the strategic level and form part of the narrative for operations, but this will not

necessarily happen. As a conflict evolves, the thematic designation may change. It is

important for the operational and strategic levels of command, informed by tactical

commanders, to anticipate the need for any change. Within a single operations

theme more than one type of operation will often occur simultaneously.

Within the operations themes, certain types of operation exist. They are not mutually

exclusive and are often concurrent with other types of operation within the mosaic of

conﬂict. As doctrinal deﬁnitions, they are neither designed nor do they necessarily correspond

to UK Defence planning tools or assumptions. Rather, they aid analysis and articulation

of complex missions and provide the essential gearing required to sequence a series of

tactical activities to achieve operational objectives. This doctrine groups types of operations

into combat, stability and military aid to the civil authority (MACA) operations. Stability

operations (which NATO describes as crisis response operations) and MACA are UK terms.

This doctrine also includes an additional, discrete type of operation described as capacity

building. Types of operation and operations themes are covered in more detail in Annex 8C.

Within all types of operation, land forces conduct all or some of a range of tactical

activities, often concurrently. The balance between the different activities varies from

one operation to another over time, as illustrated in Figure 2-2. Tactical activities are

either offensive, defensive, stability or enabling. In the mosaic of conﬂict a force may be

required to conduct all activities simultaneously. Also, these activities are not mutually

exclusive. A single force element may link them by a simple transition from one activity to

another without breaking contact with an enemy; for instance from a defensive activity

to an offensive one. Enabling activities are never conducted for their own sake; their

purpose is to enable or link other activities. Tactical activities are described in Chapter 8.

Figure 2-2. The balance of tactical activities, varying over time and between types of operation

AJP-01. Note that UK doctrine refers to defence engagement which is largely the same as NATO doctrine’s

description of peacetime military engagement, but is not constrained to peacetime situations.

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Operational relationships

2-18. Operations and campaigns are unlikely to be conducted by a single Service or indeed by

armed forces alone, and will most likely be multinational. Successful strategy requires

more than military means; it depends on the cooperation of diplomatic, economic and

military instruments of power, and the alignment of ends (objectives), ways (methods)

and means (resources), underpinned by a compelling narrative. Land forces always

seek to combine arms and will rarely work in isolation, more often supporting or being

supported by air, maritime, special forces and logistic components as part of a joint force.

Also, although the UK may choose to act alone, contemporary political and economic

factors suggest that in most cases its forces are likely to operate as a contributing or

lead nation, within an alliance or as part of an ad hoc coalition. They will often also

work with regional or host nation partners. Most of the operations that land forces are

likely to participate in, therefore, will require joint, inter-agency and multinational

relationships.

The joint force also consists of regular and reserve military personnel,

civil servants and contractors, combined into a single team; this is described as the

whole force approach. This section provides a summary of these four relationships.

Joint

2-19. The term joint describes an operation or organisation is one in which elements

of at least two Services participate. More specifically, a joint operation is one

where scalable maritime, land, air and special forces operate together within a

single military force and/or command structure to achieve a specific mission or

missions, in peace, war or crisis. A joint approach is one of the foundations of

UK defence policy. Most campaigns in British military history have been joint; and

contemporary national, NATO and coalition operations are all joint, structured

according to the nature of the task. A joint approach combines capabilities to make

each of them more effective. In operations this requires that maritime, land, air,

special forces and logistic components are included in planning from the start.

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in

war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single, concentrated effort.

President Eisenhower

2-20. In military terms, expeditionary campaigns are usually conducted by joint task

forces (JTFs), created specifically for an operation. These may be national,

coalition or NATO JTFs. JTFs are tailored to a mission, and furnished with the

capabilities necessary to achieve specified objectives. They are usually multinational

and their titles differ depending on the alliance or coalition involved.

2-21. JTF headquarters plan and conduct the campaign at the operational level. Their

subordinate force elements prosecute and coordinate battles and other tactical

engagements to achieve operational level objectives. In larger scale operations, including

major combat operations, a JTF will often exercise command through subordinate

land, air, maritime, special forces and logistic components. This structure brings

9 Commonly referred to as the combined, joint, inter-agency, intra-governmental and multinational (CJIIM) environment.

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significant coherence to environmental activities, but land forces may not experience

the same depth or proximity of joint cooperation as they might be accustomed to in a

national or land-centric context. Indeed, in a land-centric campaign, command may be

conducted by a JTF (Land), integrating the components within a single headquarters,

alongside non-military actors and agencies. The JTF structure is designed to achieve

the campaign objectives, rather than satisfy individual Service requirements. In both

cases, the detail of the organisational structure is less important than the success of

the campaign, which depends on a flexible approach to command and control.

2-22. Generally components work together through ‘supported/supporting’ relationships,

maximising the overall effect of the joint force. A supported commander has

primary responsibility for all aspects of a task or line of operations assigned

by higher authority. A supporting commander provides augmentation or other

support to a supported commander, or develops a supporting plan. Land forces

always require support from the air component and may receive support from, or

give support to, any component for particular joint objectives in a campaign.

Inter-agency

2-23. Successful strategy requires an inter-agency approach to integrate the application of the

military, economic and diplomatic instruments of power, at all levels of command and

throughout the campaign. Ultimately states resort to the use of force when diplomatic

and economic power cannot achieve the outcome required. When military power is

used, it is in conjunction with the other two. It is, therefore, important to understand

which agencies function at the operational level, how they will affect the tactical level,

and the impact they will have on the conduct of operations. This inter-agency aspect of

operations includes supranational organisations, for example the UN; UK government

departments other than the Ministry of Defence, national intelligence agencies, host

nation or other indigenous partners, non-governmental organisations, humanitarian

groups, private security companies; and other contractors and commercial organisations.

2-24. To engender effective inter-agency relationships, the UK government seeks to engender

effective inter-agency relationships across all departments. This approach requires a

culture of collaboration and cooperation as well as structures developed to enable

shared understanding. Where activity cannot be synchronised or integrated it must

be deconflicted. This is described through the Full Spectrum Approach, which is

also referred to in other government departments as the Integrated Approach.

Similiarly, NATO doctrine describes a Comprehensive Approach in which military

and non-military actors contribute with a shared purpose, based on a common sense

of responsibility, openness and determination. This is facilitated by civil-military

interaction which applies at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

2-25. By harnessing the three instruments of power, a full spectrum approach can increase

tactical freedom. It applies expertise where and when it is needed to improve

the prioritisation, synchronisation and coordination of activity. This approach

can contribute to a sense of stability because when power is exercised in a civil

context it creates perceptions of normality. There are also potential constraints

10 The Full Spectrum Approach will be described in the FSA Primer to be produced by DCDC. Although

both terms are current in government, the Full Spectrum Approach will be used in this book.”

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that can be caused by an integrated or full spectrum approach. There might be

different perceptions of risk, competing resource priorities, language difficulties,

differences in operating procedures, clashes of organisational culture, or variations

in empowerment and operational objectives. Even within a common strategy,

all are potential sources of friction which could impact adversely on military

activity and consequently broader operational outputs. Ultimately, the test of

success lies not in the degree of cooperation, even though intrinsically valuable,

but in the complete, integrated outcomes achieved through cooperation.

2-26. Human relationships are decisive in making the approach work or fail. Underlying

the approach is the common desire to achieve unity of effort and an acceptance

that all three instruments of power are required for success. Military headquarters

and their command posts, because they are usually relatively well-resourced and

secure, can provide the physical means to enable a full spectrum approach.

Multinational

2-27. Although the UK retains the capability to conduct certain types of

overseas operations independently, Defence policy is described as

‘international by design’.

Multinational operations are the norm, whether

in alliances, coalitions or partnerships with host nation forces.

There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.

Winston S Churchill

2-28. Alliances exist between states for mutual benefits, which may be economic, diplomatic

or military. Military alliances can be between individual countries or based on an

alliance organisation, of which NATO is pre-eminent from the UK’s perspective. They

seek to develop shared strength during peacetime, working and training together

to build interoperability. Coalitions are formed as temporary alliances for common

action by two or more nations, or based around an alliance like NATO. They will

usually have an agreed lead nation. National policy envisages that most major overseas

military operations involving UK land forces will be as part of a coalition that will

probably be led by the United States. Coalitions and alliances bring mass, legitimacy

and diplomatic power but also friction. Land forces must be ready to adapt to the

requirements of a particular coalition. Although the stated purpose of an alliance

or the action required by a coalition may be clear, nations join them for a range

of reasons, explicit and unstated. Cooperation always has challenges, which are

exacerbated when alliance or coalition members do not have matched motives and

capabilities. In every case, national considerations will play out at the tactical level,

requiring commanders and staff to understand partners’ considerations and to exercise

diplomacy. There are, therefore, benefits and costs in joining coalitions and alliances:

11 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2015.

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a. Membership of a coalition or alliance provides many benefits, particularly diplomatic

leverage to achieve international influence, not only to pursue a campaign but also to

shape that campaign in the national interest. This benefit is broadly in proportion to

the level of equity that a nation invests in the operation, with lead nations reaping the

greatest potential reward. Membership also confers: representation in the coalition

chain of command; unity and economy of effort, and a common purpose which adds

to legitimacy and provides access to capability and mass; a sharing of risks; and a share

of the benefits of a successful outcome from the campaign. Alliances and coalitions

concentrate resources and provide a range of options which most nations could not

generate independently.

b. Membership of a coalition or alliance means bearing a share of additional risks. It

demands interoperability, the pursuit of which can be expensive and time-consuming.

Membership can dilute national and military priorities. Coalitions may also include

new allies with which the land force has not developed interoperability, requiring

the force to adapt accordingly. Other costs include the need for consensus and a

consequent reduction in freedoms. If a campaign goes badly, it is difficult to disengage

from collective responsibility. The committal of resources to a coalition or alliance

reduces the freedom to conduct other tasks. Burden sharing can also undermine the

requirement for national military capabilities and versatile forces.

Where responsibility is to be shared, it is essential to have written agreement in advance

on how decision making and governance will operate within an alliance or coalition. The

UK normally acts with allies, as it did in Iraq. Within the NATO Alliance, the rules and

mechanisms for decision taking and the sharing of responsibility have been developed

over time and are well understood. The Coalition in Iraq, by contrast, was an ad hoc

alliance. The UK tried to establish some governance principles in the Memorandum of

Understanding proposed to the US, but did not press the point. This led the UK into the

uncomfortable and unsatisfactory situation of accepting shared responsibility without the

ability to make a formal input to the process of decision making.

Sir John Chilcot, The Iraq Inquiry (2016)

2-29. The extent of a forceâ€™s multinationality depends on a number of factors. The degree of

interoperability is the foundation that governs what is achievable. However, the nature

of the task is the deciding factor. Certain tasks are not achievable at certain levels unless

interoperability is very high. Also, the more deeply a force is integrated, the more likely

it is that a nationâ€™s forces will come under the command of allied officers. Consequently,

the higher the risks involved in tactical activity, the more likely it is that national chains

will compete with, even supersede, multinational chains of command. This is also the

case when the deployment is close to a nationâ€™s strategic interests. This is why unit level

multinationality is more common on peace support than it is on warfighting operations.

The design of a force will depend on judgement, balancing the strategic benefits of

the multinational arrangement with the tactical feasibility, limited by interoperability.

2-30. It is essential that joint, allied and coalition forces establish effective host nation

partnerships. The degree of support offered to and by host nation governments

and security forces is linked to its own political and social context as well as to the

campaign itself. A host nation may provide access, overflight or staging facilities

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2-12 |

for joint forces to and from the area of operations. Alternatively it may be within its

territory that operations are conducted and it may provide military capability directly,

including its own land forces. We may work with a host nation partner to help improve

their external and internal security capability through direct or indirect capacity

building. In all cases, the nature of the relationship with host nations is likely to be

dynamic. They may exert their sovereignty in different ways during the campaign.

Their motivations and political interests may evolve and will affect how joint forces

conduct operations. Politics, culture, extant relationships, legitimacy and capabilities

all affect the character of host nation partnerships. Early engagement with and

understanding of organisations with which land forces may operate is fundamental

in forming effective partnerships. Defence Engagement provides one aspect of this.

Within a wider integrated or full spectrum approach, it sees land forces developing

relationships with host nation security forces in peacetime, and during and after conflict.

Whole force approach

2-31. The whole force approach

concerns the appropriate mix of individual people within

each group of Defence actors that contribute to operations. People are the defining

attribute of land forces, whether organised as part of or alongside combined arms,

joint or multinational formations. The operational challenges require people who are

agile, adaptable and together have the full range of knowledge, skills and experience.

2-32. The whole force approach places human capability at the heart of decision making,

ensuring that outputs are delivered by the right mix of capable and motivated

people. This mix might include regular and reserve service personnel, civil servants,

other civilians (including local nationals) and contractors. This approach enables and

requires land forces to draw on specialist expertise not normally held within regular

military establishments. In addition to seeing civil servants embedded within land

force structures, this may also include, for example, logisticians, cyber experts, or

medics from either the reserve forces or as contractors. Contractor support to

operations describes specific groups of contractors on deployed operations

(referred to as CONDO), private security companies and sponsored reserves.

2-33. The mix of individuals varies from operation to operation. Forces at very high readiness

usually comprise mostly regular personnel, while forces engaged on more enduring

stabilisation operations contain a broader mix. At the same time, the blurring of previous

distinctions between domestic and overseas operations and threats means that a whole

force approach is as relevant and necessary in the UK as in the deployed force.

Contractors need to be in our force design and generation from the outset. This will ensure

integration at the earliest opportunity and allow better planning to make certain that the

contractor produces the desired military effect.

Operation HERRICK Campaign Study (2015)

12 Previously described as â€œTotal Support Force or the Whole Force Conceptâ€

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2-34. In the same way that relationships with multinational and joint partners are

improved through mutual understanding, working and training together, the

whole force approach will also benefit. Civilians and contractors work under

different terms and conditions to regular and reserve personnel. Their flexibility

and security requirements will vary, as will the assurance of their input.

UK land forces contribution to strategy and joint operations

2-35. The context of operations informs the enduring contributions that land

forces make to strategy and joint operations. UK land forces can:

a. integrate the effects of national instruments of power in the land environment;

b. defeat enemy land forces;

c. secure and hold terrain objectives, including access to areas of operations;

d. directly influence the behaviours of conflict actors, in conjunction with other

instruments of power;

e. enable other Services, instruments of power, partners and agencies to operate,

including through providing security, tactical understanding and interpersonal

relationships;

f. represent strong political commitment in support of national, alliance, coalition or

bilateral objectives, complementary to other instruments of power;

g. deter hostile and potentially hostile actors from aggression, as part of a credible and

capable joint force;

h. support the civil authorities in providing of homeland resilience and security; and

i. support conflict prevention and security improvement through persistent engagement

and capacity building.

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ADP Land Ops

Chapter 3

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Fighting Power

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CHAPTER 3

Fighting Power

Introduction

3-01. Fighting Power is a concept that describes the

operational effectiveness of armed forces, or any

element of them. Common across Defence and

NATO,

the concept guides force development

and preparation. This chapter explains the

contextual characteristics of Fighting Power,

and then describes its three components:

conceptual, moral and physical. See Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. Model of Fighting Power

3-02. The conceptual component is the forceâ€™s knowledge, understanding and application

of doctrine â€“ the ideas behind how to operate and fight â€“ kept relevant by its ability

to learn and adapt. The moral component is the forceâ€™s morale, leadership and ethical

conduct: the ability to get people to operate and fight and to do so appropriately.

The physical component consists of manpower, equipment, sustainability and

13 See AJP-01, AJP-3.2, Allied Joint Doctine for Land Operations and JDP 0-01, UK Defence Doctrine. Note that United States

Army doctrine does not use this model.

Fighting Power

â€¢ Introduction

â€¢ Conceptual component

â€¢ Moral component

â€¢ Physical component

â€¢ Readiness, deployability

and recovery

Context

Relative

Competitive

Environment

Actors

Physical

component

î‚„ Manpower

î‚„ Equipment

î‚„ Training and

collective

performance

î‚„ Sustainability

î‚„ Resources

Conceptual

component

î‚„ Understanding of

how to operate

î‚„ Flexibility to adapt

Moral

Component

î‚„ Morale

î‚„ Leadership

î‚„ Ethical

foundations

| 3-1

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resources: the means to operate and fight. Training is considered as part of the

physical component, although it develops and integrates all three components. The

three components are interdependent. In some circumstances, one component can

be more important than the others. The level of Fighting Power is closely connected

to readiness: the more complete all the elements are, the higher the level of

readiness. The Fighting Power of a force element relies on the overall Fighting Power

of its Service, and on its ability to provide the necessary institutional support.

3-03. The Fighting Power of a Service or force must be adaptable if it is to be effective on

operations. A force must be balanced, able to start the operation at the appropriate

time and place, able to continue for as long as is necessary, and be large enough

for the task. These requirements point to readiness, deployability, and the capacity,

if necessary, for endurance. The nature of the task or campaign will indicate the

scale of force required, but it may be necessary to generate mass: to expand armed

forces for unforeseen circumstances, as the UK did in the world wars and for the

Korean War. Beyond the requirements of readiness, deployability, duration and

mass, the force must be adapted to the context of each unique operation.

3-04. Fighting Power is in some respects a relative as well as an absolute concept.

For example, certain forces may be assessed as having high and balanced

Fighting Power, but be fundamentally unsuited for the task. So Fighting Power

is inherently contextual, determined by how well a force (our own, allied or

enemy) is adapted to the character of the operation in which it is engaged.

Certain contextual characteristics inform assessment of Fighting Power:

a. Assessment of Fighting Power is both quantitative and qualitative. Much of the

physical component can be quantitatively measured. This constitutes the visible

combat power of a force and informs force ratio assessments, and so contributes

to understanding relative capabilities. On the other hand, the moral and conceptual

components tend more to subjective, qualitative assessment. The three components

are interdependent, although which, if any, is pre-eminent depends on the situation.

b. Military effectiveness is measured not against an absolute standard; rather it is relative

and competitive in nature. Comparison to and understanding of the Fighting Power

of other relevant actors provides the essential reference points by which land forcesâ€™

Fighting Power can be assessed and adapted in a given situation.

c. The environment in which land forces are used and for which they are prepared

also has a significant bearing on their actual Fighting Power. Given the uncertainty

of where, against whom and with whom operations might be conducted, land forces

require mental and physical preparation to operate in a range of environments. A force

optimised to fight and operate in a single environment may not have the appropriate

balance of Fighting Power to operate elsewhere. When Fighting Power is developed to

deal with the complexities of the most demanding operational environments, a force

increases its potential to adapt rapidly to new situations.

d. In contemporary operations, the Fighting Power of UK land forces is dependent on

effective interoperability with other Services, allies, partners and agencies. The moral

component is strengthened through human interoperability, the physical through

technical interoperability, and the conceptual through procedural interoperability.

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The conceptual component

3-05. The conceptual component of Fighting Power rests on the development and

application of doctrine. As the intellectual basis of Fighting Power, it guides the

physical and moral components. Deficits in the conceptual component, for example

through misunderstanding, or insufficient flexibility, severely damage a forceâ€™s

overall Fighting Power, even if the will and means to fight are well developed.

Theory exists so that one does not have to start afresh every time sorting out the raw

material and ploughing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is

meant to educate the future commander or, more accurately, to guide him in this self-

education; not accompany him to the battlefield.

Carl von Clausewitz

3-06. The conceptual component is as important to routine military activity as it is to

operations, providing the corporate mental agility, intellectual rigour and creativity

required to adapt quickly. This section describes two elements of the conceptual

component particularly relevant in an operational context: understanding

how to operate, and the flexibility by which a land force can adapt.

3-07. Understanding how to operate, the basis of the conceptual component, requires

understanding of a given situation and knowledge of the relevant doctrine.

Understanding is the perception and interpretation of a particular situation to

provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision making.14

To operate effectively in complex situations, land forces must develop understanding

of the nature and character of conflict and its context. This understanding,

constantly refined through education and experience, not only ensures that the

doctrine used is relevant and useable, but also that it can be applied pragmatically,

rather than by prescription. See Annex 8A for further detail on understanding.

3-08. Doctrine is defined as a set of fundamental principles

by which military forces guide their actions in support

of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement

in application. Doctrine is a formal expression of military

knowledge and thought that the British Army accepts

as being relevant at a given time. Agile, not dogmatic,

it takes past experience and extracts guidance for

dealing with future challenges, providing a foundation

from which initiative can be applied with confidence.

3-09. As doctrine underpins all military activity, it is the basis for education and training.

UK land forces doctrine is founded on joint and NATO doctrine.

Where there are

deviations from this, they must be clearly communicated to all involved. The language

and terminology used in doctrine must be precise, clear, and formally agreed.

14 JDP 04, Understanding.

15 It is Defence policy that except where there is a speciï¬c need for national doctrine, the UK will adopt

NATO doctrine, with caveats or ampliï¬cation where necessary. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP)

Land Operations is an example of national doctrine, albeit coherent with that of NATO.

Military Doctrine

is defined as a set of

fundamental principles

by which military forces

guide their actions in

support of objectives

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The central idea of an army is known as its doctrine, which to be sound must be based

on the Principles of War, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit of

mutation in accordance with change in circumstance. In its ultimate relationship to the

human understanding, this central idea or doctrine is nothing else than common sense â€“

that is, action adapted to circumstance.

Major General JFC Fuller

3-10. Doctrine is broadly categorised as either higher or lower level, as illustrated in Figure 3-2:

a. Higher-level doctrine establishes the philosophy and principles that underpin the

approach to military activity. It provides a framework for the employment of the

military instrument and a foundation for its practical application. While it is in part

prescriptive, it is mostly descriptive. Higher level NATO and joint doctrine is contained

in the Allied Joint Publication and Joint Doctrine Publication series respectively. If NATO

doctrine differs significantly from UK joint doctrine, UK either retains a national JDP

or adds national â€˜green pagesâ€™ to the AJP, referred to as a â€˜hybridâ€™ publication. Army

Doctrine Publication Land Operations is the British Armyâ€™s higher level doctrine, also

referred to as capstone doctrine for land forces.

b. Lower-level doctrine focuses on the practices and procedures required for the effective

employment of military forces. It is more prescriptive than higher-level doctrine and

at its lowest levels includes instructions for specific drills. NATO lower-level doctrine

for land forces is found in the Allied Tactical Publication series. For UK land forces,

the equivalents are the Army Field Manual series (of thematic, environmental and

functional doctrine), tactical aides-memoire, handbooks, and standard operating

procedures and instructions.

3-11. Effective doctrine is accessible, credible and relevant. This requires engaging with three

groups in its development: writers, teachers and practitioners. It is the responsibility of

commanders not only to understand and apply doctrine, but to impart understanding

to their subordinates, as well as to recommend improvements to those who write

it. Doctrine is reviewed and refreshed as required to account for evolving strategic

direction, emerging doctrine (from both higher and lower levels), the changing character

of conflict and relevant lessons from experimentation, training and operations.

3-12. The second essential element of the conceptual component is the flexibility

to adapt to deal with complex, dynamic challenges. Flexibility spans all

components of Fighting Power, but is guided by the conceptual component. A

dogmatic and rigid conceptual component stifles the opportunities presented by

organisational versatility. A flexible conceptual component can enable the whole

force to adapt with confidence in the face of uncertainty and in competition with

adversaries, when whoever adapts most effectively is more likely to prevail.

Flexibility is the ability to change rapidly, appropriately and effectively to new

circumstances.

Principle of War â€“ Flexibility

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NATO

Joint Land

AJP -01

Allied Joint Doctrine

ADP

Land Operaî†Ÿons

Allied Tacî†Ÿcal

Publicaî†Ÿons

AJPs

JDPs

AFMs

Supporî†Ÿng AJPs

Handbooks, Procedures,

Aides Memoire

Special to Arm Doctrine

Funcî†Ÿonal

Themaî†Ÿc

Funcî†Ÿonal

Themaî†Ÿc

Environmental

AJP-5

Army Leadership

Doctrine

The Staï¬€ Standard

for the Army

Higher level philosophy and principlesLower level pracî†Ÿces and procedures

JDP 0-01

Briî†Ÿsh Defence Doctrine

Environmental

Hybrid

Figure: 3-2. Doctrine organisation

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3-13. History is full of examples of military forces that have either successfully

adapted or failed to do so. Land forces that are successful in adaptation

require, though not exclusively: the right command and cognitive skills across

the force; a broad, flexible doctrine; the ability to identify and learn lessons;

organisational and technical flexibility; and broad-based preparation.

3-14. Firstly, land forces require the command and cognitive skills to be flexible and

adaptable. Essential to all aspects of flexibility is a military culture that supports and

nurtures mental agility and initiative. The British Armyâ€™s command philosophy, Mission

Command, promotes decentralised command, freedom and speed of action, and

initiative. Mission Command not only encourages but also demands that subordinates

use their initiative. It is through initiative and a culture of mutual trust providing a

safe environment for open analysis of shortfalls that a land force learns lessons, and

adopts innovative approaches to complex challenges. Initiative draws strength from

experience and realistic training. It also draws strength through understanding of

doctrine, military education and a questioning mindset across the whole force.

3-15. Secondly, a broad doctrine provides a common foundation on which land

forces can build when faced with potentially new situations. Although the

principles of doctrine endure, tactics, techniques and procedures need to evolve

rapidly, adapting to the specific situation. A land force can only gain meaningful

understanding when it has actually engaged on an operation. It can then generate

lessons from the operational theatre, enabling its own rapid adaptation, that

of follow on forces, and longer term institutional level force development.

a. Lessons are experiences, examples, or developed observations that impart beneficial

new knowledge or wisdom for the future. Lessons can be identified through historical

study, training, operations and the experiences of other forces. An effective lessons

capability depends on a military culture that strives for continuous improvement,

encouraging enquiry into and examination of what has gone well and what has not.

Fundamental to this culture are leaders who engage directly and openly in the process,

with humility, trust and a willingness to learn.

b. The supporting lessons process requires a staff structure and information management

and exploitation tools. The process initially comprises lessons capture and analysis of

observations and insights, resulting in lessons identification. The lessons identified

are assigned to those responsible for remedial action. There are two ways by which a

lesson is described as being learned. The first is when validated implementation of the

remedial action results in improved operational performance and capability. The second

is when identification of best practice is widely communicated and exploited.

It is this flexibility both in the minds of the Armed Forces and in their organisation, that

needs above all to be developed in peacetimeâ€¦ This is the aspect of military science which

needs to be studied above all others in the Armed Forces: the capacity to adapt oneself to

the utterly unpredictable, the entirely unknown.

Professor Sir Michael Howard

16 This framework is from Meir Finkelâ€™s On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological

and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battleï¬eld, (2011).

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3-16. Thirdly, the land force requires organisational and technological flexibility. A

balance of capabilities across the land force, plans for regeneration and constant

innovation together aid flexibility. A balanced force includes the appropriate mix of

force elements (combat, combat support, and combat service support), force types,

specialist capabilities, and individuals (the whole force approach). If the force is not

ideally balanced, the risk can be partially mitigated by exploiting synergies with allies

and other Services. Robust and realistic plans for the regeneration of capabilities also

contribute to the potential adaptability of the force. Flexibility can also be enabled

by the innovative use of current and emerging capabilities and technologies. While

innovation can require specialist expertise, it can also come from, for example,

wargaming and scenario based planning. The success of the German Armyâ€™s innovation

in the 1920s demonstrates the potential of such an approach (see below).

3-17. Finally, adaptable land forces conduct

realistic broad-based preparation through

military education and training. Although we cannot predict the future, rigorous

analysis, lessons from our own and othersâ€™ experiences, education and concept

development can indicate many characteristics of the conï¬‚icts likely to be faced. Realistic

and demanding training to develop core skills, based on doctrine and supported by

effective lessons processes, underpins the successful adaptation of land forces.

Learning From history â€“ German Army 1920-30s

Under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, the German army (Reichsheer) had to be reorganised.

It was limited to 100,000 men, of whom only 4000 could be officers, and it was not

allowed to have heavy or modern equipment. As its chief from 1919, General Hans Von

Seeckt implemented the changes and instituted a major programme to examine the

lessons of the First World War.

The first experiments on mechanization and mobility were carried out in 1921 and the

lessons from these were widely distributed throughout the army. Foreign writings on

military theory (such as by Fuller, Liddell-Hart and Martel) were translated into German

and studied and debated. The review of lessons, the experimentation and study led to

the promulgation in 1933 of a coherent and realistic doctrine (TruppenfÃ¼hrung) â€“ that

emphasised combined arms manoeuvre; close air support; decentralized command and

control; and rapid exploitation. The 100,000 were trained as the leadership cadre of a

much larger army.

In the 1930s Germany used dummy tanks (plywood hulls mounted on a truck chassis)

and other ways of experimenting, training and refining their tactics. This allowed them to

continue the process of force development without causing the major powers to intervene.

Rapid expansion followed soon after Hitler came to power in 1933, but the foundation for

the early, shattering successes of the Wehrmacht in the Second World War was laid by the

conceptual preparation of Seecktâ€™s Reichsheer.

17 The NATO force types are heavy, medium and light. This is explained further in Chapter 7

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The moral component

3-18. The moral component concerns the human aspect of Fighting Power. It consists

of three mutually dependent elements, described in turn in this section: morale

is the will of the force and its soldiers to fight; leadership is the essential

element of morale, inculcates the ethical foundation, and directs the force across

all three components of Fighting Power; and the ethical, moral and legal

foundation underpins the way in which land forces conduct operations.

3-19. The moral component is easily corrupted. To be sound, its three elements must be strong

and balanced. A force can have high morale, be willing and able to fight very effectively,

but if its actions are not legitimate, it risks becoming like the Waffen SS in the Second

World War. Such forces can never be the instrument of a democracy. Likewise, when a

forceâ€™s ethical, moral and legal foundations are sound, but its leadership or morale is

weak and it will not fight, it is at best useless, at worst a danger to the wider force.

3-20. Morale, the first element, resides at the heart of Fighting Power. Maintenance of Morale

is a Principle of War because high morale enables the land force to fight and overcome

the privations of conflict. High morale is possible without an ethical foundation, but this

would be ultimately self-defeating for the land forces of a democratic country. Indeed, the

morale of the land force is strengthened by its moral integrity and legitimacy. Morale is

not a discrete entity, but is the product of the synergy of all three components of Fighting

Power. Of the many contributory factors to morale, which include the Armyâ€™s Values

and Standards, seven stand out and are described below. These are mutually supporting

and developed most effectively through leadership and challenging, realistic training.

Morale is a state of mind. It is steadfastness and courage and hope. It is confidence and

zeal and loyalty. It is Ã©lan, esprit de corps and determination. It is staying power; the

spirit which endures to the end â€“ the will to win. With it all things are possible, without it

everything else, planning, preparation, production, count for naught.

General George C Marshall

a. Fighting spirit unifies all who serve in our armed forces. Comprising initiative,

courage, resilience, determination and toughness, fighting spirit drives soldiers forward

in the most arduous and adverse of conditions. Through fighting spirit, soldiers accept

both the legal right and duty to apply lethal force, and also the potentially unlimited

liability to lay down their lives in the service of the nation. Fighting spirit requires moral

and physical fortitude. By testing fighting spirit in demanding training, it is hardened

and made more resilient to the realities of potentially brutal land conflict.

b. Moral cohesion is the sense of shared identity and a determined purpose that gives a

force the will to fight and succeed. Cohesion binds individuals into teams, and teams

into effective fighting forces. Strong moral cohesion makes forces emotionally resilient

in adversity. It also helps to make individuals more likely to use their initiative and

exploit opportunities, because they will be confident of the support of their comrades

and unit or formation. The nature of conflict puts significant pressure on moral

cohesion, but without it, the force is susceptible to shock and collapse. Leadership

enhances moral cohesion by building shared identity and values. Individual friendships

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and collective bonding grow when teams are kept together over time, developing a

sense of belonging. Common experiences and histories strengthen comradeship and

pride. Together, these build identity, ethos and cause, which individuals can value even

above their own lives.

Discipline underpins fighting spirit and moral cohesion. It is the glue that holds

soldiers together when threatened; it is the primary antidote to fear. When discipline is

sound, commanders can be confident that their orders will be carried out, and soldiers

know that their commanders and comrades will not let them down. Commanders

at all levels are responsible for maintaining discipline in terms of obedience to the

law, regulations, orders, instructions, procedures and standards. The best discipline,

however, is self-discipline. Commanders must be confident that their subordinates will

strive to do their duty under the worst conditions of war, and do so with initiative and

intelligence.

d. Comradeship is the basis of moral cohesion and the wider morale of the land force.

Land conflict is ultimately a human activity conducted by groups of people, whose

comradeship gives them the friendship and mutual trust necessary to endure and

overcome danger, fear and privation. Honed on operations, comradeship is forged in

the common bonds developed between individuals and teams working, training, living

and socialising together. Comradeship embraces former comrades-in-arms and the

families of soldiers, often making units families themselves.

e. Pride in oneself, oneâ€™s unit, Service, country and cause can be a potent moral force.

As a sense of worthy achievement, pride inspires individuals and teams to the greatest

heights of sacrifice and valour. It also generates a common goal of avoiding shame

by doing the right thing, upholding the ethical foundation and abiding by the Values

and Standards. Pride without arrogance brings people from the widest variety of

backgrounds together, strengthening the ties of moral cohesion.

f. Confidence and trust placed in the equipment and sustainment of the physical

component are also instrumental to morale. Living conditions, rations, ammunition,

vehicles, weapons, communications, and medical support, for example, all underpin

morale. The nature of land conflict means that a disconnect between expectations and

reality is inevitable, but a force with high morale and strong leadership can usually

overcome this. However, when failures in equipment or sustainment become or are

perceived to be systemic, unnecessary or irreversible, morale suffers.

g. Field Marshal Slim concluded that â€œonly spiritual foundations can withstand real

strainâ€. The spiritual foundation relates to belief in a cause, which may be religious,

cultural or political. In the same way as the ethical and legal foundations of the moral

component require nurturing and protection, so will the spiritual foundations. Spiritual

support comes in many forms. It is provided by chaplains and lay persons in units, by

families and wider social networks, and by strong leadership, developing shared belief

in the cause to be fought for.

3-21. Leadership is the central element of the moral component; it is so important to morale

and the whole conduct of operations that it is treated as a separate subject. Land

forces rely completely on the strength of their leadership at all levels, from the force

commander to the most junior non-commissioned officers. Leadership is not, however,

constrained solely to the chain of command or to those of rank; anyone, including private

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soldiers, can motivate those around them through initiative, example and courage. In

battle, it is leaders who break the paralysis of shock amid fear, uncertainty, death and

destruction. Their vision, intellect, communication and unceasing motivation paves the

path through chaos and confusion. They inspire the force through boldness, courage,

personal example, compassion and resolute determination to win. Then, and at all other

times, it is leaders who shape and control the conduct of the force, for good or ill.î€

3-22. Leadership, therefore, is the critical element of the moral component, vital to the

success of operations, particularly in their darkest moments. It is also the cornerstone of

command, as the trust and mutual understanding engendered by good leadership are

central to Mission Command. It is instrumental in inculcating the ethical, moral and legal

foundation of the force. Leadership provides the inspiration, purpose and direction to

the development and protection of all components of Fighting Power. Bad leadership,

often masked in the hierarchy of land forces, has far reaching and damaging effects.

It rapidly demoralises and destabilises a land force and its combat effectiveness.î€

Definition of Army Leadership: A combination of character, knowledge and action that

inspires others to succeed.

Army Leadership Doctrine

3-23. Army Leadership Doctrine exists because land operations and the nature of land forces

require a distinctive approach to leadership. Leadership on operations is conducted

in a challenging context, which, because of the nature of conflict, is sometimes at the

extremes of human experience. It is constrained by doctrine and policy (for example

levels of authority), orders, and the ethical, moral and legal foundation of the force.

It is important to understand three particular elements of operational leadership.

a. Land forces have to be deeply hierarchical, with leaders (commanders) appointed

to the lowest levels. The adversarial and human characteristics of operations place

particular demands on leadership in the land force, requiring it to be developed in and

exercised by all ranks. Fostering junior leadership and initiative at all levels enables

Mission Command.

b. Leaders at all levels establish the command culture and climate of the force and

any element of it. If either culture or climate is inappropriate, it damages morale, and

therefore operational effectiveness. Culture is relatively stable and enduring, and is

established by senior leaders whose attitudes and behaviours shape that of the wider

force. Climate is more specific, susceptible to change and heavily influenced by lower

level leadership. It is most relevant in smaller groups, such as at unit level and below.

Leaders of all ranks must establish an appropriate climate and culture that promotes

and is consistent with the Armyâ€™s Values and Standards.

c. UK land forcesâ€™ reputation for and practice of good leadership is vital to operational

success. We remain a reference point, domestically and internationally, for leadership

throughout the force. Because campaign authority includes how the members of

the force conduct themselves, collectively and individually, it is essential to maintain

the reality that underpins this reputation. The reputation, built over a long time, is

therefore a key factor of our operational effectiveness, but it is easily damaged by bad

leadership and misconduct.

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3-24. Army Leadership Doctrine explains what is expected of leaders on operations and in all

other activity. It explains the Army Leadership Framework (what leaders are/know/do),

the Army Leadership Model (the three roles and six functions) and the Army Leadership

Code. The key operational requirement is for good practice of British Army leadership to be

translated into good practice by those in command, and for it to be adopted by all ranks.

a. The Army Leadership Framework explains the characteristics of leaders. â€˜What

leaders areâ€™ is about integrity, example and personal impact. Leaders set the

example as role models, accept responsibility and are able to influence people and

events. They routinely apply and promote the British Armyâ€™s Values and Standards

and in all situations. Leaders care about the people they lead, the example they

set, their own leadership and the Armyâ€™s Values

and Standards. â€˜What leaders knowâ€™ is about

professional competence. It is grounded in the

fact that leaders are soldiers first and foremost,

and should be experts in their technical field. In

the operational context it requires, for example,

thorough understanding of doctrine, the context

of operations, and higher commanders intent.

â€˜What leaders doâ€™ is about translating values

and competence into action. Leaders develop

the individuals under their command, and build

effective teams. But above all, they lead their

people to achieve their tasks.

b. The Army Leadership Model

describes the

generic role of a leader performing three interdependent roles: achieving the task,

building teams and developing individuals. Obviously highly relevant to operations,

the leader requires contextual understanding and has six further leadership functions:

defining the task, planning, communicating, executing, supporting and evaluating.

c. The Army Leadership Code consists of seven behaviours that define how Army

leaders should lead. It assists them in translating Values and Standards into action and

reminds them of the desired leadership behaviours.

I contend that fortitude in war has its roots in morality; that selection is a search for

character and that war itself is but one more test - the supreme and final test if you will -

of character. Courage can be judged apart from danger only if the social significance and

meaning of courage is known to us; namely that a man of character in peace becomes

a man of courage in war. He cannot be selfish in peace and yet be unselfish in war.

Character, as Aristotle taught, is a habit, the daily choice of right and wrong; it is a moral

quality which grows to maturity in peace and is not suddenly developed on the outbreak of

war. For war, in spite of what we have heard to the contrary, has no power to transform, it

merely exaggerates the good and evil that are in us, till it is plain for all to read; it cannot

change; it exposes

Lord Moran

18 Based on Adairâ€™s theory of Action Centred Leadership.

The Army Leadership Code

Lead by example

Encourage thinking

Apply reward and discipline

Demand high performance

Encourage conï¬dence in the

team

Recognise individual strengths

and weaknesses

Strive for team goals

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3-25. The third element of the moral component is the ethical, moral and legal

foundation. To be effective, a forceâ€™s actions must reflect a sound and appropriate

ethical, moral and legal foundation, and be perceived as such by the audience. If

they are not, campaign authority will be undermined, reducing, if not removing, the

opportunity to translate tactical military success into desired political outcomes.

3-26. The actions of land forces are guided by their obligations as soldiers and an ethical

foundation shared with that of UK society. These ideas inform two of the Armyâ€™s

values â€“ selfless commitment and respect for others. This ethical foundation is based

on the concept of inalienable natural rights, granted not by a particular government

or culture, but universal and non-negotiable. Modern Western liberal democracy

emerged from the belief that every individual has the natural right to life and liberty.

From these natural rights stem three moral principles. First, everyone in the world

is morally equal, including before the law. The second principle is that of intrinsic,

individual moral dignity: a personâ€™s status is defined not by what they do, but by

the fact that they are human beings. Third, everyone has moral worth, residing in

their potential. While always acting lawfully, land forces apply these principles in

their engagement with other people, in conflict and non-conflict situations.

3-27. However, UK soldiers have responsibilities to the country and their comrades not expected

of other parts of society, and voluntarily place their inalienable right to life and liberty

behind that of service to the nation. They must be prepared to accept risk to their own

lives, and they are required when necessary to use lethal force. To ensure they conduct

themselves appropriately, they must comply with the Armyâ€™s Values and Standards and

fulfil their commitment as part of the mutual obligation of the military covenant.

3-28. The practical expression of the Armyâ€™s ethical foundation

are the Armyâ€™s Values and Standards that guide the

conduct of every soldier. They are a fundamental part of

morale. Operational effectiveness and the reputation of

land forces depend on the ability of every individual to

demonstrate absolute professionalism in the most intense

of circumstances. Adversaries and enemies will seek to

manipulate situations and our understanding to not only

test our resolve, but also our ethical foundation. Our

Values and Standards are the practical code that fulfils

this foundation. The Values of courage, discipline, respect

for others, integrity, loyalty and selfless commitment

together guide our actions. They define who we are as

individual servicemen and women and collectively as a

land force. The Standards define the manner in which serving personnel are required

to behave in every aspect and dimension of their life, professional and private. They

demand that our actions are lawful, appropriate and totally professional. The Armyâ€™s

Values and Standards publication provides a detailed and authoritative explanation.

3-29. Service personnel are bound by service to the country in what is effectively a mutual

military covenant. This arrangement is inherently unequal in that they may have

to contribute more than they receive: their liability is total. In putting the needs of

the country, society and their comrades before their own, they forgo some of the

rights and freedoms enjoyed by their fellow citizens. In return, UK service personnel

Values

â€¢ Courage

â€¢ Discipline

â€¢ Respect for others

â€¢ Integrity

â€¢ Loyalty

â€¢ Selï¬‚ess commitment

Standards

â€¢ Lawful

â€¢ Appropriate

â€¢ Total professionalism

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should be able to expect the country, and their commanders, to provide them

with the necessary resources and leadership to: achieve the objectives required

of them; treat them fairly; value and respect them as individuals; support their

families; and provide long term support, should they need it, during and after their

service. As a covenant, it imposes moral rather than contractual obligations.

The physical component

3-30. The physical component of Fighting Power provides the means to fight. Comprising

principally manpower, equipment, training, sustainability and resources (METS-R), it

is also referred to as the combat power of a force. Manpower and equipment are

converted into ready, deployable forces by training. Training, although described within

the physical component, has an essential part in the development of Fighting Power as

a whole, building the moral and conceptual components as much as the physical.

3-31. The Fighting Power of a land force is founded on its people â€“ manpower. The Armyâ€™s

ability to attract, recruit and retain the right people, with the right skills, in the right

quantity and at the right time is critical to its Fighting Power. Land forces require

soldiers who are ready and prepared, individually and collectively. UK land forces also

demand that soldiers place the needs of the Service above their own. Manpower

is, therefore, absolutely dependent on the moral component if it is to be effective

and sustainable. It also relies on the conceptual component to ensure required

knowledge and skills. This pool of manpower does not consist solely of soldiers,

regular or reserve, but also of civil servants, other civilians and contractors. Each will

come with differing terms of service, experiences, requirements and expectations

that must be accounted for in forming a cohesive and effective land force.

3-32. Land forces require sufficient and effective equipment, designed, manufactured and

scaled according to the likely or directed operational requirement. Equipment can be

operational or non-operational, deployable or non-deployable. Equipment care is the

responsibility of all soldiers to ensure that equipment is serviceable for

use on operations and training and money is not wasted.

3-33. Equipment programmes follow a cycle of concept, assessment, demonstration,

manufacture, in-service use and disposal. This process can be time and resource

intensive and may not be sufficiently responsive to the needs of an adaptable

land force. Alternative procurement methods exist through the urgent capability

requirement process, but these can be expensive. The Army, therefore, seeks to

reduce the difference between programmed and urgent procurement. This requires

first an understanding of the nature and character of conflict and of doctrine. It

also depends on a coherent research and development programme between the UK

Government and industry, experimentation, and operational analysis. Additionally,

harnessing initiative, creativity and innovation through lessons processes improves the

equipment availability of the force and identifies novel ways of

adapting its use.

3-34. Training is the essential vehicle by which all three components of Fighting Power are

developed. Force preparation relies on a structured training progression, tailored to the

operating context, tempo and the resources available. The overall progression begins with

19 This is not quite the same as the Armed Forces Covenant, a policy codiï¬cation of the military covenant, in which the UK Government

encourages community support to service personnel, veterans and families.

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turning recruits into soldiers. They are then trained in a specific role, individually and as

part of a team. The team is trained to be a coherent part of a sub-unit. The sub-unit is

then trained to operate within a combined arms grouping; the combined arms grouping

is then trained within a formation context. Once in units, through the progression

soldiers develop interoperability not only with other arms and Services but also allied

nations. This continuous flow can be divided into individual and collective training.

These two elements are best delivered separately to avoid training a force of individuals,

at a time when that force needs to be training as a whole. Training continues during

operational deployments, not only to maintain core skills, but as part of adaptation, so

the force can employ new tactics, techniques and procedures, and use new equipment.

It cannot be too often repeated that in modern warâ€¦the chief factor in achieving triumph

is what has been done in the way of preparation and training before the beginning of the

war.

Theodore Roosevelt

3-35. AFM Training provides guidance on how to plan and conduct training in

accordance with prioritised direction given by higher headquarters. The

principles of training reflect the cumulative experience of many military

generations and form the bedrock of the Armyâ€™s approach to training.

3-36. As people are the foundation of a land forceâ€™s Fighting Power, training is designed

around individuals first. Intimately related to education, individual training provides

the essential skills needed to conduct operational tasks as a soldier, apply trade skills in

the field and operate as part of a team.

Physical fitness, shooting and fieldcraft

are the essential foundation of military

skills for all soldiers, but are insufficient

for contemporary operations. Other

skills are required, such as the ability

to access and use information, and

to communicate and cooperate with

allies, partners and other actors in the

area of operations. Individual training is

delivered after recruitment, and continues

throughout careers, building upon special-

to-arm expertise. This is essential for

the maintenance and development of

military skills, as they quickly fade if they

are not practised. Individual training is

one of the first responsibilities of commanders; they should ensure that standards are

maintained by, among other things, a cycle of annual skills testing. Strong collective

performances are based on strong individual capabilities, and weaknesses in collective

performance can often be traced to gaps or weaknesses in individual training.

The principles of training:

â€¢ Is a function of command

â€¢ Is a continuous and progressive process

â€¢ Must be challenging and interesting

â€¢ Must be realistic

â€¢ Must have an aim and objectives

â€¢ Training methods must be continuously

reviewed for effectiveness

â€¢ Must reï¬‚ect operational doctrine

â€¢ Must be permissive of error

â€¢ Must be appropriately safe

â€¢ Must be exploited

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3-37. Collective training is the iterative process by which competent individuals are gradually

forged into teams of increasing size, complexity and capability. A force is not ready for

operations until it has undergone robust and realistic collective training, to training

objectives and conditions consistent with the operational requirement. Collective

training seeks to replicate, through simulation and field training, the challenges of

complex operations. The primary purposes of forms of collective training vary, but

each complements the others. Collective training builds competence over time,

beginning with low level team skills, through special-to-arm and combined arms to

joint training. Commanders and staff at all levels participate in command training.

In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or

so irrevocable as in the military.

General MacArthur

3-38. Collective training is described as either foundation or mission specific training. The

collective skills developed are not bound to a single category; rather this description

informs the purpose and resourcing of the training conducted. Foundation training

develops the flexible core competences of the land force, providing it with a firm

foundation from which to adapt to specific operational situations. It takes account of

how the operating environment might change or broaden as well the unchanging aspects

of the nature of conflict. Foundation training seeks to replicate high-intensity, complex

warfighting. It reflects the nature and character of conflict, the austerity of expeditionary

campaigns, and the requirement to fight in both the physical and virtual domains, with,

against and among multiple actors and in view of the rest of the audience. Mission

specific training then addresses inevitable shortfalls in foundation training, and enables

a unitâ€™s adaptation to meet its specific, intended mission. Mission specific training

continues both on arrival in a theatre of operations and during deployment, ensuring

that the force trains in the most current and relevant tactics, techniques and procedures.

3-39. Education contributes, in parallel with training, to the development of Fighting

Power as a whole. Training without education will not be sufficiently sophisticated

to deal with the complexity of conflict and operations. Education without training

does not prepare people to apply the theory. Military education equips individuals

with the breadth and depth of knowledge and skills to assume greater responsibility

and increase their employability. Courses, academic placements and private study

are examples. The adaptability of land forces depends on continuous investment

in, encouragement of and reward for appropriate education. Most importantly,

education gives people the intellectual edge and confidence to improvise, innovate

and find solutions to problems which do not fit the contingency expected.

3-40. Sustainability is essential: even if the force is fully manned and has all the necessary

equipment, if it cannot be sustained, it cannot be employed as intended. Sustainment

also underpins the path from force preparation to deployment. This encompasses

the sustainability of individuals and teams, of training, and of infrastructure and

training space so that soldiers can live and train together in suitable conditions.

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The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends on administration and

transportation . . . It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army

to be and when; it takes much more knowledge and hard work to know where you can

place your forces and whether you can maintain them there.

Field Marshal Wavell

3-41. The physical component is also reliant on wider resources. Manning, equipping,

training and sustaining armed forces costs money. Ultimately, if there are

insufficient resources available on and between operations to recruit, train,

equip, deploy and sustain the force, Fighting Power is severely undermined.

Readiness, deployability and recovery

3-42. Fighting Power can only be applied if the force is held at the appropriate readiness, can

be deployed in time, and then recovered for the next operation. Forces are generally

held at readiness, or notice to move, from their home base or a mounting centre in

the UK. A force at 6 months notice to move, for example, needs that time to train

and gather the necessary resources to complete its Fighting Power. Notice to effect is

largely dependent on the resources, including time, required to deploy and be ready

for employment. Readiness applies to all components of Fighting Power: conceptual

readiness reflects the required understanding and intellectual readiness to adapt to

expected and unexpected contingencies; moral readiness is represented by the leadership

and morale of the force; and physical readiness by the physical state of the force.

3-43. The deployability and recovery of the force requires internal and usually

external, including joint, enablers. For example, the joint force may enable the

deployment of a land force to a point of disembarkation from which it may

need to project itself overland for hundreds of kilometres. These factors must be

accounted for when considering the readiness and overall military effectiveness of

a land force. Enabling actions include: pre-deployment leave; reception, staging,

onward movement and integration (RSOI); the relief in place of the in-place force;

extraction and recovery; decompression; and post-operational tour leave.

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3rd Division - France 1940

The distinction that can be made between pure numbers of troops and their actual

Fighting Power is well illustrated by the contrasting experiences of the British 3rd and

12th Divisions in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in May 1940. Soon after the

German invasion of France on 10 May 1940, the Allied forces were split by a bold and

massive armoured thrust that forced the BEF to fall back towards the port of Dunkirk.

Though having similar numbers of infantry battalions to the 3rd Division, 12th

Divisionâ€™s actual Fighting Power was compromised by a range of powerful

disadvantages. The 3rd Division, as one of the pre-war regular divisions, was a long-

standing force, one of the best equipped in the Army, and had been in France since

late 1939. Its GOC, Montgomery, had trained them hard for 6 months before the

German invasion. But 12th Division was only recently created. The troops had not

trained together; they lacked cohesion, being a collection of disparate battalions; the

senior officers did not know their men; and the division had virtually no anti-tank

weapons, combat support or combat service support.

12th Divisionâ€™s Fighting Power was further compromised by the circumstances in

which it found itself. Deployed to defend lines of communication and so spread over

a wide area, a German breakthrough led the division to be tasked suddenly on 20

May with the defence of the towns of Albert, Amiens, Abbeville and Arras against

Guderianâ€™s advancing XIX Panzerkorps. Though 3rd Divisionâ€™s circumstances were also

difficult, the force having to conduct a fighting withdrawal, they were able to do so

closed up with other divisions to either flank.

Under these circumstances, the contrasting experiences of the two divisions become

easier to understand. In fighting lasting no more than seven hours, 12th Division was

effectively annihilated and was utterly defeated and dispersed. Eight days later, during

the final stages of the withdrawal to Dunkirk, the left flank of the BEF was suddenly

exposed due to Belgiumâ€™s surrender. The 3rd Division (at this stage reduced to almost

50% combat effectiveness after 18 days of continuous combat and withdrawal) was

ordered to disengage from one flank and move to the other. This involved a 50 mile

move across the rear of the BEF and occupation of a position on the Yser Canal.

Though exhausted and in a nearly defeated army, 3rd Division remained a cohesive

fighting force and completed the move in a single night.

Thus, though comparable in numbers, the Fighting Power of the ill-fated 12th Division

was not equal to that of 3rd Division because the 12th laboured under significant

physical, moral and conceptual difficulties brought about by deficiencies in equipment,

training and the circumstances in which the unit had to fight.

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PART 2

Fundamentals

Part 1 described the nature and character of

conflict, and the implications for land forces.

These indicate a need for doctrine that addresses

the increasing global flow and availability of

information as well as the enduring human,

adversarial and political nature of conflict. This

doctrine is Integrated Action â€“ the application of

the full range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities

to change and maintain the understanding and

behaviour of audiences to achieve a successful

outcome. It is a unifying doctrine which guides

the orchestration and execution of operations

whether the task is any combination of fighting,

engagement, security or support. In particular

it provides the conceptual framework for land

forces to succeed in an interconnected world

where information is pervasive. While only

formations at the higher tactical level and

above are routinely resourced and structured

to orchestrate Integrated Action, it governs the way of thinking about all operations,

and informs how they are executed. Integrated Action is explained in Chapter 4.

Integrated Action is supported by the tenets of the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission

Command. The application or threat of lethal force in accordance with the Manoeuvrist

Approach, explained in Chapter 5, is central to combat operations. The Manoeuvrist

Approach is an attitude of mind that seeks indirect approaches in applying strength against

the vulnerabilities of the enemy. It is the British Armyâ€™s fighting doctrine for the tactical level,

specifically focused on the enemy. It is a particularly important aspect of Integrated Action as

combat operations can have far reaching effects at the operational and strategic levels. Mission

Command, the subject of Chapter 6, is our command philosophy. It emphasises decentralised

command, empowers leaders down to the lowest level, and makes them responsible for

acting to achieve their commanderâ€™s intent within designated constraints. Integrated Action

guides the land contribution to joint and multinational operations. It is consistent with the

UK doctrine of Joint Action

. Integrated Action and Joint Action are also consistent with

NATO operational and tactical doctrines. These emphasise the military contribution to an

inter-agency full spectrum approach through the orchestration of the NATO joint functions.

Together, Integrated Action, the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command

form the fundamental ideas of UK land forcesâ€™ doctrine. The Chapters that follow

in Part 2 provide the intellectual foundation for Part 3, which introduces how

operations are conducted and provides the capstone for the AFM series.

20 Joint Action is deï¬ned as the deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to affect actorsâ€™

will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them to achieve inï¬‚uence. (JDP 3-00)

Part 1 â€“ Context

Nature and character of conï¬‚ict

National and operational context

Fighting Power

Part 2 â€“ Fundamentals

ï€´ Integrated Action

ï€´ Manoeuvrist Approach

ï€´ Mission Command

Part 3 â€“ Conduct of operations

Organising for operations

Orchestrating and executing operations

Commanding operations

Sustaining operations

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ADP Land Ops

Chapter 4

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Integrated Action

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Integrated Action is the application of the full range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities to

change and maintain the understanding and behaviour of audiences to achieve a successful

outcome.

Introduction

4-01. Integrated Action describes how land

forces orchestrate and execute operations

in an interconnected world, where

the consequences of military action

are judged by an audience that extends from

immediate participants to distant observers.

Integrated Action requires commanders and staff to

be clear about the outcome that they are seeking and to

analyse the audience relevant to the attainment of

their objectives. They then identify the effects that

they wish to impart on that audience to achieve

the outcome, and what capabilities and actions are

available. These lethal and non-lethal capabilities

may belong to the land force itself, or to joint, inter-governmental, inter-agency, non-

governmental, private sector and multinational actors involved in the operation. What is

important is for commanders and staff to work out how to synchronise and orchestrate

all the relevant levers to impart effects onto the audience to achieve the outcome.

4-02. Integrated Action, with the audience as its major consideration, requires

sophisticated understanding, integration of all capabilities available, and is

outcome-focused. These are the four fundamentals of the doctrine. Within

land forces, the tactical functions are the primary levers of influence.

a. People are at the heart of conflict; it is their decisions and behaviours that determine

how conflict is conducted and resolved. Integrated Action requires consideration of

the diverse audience that is relevant to the attainment of our objectives, globally,

nationally and within theatres of operations.

b. Integrated Action is founded on the land forceâ€™s understanding of its task and

environment. A dynamic approach to understanding, built on a learning culture, allows

the force to adapt and innovate in response to evolving situations.

c. Land forces create desired effects by the integration of lethal and non-lethal

capabilities. Effective integration relies on the cooperation and interoperability of the

CHAPTER 4

Integrated Action

â€¢ Introduction

â€¢ Fundamentals

â€¢ Orchestration and

execution

â€¢ Understanding and the

audience

â€¢ Integration of actions to

achieve desired outcomes

â€¢ Examples of Integrated

Action

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land force, multinational, host nation, inter-governmental, non-governmental and

inter-agency partners, as well as of tactical combined arms formations and units.

d. Integrated Action needs commanders to think about how their actions contribute to

the desired outcomes, in a broad and evolving context. This approach encourages

a wider and longer-term view of a situation, relative to the task and role of the land

force.

4-03. This chapter explains how these fundamentals of Integrated Action are put into

practice. The first section describes what land forces need to understand, with the

priority being the human aspect of the land environment â€“ the audience. The second

section introduces how the land force integrates lethal and non-lethal capabilities

to achieve desired outcomes. The chapter concludes with three examples.

4-04. The doctrine of Integrated Action applies at all levels to land forces,

from the land component of the joint operation, to tactical formations,

units and sub-units. There is, however, an important delineation

between responsibilities for its orchestration and execution.

a. It is only at the higher tactical or operational level (usually the division or corps) that

Integrated Action can be orchestrated and fully aligned with joint, inter-agency and

multinational operations. In certain circumstances, brigades or units may be the

highest level of UK land command in a particular theatre and so may be required to

operate at the operational level. Examples include conducting capacity building or non-

combatant evacuation operations. In such cases, they must be resourced appropriately.

b. Brigades and units at the tactical level plan and execute their contributions to

Integrated Action. They routinely integrate their capabilities and activities to deliver

single tactical actions, as part of a longer term higher tactical or operational level plan.

Understanding and the audience

4-05. Central to Integrated Action is analysis and understanding of the audience relevant

to the attainment of our objectives. We must also develop understanding of the

information and physical aspects of the operating environment, and of the context

and consequences of our actions. However, no amount of analysis can achieve

complete understanding in advance of an operation; and predictable relationships

between cause and effect are rare in adversarial human conflict. Therefore, it is

essential to set the force to learn throughout an operation, generating dynamic and

continuous understanding. This will require specific planned effort, to collect and

analyse information to test deductions, and to refine decisions as to future action.

a. The audience is made up of all the groups and individual people whose perception

and interpretation of events and subsequent behaviour contribute to the success or

otherwise of military action. These groups range from the global audience right down

to immediate participants, as illustrated in Figure 4-1.

b. Within the wider audience are actors â€“ those individuals or groups who take action

or directly exert influence. They include our own forces and allies, as well as others

who are friendly, neutral or hostile to us. Although the audience and actors are not

constrained geographically, tactical level land forces are primarily concerned with

changing or maintaining the behaviour of actors within an area of operations, while

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promoting the consent of the wider audience. These local actors, ranging from armed

groups to non-governmental and private sector organisations, may be, or have the

potential to be supportive, neutral or hostile.

c. Adversaries are a sub-set of actors; they seek to prevent us from achieving our

objectives. They may have many different motivations and may be subject to a broad

range of influences. Adversaries will often present hybrid threats, combining the threat

or application of armed force with deniable or ambiguous actions that may not cross

the threshold of armed conflict.

d. An enemy is a particular kind of adversary, who seeks to oppose us through armed,

lethal means.

The boundaries between these groups are not fixed. For example, adversaries may be

persuaded or elect to become neutral or even friendly actors. Conversely, the unintended

consequences of our actions may see previously neutral actors become our enemies. It is

important to identify how groups and individuals relate to each other, what motivates and

influences them, how they can influence us and how land forces might seek to achieve

advantageous behavioural outcomes while preventing those that are undesirable.

4-06. Commanders must also understand the information aspects of the land environment:

how it can influence the audience, and how, as a resource of the land force, it

supports the integration of actions. As a means of influence, we must understand

what information is relevant and, to whom, how it is received, and how it might

influence peopleâ€™s decision-making and behaviours. We must also understand how

we and other actors compete for influence by using information, in both the physical

and virtual domains. Information is also a fundamental resource of land forces, our

partners and adversaries. It is generated, maintained and transferred primarily in the

virtual domain, which will be contested and potentially denied by adversaries.

Audiences

Actors

Adversaries

Enemies

Audience. All the groups and individual

people whose perception and interpretation

of events and subsequent behaviour contribute

to the success or otherwise of military action

Actors. A group or person that

takes action or directly

exerts inï¬‚uence

Adversary. A group or person that

seeks to prevent us from achieving

our objectives

Enemy. A group or person that seeks

to defeat us through armed lethal means

Figure 4-1. Audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies

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4-07. Understanding how we and others operate in the virtual domain informs how we

protect our own information, and how we might challenge our adversaries. We seek

information superiority, but must be able to operate without it. Understanding the

physical geography of the land environment underpins the effective integration

of physical actions, such as manoeuvre and fires, with other levers of influence,

for example, information activities or those delivered by other instruments of

power. First, we must understand the military relevance of the terrain, both as

an objective of land operations and as the medium through which operations

are conducted. Factors include the ground, weather, climate and infrastructure.

Secondly, we need to understand the relevance of the physical geography to the

audience. Different people perceive and use the physical environment in significantly

different ways. For example, a particular building may hold cultural significance to

a key audience, and so should not be considered solely for its physical utility.

4-08. The context comprises the historical, political, economic, cultural and social

background to the situation or conflict. It shapes what resources and missions are

allocated to land forces, their freedoms, constraints and relationships with other

actors. It also shapes, but cannot predict, the likely consequences of our actions,

which in turn contribute to the evolving context. Actions will have both intended

and unintended effects. These can be positive or negative, immediate, short or

long term, and will be perceived and interpreted differently by different parts of

the audience. Commanders, therefore, need to constantly assess and re-assess the

consequences of their actions, as perceived by the audience, and adjust accordingly.

Integration of actions to achieve desired outcomes

4-09. Understanding is a means to an end; nothing happens until action is taken. What

is important is to draw from the available relevant information what effects and

combinations of actions are required, and then to act appropriately and quickly, relative

to other actors. Furthermore, it is through action that understanding is often best

developed. Only so much can be learned through observation and study; early actions

should usually be seen as a bridge from preliminary understanding to Integrated Action.

4-10. Integrated Action blends lethal and non-lethal actions to have effects on the

understanding, physical capability, will and cohesion of the audience. Organised into

attainable objectives, these effects are ultimately realised in peopleâ€™s minds, influencing

their decision making, to achieve the desired outcomes. Although not all tactical

activities are directed against people, the ultimate targets of land power are the audience

and actors (including enemies, adversaries, allies and civilians). Integrated Action is

planned from desired outcome back to actions, through objectives and effects, and

adjusted in execution in response to what has been learned and the changing situation.

4-11. Informed by continuous analysis of the audience, the commander describes the desired

outcomes, an outcome being a favourable and enduring situation. Where appropriate

to the tasks assigned and the resources available, outcomes are described in terms of

changed or maintained understanding and behaviour. In all cases, however, land forces

operate in a context where the success of military actions is judged by a wide audience.

4-12. Because military operations are unpredictable, they must be designed to

allow those executing the plan to focus on clearly defined and attainable

tactical objectives, in the context of desired and potential outcomes.

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4-13. Objectives are achieved by effects that bring about changes (or not) in a particular

object, for example maintaining the support of particular actors or denying an enemy

access to a piece of terrain. Integrated Action, seeks effects on the understanding,

physical capability, and will and cohesion of actors, consistent with the desired outcome.

a. The decision-making of actors is, like ours, grounded on their understanding, how

they perceive and interpret particular situations. Actions can affect their understanding

directly or indirectly. Often, how key individuals understand a situation can affect

the decisions and behaviour of larger groups. For example, enemy commanders who

have been deceived, or denied the ability to make accurate assessments, will give less

effective direction to their subordinates; a force might show additional resolve as a

result of the actions of just one individual; or a community might leave a town or stay

in it, support an enemy or not, depending on how a few influential people interpret

the situation.

b. Our actions can damage, build or maintain physical capability in the form of people,

equipment and infrastructure and the means to sustain or direct them. For example, an

enemyâ€™s physical capability can be destroyed or denied; partner forces can be equipped

and trained; and communities can be provided with or given improved access to

resources and infrastructure.

c. Our actions can seek to affect actorsâ€™ will and cohesion positively or negatively,

depending on the desired outcome. Land forces can use Integrated Action to bolster

or maintain partner and community will and cohesion, for example, by using capacity

building or fire support to improve partner forcesâ€™ morale.

4-14. Having identified the effects required, a commander integrates the actions and

capabilities available to achieve them. Those actions taken by the land force are

normally worded as tasks, which, together with their purpose, constitute subordinatesâ€™

missions. At the tactical level, such missions are typically fixed: they require

specific activity, such as attacking, seizing terrain, building a bridge or providing

logistic support. A capacity to think laterally beyond these missions is, however,

required; commanders must always consider the wider impact of their actions and

how they might contribute to first and second order effects and outcomes.

The Tactical Functions

4-15. The tactical functions are the primary levers of influence, representing the full

breadth of the forceâ€™s activities that are integrated when orchestrating and executing

operations. These are, however, rarely sufficient. Commanders and staff must

also seek to integrate a range of different levers not under their direct control;

they must, therefore, cooperate with joint, inter-governmental, inter-agency, non-

governmental, private sector and multinational actors involved in the operation.

4-16. Those tactical functions mainly directed towards actors are: manoeuvre, fires,

information activities and capacity building.

Their successful application

depends on command and intelligence which set the operationâ€™s direction,

and protection and sustainment which enable the mission. These tactical

functions can also have direct and indirect effects on the audience as well as

on the mission itself. For example, how a force collects intelligence, protects or

sustains itself may directly affect the audienceâ€™s perceptions of the force.

21 Capacity building is the land force contribution to outreach in Joint Action.

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4-17. The nature of the task determines how the tactical functions are applied. When fighting,

for example, the main effects sought are on the will of the enemy and so this aspect of

Integrated Action is guided at the tactical level by the Manoeuvrist Approach. As each

operation is unique, however, there is no single way by which actions are integrated.

Rather, there are doctrinal frameworks, common to varying degrees in joint and NATO

doctrine, which aid the organisation and visualisation of Integrated Action. These are the

operational and tactical frameworks, which link groups of actions by their purpose,

and the geographic framework which does so by their location in relation to the

force. The tactical functions and doctrinal frameworks are explained in Chapter 8.

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Gulf War - 1990/1991

In August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Soon after, the United Nations

Security Council authorised a coalition of 34 nations to eject Iraqi forces. The

campaign lasted from 2 August 1990 to 28 February 1991. The fighting in 1991 is

remembered by many as being largely about fires and manoeuvre. But from national

capitals to the battlegroup level, there were important political and information

activities aspects to the operation, integrated with fires and manoeuvre, which

included many of the elements of Integrated Action in a warfighting operation.

At the strategic level, the first challenge was to assemble the Coalition in Saudi Arabia.

This was hugely sensitive because the arrival of thousands of Western soldiers and

airmen in the cradle of Islam was unprecedented and in many quarters unwelcome.

Part of the solution was to place Coalition forces under overall Saudi command,

with the components commanded by US generals. The Coalition was eventually

700,000 strong with the major contributions from the United States, UK, Saudi

Arabia, France, Egypt and Syria. Subsequently, the major issues were building and

maintaining consent for the operation, keeping the Coalition together, and retaining

campaign authority. In the time before the internet, print and broadcast media played

a key role in informing opinions at home. Live TV, used by both sides to inform

audiences, was particularly prominent. The cohesion of the Coalition was critical,

and also a potential vulnerability. Retaining campaign authority was essential.

At the operational and tactical level, psychological operations played an important role

in demoralising Iraqi forces. Initially Iraqi troops occupying Kuwait were reached by

using smugglers to get small radios and cassette tapes into Kuwait. The 50,000 tapes

that were smuggled in had popular Arabic music on them and also messages from the

Coalition, crafted by the Saudis to appeal to their intended audience. When the six

week air campaign began in January 1991, coalition air raids deliberately destroyed

the Iraqi TV system, and filled the void with their own broadcasts, again designed

and presented with Saudi assistance. Indeed, the air campaign itself was intended to

be a powerful political and psychological instrument. Whilst preparatory air attacks

failed to coerce Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, the impunity with which Coalition

air attacks were conducted provided compelling evidence of the Coalitionâ€™s military

superiority. These air attacks also imposed significant physical and psychological attrition

on defending Iraqi forces. Iraqi defences were bombed and leafleted to encourage

desertion and later, honourable surrender. Some battlegroup objectives were also attacked

with lethal force while surrender was encouraged and enabled by loudspeaker.

The manoeuvre of the land component of the campaign delivered the decisive coup

de grÃ¢ce. Controversially, the ground operation was brought to a close after only 100

hours, largely because of the threat of the loss of campaign authority. The reaction of

the audiences at home to what seemed excessive destruction of defeated Iraqi forces

on the Basra Road; the threat of the disintegration of the Coalition if the Western

members were to go on to Baghdad; and the willingness of the Iraqis to negotiate

a surrender were all considerations that brought military operations to an end.

Thus, Coalition success required the careful integration of political, psychological,

and military activity in order to achieve the campaignâ€™s limited declaratory goals.

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Operation HAMKARI - Afghanistan 2010

In 2010 the surge of United States forces into Afghanistan allowed the International

Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) to attempt to regain the initiative in Kandahar

province. In Regional Command (South), Kandahar City was the key, because it

was the heart of the Pashtun south, the birthplace of the Taliban movement, the

former de facto capital of the Taliban government, and the home of President Karzai.

For the Taliban, if they could not seize and hold Kandahar, then contesting it was

important for their attempts to appear a viable rival to the Afghan government.

The commanding general realised that efforts in Kandahar province could not simply comprise

a physical effort to drive out the Taliban; there would also have to be a political effort to re-

connect the people to the Afghan government. The preliminary requirement was to understand

the physical, human and information aspects of the environment. A particular focus was to

establish which actors could enable or undermine the operation, and to determine who it was

that could provide the conduits within the Government, and also from within the population

at large, to effect the necessary change. It was also essential to understand what tools or

levers could be applied to achieve the desired behaviour from these actors. Certain actors

might be supportive if their agricultural and economic problems were addressed; others

might have to be removed and replaced; others empowered by another authority; some

might join the Afghan security forces; many would need to be defeated by military action.

Operation HAMKARI (from the word â€˜cooperationâ€™ in Dari and Pashto) was launched

in July 2010 as a combined civil-military operation to deny the Taliban control of key

terrain around the city and to improve governance and development. Taliban access into

Kandahar City was dependent on their control of the surrounding districts, where they

had a relatively secure refuge from which they controlled or influenced the population.

Phase One involved extensive shaping operations. These operations included efforts

by the Afghan Government to place the right personnel in key appointments in order

to improve the capability and legitimacy of local government. They also included

targeted raids to capture or kill Taliban leaders. Afghan government forces established

physical control of Kandahar city enabling them to control the flow of population in

and out, and therefore also cutting off the insurgent supply and infiltration routes.

Subsequently, the divisionâ€™s brigades executed overlapping decisive phases. Each brigade

was assigned one of the surrounding districts which they cleared sequentially. Arghandab

district was first. It was historically and physically important terrain for the Taliban and a

major centre of improvised explosive device (IED) production and arms caches. Afghan

and ISAF forces began the clearing operation in late July, targeting the strongholds

in west-central Arghandab, and by the beginning of October they had cleared the

enemy positions and IED belts. These activities were accompanied by parallel efforts to

improve the effectiveness of civil government. The other districts, and more fighting,

followed, but the Taliban in the region were defeated. The remaining Taliban fighters

either fled or laid down their arms; some joined ISAF cash-for-work programmes.

Operation HAMKARI consciously blended all non-lethal and lethal means available to

the commander to change the physical capability, will and cohesion, understanding and

behaviour of key targeted actors. It was, effectively, an exercise in Integrated Action.

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Operation GRITROCK - Sierra Leone 2014

A task force under command of a brigade headquarters deployed to Sierra Leone in

September 2014 to assist the UK Department for International Development (DFID)

to support the Government of Sierra Leone in countering the outbreak of the ebola

virus. Although there was a security risk, the main threat was not an armed enemy,

but a lethal virus. Since the security threat was not primarily military in character,

Defence was in a supporting role at the strategic level. Nevertheless, on the ground

the military were required to provide a framework of command and control,

coordination and action which proved critical to the success of the operation.

The tri-service force was initially commanded by a logistic brigade headquarters. It included

combat and combat support force elements (infantry, combat engineer, communications,

intelligence, and information activities forces) and combat service support to enable the mission.

Critical force elements were joint or drawn from other components, including: a tri-service

medical group, RAF strategic lift and RFA ARGUS. Although it was clear that the British military

was not in the lead, the force was a key resource, and the command and control and medical

capabilities provided by the military were particularly valuable to the UK-led international effort.

At the initiation of Operation GRITROCK, the threat was extreme and the situation

was deteriorating. There was an infection rate of 600 people per week (and climbing),

many hospitals and medical centres had closed, there were dead bodies in the streets

and health care workers were contracting the disease at an unsustainable rate.

The brigade commanderâ€™s first task was to begin to understand the problem and to build

relationships with key individuals and organisations. The commander had had some first-

hand experience of the country, and the Army had been engaged in Sierra Leone for over

14 years. There was considerable local knowledge, some key personal relationships already

existed and the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence were well-

disposed to the British and competent. By developing an understanding of the nature and

outlook of all the key actors in Sierra Leone and in London, the brigade commander was able

to begin to work out how best to assist DFIDâ€™s team on the ground, and their 2* overall lead.

The efforts of the Sierra Leone Government, DFID, NGOs and the supporting military task

force turned the situation around over a period of months. Many more people died, but the

virus outbreak was stabilised, contained and eliminated. The military contribution, although

a supporting effort, was vital to the success of the operation. It had a very significant

influence on planning, strategy, conduct of the operation, the maintenance of morale of

NGOs and Sierra Leonean health services, and the continuance of effective governance in

the country. For example, the military were able to deploy trained and equipped medical

staff immediately into theatre; they built and then operated ebola treatment centres;

they provided a framework for the training of local medical, police and government

personnel; they provided critical logistic capabilities for the ebola treatment programme.

The doctrine of Integrated Action did not exist during Operation GRITROCK, but

the brigade commander consciously used the tools of operational art and counter-

insurgency doctrine to guide his actions. His approach focused on identifying the

desired outcomes and objectives, and the human audience and actors whose behaviour

would be essential for success. Some of those actors were his superiors in London and

partners in Sierra Leone. Some of them he could influence personally or by the words

or deeds of his task force; others had to be reached vicariously through the Sierra

Leonean authorities and media, DFID, and relevant NGOs. Operation GRITROCK is a good

example of the ideas of Integrated Action being applied in a non-conflict situation.

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ADP Land Ops

Chapter 5

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Manoeuvrist Approach

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CHAPTER 5

Manoeuvrist Approach

Introduction

5-01. The Manoeuvrist Approach is the Armyâ€™s fighting

doctrine for the tactical level. It determines the

way we fight enemies across the different types of

operation, and because fighting can have extremely

significant consequences, it is set in the broader

context of the audience and Integrated Action. It

is an indirect approach which emphasises effects

on the will of the enemy. It blends lethal and non-

lethal actions to achieve objectives which shape

the enemyâ€™s understanding, undermine their will

and break their cohesion. It aims to apply strength

against vulnerabilities. Significant features are momentum, tempo and agility, which

in combination lead to shock and surprise. It entails doing the unexpected, using

initiative and seeking originality, combined with a relentless determination to succeed.

5-02. This section describes the requirements of the Manoeuvrist Approach; ways

of seizing and holding the initiative; and how to shape the understanding of

enemies, undermine their will and break their cohesion. Although explained

separately below, gaining the initiative and attacking vulnerabilities must

be seamlessly connected. Each reinforces and enables the other.

Requirements

5-03. The Manoeuvrist Approach, enabled by Mission Command, has two specific

requirements: an attitude of mind and understanding of the enemyâ€™s vulnerabilities.

5-04. First, the Manoeuvrist Approach requires an attitude of mind that seeks indirect

solutions to reduce the enemyâ€™s will to fight, by pitching our strength against enemy

vulnerability, rather than strength. This indirect approach emphasises the use of initiative

to act in original ways unexpected by the enemy and a relentless determination to

retain the initiative and exploit success. It does not preclude destruction of the enemy

so long as the results sought are disproportionately greater than the resources applied

and the enemyâ€™s will to fight is undermined and their cohesion shattered. It depends

on practical knowledge, agility, Mission Command and the willingness to accept risks.

5-05. The second requirement is an understanding of the enemyâ€™s vulnerabilities, both before

contact and as they appear and evolve during battle. Centre of gravity analysis can be a

useful tool for this. The Manoeuvrist Approach guides us to ï¬nd, attack, and exploit these

vulnerabilities in an enemyâ€™s strength. Additionally, commanders must consider carefully how

the enemy themselves might apply the Manoeuvrist Approach. They must understand their

Manoeuvrist Approach

â€¢ Introduction

â€¢ Requirements:

â€¢ Understanding

â€¢ Attitude of mind

â€¢ Psychological impact

â€¢ Seizing the initiative

â€¢ Shaping understanding

â€¢ Attacking will and cohesion

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own centre of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, and protect their forces accordingly. Contextual

understanding is also necessary. The Manoeuvrist Approach is not executed in isolation

from wider contextual and operational factors, for example, domestic appetite for risk and

casualties (of friendly and enemy forces), or second and third order effects of actions taken.

Psychological impact of the Manoeuvrist Approach

5-06. The tools of seizing the initiative, shaping understanding and attacking will and

cohesion are means to an end. By holding the initiative and operating at higher tempo

than the enemy, we aim to impose multiple, simultaneous dilemmas, forcing the

enemy to make decisions favourable to us or, when necessary, to induce shock and so

render the enemy incapable of rational decision making. The classic physiological and

psychological symptoms of shock are numbness and irrational behaviour, preventing

the enemy from responding effectively to a developing situation. It is most debilitating

when the full range of the forceâ€™s capabilities, lethal and non-lethal, is applied against

enemy vulnerabilities. As an effect, shock is both unpredictable and temporary, so

its effects must be rapidly exploited before the enemy can respond effectively.

Seizing and holding the initiative

5-07. The initiative is the ability to dictate the course of events, to decide and act

before our opponents do and so gain advantage. In contact with an enemy,

gaining, regaining and retaining the initiative requires: tempo, surprise, pre-

emption, momentum, simultaneity, exploitation and avoiding culmination.

They cannot be applied in isolation, but are mutually reinforcing.

5-08. Tempo is the rate of activity of operations relative to an enemyâ€™s. It is about acting more

quickly than the enemy. The side which consistently decides and acts fastest should gain

and hold an advantage. Speed and quality of decision-making, while necessary to gain

and hold the initiative, is not sufficient. Action must follow swiftly, enabled by Mission

Command and good battle procedure. Often a perfect plan made and executed too

late will fail, whereas an imperfect one made before an enemy can act will succeed.

5-09. Surprise is an important way of seizing and retaining the initiative. It must be central

to the design of all combat operations and be sought by commanders at all levels.

a. Surprise is a potent psychological weapon, causing shock through unexpected action in

time, space and method. For example, surprise can be achieved by: attacking an enemy

earlier or more rapidly than anticipated, including through cyber electromagnetic

activities (time); attacking the enemyâ€™s rear, or preparing well concealed depth

defences (space); unforeseen employment of air manoeuvre or indigenous forces, the

concealment and employment of reserves or sudden withdrawal to defensive positions

(method).

b. The increasing visibility of a land forceâ€™s actions places increased importance on the

use of deception to achieve surprise and to protect the forceâ€™s own vulnerabilities.

Deception is defined as those measures designed to mislead the enemy by

manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce them to react in a

manner prejudicial to their interests. There are two methods of deception: simulation,

which deliberately allows an enemy to see false activity (for example through a

demonstration); and dissimulation, which is hiding the reality by concealing it or

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making it appear to be something else. Deception plans must have a clearly defined

aim, be convincing by playing to enemyâ€™s perceptions, prejudices and likely reactions,

and be flexible, without consuming disproportionate resources or time. Enemies will

also employ deception, requiring commanders and staff to have a sceptical mind-set.

c. The acme of surprise is when it combines high tempo physical manoeuvre, superiority

in the virtual domain, and concentrated application of violence â€“ sometimes termed

â€˜shock actionâ€™. Enabled by security, surprise involves using combinations of secrecy,

concealment, deception, originality, audacity and tempo to confuse, paralyse or disrupt

effective decision-making, and undermine an adversaryâ€™s morale. Thus it is instrumental

not only to gaining the initiative, but also subsequently to attacking and defeating the

enemy. It need not be total, but merely sufficient to instil doubt, delaying a decision

or an action until it is too late. The effects of surprise are transitory, as shock and

confusion recede over time, so its effects should be exploited rapidly and aggressively.

5-10. Pre-emption is to seize an opportunity, which may itself be fleeting, to deny the enemy

an advantage before they act. It denies them the initiative and frustrates their plan.

Its success lies in the speed with which the situation can be subsequently exploited.

5-11. Momentum is the driving force of a moving object. Maintaining momentum

keeps an enemy off-balance and enables a commander to retain the

initiative. As a product of velocity and mass, it is liable to be reduced through

either a loss of speed or of combat power, stalling the operation and so

allowing the enemy to regain the initiative. Exploitation of momentum

creates the bridge from seizing the initiative to achieving success.

5-12. Simultaneity seeks to disrupt the decision-making process of opponents by confronting

them with a number of concurrent problems. By attacking or threatening enemies in

many ways and from many directions at once, in the physical and virtual domains,

they cannot concentrate on any one attack, nor establish priorities between them.

They cannot choose how and where to react; they are torn between multiple threats

and find it hard to respond coherently. Enemy cohesion is particularly susceptible

when several layers of their command system are acted against simultaneously.

5-13. Exploitation is defined as taking full advantage of success in battle and following

up initial gains.

If not exploited, the effects of surprise and shock, pre-emption, tempo,

momentum and simultaneity are likely to be local and temporary. A capable enemy

will try to recover and seek ways of regaining the initiative. Therefore success should

be exploited to maintain the initiative, extend and expand its effects and encourage

collapse. Exploitation can be planned or opportunistic. Planned exploitation is designed

in advance to follow anticipated success and may require fresh, echeloned forces.

Opportunistic exploitation is a way of building on local success. It should be carried out

with the resources at hand and should be initiated as soon as an opportunity is recognised,

particularly at lower tactical levels. The most effective exploitation integrates the full range

of lethal and non-lethal capabilities available to the force, appropriate according to the

task and environment. For example, a combat action may be exploited by manoeuvre

and information activities or, in a counter-insurgency context, by a combination of

information activities and capacity building. Exploitation is enabled by Mission Command,

effective understanding and balanced, mobile and flexible reserve or echeloned forces,

which can be deployed rapidly to take advantage of the opportunities presented.

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5-14. Avoiding culmination is also key and must be constantly balanced with the advantages

presented by exploitation. The culminating point is defined as the point in time and the

location at which a force no longer has the capability to continue an operation under

current conditions and so loses the initiative. An operational pause may be required: a

temporary and deliberate cessation of certain activities during the course of an operation

to avoid reaching the culminating point and to be able to regenerate the combat power

required to proceed with the next stage of the operation. Anticipation of when or where a

force might reach a culminating point requires detailed understanding of the environment

as well as of friendly and enemy forces. Implementation of an operational pause at a

place and time to the advantage of friendly forces allows the initiative to be maintained.

Shaping understanding

5-15. The Manoeuvrist Approach seeks to manipulate an enemyâ€™s understanding to produce

behavioural outcomes favourable to the friendly force. The perception of failure is the

best mechanism by which to promote actual failure, convincing the enemy of the futility

of their actions. The shock induced by surprise and an enemyâ€™s loss of initiative all

contribute to this perception of failure. Security, deception and information activities

amplify their effects and are therefore central to the Manoeuvrist Approach. They

are not, however, sufficient. Shaping the enemyâ€™s understanding conclusively is rarely

achievable without the application or threat of force, attacking will and cohesion.

Attacking will and cohesion

5-16. The will and cohesion of a force are indivisible. Will is the determination to

persist in the face of adversity. It has two aspects: intent and resolve. Both can be

influenced, attacked and undermined. The enemyâ€™s intent is thwarted when they

believe that their aim is no longer achievable, and so desist from their course of

action. The enemyâ€™s resolve is their strength of will. It is overcome when they are

demoralised and no longer have the desire to continue. It is intimately linked to

the cohesion of the force. The same principle applies to our own force; we must

protect our own will and cohesion from the actions of enemies and adversaries.

5-17. Troops who have moral cohesion stick together: they continue to fight despite adversity

and local reverses. It relies on leadership, perception of success, confidence and trust

that forces will be supported and sustained. It cannot, therefore, be separated from the

physical cohesion that gives a force its potential to mass forces and effects at the time

and place of its choosing. Physical cohesion relies on sustainment, freedom of movement,

and effective command systems of leaders, command posts and communications.

5-18. Physical capability is also a feature of cohesion. If key combat forces, combat service

support or command nodes are lost or threatened, then both moral and physical cohesion

of the enemy are reduced, while the freedom of action and initiative of friendly forces are

enhanced. Attacking and often destroying physical capabilities is therefore required by

the Manoeuvrist Approach as a means to an end of defeating the enemyâ€™s will to fight.

5-19. Ultimately, without moral and physical cohesion, a force becomes less than the sum of

its parts and readily susceptible to shock. As well as using surprise and pre-emption,

cohesion and will can be attacked through dislocation, disruption and destruction.

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a. Dislocation denies the enemy the ability to bring their strengths to bear, or to

persuade them that their strength is irrelevant. Its purpose is wider than the frustration

of the enemyâ€™s plan; it is about ensuring that their strengths are in the wrong place.

It may be deliberate or a fortunate consequence of other actions. Deep penetration,

envelopment and deception are three methods of dislocation. Another method is

distraction, encouraging the enemy to cover more options than they can afford.

b. Disruption can be used to break apart and confuse assets that are critical to the

employment and coherence of the enemyâ€™s fighting power. It aims to rupture the

integrity of a force, to render it incapable of deciding and acting purposefully. Military

targets might include communication networks, command centres, transport nodes,

or logistic facilities. Against irregular forces, disruption can be achieved by attacking

vulnerabilities in the enemyâ€™s networks.

c. Destruction, when unsupported or unfocused, is not normally a major contributor

to shock, other than when used on a massive scale. Otherwise, the careful selection

and destruction of discrete capabilities or force elements amplifies the effects of

surprise, dislocation and disruption, and can be decisive in undermining an enemyâ€™s

will to fight. Such targeted destruction may well be the focus of all of the forces

of a particular formation or battlegroup within a wider concept of operations. The

effects of destruction also extend beyond the elimination of a particular capability and

demoralisation of the wider force. Second order consequences may include adverse

or positive reactions from across the audience, or a later requirement to reinstate the

same capability for use by friendly forces or the local population.

Attacking will and cohesion - Falkland Islands 1982

42 Commando assaulted Mount Harriet in the Falklands on the night of 11 June 1982 in

a surprise attack from the enemyâ€™s rear. The 4th Argentine Infantry Regiment, defending

Harriet, expected an attack from Mount Wall to the west; a diversionary attack by 12

Troop of 42 Commando reinforced that perception. The main body attacked from the

south-east and approached to within about a hundred metres of the Argentine positions

before it was detected. The assault was very rapid: leading elements reached the crest of

Mount Harriet within 40 minutes; the crest line was cleared within about two hours; and

the fighting was largely complete within 5 hours.

The Argentine regimental command post and mortar platoon were overrun early in the

assault. This was a lucky consequence of the chosen axis of attack but the effects of this

selective destruction were significant. The Argentines lost much of their primary indirect

fire support and command and control of their forces; both affected their cohesion. An

Argentine company commander attempted to organise a counter-attack force on the

north side of the ridgeline; however a sudden, concentrated artillery fire mission broke up

the attack. The survivors were seen fleeing east towards Stanley through the smoke and

darkness. The surprise attack, shock action and some aspects of the destruction achieved

had overcome the 4th Infantry Regimentâ€™s cohesion; it collapsed and was effectively

destroyed as a fighting force.

Abridged from Nicholas van der Bijl, Nine Battles to Stanley (1999)

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Colonel John Boyd and the OODA loop

Boyd was the USAF officer who developed the â€˜OODA loopâ€™: a decision-action cycle of

observe, orient, decide and act. It came from his experience of air combat between USAF

F86 Sabres and Chinese MiG 15s in the Korean War. In many ways the MiG 15 was a

better aircraft than the Sabre, but the Sabre was far superior in combat. Boyd wanted to

understand why.

Boyd concluded that the Sabreâ€™s bubble canopy gave US pilots better visibility and

situational awareness than their opponents. Also, Sabres had early hydraulic flight controls,

unlike the MiGs, so pilots could more rapidly manoeuvre the aircraft. The psychological

stress of being in combat with a Sabre increased USAF superiority as it caused many MiG

15 pilots to panic and underperform.

He posited that pilots operated a decision making process in a continuous cycle of: observe,

orient, decide and act (OODA). Later this idea was expanded to describe the cycle that

any dynamic organisation goes through. Boyd saw that the goal was to go more rapidly

through the cycle than the opponent, and try to slow the opponentâ€™s cycle. The critical

proviso was that the orientation phase was most important: if the wrong judgements were

made this would lead to incorrect and possibly fatal decisions irrespective of the speed of

the cycle.

We see it now as a helpful way to understand the concept of tempo. A force and its

adversaries observe the unfolding situation. They orient themselves to the situation,

decide what to do, and act. The decision and action stages give continuous feedback to

observation and so the process goes on.

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ADP Land Ops

Chapter 6

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Mission Command

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CHAPTER 6

Mission Command

Introduction

6-01. Command is the authority vested in an

individual of the armed forces for the direction,

coordination, and control of military forces.

The manner in which command is exercised by

armed forces is described as their command

philosophy. The British Armyâ€™s command

philosophy is Mission Command. This philosophy

is founded on the clear expression of intent by commanders, and the freedom of

subordinates to act to achieve that intent. Mission Command is common across Defence

and is the allied concept for command and control of NATO land forces.

As a command

philosophy, it comprises commonly understood principles and guidelines for application;

its expression will, however, vary in relation to cultural, task and operational factors.

This chapter places Mission Command in context, explaining the nature of command.

It then describes Mission Command, its principles and how it is applied in practice.

Context

6-02. Historically, land forces have employed different command philosophies, ranging

from Mission Command to more centralised control.

Centralised control seeks to

impose order and certainty on the battlefield. It does not, however, account for the

adversarial and dynamic nature of conflict, where success comes from the speed

of appropriate reaction to a changing situation, and from the initiative and will to

fight of every soldier and unit. Higher commanders responsible for planning and

executing operations cannot feasibly make timely and appropriate lower level tactical

decisions; these are best made quickly by subordinate commanders on the spot.

6-03. In conflict, even the most robust communication systems are not completely

reliable. This failure occurs through either the friction inherent in conflict or an

adversaryâ€™s cyber or electromagnetic attack. In such circumstances, subordinates

require freedom of action, within the constraints of their commandersâ€™ intent,

to prevail over friction and chaos. Success demands a command philosophy

which draws strength from but is not reliant on improving communications,

enables the rapid identification and exploitation of opportunity to match strength

against vulnerability, and harnesses the disciplined initiative of all forces.

22 There is no formally agreed NATO deï¬nition of Mission Command. This

chapter is consistent with NATO and joint descriptions.

â€¢ Introduction

â€¢ Context

â€¢ Nature of command

â€¢ Mission Command

â€¢ Principles

â€¢ Application

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Nature of command

6-04. For UK Armed Forces, command authority has a legal and constitutional

status, codified for the British Army in Queenâ€™s Regulations, and is vested in

commanders by a higher authority that gives direction and assigns forces for

them to accomplish missions. The exercise of command is the process by which

commanders make decisions, impress their will on and transmit their intentions

to subordinates. With authority comes responsibility and accountability â€“ all

three of which must be correctly aligned for command to be effective.î€This is

particularly important when responsibility is delegated, as it usually is.î€Authority

is the power and right to give orders and enforce obedience.î€Responsibility is the

ability and obligation to act independently and make decisions.î€Accountability

is the requirement and expectation to justify actions and decisions.

a. Authority may come with a specific appointment, by virtue of rank, or be delegated

by an appropriately authorised superior. When a commander delegates authority, the

scope of that authority is stated in orders, including the command relationships of

subordinate force elements. When a commander delegates responsibility, it must be

matched with the required delegated authority. Too little authority and the subordinate

will not be able to assume full responsibility. Too much and a subordinate may

misjudge and over-reach. It is essential that subordinate commanders and staff officers

do not exceed their authority.

b. With the authority granted to

commanders comes a wide range of

standing responsibilities, dependent

on their position, rank or delegations.

In addition to these, military operations

in general and Mission Command in

particular rely on subordinates receiving

additional responsibility for missions

and tasks so that they can achieve their

commanderâ€™s intent. It is essential that the

responsibility assigned over the forces and

resources matches the mission or task, and

that the requisite authority accompanies

it. Otherwise, the subordinate will not

have the required materials and power to

succeed. Responsibility also involves an

obligation to complete the task to the best

of a commanderâ€™s ability.

c. Accountability ensures that authority is exercised appropriately and that

responsibilities are fulfilled. Whoever has authority and responsibility for anything will,

if necessary, be required to justify their actions, and will be responsible in law for their

decisions and actions.

Figure 6-1. Functions of command

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6-05. By delegation, commanders use their authority to ensure that along with resources,

subordinates receive the appropriate authority and responsibility for their missions

and tasks. Whoever has authority delegated to them becomes accountable for the

mission and the conduct of the forces under their command. Delegation does not

detract from the authority of superior commanders (delegation can be rescinded),

and since they are responsible for the decision to delegate and for the actions of

subordinates, the superior commanders retain overall accountability. So, commanders

and subordinates to whom they delegate share authority, responsibility and

accountability for delegated missions and for the forces under their command.

6-06. Military command at all levels is the art of decision making, motivating and directing

forces into action to accomplish missions. It is founded on understanding and constant

assessment of the operating environment and its various actors and audiences, people,

resources, risk and desired outcomes. A commander determines courses of action to be

taken, leads the force and controls the execution of the mission. The three functions

of command, which are inter-dependent, are decision-making, leadership and control

(see Figure 6-1). A command system comprises not only the commander, but also the

staff who, depending on the level of command, contribute to the effect of all three

functions, with particular emphasis on control. Deficiencies in any of the constituents

of command have a detrimental effect on a forceâ€™s fighting power as a whole.

a. Timely, accurate and effective decision-making (including assessing risk) increases

tempo relative to opponents, thereby increasing the probability of success on

operations. Decision-making stems from a blend of structured military processes

and intuition, developed through experience, education and training. Intuition and

judgement are key when making difficult decisions, evaluating risk and exploiting

fleeting opportunities on the basis of incomplete information. Knowing when to

be resolute and when to consider a change in direction are fundamental skills of

a commander and are features of strong leadership. Making major decisions is

a commanderâ€™s responsibility, including judgements relating to the whole force,

especially those relating to less quantifiable aspects of the art of war, for example

when to decide and when to act. The staff also make certain decisions on behalf of the

commander, appropriate to their delegated authority, as well as assist the commanderâ€™s

decision-making.

b. The way in which commanders exercise leadership of their staff and subordinates

necessarily impacts on the conduct of the force. Commanders must be strong leaders,

capable of adapting their leadership style to the requirements of the operation and

force. Different circumstances demand varying degrees of regulation, delegation,

inspiration and coercion. Army Leadership Doctrine explores in detail this critical

constituent of command.

c. As a function of command, control is the oversight, direction, and coordination

of assigned forces in accordance with the commanderâ€™s plan and intent. Control is

achieved through employing common command doctrine, including standardised

procedures for the control of operations and forces. Above sub-unit level, it may be

delegated to staff, but at all levels commanders may need to control activity personally

to ensure that their intent is achieved.

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Mission Command

6-07. Mission Command is the British Armyâ€™s command philosophy. This is an approach which

empowers subordinate commanders and promotes initiative as well as freedom and

speed of action. Critically, it focuses on achievement of higher intent through mission

type orders. It empowers leaders at every level and is intended to generate agility and

tempo. This enables us to overcome an enemy in the most chaotic and demanding

circumstances and unlocks everyoneâ€™s potential to seize winning opportunities, however

fleeting. Supporting Integrated Action, Mission Command focuses on outcomes,

objectives and effects, rather than specifying the detailed ways in which these are

to be achieved. Mission Command depends on: the duty of commanders to express

their intent clearly and to ensure that it is understood; the duty of subordinates

to act to achieve that intent; and the presumption by subordinates of delegated

freedom of action to achieve the intent, within specified and implied constraints.

6-08. For Mission Command to work, the three functions of command must be in harmony.

Commanders must ensure that subordinates understand the context and their

commanderâ€™s intent. Commanders at all levels must use good judgement and initiative

to achieve intent and develop a mind-set focused on identifying indirect solutions to

problems. Mission Command requires commanders who will make sound decisions

without recourse to their higher headquarters and who are comfortable with freedom

of action rather than tight control. It also depends on effective leadership at all levels of

the force, with the most junior commanders and private soldiers confident and willing

to use their initiative and tactical understanding to exploit opportunities. It also requires

control: actions must be deconflicted, and resources shared, and some subordinates

will need more control than others. If Mission Command is to be instinctive, it must

be well understood and practised, not only on all operations and during field training,

but every day. Commanders must empower their subordinates routinely because this

gives them the confidence to act boldly and independently on the battlefield.

6-09. In practice, there are circumstances when commanders must apply greater

control of their subordinates. Factors to be considered include: the nature of

the task, including how complex or time critical it is; and the aptitude and

capability of subordinates and staff to apply Mission Command in a given

context. In these circumstances it is a superior commanderâ€™s duty to ensure

that their intent and detailed guidance is understood and followed.

6-10. In a multinational and inter-agency environment, even when Mission Command

is formally advocated, it may be subject to differing national, organisational and

individual interpretations and applications. This can be extremely challenging.

Improved interoperability may assist to some degree. Commanders and staff must

be prepared to adapt, recognising also the requirements of potential partner nations

and agencies that will not recognise or be able to practise Mission Command.

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Principles of Mission Command

6-11. Mission Command comprises one guiding principle and five further principles.

The fundamental guiding principle of Mission Command is the absolute

responsibility to act to achieve the superior commanderâ€™s intent.

6-12. Mission Command requires unity of effort. This stems from the commanders

ability to formulate a clear intent and mission statements; the use of common

doctrine and tactics; a common language of command; a high standard of

collective training; and the designation of priorities and a main effort. Taken

together, these provide a framework of common understanding throughout

a force. They also assist the coordination of actions in time and space and

the ability to anticipate and respond swiftly to changes in the situation.

a. Unity of effort is further enhanced by: commandersâ€™ nesting their plans in the context

and intent of superiors, at least two levels up; and ensuring that their own direction

is resourced two levels down. This is described as vertical integration. The concept

of horizontal integration, which helps subordinates understand how their missions

interact with others at their own level, is equally important. Horizontal and vertical

integration are essential to delivering cooperation between units and formations within

the framework of the commanderâ€™s intent.

b. In support of unity of effort, commanders should state a main effort â€“ the activity

which the commander considers critical to the success of the mission. However, in

the orchestration of complex operations stating a single priority may not always be

possible. A main effort is given substance in three ways. Firstly, it attracts resources

and sufficient fighting power. Secondly, it has relevance for all subordinates, even

those who are not part of it; they may lose resources to it, and are expected to support

it without further direction should circumstances require it. Thirdly, these main and

supporting efforts are integrated into a concept of operations. This might require

narrowing boundaries to concentrate force, requiring economy of effort elsewhere.

c. Although there may be a sequence of main efforts, there cannot be more than one

at any one time. The main effort should be expressed as a single action together with

the principal force undertaking it. Commanders may choose to shift the main effort in

response to changing situations.

6-13. In Mission Command, subordinates must exercise freedom of action,

within specified and implied constraints, to act as they see fit to

ensure the achievement of the higher commanderâ€™s intent.

a. To do so through the inherent friction and chaos of conflict requires subordinates to

have the determination, drive, vigour and disciplined initiative to take the plan through

to a successful conclusion. Subordinates have the most up-to-date information about

the situation in front of them and must make decisions and act quickly without waiting

for further orders. When the situation changes, subordinates must rapidly adapt their

plans or what they are doing to achieve the intent, using their best judgement and

without asking for permission. To nurture boldness and promote a will to win across

the force, superior commanders should always support the subordinateâ€™s decision, only

overruling it if it is unsuitable. This enables the force to sense opportunities, tackle

threats quickly, and generate and maintain tempo.

23 Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 3.2.2, Command and Control of Allied Land Forces describes â€˜decentralised executionâ€™ rather

than â€˜freedom of actionâ€™. Note that UK joint doctrine does not explicitly refer to principles of Mission Command.

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b. Decentralisation of execution is the means by which freedom of action is achieved. For

it to work, commanders provide guidance and constraints that allow subordinates to

use their initiative. Commanders must also allocate sufficient resources, including time,

information and intelligence, manpower, equipment, materiel, rules of engagement,

and space. Critically, decentralisation requires delegation of authority for decision-

making within particular constraints. These freedoms and constraints may be clearly

stated or implied in orders. The extent of delegation will depend on the superior

commanderâ€™s judgement of their subordinates. A commander must understand which

subordinates will thrive and excel with fewer constraints, and which will require more

direction and control. This is likely to inform the kind of tasks different subordinates

receive.

6-14. Trust is a pre-requisite of command at all levels. Trust improves speed of decision

making, and, therefore, tempo. While trust must be earned and not demanded, the

default should be for commanders to trust their superiors and subordinates. In particular,

they must trust that their subordinates will sensibly interpret their intent and persevere

to achieve it. Personal trust can only be built up over time with experience, rather

than by reputation. The spirit of Mission Command requires a bond of trust between

superiors, subordinates and peers that will develop through shared experience. These

bonds are strengthened when commanders tolerate mistakes and foster a climate

where failure is an opportunity to learn. This is not about encouraging recklessness or

gambling, but about accepting errors in the pursuit of calculated risk-taking, boldness

and initiative. If a subordinate cannot trust their superior to support them in such

circumstances, the bond of trust will be eroded; the subordinate will not act on their

own initiative; and the moral fabric of Mission Command will be lost. Trust is based on

a number of qualities, including personal example, integrity, professional competence

and attention to detail. The basis of trust is respect and mutual understanding.

6-15. Like trust, mutual understanding is established over time and through the application

of common doctrine and concepts. With experience, commanders gain understanding

of the issues and concerns facing their subordinates, partners and peers. Professional

knowledge and study, and the cultivation of personal relationships give subordinates,

in turn, an insight into command at higher levels, enabling them to anticipate and

apply their initiative to good effect. Mutual understanding is also based on common

doctrine and command philosophy and so cannot be assumed when operating in

a multinational and inter-agency context. Where shared experience and common

doctrine do not exist, commanders should pay particular attention to developing and

sustaining mutual understanding as a central pillar of effective interoperability.

6-16. Successful command requires timely and effective decision-making at all levels.

Timely decisions allow our forces to act more quickly than adversaries and enemies

can cope with. Despite the increasing availability and speed of information, it

remains essential for commanders to make decisions on the basis of incomplete

and imperfect understanding. This can seem risky, and good judgement is required

to decide when is the right time to act or not act. In general, however, it is often

less risky to act quickly than it is to wait for more information and give adversaries

more time. Developing an intuitive understanding of when to decide is as integral

a component of the art of command as knowing from where to command.

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Application of Mission Command

6-17. Founded on the principles above and the absolute responsibility to act to

achieve the superior commanderâ€™s intent, there are practical, sequential

actions that guide the effective application of Mission Command.

a. Commanders ensure that their subordinates understand the intent, their own

contributions and the context within which they are to act.

b. Commanders exercise minimum control over their subordinates, consistent with the

context and nature of mission, and the subordinatesâ€™ experience and ability, while

retaining responsibility for their actions.

c. Subordinates are told what outcome they are contributing to, the effect they are to

realise and why.

d. Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.

e. Subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their superiorâ€™s intent.

Modernâ€¦ warfare demands quick movement, quick thinking and quick decisionsâ€¦ There

simply is not the time to put a decision into writing or the opportunity for putting it into

effect may be lost: and it is the effect of the decision that matters, not the writing of it

outâ€¦ Recent operations have shown thatâ€¦ situations develop and change so rapidly that

more and more it is becoming necessary for subordinate commanders to be â€˜in the mindâ€™

of their superior so that they will instinctively take the right course of action in accordance

with his general intention, acting upon the briefest of instructions and often upon none at

all.

War Office report on operations in the Western Desert, 1940

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PART 3

Conduct of operations

Part 3 describes how land forces conduct

operations, adhering to the fundamentals of

land doctrine and in the context of

contemporary conflict. Before land operations

begin, land forces must organise appropriately

and develop sufficient interoperability with

other participating actors. This is the subject

of Chapter 7. Chapter 8 then introduces how

land forces orchestrate and execute Integrated

Action. Chapters 9 and 10 focus on two

specific areas critical to all operations â€“

command and sustainment. The AFM series

expands on the concepts and themes

introduced in Part 3.

Part 1 â€“ Context

Nature and character of conï¬‚ict

National and operational context

Fighting Power

Part 2 â€“ Fundamentals

Integrated Action

Manoeuvrist Approach

Mission Command

Part 3 â€“ Conduct of operations

ï€´ Organising for operations

ï€´ Orchestrating and executing

operations

ï€´ Commanding operations

ï€´ Sustaining operations

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ADP Land Ops

Chapter 7

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Organising for operations

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CHAPTER 7

Organising for operations

Introduction

7-01. This chapter explains interoperability, how

land forces organise for operations, and how

they support and are supported by other

components. The aim is to provide the baseline

knowledge necessary for interoperability

within a land force, and between it and

other components within a joint force.

Interoperabilty

7-02. Integrated Action requires significant cooperation

between all elements of the combined arms,

joint, inter-agency and multinational force.

The key enabler for military cooperation is

interoperability â€“ the ability to act together

coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve

tactical, operational and strategic objectives. The

purpose of professional study and working and training together with other forces and

nations is to build interoperability. Interoperability strengthens and amplifies the unique

contributions of all forces and agencies, at every level. Multinational and inter-component

interoperability is usually more challenging and needs more effort and resources than

interoperability within UK land forces, but even this requires conscious effort. The

exact requirement for interoperability is determined according to operational need.

Military operations are joint enterprises between formations, arms, services, government

departments, agencies, allies and host nation partners, so depend on cooperation

for success. Cooperation is best engendered through shared training, developing

interoperability, team spirit and cohesion.

Principle of War â€“ Cooperation

7-03. Land operations are conducted by combined arms forces because no single arm of the

land force can operate entirely independently of other arms. So even within land forces,

a high degree of interoperability is required: each arm must be interoperable with every

other arm. The start point for interoperability for force elements at all levels, therefore,

is competence and the ability to advise with authority on their particular capabilities

and limitations. So, when establishing interoperability with other components and

contributing to joint campaigns, land forces, by virtue of their professional credibility,

Organising for operations

â€¢ Interoperability

â€¢ Organisation of land forces

â€¢ Structures

â€¢ Force elements

â€¢ Force types

â€¢ Specialist capabilities

â€¢ Combined arms forces

â€¢ Relationships

â€¢ Air

â€¢ Maritime

â€¢ Special forces

â€¢ Logistic

â€¢ Cyber

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knowledge, skills and expertise, are the authority for the planning and execution of land

operations. A force element, formation or component seeking to be interoperable with

other arms, components or agencies from any nation, must also seek to understand its

partners and establish strong working relationships with them. Above this, individuals

in the land force must understand the theory and process of interoperability. The

requirement for interoperability is defined by the answers to three questions: with

whom, to what level and in what functions will force elements organise for operations?

A good inter-Service staff officer must first be a good officer of his own Service.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Slessor

7-04. The level of interoperability required for each relationship varies. In some cases an

awareness of a particular activity and suitable de-confliction may suffice. Defence policy

defines three levels of interoperability. Integrated means that forces are able to merge

seamlessly and are interchangeable. Compatible means that forces can interact with each

other in the same geographical battlespace in pursuit of a common goal. De-conflicted

means that forces can co-exist but not interact with each other. Additionally, in certain

cases, the actions or capabilities of a force or agency may even have a damaging impact

on those of others, making even co-existence challenging. The level of interoperability

within a multinational force is seldom uniform. For example, a multinational corps or

division might consist of compatible force elements from contributing nations with

some multinational integrated elements (such as the headquarters, some combat

support and combat service support force elements). In other circumstances, such as

a combined arms battlegroup, full integration lies at the heart of mission success.

7-05. High levels of interoperability take time and resources to develop and maintain, and

must be honed through training and by learning lessons during operations. Challenges

to achieving interoperability arise from differing cultures, structures, equipment, laws

and languages, and critical variations in doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and

sustainment. These are commonly categorised into three dimensions of interoperability,

as illustrated in Figure 7-1. Technical interoperability concerns systems and equipment.

This involves issues such as communication and information systems, connectivity,

standardisation of ammunition and other combat supplies. NATO standards are often

used to enable technical interoperability. Where possible, procedural interoperability

is based on NATO doctrine, procedures and terminology. Human interoperability,

which includes language, creates trust and mutual understanding by strengthening

relationships on operations and in training. It can mitigate shortfalls in the other

dimensions of interoperability and so is the responsibility of all members of land

forces to nurture and promote. A human interoperability approach is particularly

important for defence engagement and capacity building tasks. It has five aspects.

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Figure 7-1. Interoperability model

a. Language proficiency is central to multinational interoperability, assisting

comprehension and relationship building. Even when working in English, it is essential

that native speakers communicate clearly, avoiding slang, idioms and â€˜quasi-doctrinalâ€™

terms; even formally agreed doctrinal terms may be interpreted differently across a

multinational force.

b. Effective personal rapport between commanders influences cooperation at all levels.

Commanders must strive to develop genuine and robust relationships with each other.

c. Mutual respect for the professional ability, culture, history, religion, customs and

values of participants strengthens relationships. Cultural understanding is particularly

important to maintaining and promoting the cohesion of a multinational force, and

when working with a host nation partner, particularly during capacity building tasks.

d. Time taken to improve knowledge of the doctrine, capabilities and aspirations of

partners will pay dividends. It is important that forces and agencies assume a role

commensurate with their aspirations, tempered by their capabilities.

e. Patience is essential as differences of opinion, perspective and understanding, whilst

natural, may generate friction. A patient approach built on mutual trust and respect,

and combined with effective cooperation takes time, but will ultimately bear fruit.

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Organisation of land forces

7-06. Land forces are generally structured hierarchically into formations, units and sub-

units and categorised by function, type and specialist capabilities. They are organised

operationally by combining arms to form a cohesive and versatile whole. The

principle of combining arms demands high levels of technical, procedural and human

interoperability between all arms. This overview explains how land forces organise

within combined arms formations â€“ the basis for land environment interoperability.

7-07. A typical hierarchy flows down from army group to army, corps, division, brigade,

unit and sub-unit. Formations and units are designed to be modular and scalable,

so that elements can be easily added or taken away, and they can be expanded

or contracted. The greatest capacity for this lies in corps and divisions.

a. A corps commands a number of divisions, functional brigades and task forces,

comprising all types of force element. It is the link between the operational and tactical

levels of conflict. It can command at the operational level (as a JTF (Land), or land

component headquarters, for example), but in major coalition or alliance operations,

it may be a subordinate tactical formation in the land component, operating at the

higher tactical level. In the British Army, the corps is the highest level of deployable

headquarters and is assigned to NATO as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. A corps is

fully resourced and structured to orchestrate Integrated Action in a joint, inter-agency

and multinational context and can plan and execute large-scale complex operations

simultaneously.

b. The division is a tactical formation that commands brigades within a corps, JTF

(Land) or theatre framework. A divisional headquarters may form a land component

headquarters for specific operations. It is the lowest level formation that routinely

commands all types of force element. A division has integral intelligence, surveillance

and reconnaissance (ISR), combat support and combat service support force elements,

enabling it to conduct continuous operations. It usually also has at least one

manoeuvre brigade. A divisional headquarters, capable of planning and executing

simultaneously, can also command at the operational level as a land component

headquarters. For example, a combat operation of just one brigade or a capacity

building operation made up of several smaller groupings is likely to require command

by a divisional headquarters. The division is the lowest level capable of orchestrating

Integrated Action and routinely interacting with joint, inter-agency and multinational

actors.

A divisionâ€¦ is the smallest formation that is a complete orchestra of war.î€

Field Marshal Slim

c. The brigade is a tactical formation with combat, combat support and combat service

support force elements. Its primary focus is on achieving tactical effects. It is at the

brigade level that task organisation between combat units takes place to create

combined arms battlegroups. A brigadeâ€™s capacity to plan and execute operations

simultaneously is contingent on the intensity and type of operation.

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d. A unit is the smallest grouping capable of independent operations with organic

capability over long periods. It contains integral combat service support and limited

combat support elements, and is normally commanded by a lieutenant colonel. Units

typically have between 400 and 1000 people, the majority of which are of one arm or

Service. Units of the British Army are called regiments or battalions. A Royal Marine

unit is called a commando. In more demanding types of operation including combat, a

unit battlegroup does not normally have the capacity to plan and execute battlegroup

level operations simultaneously; it generally does one or the other.

e. A unit contains a number of sub-units, usually three to five. Sub-units are normally

commanded by majors, and typically have between 60 and 150 personnel. British

sub-units are called squadrons, companies or batteries. Sub-units are usually grouped

into battlegroups or task forces but are, for limited periods, capable of independent

operations, if they have been provided with suitable combat support and combat

service support elements.

7-08. Land forces are categorised functionally as either combat, combat

support or combat service support force elements.

a. Combat force elements are those that engage the enemy directly. They manoeuvre

and fight, typically employing direct fire weapons, to gain ground, find and defeat the

enemy, or acquire information. They include armoured, reconnaissance, infantry, and

attack and reconnaissance aviation units.

b. Combat support force elements provide operational assistance, including fire and

manoeuvre support to Combat force elements. They include support helicopters,

artillery, combat engineers, intelligence, communications, command support and

information activity specialists.

c. Combat service support is the organisational support provided to the whole force,

primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. It includes logistic, health service

and equipment support, personnel, welfare and administration force elements. Certain

combat service support functions are also provided by combat engineers, such as

providing water and electrical power supply, infrastructure and supply routes.

7-09. Complementary to functional categorisation, land forces are also distinguished

by their force type, commonly described in NATO as heavy, medium or light.

Combined arms groupings generally comprise more than one force type, but with

one being predominant. These force types are brought together (task organised)

for specific roles or tasks. For example, in the British Army, armoured infantry

brigades are built around heavy force types of tanks, armoured infantry, self-

propelled artillery and armoured engineers. In creating a force of a particular type,

force design has to make trade-offs between protection, firepower, operational

and tactical mobility, and logistic demand. All forces are strategically mobile. They

can go by sea or in the case of light forces, by air, to anywhere in the world.

a. The forces with the most firepower and protection tend to be equipped with heavy

armoured vehicles. To maximise firepower and protection, a compromise is made with

operational and tactical mobility. Their operational mobility is limited by high logistic

24 Traditionally the major combat and combat support functional branches of the British Army were known as arms (leading to the expres-

sion â€œcombined armsâ€) and the combat service support branches were known as services.

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demand. But their tactical mobility is excellent, except in the most densely complex

terrain, particularly when enabled by armoured combat engineers. On the other hand,

dismounted light forces have limited firepower and intrinsic protection. Yet they

can theoretically go anywhere that human beings can go â€“ into mountains, forests,

marshes, buildings, caves or subterranean structures. But their operational mobility,

without assistance, is limited to how far and fast a soldier can march. Of course, when

light forces are supported, by aircraft or vehicles, they can go anywhere within a

theatre very quickly.

b. The operational mobility of a force can be enhanced by trading off firepower and

protection. The force can be equipped with armoured vehicles that are optimised

for long range manoeuvre, but still have some valuable protection and firepower.

This reduces the range of threats that they can deal with, but can give advantages,

particularly if access to the theatre by sea or air is challenged or denied. Also, this level

of mobility can enable rapid concentration and dispersion of a force, enhancing the

scope for security and surprise.

7-10. A further categorisation is of particular specialist capabilities, which

include: ISR, air manoeuvre, amphibious and capacity building forces

Several NATO countries also have specialist mountain forces.

a. The primary purpose of ISR forces is to collect, process and disseminate the

information and intelligence required to enable understanding of the human,

information and physical aspects of the land environment. They can be close, medium

or long range and can support all force types. Task organised into combined arms

groupings, their composition depends on the level at which they operate and their

task; they also often include forces from outside the land component (for example

special forces or human intelligence specialists). At the higher tactical level, ISR

tasks may be allocated to a combined arms battlegroup or formation. Although

reconnaissance and surveillance

tasks differ in scope and duration, when resourced

and prepared appropriately, ISR forces are generally capable of conducting both

tasks. These forces include, but are not limited to: manned and unmanned air

systems including aviation reconnaissance; certain combat, combat support (including

intelligence specialists) and combat service support force elements; and technical ISR

assets exploiting cyber electromagnetic activities of all actors in the area of operations.

Although ISR forces generally avoid armed contact, reconnaissance forces, when

supported by fires, can provide guards and screens, or be used to degrade enemy ISR

capabilities.

b. Air manoeuvre forces are a specialist type of light force. They exploit the mobility

of aircraft to provide reach and speed. Air manoeuvre forces include attack, support

and reconnaissance helicopters, air assault and airborne infantry with organic combat

support and combat service support. Their actions are closely integrated with all

forms of air power and the actions of ground manoeuvre forces if also deployed. Air

manoeuvre forces are also intrinsic to amphibious manoeuvre, used to project force

onto objectives beyond a specific beach or landing site. Once on the ground, air

manoeuvre forces have the strengths and weaknesses of light forces.

25 Capacity building forces are not a separate category in current NATO doctrine.

26 For deï¬nitions of reconnaissance and surveillance, see Allied Administrative

Publication (AAP) 06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Deï¬nitions.

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c. An amphibious force consists of a naval force and a landing force, together with

supporting forces that are trained, organised and equipped for amphibious operations.

Amphibious forces undertake littoral or riverine operations, deployed and supported

(at least initially) from ships. Amphibious forces conduct landing force operations in the

littoral environment, which are land areas predominantly susceptible to engagement

and influence from the sea. Landing force operations, conducted in accordance

with Joint Action, require close integration of joint forces, routinely comprising: an

amphibious task group; landing force; battlefield helicopters and air group; and joint

enablers.

d. Capacity building tasks can (and often must) be conducted by any appropriately

skilled and prepared force element. UK land forces, however, include specially trained,

structured and equipped capacity building forces. These include those designed to

develop the capacity of host nation security forces as well as those able to assist with

physical and organisational infrastructure development.

7-11. The combination of capabilities provided by different force elements and types, when

they have sufficiently high levels of interoperability, produces extremely powerful

combined arms forces, where the sum of the parts is greater than the whole. This

combination of forces is the norm for all formations and units on operations. As a guide,

during warfighting operations a combined arms force is designed to be capable of the

four complementary and concurrent functions of the tactical framework: find, fix, strike

and exploit. It should also always have a reserve. These functions do not require equally

sized forces for each; rather they are resourced according to the tactical requirements.

7-12. Task organisation is the process by which combined arms forces are formed.

Task organisation during operations increases flexibility. It depends, however,

on appropriate interoperability, enabled by common doctrine and common or

compatible procedures, and developed during training. Commanders must balance

the flexibility of frequent task organisation with a potential reduction in tempo.

7-13. In the British Army, the term battlegroup has a particular meaning. A battlegroup is a

combined arms force commanded by a combat unit headquarters. It comprises sub-units

drawn from armoured, reconnaissance, infantry or aviation units. A task force refers to

a combined arms force created for a specific purpose. It is based on the headquarters

of any type of force, at unit and formation level, and is not limited to a combat arm.

Relationships of land forces to other components and capabilities

7-14. Interoperability is also required between land forces and other components and

capabilities. The basis of this form of interoperability is an understanding of

their characteristics, and of the relationships, dependencies and mutual support

between them and land forces. This is just the start. Interoperability, at whatever

level required, can be improved through deeper study and training together.

27 An example would be an engineer unit allocated an infantry sub-unit for local protection. Note that in the United States Army, task

force usually refers to a unit-level combined arms grouping, and combat team to a brigade level grouping.

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The air component

The development of air power in its broadest sense, and including the development of all

means of combating missiles that travel through the air, whether fired or dropped, is the

first essential to our survival in war.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Trenchard

7-15. Air is the most important physical environmental interface for land forces, which also

have their own integral air assets (primarily unmanned aircraft and helicopters). Gaining,

maintaining and exploiting control of the air is critical to success in most operations in

the land environment. Air power is also an accelerant to actions in the land environment:

generating intelligence, delivering fires, and significantly enhancing options for

manoeuvre at far greater speed and reach than can be achieved on the ground alone.

Seizing the potential of the air environment is not discretionary for land forces. They must

understand the attributes of airpower, the fundamentals of air-land integration, and how

the separate air and land components can complement their strengths and mitigate their

weaknesses. Land operations are conceived, planned and executed as air-land operations.

7-16. The core attributes of air power, whether drawn from air, maritime or land

components, are the exploitation of height, speed and reach. Height allows

manoeuvre in three dimensions; speed projects power rapidly and responsively;

and reach opens up adversariesâ€™ vulnerabilities otherwise protected.

a. These core attributes enable and enhance additional characteristics. Air powerâ€™s reach

combined with increasing persistence gives it ubiquity; it can pose or counter threats

simultaneously across a wide area. Its speed gives it tactical agility and operational

flexibility, able to achieve multiple effects over distance and in a short period. For

example, aviation can rapidly switch from intelligence gathering to fires in different

parts of the battlespace. Speed and reach also mean that effects can be quickly

concentrated in time and space, amplified by precision technology.

b. Air power also has inherent constraints. The most significant are its relative

impermanence, limited payload and vulnerability. The latter includes the fragility of

aircraft, the effects of weather and the requirement for well-found and secure basing,

logistic and equipment support.

7-17. Air power has four fundamental roles; control of the air; intelligence

and situational awareness; attack; and air mobility. These roles provide

the basis for understanding air power and also frame how air power,

including from the land component, can support land forces.

a. Control of the air is crucial. It enables freedom of manoeuvre in all of the physical

environments. Control of the air helps commanders to seize and hold the initiative.

Rather than talking of air â€˜superiorityâ€™, it is more accurate to define control of the

air as the freedom, bound by time, to use a volume of airspace, while, if necessary,

denying its use to an opponent. Adversaries who possess advanced air forces and

some non-state adversaries are able to challenge control. This is particularly the

case at lower altitudes which are likely to be contested with portable air defence

systems, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms. Rotary and slow fixed-

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wing aircraft (including unmanned aircraft), cooperating closely with or as part of the

land component, necessarily operate within the envelope of these weapons, so are

vulnerable, particularly during take-off and landing.

If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and lose it quickly.

Field Marshal Montgomery

b. The high vantage point afforded by air and space allows a view of the land battlespace

across the entire electromagnetic spectrum, enhancing intelligence and situational

awareness. Aircraft and space platforms, including unmanned air systems, provide

layers of sensing in depth that, integrated with other sources, allow commanders to

search out information on the human and physical aspects of the land environment.

Unmanned aircraft, because of their flexibility, endurance and the risks that can be

taken, are changing the way the air environment is exploited to find information.

c. Land forces can also be supported by air targeting the enemy and their infrastructure,

or by using the psychological effects of air power to attack will, for example by making

shows of force. Air attack can be executed to shape the strategic context or to

support operations or tactical engagements. Air interdiction seeks to destroy, disrupt,

divert or delay enemiesâ€™ surface potential before it can be used effectively. Close air

support provides land forces with firepower to destroy, suppress, neutralise, disrupt, fix

or delay an enemy, often in close proximity to friendly forces. Close air support requires

detailed integration with the fire and manoeuvre of land forces for targeting guidance

and to avoid fratricide. It can be delivered by a combination of fixed-wing aircraft and

helicopters. Helicopters can be task organised to a land formation, included within its

scheme of manoeuvre or given their own mission and area of operations.

d. Air mobility supports deployment, sustainment and manoeuvre. It includes air drop,

air manoeuvre missions, personnel recovery and aeromedical evacuation. Air mobility

enables the global, regional and local deployment of personnel and materiel, both

military and civilian. It is the fastest way to move supplies and mass forces. Intra- and

inter-theatre air mobility is often the only way to get wounded personnel to medical

facilities quickly enough to save lives and to conduct an efficient relief of troops.

The understanding of air power has been hard won, but to maintain â€˜air mindednessâ€™

into contingency, training in air power and specific air and aviation capabilities needs to

continue to be part of the land training syllabus at all levels.

Operation HERRICK Campaign Study (2015)

7-18. Air-land integration (ALI) is a particular form of interoperability between the air

and land components. It describes the creation and execution of simple operational

and tactical plans by land and air forces, synergistically blending land and air power

across all activities, from ISR to fires, manoeuvre and sustainment. ALI is a concept

that requires strong relationships built over time, effective training and resourcing,

an awareness of joint doctrine and capabilities, and detailed co-ordination and

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liaison between air and land components. To achieve ALI, air staff are fully integrated

within core planning teams from the outset; and land formations maintain sufficient

numbers of air-minded personnel at tactical and operational levels. Common and

assured procedures between air and ground forces are essential, particularly because

in multinational operations, the air component is also most likely to be multinational.

7-19. Effective interoperability between air and land components is particularly important

for the planning and execution of air manoeuvre operations. These provide

commanders with an ability to deploy light land forces rapidly, and to support

all force types across the battlespace, either as part of land manoeuvre or as a

means of projecting land power in its own right. They are initiated and controlled

by land forces (with the exception of certain amphibious operations). The air

component plays a key role in air manoeuvre. The cooperation between components

has an air to air element, as battlefield helicopters are usually part of the land

component or amphibious task group. Air manoeuvre takes different forms.

a. Airborne operations involve the movement of combat forces and their logistic support

into an objective area by air. Forces reach their objective by parachute (referred to as

air drop by NATO) or air-land delivery.

b. Air assault operations deliver combat forces by helicopter within direct fire of their

objective.

In amphibious operations, this is part of â€˜ship to objective manoeuvreâ€™.

c. Airmobile operations are those in which combat forces and equipment manoeuvre by

aircraft to engage in ground combat. Unlike air assault, airmobile operations do not

deliver forces directly onto an objective and so require less specialist training.

d. Independent helicopter tasks are also carried out within a forceâ€™s scheme of

manoeuvre.

7-20. The relationship between land and air components is synergistic, with the land

component providing critical support to, and enhancing the effectiveness of, air

operations. First, land forces share airspace with air forces, including for the use of their

own aircraft and weapon trajectories. Through understanding of ALI and associated

control measures, land forces coordinate and arrange ground troops and their activities

with regard to the air environment. Second, land forces mitigate the vulnerabilities of air

power by defending airfields, supporting essential logistics requirements and suppressing

or destroying enemy air defences. Third, land forces can seize and hold terrain from which

enemy air assets can be engaged or which might be used as forward operating bases or

airfields. Finally, land forces can operate to make the enemy more vulnerable to air power.

The maritime component

7-21. As an island nation with global interests and responsibilities, UK land forces rely

on the maritime component for sustainment, projection and support of land

operations. Furthermore, as urban-littoral populations grow, land forces will

necessarily conduct operations at this interface of land and maritime componentsâ€™

battlespace, where each component supports the other. For land forces, this

requires an understanding of: the attributes of maritime power projection,

the littoral environment, and where mutual support can be offered.

28 Air assault is not a NATO concept.

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7-22. The principal attributes of maritime power are: access, mobility, sustained

reach, posture, versatility, resilience, leverage and lift capacity. Maritime forces

also have the ability to remain poised at sea for extended periods as an act of

coercion, with limited political liability, and then take direct action against targets

ashore. These attributes can be exploited through the three roles of maritime

power: warfighting, maritime security, and international engagement.

7-23. Maritime capabilities can create a broad range of effects and influence from the sea into

the land environment in support of land forces. These include demonstration of political

intent, early theatre entry, enduring littoral operations, long-term sustainment and

support to operations, and the application, or the threat of maritime strike. Maritime close

air support, other joint fires and air mobility are significant enablers to inland activity,

especially in the early stages of an operation, before a land foothold has been established.

Maritime platforms contribute intelligence, area surveillance and communications

capabilities to land forces. They can provide: air defence over littoral areas; logistic

support; clean facilities for deep maintenance and casualty treatment; and locations from

which to exercise command. Maritime forces can also protect land forces by providing

a sea-based defensive barrier, or by preventing enemy manoeuvre from the sea.

7-24. Over two thirds of the worldâ€™s population live within 200 kilometres of the sea and

most states have a coastline. Operational theatres with coastlines present both

opportunities and challenges for land forces. Complex coastlines with navigable

inlets, estuaries and offshore islands may see land and maritime forces operating

in very close proximity, thus presenting battlespace management challenges. It

is in this littoral environment that amphibious operations are conducted.

Lying offshore, ready to act, the presence of ships and Marines sometimes means much

more than just having air power or shipâ€™s fire, when it comes to deterring a crisis. The ships

and Marines may not have to do anything but lie offshore. Itâ€™s hard to lie offshore with a

C-141 or C-130 full of airborne troops.

General Colin Powell

7-25. Amphibious operations are maritime activities, launched from the sea by a

naval and landing force embarked in ships or other craft, with the principal

purpose of projecting the landing force ashore tactically into an environment

ranging from permissive to hostile. Primarily conducted to create effects in

the land environment, there are four types of amphibious operation.

a. Amphibious raids involve swift incursion into or temporary occupation of an objective

followed by a planned withdrawal. Concentrated in time, space and resources, they

seek to destroy or disrupt adversary infrastructure, gain information, create a diversion,

capture or evacuate individuals and/or equipment.

b. Amphibious assault is the principal type of amphibious operation, establishing, with

some permanence, a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Amphibious

assaults exploit the full effect of maritime power for the rapid build-up of landing

forces ashore.

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c. Amphibious withdrawal concerns the extraction of forces by sea from a hostile or

potentially hostile shore in preparation for re-deployment.

d. An amphibious demonstration seeks to deceive an enemy by a show of force with

the expectation of deluding the enemy into an unfavourable course of action. An

amphibious demonstration must pose a credible threat to the enemy, requiring them to

allocate sufficient forces to counter the apparent threat.

The integral aviation and surface manoeuvre craft, stores capacity and diverse skill sets

make amphibious forces well suited to a range of other operations, including non-

combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

7-26. Land and maritime forces operate together not only in the littoral, but also in

the riverine operating environment. This is an inland, coastal or river delta area

comprising both land and water, characterised by limited land lines of communication.

Waterways are extensions of the littoral, and so provide an important conduit for

the conduct of amphibious actions, offering natural penetration points as well as

obstacles. Riverine actions can provide freedom of movement for land operations or

deny it to an adversary. Although amphibious forces can be structured and trained

for riverine operations, they can also be conducted by other maritime or land

component forces. These must be able to exercise command of the riverine operation

and also control the riverine environment, including the sub-surface element.

Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war

have always been decided â€“ except in the rarest of cases â€“ either by what your army can

do against your enemyâ€™s national life, or else by fear of what the fleet makes it possible for

your army to do.

Sir Julian Corbett

7-27. There is potential for tactical synergy between land and maritime components beyond

amphibious operations. Land forces can neutralise threats to naval forces from the shore,

undermining adversary anti-access and area denial efforts. They can seize and guard

onshore infrastructure required by naval forces and also provide landing forces and fires

for amphibious operations. For instance, land forces might secure naval infrastructure

or suppress coastal defences while maritime forces conduct shaping operations in

depth. Having mutually enhanced the joint commanderâ€™s freedom of action, land forces

might then exploit along a coastline, supporting and supported by maritime forces.

The special forces component

7-28. Special forces provide strategic insight and precision effects in all operating environments.

Designed, trained and equipped to operate at the strategic and operational levels,

they create effects beyond the reach, capability or expertise of conventional forces.

7-29. The degree of cooperation between land forces and special forces

depends on the nature of the operation. Routinely, special forces operate

at the strategic level, which may, or may not, require detailed planning

and cooperation with the land force and other components.

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7-30. At the operational level, they usually form a component alongside those of maritime,

land, air and logistic forces, either within an integrated JTF headquarters or in

supporting/supported relationships with other components. From a UK perspective,

command and control of UK Special Forces (UKSF) operations is directed on a case

by case basis by the Chief of the Defence Staff. On joint operations, special forces

operations will typically be deconflicted in time and space from land forces. Even

then, there are likely to be interests common with land forces. These include how

the audience and key actors respond to military activity, target deconfliction, access

to intelligence and communications systems, management of the electromagnetic

spectrum, fire support coordination, sustainment and personnel recovery.

7-31. Even though special forces will rarely be deployed for tactical effect, there will be

occasions demanding closer cooperation between them and land forces at the tactical

level. These include circumstances when land forcesâ€™ tactical actions have operational

or strategic level consequences, resulting in closer proximity of force elements or the

sharing of particular capabilities. For example, on a capacity building mission, land forces

may operate alongside special forces. Or, specific counter-terrorism or hostage rescue

skills, only held by special forces, may be required within the battlespace of a land force.

7-32. Effective cooperation with special forces requires an understanding of their

characteristics,

principles of employment, roles, planning considerations,

limitations and dependencies. Each nationâ€™s Special Forces vary according to national

requirements. The term special operations forces (SOF), common in NATO, encompasses

a breadth of units with unique capabilities; they are not necessarily equivalent

in terms of capability or role to UKSF. Commanders and staff must understand

where NATO SOF and UKSF differ and plan accordingly. The description here is

focused on that of UKSF,

with key differences to NATO doctrine highlighted.

7-33. Special forces operations are underpinned by a number of characteristics.

Precision

allows them to provide military options in situations that require a tailored and focused

effect. Operations are conducted with tempo to gain and retain the initiative. Maintained

at very high readiness, special forces have the agility to enable responsive strategic

and operational deployment. They also have the ability to operate at reach, globally, in

the most hostile and politically complex environments beyond the capabilities of many

conventional force elements. Special forces levels of endurance allow operations to be

conducted in hostile environments for extended periods, isolated from main combat

forces and surviving on relatively limited resources. Operators accept a commensurately

high level of individual and collective physical risk. Special forces maintain high levels

of secrecy in respect of their operations, capabilities, information and personnel.

7-34. Special forces are a scarce and valuable resource. UKSF and NATO SOF are

employed according to similar enduring principles. Used for strategic effect,

they are commanded at the highest appropriate level and involved in the earliest

stages of planning to enable timely decision-making. They are provided with

access to the best intelligence available and have their security protected.

29 For example, some NATO SOF include civil-military cooperation and psychological operations

teams, language and environmental specialists, as well as other capabilities not generally

held by UK. See AJP-3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations.

30 See JDP 0-40 UK Special Forces Doctine for further detail on UKSF.

31 AJP-3.5 refers to ï¬ve attributes of SOF: high tempo; pre-emption; disruption; deception; and initiative.

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7-35. Special forces have three broadly defined roles, each of which has a number of

associated tasks or activities.

Surveillance and reconnaissance delivers strategic

insight, support to planning, target development, assessment and liaison. Support and

influence is achieved through capacity building of security forces, military assistance

to irregular forces, civil-military cooperation and information activities. Offensive

action seeks to seize, destroy, capture or inflict damage to an opponentâ€™s offensive

capability or infrastructure to create specific and often time-sensitive effects. It includes

sabotage, raids, strikes and ambushes, counter-terrorism, and bespoke operations.

7-36. UKSF, while maintaining specific protocols for their own operations, in a joint

context apply operational level planning processes. The Special Forces Component

Commander and Special Forces Task Group Commander, represented by a Special

Operations Planning and Liaison Element or Special Forces Cell, should be involved

in the planning process from the outset so that advice on capability and the best use

of scarce resource can be included within the evolving campaign design. They can

then support and shape the operation, within the freedoms and constraints laid down

in the operational directive. In an operational environment, liaison officers are also

likely to be deployed to land (and other) component headquarters to advise on the

coordination, integration and de-confliction of special forcesâ€™ activities as required.

7-37. While a significant force multiplier, special forces have limitations. Special forces

are small in number and must be employed appropriately, focusing effect at critical

times and places. They are not a substitute for land forces, which have greater mass

and firepower, and can potentially be reconstituted more quickly. They should not

be employed for tasks which may appear attractive, but against which conventional

forces are more appropriate. As a finite resource with a relatively high cost to train

and equip, UKSF will routinely be assigned to the strategic main effort. Although

UKSF can operate for extended periods in hostile territory, they do not generally

hold ground. However, through integrated planning and execution of operations

special forces may magnify the effectiveness of land operations in a joint context.

7-38. Access to intelligence, sustainment and means of force projection are all key

dependencies for special forces. They are normally deployed against high value

targets, often at short notice, and require intelligence of the highest fidelity. The

nature of special forces operations also requires bespoke and flexible sustainment.

This tends to be small-scale but more complex compared to that of conventional

forces. Finally air support is a critical enabler for special forces operations.

32 AJP-3.5 describes: special reconnaissance, military assistance and direct action.

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The logistic component

It is no great matter to change tactical plans in a hurry and to send troops off in new

directions. But adjusting supply plans to the altered tactical scheme is far more difficult.

General Walter Beddell Smith

7-39. The logistic component is an essential element of all operations. Unlike the

environmental components, it is not tied to a specific Service but is inherently

joint. It also differs in that it exists only at the operational level; it is an integral

part of an end-to-end system, from industry to deployed tactical force elements.

At the tactical level, land forces are, therefore, unlikely to interact with the logistic

component in the same manner as with, for example, maritime, air or special forces

components. Land forces must, however, understand the construct of the logistic

component and its relationship with land componentâ€™s logistic force elements,

which together inform the land approach to sustainment. The planning and

execution of sustainment in the land environment is the subject of Chapter 10.

7-40. The logistic component is responsible for all logistic activity at the operational

level. It supports the activities of the combat components, which are usually

responsible for tactical level sustainment specific to their operating environment.

7-41. In a multinational context, logistic arrangements are complex and need to be agreed

and established in advance of operations. By default the sustainment of national forces

in a multinational operation is a national responsibility. However, nations should explore

opportunities for cooperation to reduce duplication of effort. Such arrangements may

include appointing a lead logistic or framework nation, or appointing particular roles

to contributing nations. In multinational operations, each nation establishes a national

support element in support of their national contingent. The activities of the various

national support elements are de-conflicted and coordinated at the operational level

by a multinational logistic headquarters, on NATO operations called the joint logistic

support group. On UK-led operations requiring more than specialist augmentation of

a JTF headquarters, a logistic component is formed. This component, or a national

support element in a multinational operations, may be founded on the UK Joint Force

Logistic Component (JFLogC), an existing logistic formation or a bespoke headquarters.

7-42. Sustainment in the land environment can be very complex and resource-intensive,

depending on the type of operation, the scale and types of forces involved, the

distances to be covered and the threats posed by both the physical environment and

enemy action. These factors inform the relationship of the logistic component with land

component logistic force elements. At the very least, a close and formalised cooperative

arrangement with the deployed logistic brigade or lead logistic unit is required.

7-43. The logistic component has several generic functions. These include theatre

activation, movement control, certain in-theatre movement and life support tasks (for

example, reception, staging and onward integration), force supply and distribution,

the reverse supply chain, contractor support and personnel policy. Tactical level

logistic, equipment, health services, infrastructure and administrative support

are normally conducted by the individual components, but require coordination

across the wider joint operations area. They also are often optimised by drawing

on skills available across the joint force and through the whole force approach.

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7-44. The factors aboveî€and the character of contemporary conflict shape the

approach to sustainment in the land environment, which has five elements.

a. Sustainment is focused on support to expeditionary operations. Although there may

be requirements to sustain military activity within the UK, the focus of sustainment

doctrine, training and preparation is on expeditionary operations.

b. Sustainment is a fundamentally joint activity. In order to deploy forces and sustain

them in an expeditionary environment, the end-to-end support chain is predominantly

joint. It is only forward of the deployed joint supply area that sustainment activity

becomes the responsibility of the land component commander.

c. Sustainment is delivered through a range of military, civilian and allied capabilities (the

whole force approach). Sustaining UK land forces requires capabilities that frequently

are only available from reserve, contract, host nation and allied resources.

d. The UK has adopted the NATO principles of logistics to enhance interoperability and

reflect the NATO underpinning of UK defence. These are described in Chapter 10.

e. Sustainment activities must be designed and executed in the context of Integrated

Action. The actions of the logistic component and of land logistic force elements have

intended and unintended consequences beyond those directly contributing to the

sustainment of the land force. For example, the delivery of humanitarian aid, a convoy

of logistics vehicles or the disembarkation of main battle tanks in a foreign port,

can all be observed by the audience. Alternatively, the establishment of sustainment

nodes and capabilities, along with use of locally sourced contractors, can reassure the

local audience of our commitment to security, stabilisation and the local economy.

Conversely, sustainment activities can inadvertently lead to corruption, in particular

contracting and employment of local civilians, and potentially undermine longer-term

political success.

Cyberspace

7-45. Land forces operate in an increasingly complex environment, where information

technologies continue to transform how land forces operate with, among and

against other actors. Cyberspace in particular presents significant opportunities and

threats. Integrated Action is enhanced by cyberspaceâ€™s ubiquitous, interconnected

and dynamic nature. These same factors, however, also enable threats such as

espionage, sabotage and subversion. There is no cyber component matched to

this environment (as there is for the physical environments of maritime, land and

air). Rather, cyberspace pervades all operations and so responsibility for exploiting

its potential and protecting from its threats is common to all components.

7-46. Joint doctrine defines cyberspace as: an operating environment consisting

of the interdependent network of digital technology infrastructures

(including platforms, the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer

systems, as well as embedded processors and controllers), and the data

therein spanning the physical, virtual and cognitive domains.

33 JDP 0-50 UK Cyber Doctrine.

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7-47. The cyber operating environment of platforms, networks and systems is critical to

operations, and can be explained by reference to near, mid and far operating spaces.

The near space is controlled and assured by a particular commander. The mid and far

spaces are not; the mid includes systems operated by other government departments,

or commercial companies; the far lies predominantly outside the control or assurance

of friendly actors and is likely to be owned by third party or hostile actors.

7-48. There are four roles identified with cyber operations: defensive cyber

operations (DCO), comprising active and passive measures; cyber intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance (cyber ISR); offensive cyber operations (OCO);

and cyber operational preparation of the environment (cyber OPE).

7-49. Cyberspace and the electromagnetic environment (EME) must be considered together.

Electromagnetic activity can be used to affect the ability of other actors to operate

in cyberspace, and vice versa. The EME, however, is focused on activity in the

virtual domain, while cyberspace also spans the physical, including, for example,

the computer cables that carry data traffic. The term cyber electromagnetic

activities (CEMA) refers to the integration of activities in cyberspace and the EME,

as illustrated in Figure 7-2. The full range of activities is usually only conducted and

orchestrated at the divisional level and above. At lower levels, land forces will either

execute specific CEMA or integrate their own actions with CEMA executed by other

organisations. In all cases, land forces must consider the effects of cyberspace and

the EME on their particular operating environment and the actors within it.

Figure 7-2. Cyber electromagnetic activities conducted by land forces

Cyberspace operations

â€¢ Defensive cyberspace operations

â€¢ Offensive cyberspace operations

â€¢ Cyberspace intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance

â€¢ Cyberspace operational preparation

of the environment

Electronic warfare

â€¢ Electronic attack

â€¢ Electronic defence

â€¢ Electronic surveillance

Spectrum management

operations

â€¢ Plan, coordinate and manage

the use of the electromagnetic

spectrum

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7-50. Cyberspace and the EME provide the medium through which operations are

planned and also, increasingly, executed. They affect land forces of all types

and at all levels, from the lowest tactical grouping using networked, digital

communication systems and global positioning systems (GPS) to higher tactical

formations resourced to orchestrate cyber activities within Integrated Action.

Protection and exploitation of cyberspace and EME are, therefore, fundamental

to all operations. Considerations for land forces include the following.

a. Whether near, mid or far, cyberspace is contested. Hostile actors constantly probe our

systems to seek vulnerabilities, intelligence and advantage. Land forces must protect

against cyber attack, while remaining capable of planning and executing operations

with reduced or denied access to cyberspace and the EME. This could include

operating for periods of time without GPS navigation, tactical data or secure voice

networks, or the ability to communicate with the home base.

b. The increasing global accessibility of cyberspace, low relative cost (when compared

with more traditional capabilities) and difficulty in attributing attacks means that its

exploitation is not limited to peer competitors, but to almost all potential adversaries.

Also, land forces and those we wish to protect are increasingly and routinely

dependent on cyberspace as a matter of daily life. Cyber factors must be considered in

land forcesâ€™ planning.

c. Most electronic control systems have cyber vulnerabilities, even if not all are readily

exploitable. Cyber attacks can cause damage not only in the virtual domain,

manipulating information, but also in the physical domain. They can be used to affect

directly electronically-controlled systems, from equipment to infrastructure.

d. Actions in cyberspace and the EME can have a broad range of effects in time and

space, as part of all tactical functions. Unconstrained by physical environments, their

range can be almost without limit and they can take effect either instantaneously, over

a longer period or be programmed for subsequent activation. These factors provide

significant opportunities through Integrated Action.

e. UK offensive cyber electromagnetic activities are conducted within the same legal

framework as operations in the physical domain. Actions taken in cyberspace can,

however, be ambiguous and publicly deniable, allowing hostile actors to remain below

thresholds traditionally associated with entering armed conflict.

7-51. In a cyber context, multinational and inter-agency interoperability is particularly

challenging. However, since the effects of actions taken in cyberspace and

the EME are not necessarily geographically bounded, de-confliction and

mutual understanding are imperative. National and commercial sensitivities

surround specific electronic counter measures, cyber and electronic warfare

capabilities; and, with the exception of spectrum management, there is

currently no common, NATO approach to cyber electromagnetic activities.

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ADP Land Ops

Chapter 8

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Orchestrating and

executing operations

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Introduction

8-01. At the operational or higher tactical level, corps

and divisions orchestrate Integrated Action and

align their activity with joint, inter-agency and

multinational operations.

The orchestration

of operations concerns the direction and

arrangement of actions, sequentially and

simultaneously, to create desired effects. Brigades,

units and other force elements, operating

at the tactical level, plan and execute their

contributions to the divisional operation.

8-02. This Chapter builds on Chapter 4, describing in

general how operations are planned and conducted

to achieve Integrated Action; Volumes 1 and 3 of

the AFM series provide greater detail. It begins by

describing the overall process of operational design and tactical planning at different

levels. It then describes the fundamental building blocks of a land forceâ€™s capabilities, the

tactical functions. It introduces how operational art connects objectives, over time,

to achieve desired outcomes. The next section explains the doctrinal frameworks,

which aid the integration of actions and effects to achieve objectives. It concludes

with a summary of the tactical activities that contribute to Integrated Action.

Operational overview

8-03. In Integrated Action the land force draws together all the levers of power and influence

available to it. These include those levers exercised by friendly actors and those integral

to the land force, which are described by the tactical functions. It applies them (through

doctrinal frameworks and tactical activities) to have the effects required to achieve

assigned objectives and outcomes. These objectives and outcomes, however, are rarely,

if ever, achieved by a single cycle of actions and effects. At the higher tactical level and

above, military operations invariably require multiple lines of activity and sequences of

objectives and actions â€“ each one dependent on prior activity. Operational art, described

later in this chapter, guides the planning and management of operations at this level.

The emphasis in this publication is to describe how tactical activities should be conducted

so that they contribute to wider operational and therefore strategic outcomes.

34 Some brigade or unit-sized task forces can be an exception to this rule.

CHAPTER 8

Orchestrating and executing

operations

Orchestrating and executing

operations

â€¢ Introduction

â€¢ Operational overview

â€¢ Tactical functions

â€¢ Operational art

â€¢ Doctrinal frameworks

â€¢ Tactical activities

â€¢ Annexes:

â€¢ Understanding

â€¢ Centre of gravity analysis

â€¢ Operations themes and

types of operation

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8-04. Effective operations rely on appropriate and constantly updated understanding

of the context of the situation, the audience, and the information and physical

environment. Understanding is specific to role. For example the land component

commander, a staff officer in a logistics unit, a battlegroup operations officer

and an engineer reconnaissance sergeant all need to know different things. It is

very important, but relatively straightforward, to develop understanding of the

physical environment and many aspects of the information environment. Critical to

the design of effective operations, and to eventual success, is understanding the

audience (the human aspect of the environment), which is far more challenging.

Further detail on the theory and process of understanding is at Annex 8A.

8-05. Figure 4-1 illustrates how the audience consists of all those relevant to the attainment

of objectives: the wider audience, actors, adversaries and enemies. The first stage in

operations design and tactical planning is to understand not only the problem and

task, but to understand enough of the relevant audience to judge what actions within

the forceâ€™s power will stimulate behaviour in a way that leads to achieving the desired

outcomes. It is also vital to try and anticipate what actors might do, including to us,

recognising that there will always be uncertainty. Action is often the best way of

developing understanding, and is certainly the way to begin to take the initiative. In

an area of operations, the audience could consist of enemies, adversaries, actors, and

other groups or individuals that are not active in the situation, or about to be, but are

still members of the audience. There are many tools used to assist with understanding

the human aspect of the environment. Centre of gravity analysis can be a useful

tool particularly for understanding what an actorâ€™s capabilities, requirements and

vulnerabilities are. The concept is described at Annex 8B. Outside the area of operations

is a wider audience that must be considered; depending on the situation, this wider

audience could be important to the course and outcome of the whole operation.

8-06. A key responsibility for commanders at all levels is shaping the context for their

part of the operation. Through responsible and constructive dialogue with their

â€˜one-upâ€™ commanders and the staff, and when possible by engagement in the â€˜one-

upâ€™ planning process, subordinates can make success more likely. They are able to

influence the enabling actions of their superiors, adjust the resources available to

them, shape expectations about the likely achievements of their force, and gain

the support and confidence of their commanders. Those with operational-level

responsibilities must go further, complementing the actions of government, senior

military officers, and diplomatic and civilian officials. By direct communication, and

information activities (including through the media) they can shape the context of the

entire venture by influencing relevant actors to assist the force, directly or indirectly.

8-07. One of the challenges of designing operations is the integration of lethal and non-

lethal effects. The means at the disposal of the land force (the tactical functions) do

not all have matched or easily assessed effects. Integrated Action aims to create effects

on actorsâ€™ understanding, physical capability, and will and cohesion. These effects

range from those that are intended to be wholly constructive and positive such as

through training the forces of a partner (capacity building and information activities),

to those intended to be destructively negative such as defeating an enemy force (fires

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and manoeuvre, accelerated by information activities). Some effects can be more or

less immediate (such as from the use of fires); others can be very long term (again,

capacity building is a good example). In both these examples, we can be confident that

our actions have led to the changed state of the actors concerned. In other cases the

connection is less clear; this is a particular issue for some forms of information activity.

We conduct all operations in order to influence people and events, to bring about change,

whether by 155mm artillery shells or hosting visits: these are all influence operations. We

sought to make use of every lever we had to influence events.

Major General Graham Binns

8-08. Tactical planning for combined arms tactical activities is more straightforward. Formations,

units and other force elements are given missions and tasks that contribute to the

higher commanderâ€™s plan and fulfil its intent. These are designed as discrete actions

to achieve specified conditions, or subordinate objectives and outcomes, as part of

the overall plan. For this lower-level activity to contribute fully and appropriately to

the overall plan, it is essential that commanders and staff at unit and sub-unit level

understand the context of their actions, their division and brigade commandersâ€™ intent

and plans, their own contributions, and the likely wider consequences of their actions.

8-09. Operations design and tactical planning lead to the scheme of manoeuvre and provide

the basis for control of the operation (Annex 8C describes different operations themes

and types of operation). Plans are continuously reviewed and refined; the situation will

change, in response to actions, reactions and the unavoidable consequences of chance

and friction. Commanders insure against uncertainty, the unpredictable opportunities

and risks that will arise, by preparing contingency plans and assigning reserves.

The tactical functions

8-10. The tactical functions

represent the full breadth of a land forceâ€™s activities when

conducting operations.

They are: command, intelligence, manoeuvre, fires,

information activities, capacity building, protection and sustainment. The tactical

functions are a device that helps to organise activities into intelligible groups; they

have no effects, whereas the activities do. Few, if any stand alone. All activity needs to

be commanded and sustained for example. However, the bigger and more combined

arms the force is, the more likely it is to have the ability for significant activity under

every heading. As a rule of thumb, corps and divisions are designed to conduct all the

tactical functions simultaneously. Subordinate force elements may be able to apply all

the functions to lesser degrees or specific ones to great effect. For example, an engineer

unit has less access to fires than a combined arms battlegroup, which in turn may have

fewer opportunities for capacity building than one scaled for security force assistance

tasks. The tactical functions also provide a useful checklist for commanders when

assessing a plan, and a common vocabulary for describing a forceâ€™s overall capabilities.

35 They deviate slightly from NATOâ€™s combat functions, which do not include capacity building. AJP-3.2.

36 The defence capability framework of command, inform, prepare, project, operate, protect, and sustain encompasses

the broader range of military actions prior to, during and after operations.

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8-11. Each of the descriptions that follow

describes the functions generically; they

are intended to apply from division to

sub-unit level. Each describes the activities

grouped under the function, and the

sort of effects the activities might have.

Figure 8-1 illustrates how the functions fall

into three groups organised by purpose.

Command and Intelligence activities

are largely internally focused, setting

and maintaining the direction of the

operation or action; manoeuvre, fires,

information activities and capacity

building are mainly directed at those

relevant to the outcome of the operation;

and protection and sustainment are

the activities that enable the operation.

Command

8-12. Command is the tactical function that enables

all other tactical functions. It is through command that the tactical functions are balanced,

resourced and directed when orchestrating and contributing to Integrated Action. It

encompasses the authority of appointed individuals and the ways and means by which authority

is exercised (through decision making, leadership, control, using information as a resource,

and communication systems). Other activities that have a signiï¬cant information element are

covered by the tactical functions of intelligence, information activities, ï¬res and protection.

Figure 8-2. Command enables all other tactical functions

a. The command and control aspect includes: interaction with other force elements, their

commanders and staff; effective planning; the management and execution of operations

and tactical activities, including battle procedure; the design and management of command

and control relationships within the force, and battlespace management; and the design,

organisation and location of command posts.

Protection and Sustainment

Information Services

Fires, Manoeuvre

Capacity Building

Information Activities

Intelligence Command

Figure 8-1. The tactical functions

â€¢ Protection

â€¢ Sustainment

Activity to set

and maintain

the operationâ€™s

direction

â€¢ Command

â€¢ Intelligence

â€¢ Manoeuvre

â€¢ Fires

â€¢ Information Activities

â€¢ Capacity Building

Activity to

enable the

operation

Activity directed at

those relevant to

the outcome

of the operation

(the audience)

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b. The use and transmission of information are also aspects of the command tactical

function. Managing the forceâ€™s information as a resource (information management

and exploitation), and establishing and maintaining assured information to the point

of need within the force (command and information systems) are both critical to

operational success at all levels. A coherent, robust and secure network of information

services, as illustrated in Figure 8-2, underpins the effectiveness of all tactical

functions.

Given the centrality of command to land forcesâ€™ doctrine, Chapter 6 describes Mission

Command and Chapter 9 explains the application of command.

Intelligence

For the commanders in particularâ€¦the priority design determinant of the strategy and

campaign is the acquisition of information, to learn about the enemy and the people and

to find out what separates one from the other.

General Rupert Smith, Fighting Instructions

8-13. Intelligence is the tactical function that makes the most significant contribution to

understanding. Intelligence is a product,

a critical resource that is used to inform the

forceâ€™s activities. Relevant information is gathered and kept updated about the audience

and actors, adversaries and enemies, the information environment and the physical

aspects of the area of intelligence interest. Intelligence as a tactical function encompasses

the activities of commanders, staff and collection assets to generate intelligence product.

Those involved do this by giving direction on requirements and, following collection

and processing, disseminating the product in a timely manner to inform operations.

a. Intelligence activity is guided by the intelligence collection plan, which is constructed

to meet the commanderâ€™s intelligence requirements. This prioritisation is essential

to focus activity on the needs of the operation, because of the abundance of

information and the friction inherent in conflict. Commanders require intelligence

about the characteristics, culture, capabilities, locations, intentions, relationships and

objectives of the audience whose understanding and behaviour they seek to influence.

Intelligence about the information and physical aspects of the land environment

supports commandersâ€™ understanding of the freedoms and constraints affecting

operations.

b. The tactical function includes collecting information through intelligence, surveillance

and reconnaissance (ISR) activity. This includes activity, for example, by force elements

responsible for electronic surveillance and human intelligence. It also includes specialist

ISR activity by manned and unmanned aircraft, armoured and light cavalry, artillery and

combat engineer special-to-arm capabilities, and battlegroup close reconnaissance.

But they do not have sole responsibility for ISR activity. The whole force contributes

to generating intelligence from all parts of the area of operations. Increasingly, open

source information is also highly relevant in informing tactical decisions.

37 Intelligence is deï¬ned as: the product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding the environment

and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers.

AAP-06.

38 See AJP-2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures, JDP 2-00, Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint

Operations, and the AFM series for comprehensive principles.

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c. Information about the relevant audience, the information environment and the

physical geography is passed to the relevant staff both to inform immediate tactical

decisions and for more considered analysis. Analysis of information about these

subjects is fused to provide commanders with a common intelligence picture to inform

decision-making.

The analysis of privileged or highly classified information is just one

element of intelligence, which also exploits the potential of ever-improving technical

processing tools applied to the wealth of open source information.

d. Dissemination is the activity that distributes relevant information to those who need

it, in time to inform their decisions and actions. This balances â€˜need to knowâ€™ with

â€˜responsibility to shareâ€™.

8-14. Above all, intelligence collection is continuous. Dynamic and adversarial situations

constantly evolve, previous truths can rapidly become ill-founded assumptions, and

adversaries will actively seek to deceive. It is vital that commanders give significant

attention to formulating their information and intelligence requirements; amendments

may reduce the tempo of a force and add undue friction. Nevertheless, these

requirements must be responsive to the situation and kept under constant review.

Manoeuvre

Everything which the enemy least expects will succeed the best.

Frederick the Great

8-15. Manoeuvre is the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in

combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect

to the enemy to accomplish the mission. The tactical function involves physical

movement and positioning of force elements over land, water or through the air.

8-16. Manoeuvre can have a range of unique effects, because only it can allow forces to

take possession of terrain. Through the Manoeuvrist Approach it offers the means

of concentrating force or the threat of force decisively in time and space to achieve

surprise and shock, and create opportunities for exploitation. Manoeuvre can have

an effect that compels adversaries to respond by acting in ways that are not in their

interests. In stability operations, placing or moving forces to reassure or provide security

is a form of manoeuvre as much as manoeuvre in combat. Manoeuvre is also often an

important element of deception (for example, a feint) or deterrence (for example, a

show of force). It can be used precisely against physical and human targets (for example,

in a raid, or targeted search). Manoeuvre, therefore, contributes to Integrated Action

through its effects on actorsâ€™ understanding, physical capability, and will and cohesion.

8-17. Manoeuvre enables and is enabled by activities grouped under the other tactical

functions. Command and intelligence direct it. In combat, organic and supporting fires

are the critical enablers, helping to generate shock and demoralisation that manoeuvre

39 â€˜Information Manoeuvreâ€™ is a term that is sometimes used to describe all information-related activity classiï¬ed under the tactical func-

tions. Manoeuvre as a tactical function means physical manoeuvre to a position of advantage. Integrated Action is intended to create

advantageous physical, virtual and cognitive effects.

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can exploit. Information activities can be used to magnify its impact. Protection activities

may conceal it to help generate surprise, and sustainment is always essential.

Battles are won by slaughter and manoeuvre. The greater the general, the more he

contributes in manoeuvre, the less he demands in slaughter

Winston S Churchill

8-18. Land manoeuvre is the combination of ground and air manoeuvre enabled by

manoeuvre support. Ground manoeuvre is best conducted by combined arms forces,

appropriate to the terrain and task. Air manoeuvre can act as an accelerant to ground

manoeuvre, or be decisive itself, supported by ground manoeuvre. For example,

ground forces can disrupt or destroy enemy air defences and open up avenues of

approach for exploitation by air manoeuvre forces. Alternatively, air manoeuvre

forces can seize, clear and hold key terrain to enable exploitation by ground

manoeuvre forces. Manoeuvre takes different forms: frontal, penetration, infiltration,

envelopment and turning movements. These are explained in the AFM series.

Fires

8-19. The tactical function of fires refers to the use of weapons to create a specific lethal

or non-lethal effect on a target. Without fires, armed organisations have no force to

apply or threaten. Lethal fires include the direct and indirect weapon systems of land,

maritime and air forces designed to destroy, neutralise or suppress an enemy. This

deï¬nition includes the organic ï¬res of manoeuvre forces: small arms, anti-tank and structure missiles,

mortars, and the main armament of armoured ï¬ghting vehicles. However, this tactical function

is mainly concerned with ï¬res directed and controlled at all levels of command, particularly the

ï¬res available to a corps or division, mainly provided by air, attack helicopters and artillery. Non-

lethal fires include offensive cyber electromagnetic activities that have physical effects.

These may, for example, degrade or deny electronically-controlled systems, including

communication and information systems as well as other equipment and infrastructure.

8-20. Fires have immediate effects on both precise and area targets, including destroying,

ï¬xing, disrupting or dislocating enemy forces. More importantly, when applied

effectively at the right time and place, they have secondary effects on an enemyâ€™s

will and cohesion. Fires can have a devastating effect on enemy morale. They

can also be used to destroy, damage or influence critical physical and virtual

resources, nodes and linkages that form part of an enemy forceâ€™s cohesion.

They can also be used to bolster the will and cohesion of friendly actors.

8-21. Fires are closely dependent on other tactical functions. They rely on actionable intelligence

and the post-engagement assessment that it provides. Fires are essential to enable

manoeuvre, but the two enhance each other. As part of shaping actions, Fires are

sometimes used independently, but they are more likely to be used in conjunction with ISR

and information activities. Attack helicopters and artillery are a critical capability of any force

and therefore a priority for protection. They also generate signiï¬cant sustainment demand.

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8-22. From battlegroup mortars upwards, for ï¬res to be most effective they are commanded

at the highest level but controlled at the lowest appropriate levels, to optimise

concentration of force and responsiveness. When fires support manoeuvre forces, for

example, the manoeuvre commander controls the fires, but seldom commands them.

Information activities

8-23. As a tactical function, information activities

covers all the ways of deliberately

communicating messages to the audience. They have a common purpose â€“ to

affect understanding. The activities grouped under this tactical function include

psychological operations, engagement, deception, cyber electromagnetic activity,

media operations, and presence, posture and profile. All of these can have first as well

as second order effects on behaviours and are fundamental to Integrated Action.

I say to you that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in

the battlefield of the media.

Ayman al-Zawahiri (Al-Qaeda)

8-24. Information activities should be used to enhance and exploit the effects of

manoeuvre, fires and capacity building; indeed if this is not done, these physical

activities do not achieve their full potential. As any actions detectable by the

audience are a form of communication, they can be used to support and

substantiate information activities. Information activities do not only enhance

our own actions, they can limit enemiesâ€™ and adversariesâ€™ ability to exploit their

own successes, and be pivotal in protecting the cohesion of our force.

8-25. Key to the success of information activities is coherence and consistency of

messages and actions, from the strategic to tactical levels. This requires the active

involvement of the whole force, using Mission Command to align the force with

the overall commanderâ€™s intent. The conduct of certain information activities

requires specialist knowledge and skills, much of which comes from outside the

British Army. Commanders at all levels have a responsibility to integrate that

expertise within the force. Notwithstanding the specialist aspects of Information

Activities, the entire force has a role to play, for example, in engagement (direct

communication to or dialogue with the audience), deception, and media operations,

as well as conforming to the forceâ€™s required presence, posture and profile.

8-26. For all the benefits of information activities, commanders and staff at all levels should

be aware of the risks, which include varying interpretations, and the unpredictability

of subsequent effects. Even a consistent set of messages can be complicated by

varying interpretations. The presence of tanks in a particular village during a peace

support operation may, for instance, send conflicting messages: to one audience it may

reassure; to another it may suggest an insecure environment. The first order effects

of a message designed to be relatively immediate are often assessable: for example,

a division commanderâ€™s phone call to a key actor may stimulate observable action,

40 Note that this deï¬nition is narrower than that of NATO which describes information activities as activities designed to affect informa-

tion or information systems. NATO also includes civil military cooperation within information activities, which in UK doctrine is part of

capacity building. See AJP 3-10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

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or a battlegroupâ€™s deception plan might be successful in fixing an enemy reserve.

However, the subsequent effects are hard, perhaps impossible, to predict. Longer

term messaging, perhaps to wider audiences, is also hard to gauge, and is more

vulnerable to counter-messaging. Therefore, effective information activities require

considerable understanding of the audience, and continuous monitoring and assessment

by specialist intelligence activity. This enables land forces to adapt their activities to

remain in step with the changing understanding and behaviours of audience.

8-27. Although many aspects of information activities are conducted or reflected

by all elements of the force, their nature means that the divisional

headquarters is normally the lowest level of command with access to the full

range of capabilities and the means to command and control them.

Capacity building

8-28. Capacity building, as a tactical function, concerns those actions taken to

improve military, and when necessary civil, security and infrastructure capability.

Security capacity building often involves training host nation partner forces.

Advise and assist tasks involve the provision of support to help the partner build

their capability, including institutionally. Accompany tasks involve partnering

on operations. Infrastructure capacity building may require reconstructing or

repairing infrastructure that has been damaged during combat operations.

8-29. Capacity building has first order effects on actorsâ€™ behaviours and their Fighting Power.

It can also have second order effects through developing capabilities that subsequently

contribute to behavioural outcomes. Normally, unlike manoeuvre and fires, security

capacity building takes a long time, perhaps years, to have lasting effect, as it involves

building Fighting Power. Like all other physical activity, capacity building enhances and

is enhanced and exploited by information activities. It also requires a comprehensive

(or between UK agencies, full-spectrum approach), to work in harmony with UK, host

nation and sometimes Allied governmental and other agencies. Even direct assistance

to host nation military forces is inherently political in nature and but one line of wider

security development which necessarily involves non-military actors. Cooperation

between the land force and other actors is essential for creating unity of effort.

8-30. The requirement and opportunity to conduct capacity building depends on the size of the

land force involved, its tasks and the type of operation. A land force may conduct capacity

building as a discrete type of operation, where capacity building activities are likely to be

the main effort, supported by the other tactical functions. In other types of operation,

dependent on resources and requirement, land forces will either deliver capacity

building as a tactical function directly, or support or be supported by others doing so.

Protection

8-31. The tactical function of protection refers to those actions taken to protect the

Fighting Power of a force. These include physical and information protection

activities and measures. It has two inter-related purposes: to enable freedom

of action; and to maintain operational effectiveness by preserving combat

power (people, equipment, materiel, installations and information).

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8-32. Protection depends on continually refreshed understanding of the risks facing

the force and the level of risk appetite. It is important to understand, mitigate

and protect both the vulnerabilities of oneâ€™s own centre of gravity, and

threats posed by adversaries and the environment. These inform the level and

application of physical and information protection measures required.

8-33. Physical protection is created by a combination of activities and force protection

measures. The activities are actions taken to protect the force from enemy ISR

and attack. These include guards, screens, air defence, concealment and counter-

chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) measures. In addition,

commanders select appropriate force protection measures. These include equipment

and procedures to reduce the likelihood of casualties, and procedures to reduce

non-battle injuries and ill-health. Information protection requires appropriate

measures of operational and information security. Care is required to ensure that

a vigorous approach to protection does not undermine other key objectives.

8-34. Critically, the moral component of the force must also be protected. In the same way

as the Manoeuvrist Approach emphasises effects on an enemyâ€™s cohesion and will to

fight, so too must we protect our own will and cohesion. The physical and information

protection measures described are necessary, but not sufficient for maintaining the

forceâ€™s moral component, which is developed over time, before and during operations.

Sustainment

8-35. Sustainment enables land forces to operate and provides them with freedom of action,

by providing for the personnel, logistics, equipment, medical and other support

required to conduct operations. Sustainment consists of supplying a force with

consumables and replacing combat losses and non-combat attrition of equipment to

maintain the forceâ€™s combat power for the duration required to meet its objectives.

8-36. Sustainment is a key enabler of Integrated Action. Without sustainment, military

operations and Integrated Action simply are not possible. In particular, manoeuvre

and fires often generate very high demand, particularly in combat, so assured

sustainment is critical to success in battle. Sustainment, therefore, is central to

commandersâ€™ decision-making, as they have to balance the desired effects with the

resources available. Sustainment is not only an enabler of Integrated Action; it can

also contribute to its outcomes. How a land force sustains itself, whether it draws

resource from a host nation, which port of entry is used and what local contracts

are established are all considerations that can have positive and negative, intended

and unintended consequences in relation to actorsâ€™ behaviour. It is, therefore,

dependent on intelligence and can complement information activities, offering

economic substance to narratives. Sustainment is the subject of Chapter 10.

Operational art

8-37. Operational art is defined as the employment of forces to attain strategic and/or

operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of

strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. It is the orchestration of a series

of tactical actions, if necessary along multiple tactical lines of activity. Operational

art is often regarded as an aspect of command at the operational (joint) level. It is

described here because although its understanding and application is implicit to land

force commanders with operational-level responsibilities, tactical commanders also

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need to understand it. It informs the design of the campaign or operation to which they

contribute, and is therefore the source of their higher commanderâ€™s intent. It is also

relevant as a tool at the tactical level, when sequencing multiple tactical activities to

achieve objectives, which in turn contribute to operational level outcomes. This is often

relevant in the case of a unit with long-term responsibilities for an area of operations.

8-38. At the land component level, and usually at the higher tactical (corps and

division) level, operational art translates strategic direction into tactical execution.

The land force contributes to joint campaign decisive conditions, which leads to

achieving the desired end state. This means that it is the principal way in which

tactical activities are designed and managed in concert with other agencies.

Operational art in the contemporary land operating environment is, therefore,

the orchestration (design and management) of Integrated Action.

Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the

kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals.

TE Lawrence

The stroke of genius that turns the fate of a battle? I donâ€™t believe in it. A battle is a

complicated operation that you prepare (for) laboriously. If the enemy does this, you say to

yourself I will do that. If such and such happens, these are the steps I will take to meet it.

You think out every possible development and decide on the way to deal with the situation

created. One of these developments occurs; you put your plan into operation and everyone

says, â€œWhat geniusâ€¦â€ whereas the credit is really due to the labour of preparation.

Field Marshal Foch

8-39. Operations design establishes the sequence and purpose of critical actions, assigning

missions and priorities to subordinates and supporting commands. These actions are

nested within, and contribute to, the higher commanderâ€™s objectives â€“ a requirement

that may cause tension in a multinational environment when balancing national and

operational command requirements, but which should not be overlooked. Operations

design leads to the scheme of manoeuvre and provides the basis for control of the

operation (Annex 8C describes different types of operation). Operations design, through

review and refinement, is continuous; the situation will change, so the operation and the

force must adapt in response to actions, reactions and the unavoidable consequences

of chance and friction. Commanders on enduring operations accept that their periods

in charge cover only a proportion of a longer campaign. This requires a high degree

of humility in command and awareness of the context for individual contributions.

It does not routinely require a re-design of a campaign, operation or even tactical

activities every time commanders and staffs change over or troops are relieved.

8-40. As explained in the operational overview (paragraphs 8-03â€“8-09), Integrated Action

requires operations design that aligns actions, effects and objectives with desired

outcomes. Each level of the land force nests its activity under the superior level;

indeed some force elements in some circumstances may not even have outcomes: the

successful attainment of their objectives may contribute to higher level outcomes.

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8-41. Operations management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises

the execution of activities within operations and assesses their progress.

Adversary and enemy responses will inevitably affect the course of a campaign

or operation, as will those of other actors. Assessing the course of the

operation, then acting quickly in order to modify the plan to meet objectives

in a new light, is the essence of successful operations management.

Doctrinal frameworks

8-42. Commanders, having developed their understanding of the desired outcomes

and the relevant audiences, then assess what objectives need to be achieved,

and by what effects. In visualising and explaining how actions, effects and

objectives contribute to achieving the outcome, commanders design their

operations using one of the three doctrinal frameworks. The operational and

tactical frameworks group actions by their desired effects, and the geographic

framework describes where activities take place in relation to the force.

8-43. The operational and tactical frameworks are closely related, as illustrated in Figure 8-3.

The operational framework is suited to situations demanding more deliberate planning,

whereas the tactical framework is better suited to relatively simple situations involving

hasty planning. For combat missions, relatively well bounded in terms of time, space

and purpose, the tactical framework is the norm at battlegroup level and below. It is

also used at higher levels for specific tasks. For more complex or enduring missions,

the operational framework has broader applicability, from sub-unit level upwards.

The operational framework

8-44. The operational framework comprises decisive, shaping and sustaining actions

underpinned throughout by continuous understanding.

At any level of command,

it describes how the missions and tasks of subordinates interact in terms of their

purposes and contribution to what is decisive. Decisive actions are those that are

essential to the achievement of the mission. Understanding, shaping and sustaining

actions support those that are decisive and often endure throughout an operation.

By applying the operational framework, commanders and staff ensure their concept

of operations is balanced and able to have a clear and unambiguous main effort.

Figure 8-3. Operational framework

41 This framework corresponds to those in use by NATO. At the operational level, the NATO framework comprises functions of shape,

engage, exploit, protect and sustain; at the tactical level, NATO land doctrine refers to decisive, shaping and sustaining operations.

AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctine for the Conduct of Land Operations and ATP-3.2.1, Allied Land Tactics

Understanding of the environment, constantly refreshed

Shaping to create or

preserve conditions for decisive

action

Sustaining to enable the force to survive, move and fight

Decisive to

achievement of

the mission

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8-45. Actions to enable understanding precede and continue throughout an operation. They

are designed firstly to assess the context of the operation, the relevant audience, and

the information and physical aspects of the environment. Until this is done, it is not

possible to estimate the likely consequences of our actions and those of other actors

with confidence. Understanding must be continually reviewed and updated as it allows

the force to respond to threats in time, and is the basis for adaptation. Understanding is

mainly conducted by the activities covered by the tactical function of intelligence, directed

by command. In combat operations, understanding includes locating, identifying, tracking

and assessing an adversary or applying these skills to a situation, for example, the mood

of a population. Whether establishing understanding or more simply finding the enemy,

this is not simply a preliminary stage to operations but continuous; a land forceâ€™s actions

necessarily generate responses from actors and adversaries, which feed constantly

updated understanding. The context will suggest how to generate understanding,

perhaps through early deployment of specialist forces or analysis of information

and intelligence already collected. In some cases, active information gathering may

compromise subsequent shaping actions; in others, spurring a reaction may be essential

to generate understanding for shaping or decisive actions. Commanders, therefore,

express not only what they seek to understand, but also how the intelligence operation

is to be conducted. More detail on the process of understanding is at Annex 8A.

8-46. Shaping actions create or preserve the conditions required for what is

decisive to the mission. These conditions may relate to a broad or targeted

part of the audience and hostile, neutral or friendly actors.

a. Shaping actions can relate to other actors, the environment or the land force itself.

The commander may need to shape the audience and actors outside the force to gain

support or more resources for the operation, as described in paragraph 8-06. Within

the force, a shaping action might include using fires to destroy or neutralise elements

of enemy forces; moving into a preliminary position; denying enemy approaches;

constructing infrastructure; linking up with friendly forces; or reinforcing a partner

force. In audience-focused shaping actions, the purpose is to influence behaviours

in our favour, such as fixing an enemy (see below), or gaining the support of an

influential local actor. In all cases, land forces can draw on all or some combinations of

the tactical functions, particularly manoeuvre, fires and information activities.

b. Fixing is a key shaping action in combat and many adversarial situations. To fix is to

deny adversaries their goals, distract them and thus deprive them of their freedom of

action. This increases our own freedom of action. Adversaries who have no freedom

of action cannot dictate the course of tactical events; they have lost the initiative.

Depriving them of their freedom of action has both physical and psychological aspects.

Physically, their force can be blocked, or pinned against an obstacle. Psychologically,

they are fixed if they believe they have no freedom of action, if they feel compelled to

do something, or if they believe they have to persist with something that in practice

will not bring them success. Often the easiest way to fix adversaries is to threaten

something that they must protect. Deception may fix them until it is too late for them to

regain the initiative. Fixing can be broken down further.

(1) Denial of goals. A commander can gain freedom of action by preventing

adversaries from achieving their goals and by putting them in a reactive frame

of mind. The aim is to constrain them and throw them off-balance. The principal

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means are to surprise, deceive and lure. When adversaries are surprised, they will

be uncertain how to react, possibly until it is too late. When they are deceived,

they may be confident in acting, but their confidence will be misplaced. The lure

invites them to take a course of action which makes them vulnerable.

(2) Distraction. Freedom of action may be gained by distracting adversaries, to

reduce their ability to interfere with operations. Uncertain of their opponentâ€™s

objectives, distracted adversaries may try to cover all options, thereby dissipating

their force and being driven off their intended purpose.

(3) Deprivation of freedom of action. A target can be fixed by being denied

information, sustainment, or the ability to pass orders and to co-ordinate actions

and effects. In an insurgency this can be achieved by separating insurgents from

their support. In any fixing activity designed to cut down an opponentâ€™s freedom

of action, their command and control system, combat service support, and ability

to manoeuvre or focus effort are the primary targets.

8-47. Decisive action or actions are those essential to achieve the mission; without

them, the mission is unlikely to succeed. Enabled by understanding and shaping

actions, and critically reliant on sustaining actions, they can be terrain or actor

focused, or both. There may be a single decisive action, short in duration, or a

series of events over a protracted period. In both cases, what is decisive informs

the unifying purpose of supporting, enabling and subordinate formations and

units and is integral to achieving the higher commanderâ€™s intent; it contains the

main effort. Decisive actions usually require the use of manoeuvre, fires, and

information activities and have two elements â€“ engagement and exploitation.

a. In combat situations, engagement usually includes offensive or defensive tactical

activities. For example, in defence a force may block an adversary and so set the

conditions for a counter-attack. Or, engagement may be through attacking in order

to defeat an adversary. In non-adversarial operations, engagement seeks to affect

behaviours positively, without the use of force. Engagement is seldom decisive unless

vigorously exploited, and opportunities for decisive exploitation can arise without

engagement occurring.

b. Making the most of exploitation opportunities, whether created through successful

engagement or chance, relies upon an ability not only to identify them but to be able

to generate the means to exploit them. Opportunities vary according to the nature

of the operation, from identifying a gap in a main defence to sensing an armed

groupâ€™s interest in switching sides. It can also include intelligence exploitation after

achieving an objective. These opportunities are to be sought out, not waited for. The

seizure of these opportunities needs to be consolidated, using reserves and forces

in echelon, not least to avoid culmination or being counter-attacked from a flank.

Subordinates are encouraged and enabled to exploit opportunities that arise or that

they create, in accordance with Mission Command. Exploitation requires commanders

with initiative, decisiveness and a readiness to do the unexpected; it depends on

effective understanding, which in turn requires capable intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance forces. A final element of any exploitation is assessment, taking stock,

so that opportunities and threats are recognised and balanced.

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Always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and

overcome him, never give up the pursuit as long as your men have strength to follow; for

an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can then be destroyed by

half [its] numberâ€¦To move swiftly, strike vigorously and secure all the fruits of victory, is

the secret of successful war.

General Stonewall Jackson

8-48. Sustaining actions (broadly reflected by the tactical functions of sustainment and

protection) enable land forces to survive, move and fight so that they can conduct

understanding, decisive or shaping actions. Sustaining actions include supply,

repair, medical, administrative and infrastructure support; reception into theatre;

the assembly, movement and security of reserves or echelon forces; redeployment

of forces out of contact; host nation support; the establishment and protection

of own vulnerabilities, such as operating bases or lines of communication; and

support for, and protection of, civilians and civilian installations. Sustaining is also

about protection, through a balance of active measures to neutralise a threat and

defensive measures, which include guarding, dispersal, camouflage and deception.

The tactical framework

8-49. The tactical framework is a simplified version of the operational framework. It is based

on four core functions: find, fix, strike and exploit. The tactical framework is designed

for use against an enemy in combat operations, but can be adapted to other situations.

To conform to the Manoeuvrist Approach, these core functions are conducted rapidly

and in a seamless sequence. This requires anticipation and concurrent activity; part of

good battle procedure. The tactical framework can also be adapted to other military

activity at battlegroup level and below. Finding is as much about gaining a contextual

understanding as it is about locating an enemy unit. Fixing can be achieved by a range

of methods that deny enemies recourse to their desired courses of action, for example,

by reducing their popular support. Striking may involve violent offensive action, or entail

the launch of activity aimed at influencing an enemyâ€™s perceptions or those of their

supporters. At the lower tactical level, where problems are usually relatively simple and

immediate, the tactical framework is often the best framework for conducting operations.

8-50. Actions to find occur throughout an operation. In some combat situations, it

may be enough to discover the location, motivation, organisation and strength

of an enemy. In more complex situations, it is important to have contextual

understanding of the situation, to understand the physical and cultural aspects

of the environment, and to understand the likely consequences of activity on

the enemy â€“ for example on their morale â€“ and perhaps on a population.

8-51. Fix is explained in paragraph 8-46, under the shaping action of the operational

framework. Fixing involves denying an enemy their goals, distracting them and

depriving them of freedom of action. Note that fixing can be achieved using

a range of tactical methods, for example through the use of direct or indirect

firepower, jamming, deception, saturation patrolling, overt surveillance.

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8-52. Strike is a form of decisive engagement, as described in the operational framework. To

strike is to manoeuvre and then take direct action to achieve the purpose of the mission.

a. As explained in paragraph 8-15-8-18, manoeuvre means more than movement in

combination with fire. It allows commanders to marshal their capabilities so that

they are focused for greatest effect, avoiding enemy strengths and exploiting their

weaknesses. Effective manoeuvre exploits an enemyâ€™s weaknesses before they can

protect them, presenting multiple threats to which they are unable to respond

coherently.

b. Direct action in combat usually means seizing objectives or destroying enemy forces.

In a broader sense, direct action incorporates any decisive action that is focused on

undermining an opponentâ€™s will, cohesion, understanding or capability. It is generally

preferable to apply concentrated violence to win quickly at minimum cost. However, a

more protracted approach may be necessary. Then, actions are sequenced and sustained

so that the effects are cumulative.

8-53. Exploit is to seize opportunity created by previous activity in order to

achieve an objective, or directly to fulfil part of a commanderâ€™s intent.

The geographic framework

8-54. The way in which operations in the land environment relate to each other can also be

described geographically, in terms of a deep, close and rear framework. In this framework,

deep and rear operations are deï¬ned in relation to the close battlespace of operations in

and around the main forces of a formation. Geography in the land environment is important

as it describes where intended operations take place and because so often the terrain, and

who controls it, is vital or at least key. Even in a non-linear battlespace, the concepts of

deep, close and rear, and a sense of range and proximity, aid understanding. When used in

combination with the operational and tactical frameworks, they provide a powerful method in

helping to visualise, organise and integrate activity. Any or all of the activities described

by the tactical functions can be applied anywhere in the geographic framework.

a. Deep operations are conducted at long range and often over a protracted timescale,

against an adversaryâ€™s forces or resources not currently engaged in the close battle. They

may comprise intelligence gathering or fires, manoeuvre and information activities,

targeting key vulnerabilities (the will, cohesion or capabilities of an adversary). Deep

operations are usually conducted at the corps or divisional level, often supported

by other components. Deep operations conducted by land forces are distinguished

by their sustainment and communication requirements, and also by their significant

potential to dislocate an adversary, if conducted at speed and with sufficient force.

b. Close operations are those conducted by the main body of a formation, often in direct

contact with an adversary or situation. They are usually conducted at short range

and in an immediate timescale. The means include, for example, destruction, arrest,

deception, direct fire and rapid manoeuvre.

c. Rear operations establish and maintain friendly forces in order to generate freedom

of action for deep and close operations. They include many administrative and logistic

activities, protection of critical assets and infrastructure and real estate management.

They may require stability activities to maintain or gain consent of a host nation and

also the range of offensive and defensive activities through combined arms manoeuvre.

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Tactical activities

8-55. There are four groups of tactical activities: offensive, defensive, stability and

enabling. Each activity is intended to create or contribute to a particular effect on

the understanding, physical capability, and/or will and cohesion of other actors.

Competence in planning and executing the tactical activities is fundamental to a

land forceâ€™s Fighting Power. These tactical activities frequently occur simultaneously

within a single area of operations, in accordance with idea of the mosaic of conflict.

In operational design and tactics, the groups of tactical activities are closely related.

Defensive and stability activities often follow offensive activities, as a force prepares

to respond to an enemy counter-attack, and the force becomes responsible for the

security of a captured town, for example. A classic aspect of tactics is to decide where

and to what degree to concentrate force in an offensive activity and where and how

much to enable that by economy of effort elsewhere â€“ often in a defensive activity.

Offensive activities

8-56. The purpose of offensive activities is to defeat enemies, in accordance with

the Manoeuvrist Approach. Offensive activities include pre-emption to gain the

initiative, disruption of an adversaryâ€™s offensive action, deception or diversion,

seizing ground and fixing. In offensive activities, the attacker seeks to create

the conditions for freedom of movement and manoeuvre; confuse the enemyâ€™s

understanding; break or reduce their cohesion and will, or defeat their forces

selectively. Offensive activities are conducted as part of most types of operations.

It is through offensive action that a commander seeks to gain advantage, sustain

momentum and seize and retain the initiative. As it is an active rather than passive

approach, it is the chief means open to a commander to influence the outcome of a

campaign or a battle.

Principle of War â€“ Offensive action

8-57. The main characteristics of offensive activities are surprise and shock; the seizure and

retention of the initiative; agility, by which fleeting opportunities are taken; and superior

tempo, through which the intensity and sequence of activities is maintained to keep

the adversary off balance. In offensive activities, the real damage to the enemyâ€™s will

is caused by surprise and shock. Inflicting physical damage is only one way of doing

so. The effects of firepower, tempo, simultaneity and in particular surprise should be

exploited by operating throughout the depth of an area. Manoeuvre in the enemyâ€™s

depth poses a threat, to which they are obliged to respond. It will not, however,

always be possible to out-manoeuvre the enemy. Considerable force may have to be

applied, either directly or indirectly, to neutralise or dislodge them if they cannot be

by-passed. Even in operations that involve a lot of manoeuvre, it is highly likely that

some force elements will be required to destroy enemy forces or seize defended

terrain. Commanders seek to create surprise and shock, to achieve a break-in to an

opponentâ€™s defences, followed by aggressive exploitation within and beyond them.

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8-58. There are nine offensive activities, each with a specific purpose:

a. Attack. An attack is an offensive action against a specified objective.

(1) Deliberate attacks mass combat power at the expense of time.

(2) Hasty attacks trade time and detailed preparation for speed, to seize fleeting

opportunities.

(3) Counter-attacks and spoiling attacks seek to defeat or disrupt an enemy force

made vulnerable by its own offensive action. Spoiling attacks have the more

limited aim of disruption.

An attack may require a significant local advantage in combat power to succeed. A

rule of thumb is a 3:1 advantage, but this usually adjusted based on other factors such

as the state of the enemy; the type of combat power available to the attacking force,

including supporting fires; the degree of surprise achieved; and the extent to which

the cohesion of the enemy force is successfully shattered. The result of these factors

may be a need for only a 1:1 ratio, possibly less. But there are times when the enemy

is resolute and there is little scope for manoeuvre, so very significant firepower and/or

force ratios of even 5:1 are required, and example would be the break in to a well-

prepared position.

b. Raid. A raid is launched as a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure

information, confuse the adversary, seize a high-value individual or target, or to

destroy physical positions. Raids end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of

the assigned mission.

c. Exploitation. Exploitation usually follows a successful attack and is designed to

disorganise the enemy in depth. As a tactical activity, it is characterised by a rapid

advance against lessening resistance. The purpose is both physical and psychological.

Physically, the aim is to retain the initiative by preventing opponents from reorganising

their defence or conducting an orderly withdrawal. The psychological effect of

exploitation is to create confusion and apprehension throughout the enemy force,

reducing its capacity to react. This may be decisive in itself.

d. Pursuit. The role of a pursuit is to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape

or absconding individuals, with the aim of defeating or perhaps destroying them. It

develops from a successful exploitation and starts when the target is demoralised and

beginning to disintegrate under pressure. A pursuit may target enemy forces seeking

to escape from their own initiated ambush. In this case, rapidly following up into their

depth to cut off their extraction would be vital.

e. Feint. The purpose of a feint is to distract an enemy force by seeking combat or

contact with it.

f. Demonstration. The role of a demonstration is to distract an enemyâ€™s attention

without seeking contact. Both feints and demonstrations can contribute to fixing, and

can be designed to have psychological as well as physical effects.

g. Reconnaissance in force. Reconnaissance in force is used to induce an enemy to

disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or the intention of their force by

making them respond to offensive activity.

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h. Ambush. The purpose of an ambush is to inflict damage on the enemy while denying

them an opportunity to counter-attack, principally through surprise, in an action

concentrated in space and time.

i. Breakout of encircled forces. A breakout leads to an encircled force taking offensive

action to link up with a main force. The breakout attempts to surprise the encircling

enemy, so there is considerable advantage in attempting to breakout at the earliest

opportunity, before the encirclement solidifies.

Defensive activities

8-59. The purpose of defensive activities is to defeat or deter a threat. They are generally

intended to protect the force and to provide the right conditions for offensive

activities. Defensive activities alone are not usually decisive without a subsequent

offensive activity, but they can be strategically decisive, for example by creating the

secure conditions required to defeat an insurgency. Like offensive activities, defensive

activities apply to combat and all types of operations. Defensive activities are not

synonymous with weakness or defeat. Whilst offensive action is an important Principle

of War, it is just as important to be able to conduct defensive activities well.

The underlying objective [of defensive operations] should be the destruction of the enemyâ€™s

offensive capability rather than the prevention of him achieving his purpose; the former

contributes to victory, the latter delays defeat or at best leads to stalemates.

General Rupert Smith, Fighting Instructions

8-60. Defensive activities may be necessary in some operations or at certain stages in

a campaign, for example, to buy time, or to generate or maintain opportunities

for offensive activities. By holding key terrain or fixing the enemy in one area, the

conditions for offensive activities in another can be created. The object is to force

an enemy into an action that narrows its options, reduces its Fighting Power and

fixes it for a counter-attack. The challenge is to seize the initiative from the attacker.

While maintaining the integrity and cohesion of the force, the defenders seek to

hold off the attack. They lure the attackers into situations where the defenders can

create and exploit surprise, denying the attackers information, both passively and

actively, for example, by attacking their command systems. Through this range of

activities, defenders can fix their enemy for subsequent defeat by counter-attack.

8-61. The three principal types of defensive activity are mobile or

area defence, with combinations of both, and delay.

a. Mobile defence. Mobile defence is used to defeat an attack by focusing on the

adversaryâ€™s forces, rather than seeking to hold ground. Mobile defence combines

a fixing element that denies the enemy freedom of manoeuvre, and an element to

counter-attack. The balance between these two forces depends upon the mission and

relative capabilities. The force ratios required are similar to those needed for an attack,

and depend on the situation. The counter-attack element of mobile defence requires

forces that can defeat the enemy and are mobile in the terrain.

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b. Area defence. Area defence is used to defeat an attack by denial of ground

through the concentration of forces and counter-mobility effects, for example, using

obstacles or field defences. The most effective area defences operate in combination

with screening, delaying, blocking actions and counter-attacks, some of which

require mobile defence to weaken the attackers by inflicting losses, canalising and

slowing them down before they arrive at the area defence. Because this form of

defence involves prepared field defences, it can usually be conducted at a numerical

disadvantage to the enemy. A rule of thumb is that a well-prepared defence can defeat

or block an enemy with a 3:1 advantage.

c. Delay. Delaying activities are those in which a force being pressed by an attacking

adversary trades space for time, reducing the adversaryâ€™s momentum and inflicting

damage without itself becoming decisively committed. Delay is conducted to slow

an enemy forceâ€™s advance, interdicting movement and gathering information about

its intentions, without giving information away. Delaying activities also allow the

commander to prepare for a counter-attack. These actions require a particularly high

standard of collective performance in manoeuvre and command and control. A delay

can only be conducted by the most mobile forces for the terrain. It is usually conducted

with as much economy of effort as possible, except where ground is to be held for any

length of time.

Stability activities

8-62. Stability activities are bespoke tactical methods used for delivering the stabilisation aspect

of any land operation. They require a full spectrum approach with host nation and allied

agencies. Those tasks that involve close cooperation with other agencies, and particularly

host nation agencies and forces, require individuals with the right skills and personalities.

These are broadly the same as the five aspects of human interoperability (language,

rapport, respect, knowledge and patience). There are four types of stability activities.

8-63. Security and control. Security is a fundamental human need and is most likely to

motivate and regulate behaviour. Security (human, personal, national and physical) creates

the conditions in which other activity crucial to well-being can take place. People will

generally give their loyalty to the group that best meets this need. Winning the contest for

security is therefore essential to establishing the security of a state. Security and control

activities include providing reassurance patrols, public order and population control,

incident response, and protection of key sites. These activities require a lot of manpower.

8-64. Support to security sector reform. Support to security sector reform is one element

of capacity building, focused on developing security capacity. Stabilising a state depends

on transferring responsibility for providing security to indigenous, host nation forces.

This requires a full spectrum approach to reform the security sector itself, for example

by removing those who contribute to insecurity and fear, although care should be taken

not to undermine the fragile security architecture that may exist. Military forces can

contribute to this approach by training, advising, assisting and accompanying host nation

security forces. Being able to deploy early to prevent or mitigate conï¬‚ict is important

and may make a larger operation less necessary. Although it is not strictly a military task,

building indigenous police force capacity may also fall to land forces, so long as it does

not handicap the development of the stateâ€™s military forces, if they are required first.

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8-65. Support to initial restoration of essential services. Sustainable security depends on

providing essential services, for example, medical services, electricity, water, sewerage

and food. The more demanding the physical environment and the more destructive

the preceding fighting, the greater the lack of services will be felt. The solutions are

in the hands of the civilian components of a full spectrum approach. If the security

situation is not permissive to civilian specialists, military forces need to be able to improve

delivery of these services in the short-term, because they are often the outward and

actual signs of a better life. It is also likely to be a framework security task to protect

the key nodes and distribution points from disruption. A lack of essential services

will be exploited by adversaries and will create discomfort, tension and disorder.

8-66. Support to Interim Governance Tasks. Although the development of national and

local legislatures, executives and courts, a constitutional and legal system and other

aspects of a functioning government is not core military business, military forces will need

to understand and to some extent be involved in these institutions. At the very least,

they will require protection. The expertise is found elsewhere so the quicker developing

capacity in governance becomes a civil lead, the better. Military activity in governance,

for example support to elections, requires large numbers as well as suitable individuals.

Beyond the establishment of essential services, which are linked closely to security, is the

development of a stateâ€™s economy and infrastructure. These are strategic and generational

projects, but the degree of early progress will have a direct effect on the success of the

campaign. While there is some relevant military expertise, for example in civil engineering,

military forces are only likely to be capable of tactical levels of support, although this

could have strategic effect. The military priority is to create the security required for

trade, poverty reduction, infrastructure development and enterprise to take place.

Enabling activities

8-67. Enabling activities link other tactical activities together. They include those intended

to make or break contact with an enemy, and those conducted out of contact.

As with offensive and defensive activities, their applicability across all types

of operations is to be understood. Successful execution requires the same level of

planning and training as that required for offensive, defensive or stability activities.

8-68. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance activities are missions to obtain, by observation

and detection, information about, and understanding of, the human, information and

physical aspects of the land operating environment. Ground reconnaissance can be

mobile (scouting) or static (for example, surveillance by using observation posts) and

is conducted in conjunction with reconnaissance from the air, space and cyberspace.

8-69. Security. Security activities provide early and accurate warning of hostile actions

in order to protect the force. The two specific security tasks are to screen (cover

a force) or to guard (a screen with the addition of fires or offensive action).

8-70. Advance to contact. The advance to contact seeks to gain or regain contact with an

enemy under the most favourable conditions. It is normally executed in preparation for

subsequent offensive activity and therefore ends when a force is positioned for the attack.

8-71. Meeting engagement. A meeting engagement involves action between two moving

forces. The meeting may be intentional or unintentional on either side. The general

conditions for meeting engagement are that neither force is prepared for defence; both

are generally moving; and there is an element of surprise on both sides. Commanders

think through the possibilities and the need to gain the initiative as rapidly as possible,

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by fixing their enemy and manoeuvring assertively. In a meeting engagement in

particular, commanders with the most effective decision-action cycle will prevail.

8-72. Link-up. The aim of a link-up is to join two or more units or formations.

Link-up activities normally occur in contested territory and may involve

different types of forces. A typical example is a link-up between ground and

air manoeuvre forces in which the former relieves the latter in place.

8-73. Relief of troops. The relief of troops occurs when one force takes over actions or

activities from another. There are four types of relief action. The first is the relief in place

in which all or part of a force is replaced in an operating area by an incoming unit. This

can be a theatre level, operational level, or a tactical level action, for example, to and from

a forward operating base. The second is the relief of encircled forces, in which a forceâ€™s

freedom of action and security of re-supply is restored in order for it to regain the initiative

before the adversary is able to deliver a decisive action. The third is the forward passage

of lines, in which one force moves through another, for example holding a bridgehead,

or attacks through a unit in contact with the enemy. The fourth type of relief operation

is the rearward passage of lines, in which a force moving from contact passes through

another unit in defence. In all reliefs of troops, the in-place force is required to prepare for,

brief and accommodate the needs of the relieving force to maintain continuity and sustain

effect. These are complicated enabling actions which require very effective planning,

control and integration of capabilities, particularly between the land and air environments.

8-74. Withdrawal. A withdrawal occurs when a commander seeks to disengage the force

from physical contact with an enemy, for example to transition to another action.

Contact may be maintained through means such as indirect fire, reconnaissance

or surveillance. The withdrawal is conducted so as to minimise interference by

the enemy and to preserve Fighting Power. It is critical that the ability to move

rapidly to offensive or defensive actions is retained. Withdrawal is also used to

change conditions on the ground or to allow a reinvestment of Fighting Power in a

different way. Operational withdrawal may be implemented to change the dynamic

in a stabilisation context, for example by changing perceptions of occupation, or

to allow indigenous capability its independence during a transition period.

8-75. Retirement. A retirement is a movement by a force away from and out of

contact with an enemy. Such a force may require protection, for example

a screen or guard, and be wary of being interdicted by an adversaryâ€™s

deep missions; or surprised by the actions of a population.

8-76. March. A march is conducted to move a force efficiently to its place of tactical

employment. Units prepare to come into contact with the enemy, but do not expect

to do so. The march is distinct from tactical movement, in which units move in battle

formations and are either in contact with or expect to meet an enemy. When planned

and conducted efficiently, a march adds tempo to operations. A march, and the relief of

troops, requires regulation when conducted at formation level; this is often conducted

by reconnaissance troops, because of their mobility and aptitude for communications.

8-77. Obstacle breaching. The breaching and crossing of obstacles, for example, minefields,

improvised explosive devices and rivers, normally occur during offensive activities, but may

also be necessary during enabling and defensive activities. These enabling activities can

occur throughout the operating area and will often involve a passage of lines. They are

complicated and require extensive planning, rehearsal, and specialist capabilities because

they have a significant impact on the tempo, manoeuvrability and the security of the force.

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ANNEX 8A

Basics of understanding

8A-01. Figure 8A-1 illustrates how data, information and

knowledge contribute to understanding

.42

Figure 8A-1. Cognitive hierarchy

a. Data is the lowest level, comprising raw signals detected by a sensor or collector.

b. Information is data that has been processed to provide further meaning; it forms the

basis of the common operating picture.

c. Knowledge is information analysed to provide meaning and value and is derived

from both internal and external sources. Internal sources comprise formal education,

historical precedent and practical experience. External sources contain both regulated

information, collected by ISR assets and processed into military intelligence, and

unregulated information such as from the media. These sources form the basis of

situational awareness.

42 Joint doctrine on understanding is contained in JDP O4.

Judgement

Processing

Cognition

Understanding

Knowledge

Information

requirements

Data

External

Internal

Education

Experience

Regulated

Unregulated

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d. Understanding comes from applying judgement to knowledge to gain a deeper

level of awareness of a situationâ€™s inner relationships and implications for the future.

Judgement is a purely human skill, based upon experience, expertise, and intuition.

Understanding, therefore, concerns the acquisition, development and application of

knowledge to prioritise information requirements, make sense of a given context,

make better decisions, adapt and influence behaviours.

8A-02. Understanding falls into three types.

Individual understanding is the personal

interpretation of knowledge. Collective understanding is the shared perspective

held by members of distinct groups that have their own ethos, creed and identity.

Common understanding is the ability to comprehend perceptions of groups other than

our own and to establish a common baseline for communication, interpretation and

action. Common understanding, therefore, is key to establishing the interoperability

required between arms, Services, nations and agencies when working to a

common goal. It is also fundamental to planning and executing operations whose

outcomes are changing or maintaining the behaviours of a range of actors.

8A-03. Understanding has four connected characteristics. First, since understanding is the

application of knowledge to make sense of a given context, it is inherently contextual.

Second, the context evolves over time and so understanding is perishable and must

be constantly refreshed to remain valid. Third, understanding is imperfect. Important,

early moves in an operation take place when understanding is low, and when adversaries

are likely to understand the physical and human environments better than our own

forces do. Commanders need to take the initiative and be willing to act early, taking

considered risks based on incomplete understanding and rigorous assumptions.

Finally, understanding is competitive. The ability of land forces to hold the initiative

will depend on how rapidly they gain and maintain understanding and adjust to

the environment relative to their adversaries. The race for understanding requires

an organisational culture that places a premium on continual learning; and well-

established processes to gather lessons quickly from a theatre of operations, informing

concurrent force generation and the appropriate adaptation of plans and structures.

8A-04. The degree to which understanding is inherently imperfect is relative to the impact

of a number of common threats, which must be recognised and mitigated. As

understanding is perishable, it must be dynamic to be effective. It is subjective and

so susceptible to a range of psychological factors. It is also entirely dependent on

the accuracy and relevance of the data, information and knowledge from which

it is drawn. In adversarial situations, understanding is subject to deception that

purposefully aims to manipulate the data and information presented. The final two

factors rest on a paradox of understanding, namely that there seems to be never

enough information and yet simultaneously there is often too much information

from which to glean the key elements necessary for effective understanding.

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8A-05. In the context of the characteristics of and threats to understanding,

there are six principles of understanding.

a. Sub-conscious knowledge may be so ingrained that it is difficult for us to both

recognise and assess it without sufficient attention to self-awareness. Also, our

background and psychological disposition may mean that we are liable to bias or

complacency.

b. Critical analysis is the intellectual discipline that applies deliberate introspective

judgement to interpret, analyse and evaluate a problem and explain the context upon

which that judgement is based.

c. Creative thinking examines problems or situations from an original or unorthodox

perspective. Background, training and experience can often create conditional

thinking prejudicial to critical analysis. Creative thinking should be encouraged to

examine a situation from a fresh perspective and to create imaginative and competing

hypotheses.

d. In areas where change is slow, or the requirement is enduring, developing and

maintaining understanding requires continuity in observation and expertise. A

balance must, however, be struck between the imperative for continuity and the

risk of gradual assimilation. Fresh perspectives should be encouraged, exposing and

offering alternative points of view.

e. Military operations are usually inter-agency, multinational and joint and so depend on

collaboration between all actors for success. The â€˜need to knowâ€™ principle endures,

but a collaborative environment relies on information sharing â€“ the â€˜need to shareâ€™.

This helps develop common understanding and trust.

f. Fusion is the blending of intelligence and/or information from multiple sources

or agencies into a coherent picture.

It requires common procedures between the

actors and agencies involved and is essential when developing a coherent, common

operating picture. It relies on effective interoperability.

Enabling understanding

8A-06. Commanders set the climate in which understanding is enabled. If commanders

are to make the right decisions, they must create a climate that encourages open-

mindedness, critical analysis and creative thinking. They must also clearly articulate

their requirements for understanding and enable their staff to work effectively.

We have learned many lessons over the last 10 years, but one of the most compelling

is that â€“ whether you are working among citizens of a country, or working with their

government or Armed Forces â€“ nothing is as important to your long term success as

understanding the prevailing culture and values.

General Raymond T Odierno

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8A-07. Culture and beliefs influence how people, including ourselves, behave and why they

engage in conflict. Many aspects of human behaviour are the same everywhere,

but culture plays a very important role in shaping how people perceive situations

and their understanding. Contemporary operations are both multinational and

conducted among people who are likely to be from different ethnic and cultural

backgrounds to us; understanding of culture is therefore non-discretionary.

8A-08. As illustrated in Figure 8A-1, understanding is drawn from a broad and deep pool of

information and even wider basis of data. Without effective information management,

establishing individual or collective understanding is difficult. The volume of information

and the speed and means of its communication are ever-increasing and if unmanaged,

risk creating anarchy. Information management and exploitation aim to provide the

right information to the right people at the right time. It is a function of command to

ensure that these processes are sufficiently resourced and applied across a land force.

8A-09. Understanding, based on data and supported by information technology, is a human

activity and so subject to psychological factors. At an individual level, intelligence,

personality, emotional state, experience, learning, motivation, status and role, and

physical condition all affect how people think and, thus, understand situations. In

group contexts, understanding, perceptions and attitudes are developed through

the accumulated thinking of individuals interacting with each other. It is important

to guard against a number of adverse factors. Peer pressure can be positive in terms

of team building and discipline, but can also inhibit creative thinking and innovation

through generating â€˜groupthinkâ€™. Overcoming groupthink requires acceptance of

authentic dissent; commanders should be aware of this and both encourage and

acknowledge dissenting views. Other factors include unconscious bias and social

prejudice, which are particularly damaging in an operational context where cultural

and social sensitivities and understanding are paramount. These factors cannot be

eradicated, but through recognising them, conscious application of the principles of

understanding and a positive command climate, they may become less prevalent.

8A-10. Adherence to analysis and decision-making tools that are shared across a combined

arms, joint and multinational force significantly aids individual, collective and

common understanding. Analytical frameworks assist in bringing the full range

of relevant factors about a given situation into consideration. PMESII (political,

military, economic, social, infrastructure and information) is one such framework,

widely used by NATO and the United States. It is also common to analyse actorsâ€™

centres of gravity, and their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.

43 Joint doctrine refers to three levels of cultural awareness: general awareness to mitigate threats and exploit opportunities at the tacti-

cal level; cultural competence, comprising deeper and broader knowledge, to deal directly with cultural groups; and cultural expertise

developed in select individuals whose contribution is invaluable to commanders. JDP 04.

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ANNEX 8B

Centre of gravity analysis

8B-01. A centre of gravity is defined in NATO as: the characteristics, capabilities or localities

from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its

freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.

The purpose of a centre of

gravity analysis is to identify actor vulnerabilities that can either be attacked or

threatened, or be protected or strengthened. Designed for strategic and operational-

level analysis, it is also a useful tool for land forces at the tactical level.

Figure 8B-1. Centre of gravity analysis

8B-02. The centre of gravity can be deduced from analysis of what actors need to

achieve their aim. It describes the primary element of their power in relation to

a particular situation. At the tactical level, a centre of gravity of military actors,

friendly or enemy, is usually the principal physical element of their force. By dint of

being the centre of gravity, its defeat leads to that of the force as a whole. While

a centre of gravity is relatively enduring, it is not fixed; understanding must be

continuously refreshed to test whether the original assessment remains valid.

8B-03. Commonly expressed as a verb,

critical capabilities describe what a centre

of gravity can do that makes it so powerful. For example, a particular armoured

formation may form the tactical centre of gravity of a force, which could be

our own, an enemyâ€™s or a partnerâ€™s whose capacity we are building. Its critical

capabilities, in this example, may be that it can manoeuvre and strike in depth.

Centre of gravity analysis

Assessed aim and desired outcome

The actorâ€™s main goal and desired conditions

1. Centre of gravity

The actorâ€™s primary element

of power.

2. Critical capabilities

The actorâ€™s primary means to

enable the COG.

4. Critical vulnerabilities

Weakness, gaps or deï¬ciencies

through which the COG may be

inï¬‚uenced or neutralised.

3. Critical requirements

Those key system elements and

essential conditions required to

generate and sustain

the COGâ€™s critical capabilities

Conclusions

The actorâ€™s weaknesses, gaps or deï¬ciencies which could be exploited to change the behaviour of

an actor and improve conditions in the operational environment.

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8B-04. Critical requirements are the resources or means which are essential to the

realisation of critical capabilities. Usually described as a noun, following the

example above, they could include specific weather conditions, avenues of

approach, or the armoured formationâ€™s morale, fires, combat service support or

combat engineer forces. In a capacity building context, critical requirements could

also include the allocation of appropriate personnel or training resources.

8B-05. Critical vulnerabilities are those critical requirements, or components of them, that

are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralisation or defeat in a way that will contribute to

a centre of gravity failing to achieve its critical capability.

Continuing the example in

a combat context, we cannot affect the weather and critical combat service support

force elements may be very well protected. The combat engineer forces, however,

may be particularly vulnerable and if they are dislocated, disrupted or destroyed, the

force will lose the critical manoeuvre support essential to achieving its objectives.

In combat, an indirect approach seeks not to target the centre of gravity directly,

rather to apply strength against critical vulnerabilities. In protecting our own force

and in developing the capacity of another force, the same principle applies, except

that we apply strength to protect what might otherwise be vulnerabilities.

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ANNEX 8C

Operations themes and types

of operations

8C-01. Warfighting. In warfighting (also referred to as major combat operations), most of

the activity is directed against a significant form of armed aggression perpetrated by

large-scale military forces belonging to one or more states or to a well-organised and

resourced non-state actor. These forces engage in combat operations in a series of battles

and engagements at high intensity, varying in frequency and scale of forces involved.

The immediate goal is to ensure freedom of action at the expense of their opponents.

The rhythm of operations is often high with high logistics consumption. Enemy armed

forces may also use irregular forces and CBRN capabilities to support conventional forcesâ€™

military objectives. Operating in a context where warfighting is the predominant theme

may be further exacerbated, perpetuated or exploited by other irregular actors seeking

to benefit from instability, whether through insurgency, terrorism, criminality or disorder.

8C-02. Security. The transition from combat operations to multi-agency stability operations

(to re-establish stability and prosperity, underpinned by the rule of law) is important

to establish a perception of security. It is likely to be characterised not by the

attainment of specific end states (such as absolute victory) but by incremental

conditions-based outcomes (albeit they may reflect political direction to achieve

particular goals according to a rough timetable). The mix of actors, and their

respective motivations, will be highly dynamic. Conventional opponents, even

once defeated, may re-appear as, or be reinforced by, irregular forces; the threat

they pose may need to be countered at the same time as re-establishing legitimate

indigenous governance and authority. Pursuing the gradual transition towards

stability, land forces are likely to support the activities of other actors in protecting,

strengthening and restoring civil society, governance, rule of law and the economy.

Operating in a context where security is the predominant theme requires an increasing

number of stability activities together with offensive and defensive activities.

Forward presence was another key element in achieving an accurate understanding of the

environment. In areas where US forces were not deployed in significant numbers, even a

modest forward presence enhanced situational awareness and deepened relationshipsâ€¦.

Resultant relationships with host-nation forces at multiple echelons provided for improved

exchange of information and strengthened understanding of terrorist and insurgent

operations, as well as greater acceptance of US presence and opportunities for synergy in

support of shared goals.

US Government

Decade of War, Volume 1. Enduring lessons from the past decade of operations (2012)

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8C-03. Peace support. The peace support theme describes an operating environment following

an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level

of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. Where peace

support is the predominant theme, land forces may expect to develop almost exclusively

stability activities, even if ready for offensive and defensive activities. The purpose

is to sustain a situation that has already met the criteria established by international

mandate; the use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence. Typical

peace support activities include peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping,

peace building. Peace support activities are most often mandated and coordinated

by the United Nations, but may be delegated to a military alliance such as NATO.

8C-04. Defence engagement. Defence engagement is the means by which the UK employs

Defence assets and activities to achieve influence without the use or threat of force.

It includes state to state military dialogue, bilateral or multinational training and

exercises, and support to host nation security structures. Defence engagement spans

the mosaic of conflict and types of operation; it is most effective when initiated as

peacetime military engagement, continuing if necessary through conflict and into post-

conflict stability operations. Its purpose is to sustain the UKâ€™s position and influence,

protect and promote prosperity and security, build capacity and will and establish

comprehensive relationships and understanding. Early, effective and enduring defence

engagement within a full spectrum approach can help to avert instability and, if not,

reduce the likelihood of it being prolonged. It is a necessary theme of all operations.

Types of operations

8C-05. The types of operation reflect the breadth of utility and application of land forces

as part of a full spectrum approach. Throughout, the primary purpose of land

forces is to conduct combat operations â€“ to apply or threaten to apply force. This

capability provides more than the potential to defeat enemies, protecting the people

of the UK and our way of life. It gives credibility in security, peace support and

peacetime military engagement. It thus underpins land forcesâ€™ contribution to the

projection of influence and promotion of prosperity. However, while combat is land

forcesâ€™ first duty, it is not sufficient. To be effective across all operations themes

and types of operation, it requires professional understanding, study, training and

equipping for the full range of likely tasks, whether combat or stability focused.

8C-06. Projection. By dint of being an island nation with global responsibilities and ambitions,

projection of land forces is central to all types of operation overseas. Interventions

will be launched to deter and reassure, to prevent a crisis from escalating or from

spreading, to contain a threat, to reinforce a fragile peace, secure an objective

or to protect a vital interest overseas. Land forces will be delivered from the sea,

through the air or across the land. In the latter case, land forces manoeuvre from a

secure port of entry at speed and range to gain a position of advantage. Projection

requires capable military forces at varying levels of readiness, sustainable at range

and imbued with an expeditionary mind-set, individually and collectively.

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Combat operations

8C-07. Combat is a fight or struggle between armed groups. It is, by definition, adversarial and

physically and mentally demanding. Combat is ultimately what armies are for. Combat

involves a combination of friction, uncertainty, chaos, violence, danger and stress. It

always has degrees of asymmetry. The aim of combat is primarily to defeat an enemy

force, either by closing with it or from a distance, or to secure an objective by force.

War (on land) moves in an atmosphere composed of danger, physical effort, uncertainty

and chance. Everything in war is simple, but even the simplest thing is difficult, and these

difficulties, largely unforeseen or unpredictable, accumulate and produce a friction, a

retarding brake on the absolute extension and discharge of violence. These difficulties

consist of danger, bodily exertion, information or the lack of it, and innumerable other

small and incalculable circumstances and uncertainties originated by chance. These are

some of the inevitable things that always prevent wars in reality from ever approaching war

on paper and in plans.

Carl von Clausewitz

8C-08. In combat, operations take place in a situation usually characterised as war, in which

fighting, damage, coercion and persuasion are frequent, widespread, intense and

conducted by formed groupings, units or formations. Combat is necessary when

interests are directly threatened. Combat is a demanding purpose because of its high

tempo; the complexity of all arms, all-environment integration; the high degrees of

manoeuvre, firepower and protection required; the level of risk; and the potential

for destruction and loss. Combat is characterised by battles, probably at several

levels of command, requiring complex control methods, sophisticated exploitation

of information and situational awareness. There will be significant rates of physical

activity and material consumption. Combat demands advanced levels of collective

training and performance. Despite its demands, it can never be discounted or

wished away: the British Army must be capable of this most demanding of roles.

8C-09. Combat on a significant scale is sometimes regarded as â€˜conventionalâ€™ or

â€˜industrialâ€™ warfighting between uniformed, state forces in a space conveniently

absent of people. This characterisation is simplistic. Instead, the threats faced

are â€˜hybridâ€™, blending conventional and unconventional forms of conflict, using

attributable and non-attributable methods. Some areas of the battlespace are

free of clutter and congestion, while others are not. Combat has always included

â€˜hybridâ€™ threats and asymmetric frictions, including the significance of populations,

although during the Cold War, conventional military approaches did not give

them sufficient attention. This does not mean that they were not there.

8C-10. Combat cannot be considered in isolation from the other types of operation. It is

vital, when preparing for combat, to consider how it might impact on other, perhaps

subsequent, activities. It is also important that the build-up to combat does not gain

unstoppable momentum. Conflict prevention, for example, through deterrence, is

usually preferable to the consequences of committing to battle. However, a force will

only deter if it is militarily credible and this means being capable of combat. Combat

occurs, or is liable to occur, in most of the operations described below. It is the

intensity of the combat that varies. Intensity can be measured in terms of scale (size

and numbers), longevity, rates of consumption and degrees of violence and damage.

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Stability operations

8C-11. Connected to the security, peace support and defence engagement operations themes,

but not exclusively, are stability operations.

This broad categorisation does not imply

separation in time or space from combat operations. They may be conducted prior

to, after or during combat, but will rarely be conducted in isolation. For example,

counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and counter-criminality operations will most likely

complement each other, alongside capacity building and other stability operations.

While the military instrument may lead in combat operations, albeit within a full

spectrum approach, in stability operations the military instrument is in support.

8C-12. This distinction is reflected in the principles of stability operations.

These apply

to all land stability operations, the balance of emphasis reflecting the nature of the

specific task. In all cases, primacy of political purpose is the foremost consideration.

I cannot envisage a conflict where there will be no role for stabilisation operations, but

equally stabilisation is highly likely to involve combat.

General Richard Dannatt

44 NATO doctrine describes a category of crisis response operations that encompasses all those listed here under stability operations,

with the exception of capacity building. This doctrine prefers the term stability, because it broadens the scope to upstream as well as

reactive operations.

45 These are the same as joint doctrineâ€™s stabilisation security principles, with minor differences in wording to reï¬‚ect the requirements of

land operations See JDP 05, Shaping a Stable World. Note that NATO doctrine does not describe principles of stability operations.

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Principles of stability operations

â€¢ Primacy of political purpose. All military operations have a political purpose, but in

stability operations political issues are usually highly relevant to tactical actions. This

principle informs all the other principles and dictates the desired outcome, planning

and conduct of the campaign. Military actions must always be subordinate to and

aligned with the overall inter-agency, politically-led campaign. The political authority,

which may be a United Nations Special Representative to the Security General,

another international appointee or the host nation government, will usually have

overall responsibility for military operations. Depending on the operation, lower level

representatives of the authority may play an important role in operations, even to the

point of authorising military action.

â€¢ Unity of effort. All agencies, military and civilian, international and host nation must

co-operate for the campaign to be effective. This means that within the security line of

operations, the activities of the components and other actors, particularly those with

intelligence and security responsibilities, should be coordinated down to at least unit

level. Also, military and civilian agencies must co-operate. Coterminous military, police

and government boundaries, with co-operation committees at each level of authority,

are a commonly used framework to achieve unity of effort.

â€¢ Understand the context. To ensure that the military campaign, operations and

tactical actions are consistent with the political purpose, it is necessary to understand

the historical, regional and political context of the problem. Without an adequate

understanding of the human terrain, land forces will be unable to inï¬‚uence effectively

the relevant audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies. Understanding, and the

intelligence networks and cultural expertise that underpin it, has to be built over time,

and involves signiï¬cant cooperation with other agencies.

â€¢ Foster host nation governance and capacity. At every opportunity the force must

help to develop the host nationâ€™s ability to govern effectively. In the security sector this

is likely to include the capability needed to conduct effective and appropriate security

and stability operations in accordance with the other principles.

â€¢ Prepare for the long term. The campaign must aim for the long term under

legitimate authority (the host nation). The intervening force is likely to be present

for only a short time in large numbers, so its actions must be aimed at creating a

foundation on which successor international and host nation authorities and forces can

build.

â€¢ Provide security for the population. The ï¬rst duty of any government is to provide

security for the population. It is a task in which security forces play a major role as

insecurity will usually be the main reason there is a stability operation at all. The security

operation will have two aims: making the population safe from the effects of conï¬‚ict

(including from our own actions); and denying violent actors (such as insurgents) access

to the population. Security includes human security (security as in safety stability,

but also access to essential services, for example, food, health, education and justice.

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Armed forces are not usually responsible for the other aspects of human security, and

must therefore cooperate with those who are. It is essential to challenge and ideally

deny adversaries access to the population, so that it is more difï¬cult for them to

inï¬‚uence the population and to get support such as money, manpower, intelligence

and food.

â€¢ Neutralise adversaries. The neutralisation of armed adversaries and their supporters

can occur in a number of ways including deterrence, defeat, dispersal, disarmament

or absorption into legitimate security forces, political movements and society.

Armed forces play a signiï¬cant role in neutralising adversaries. Depending on the

circumstances this can include combined arms manoeuvre operations, raids, patrols,

searches, precision attacks and a lead contribution to demobilisation, disarmament,

and reintegration (DDR) efforts. To be effective and to avoid undermining the security

of the population, the military contribution to the neutralisation of adversaries requires

accurate, actionable intelligence.

â€¢ Gain and maintain popular support. In stability operations, the state, its security

forces and intervening external armed forces are in competition with adversaries for

the support of the people. The side that succeeds in gaining the support of the people,

and denies that support to the other side, is likely to win in the long term. Gaining

and maintaining support depends in part on providing security, but it also depends

signiï¬cantly on the day-to-day conduct of the authorities and their impact on peopleâ€™s

daily lives.

â€¢ Anticipate, learn and adapt. The effective force improves all aspects of its

performance throughout the campaign. This requires formal systems to look for new

ways of doing things, and learn lessons from effective and ineffective practice. The

ideas and lessons must be disseminated to beneï¬t the whole force, which requires the

capacity to adjust doctrine, training, equipment and other aspects of capability.

â€¢ Operate in accordance with the law. The armed forces and the other agencies

involved in stability operations must abide by the law and be seen to do so. This is more

than a matter of the standing requirement to act lawfully. As the armed forces of a

country which adheres strictly to the rule of law, our moral authority to intervene and

conduct stability operations depends on our lawful conduct: it is about our integrity.

This also applies to any alliance or coalition we are part of, and the host nation. It is a

critical aspect of gaining and maintaining popular support, and of undermining any

perceived legitimacy of adversaries. It is often the case that adversaries commit serious

crimes and therefore our lawful conduct sets us apart. If members of the security

forces are accused of breaking the law, legitimacy is maintained by visible and effective

investigations and where necessary, prosecutions. In the end, cover-ups destroy

legitimacy.

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8C-13. Counter-irregular activity. Counter-irregular activities fall into three

categories: counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and counter-criminality.

a. Counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency (COIN) is defined as comprehensive civilian

and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.

It encompasses those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological

and civil actions taken by a government or its partners to defeat insurgency. The

approach requires neutralisation of insurgents by killing, capturing, marginalising or

reconciling them; controlling the level of violence and securing the population COIN

is characterised by instances of combat, normally conducted at relatively low tactical

levels. Consumption of resources and violence are low (relative to focused combat

operations), but the nature of violence is likely to be more shocking because of its

context, where normality is sought or actually appears to exist. For detailed land

forces thematic doctrine the reader should consult the AFM series, within a context of

broader understanding provided by joint and NATO doctrine.

b. Counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism describes all preventive, defensive and

offensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and

property against terrorist threats and/or acts,

to respond to terrorist acts.

Counter-terrorism operations may be conducted against state-sponsored, internal

or transnational, autonomous armed groups who are not easily identified, and

who may not fall under the categories of combatants defined in international law.

Measures taken include those activities justified for the defence of individuals as well

as containment measures implemented by military forces or civilian organisations. The

latter are primarily conducted by police and special forces supported by conventional

land forces. Land forces have a greater contribution to creating and maintaining

effective protective measures to reduce the probability and impact of terrorist attacks

against infrastructure or people.

c. Counter-criminality. Counter-criminality is the action focused on preventing

organised criminal groups from escalating their activities to the point where they

become a threat to allied forces. The character of conflict is such that insurgency,

terrorism and criminality will often feed off each other. Land forcesâ€™ contribution to

counter-criminality will be very much in support of specialist agencies, requiring deep

contextual understanding to inform and assist these agencies as necessary.

8C-14. Military contribution to peace support. Peace support activities impartially make

use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations

Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Peace support cannot

take place without some form of intervention having taken place first, which may

be an uncontested deployment. Having intervened, land forcesâ€™ freedom to operate

will be determined by the willingness of the opposing parties to seek resolution. Any

reluctance may result in combat, either directly or in the protection of other agencies

and the local population. The distinguishing factor of peace support operations is that

land forces are neutral, supporting an international mandate rather than a host nation

government necessarily. Peace support efforts include conflict prevention, peacemaking,

peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Defence engagement is intrinsic

to all. This categorisation does not represent a sequential process where one necessarily

46 NATO Military Committee Concept for Counter-Terrorism, (2016) .

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leads to the next; for example, peacekeeping will not necessarily be preceded by

peace enforcement. However, land forces must understand how the different types

of efforts relate to, complement or overlap each other so that their actions support,

rather than undermine, an on-going political process. Figure 8C-1 provides a basic

conceptual framework to visualise how these activities may relate to each other.

Figure 8C-1. Military contribution to peace support

a. Conflict prevention. A range of activities, including defence engagement to keep

inter and intra-state disputes from escalating into armed conflict.

b. Peacemaking. Conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or

peaceful settlement involving primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary,

by direct or indirect use of military assets.

c. Peace enforcement. Designed to end hostilities through the application of a range

of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It is likely to be conducted

without the strategic consent of some, if not all, of the major conflicting parties.

d. Peacekeeping. Designed to assist the implementation of a ceasefire or peace

settlement and to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace. It is conducted with

the strategic consent of all major conflicting parties.

e. Peacebuilding. Designed to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by addressing

the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires

a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of

peace support efforts.

47 See AJP-3.4.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations and the AFM series for

further detail.

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8C-15. Military contribution to humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance is the

use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil

actors in the operational area or specialised civil humanitarian organisations in fulfilling

their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering. They may occur in response to

both natural and man-made disasters, and result from conflict or flight from political,

religious or ethnic persecution. Military support to humanitarian assistance is limited

in scope and duration. In a NATO context, it includes disaster relief, dislocated civilian

support, security, technical support and CBRN management. For UK humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief operations, joint doctrine should be consulted.

8C-16. Military contribution to stabilisation and reconstruction. Stabilisation and

reconstruction is normally a civilian-led process that commonly takes place during

or after crisis in states that have lost the capacity to govern themselves effectively.

As such it is best undertaken by those actors and organisations that have the

relevant expertise, mandate and competences required. There may, however, be

situations when the military is obliged to assume temporary responsibility until such

time as the security situation allows for appropriate experts to assume the lead.

8C-17. Capacity building. Capacity building can be a discrete type of stability operation,

occurring across the mosaic of conflict, as well as a tactical function. As an

operation, it may be conducted discretely or alongside other operations; it may

form part of peacetime military engagement or in less benign circumstances,

including in combat situations. Capacity building concerns those actions taken

to improve military and, when necessary, civil and infrastructure capability.

The militaryâ€™s contribution is but one element of a broader integrated or full

spectrum approach, which requires cooperation among all agencies engaged.

An understanding of the many different models that exist internationally for internal

security, policing and criminal justice is essential. But those models cannot be considered

in isolation because what works in one country will not necessarily work in another which

may have very different traditions. It is therefore critical for the Security Sector Reform

strategy to take full account of the history, culture and inherited practices of the country or

region in question. The strategy also needs to be informed by the views and aspirations of

the local population.

Sir John Chilcot, The Iraq Inquiry (2016)

8C-18. Evacuation. Evacuation operations relocate specific actors to a

place of safety and generally take place during crises.

a. Non-combatant evacuation operations. Non-combatant evacuation operations

(NEOs) are national diplomatic initiatives, but may see UK land forces supporting

or supported by allies. NEOs are conducted to relocate (to a place of safety) non-

combatants threatened in a foreign country.

b. Extraction operations. Extraction operations are those operations where a force

conducts or assists in the withdrawal of military missions and units from a crisis

region.

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Military aid to the civil authority â€“ United Kingdom operations

8C-19. The security of the UKâ€™s national territory itself is the primary concern of the UK

Government and hence the priority for the use of military forces. The UK needs

to be secured by operations at a distance because it is usually insufficient or too

late to protect the state only at its borders. Land forces are to be prepared to

contribute to home defence and to support the civil authorities when required.

This is distinct from operations to protect UK territorial integrity, for example

from invasion, although that would be the ultimate form of home defence.

Military support to internal operations are described under the heading military

aid to the civil authority or MACA. MACA includes the following.

a. Assistance may be provided by the Armed Forces to other government departments

for urgent work of national importance, responding to emergencies or in maintaining

supplies and essential services. Also, UK Armed Forces may be asked to provide

assistance to communities for special projects or events of significant value, or

through the attachment of volunteers.

b. Military support may be provided to civil law enforcement agencies, such as the police

or Border Force, in the maintenance of law, order and public safety using specialist

capabilities or equipment beyond that of civil powers.

c. Training and logistic assistance may be provided to civil authorities, through the

provision of the defence estate or facilities for either training or operational support

to other agencies carrying out their duties. For example, allowing the police to use

an army training centre to assemble and brief a large number of police officers, even

though military personnel or equipment might not be involved.

8C-20. Resilience. Resilience, which is covered in detail by joint doctrine, is the

overarching term used to describe activities and structures that ensure the UK

Government can continue to function and deliver essential public services in

time of national crisis, including terrorist attack and industrial action, or in civil

crises such as floods. The British Armyâ€™s regional command structure, mass,

technical skills, MACA activities, and secure real-estate and infrastructure are

examples of capabilities that contribute significantly to national resilience.

48 UK Government, 2015 to 2020 Government Policy: Military Aid to the Civil Authorities for activities in the UK, (2016).

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ADP Land Ops

Chapter 9

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Commanding Operations

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CHAPTER 9

Commanding operations

Introduction

9-01. The land force must have the capability to

command complex and dynamic operations

in the land environment, integrating the

effects of joint, inter-agency and multinational

partners to achieve the desired outcomes.

9-02. Command is the authority vested in an individual of

the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination and

control of military forces. It includes the processes by

which commanders, supported by their staff, make

decisions, convey intent, and impress their will in order to

accomplish missions. Command is a blend of subjective

art and objective science. It is founded on an understanding of the desired outcome;

an appreciation of concepts, missions and priorities; and the allocation of resources. Its

subjective elements include assessment of factors such as the impact of surprise, politics

and morale; decision making where there is little or no information; and anticipating the

enemy. It also requires objective analysis to control the operation and to resolve issues

relating to the mechanics of movement, logistics, and communication and information

systems (CIS). Control, as a function of command, is the oversight, direction and

coordination of assigned forces in accordance with the commanderâ€™s plan and intent.

9-03. This chapter describes the principles of command and the key characteristics

of the human components of a successful command system â€“ the commander

and the staff. It then explains how command is exercised through standard

command relationships and introduces the basic requirements for the control

of operations. It concludes with an overview of the operations process,

whereby commanders and their staff plan and execute operations.

Principles of command

9-04. Joint and NATO doctrine describe five principles of joint and multinational command.

a. Unity of command provides the necessary cohesion for planning and executing

operations. Command relationships, by which commanders achieve this authority, must

be determined when a force is established.

Continuity of command describes the ability for command authority to be exercised

continuously over time in a given area of operations. It depends on appropriately

trained, structured and resourced command support as well as on measures for

deputising that are widely understood.

49 Note that AAP-06 describes control in a broader sense as the authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subor-

dinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, that encompasses the responsibility for implementing

order or directives.

Commanding operations

â€¢ Introduction

â€¢ Principles

â€¢ The human components

of command

â€¢ Command relationships

â€¢ Control of operations

â€¢ The operations process

â€¢ Annex:

â€¢ Risk

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c. A chain of command describes the succession of commanders from a superior to

a subordinate through whom command is exercised. It is a hierarchical structure

that links points of command and defines their relationships. A clear chain of

command, understood by all, strengthens integration between formations and units

and enhances unity of effort. Subordinates must be in no doubt as to the command

state within which they are operating, to whom they are responsible and for what.

On multinational operations absolute clarity must be established over national

responsibilities and those of the coalition or alliance.

d. The command structure should ensure that the capabilities of the force are integrated

to achieve the commanderâ€™s objectives in the most effective way. The specific task

organisation will reflect the higher commanderâ€™s requirements.

e. Mission Command, which is described in Chapter 6.

Diverse are the situations under which an officer has to act on the basis of his own view of

the situation. It would be wrong if he had to wait for orders at times when no orders can

be given. But most productive are his actions when he acts within the framework of his

senior commanderâ€™s intent.

Field Marshal von Moltke (the elder)

9-05. In addition to the overarching principles of joint and multinational command, the

following considerations are relevant to the command of land operations:

a. There is a limit to the number of subordinates (and thus subordinate organisations)

that a commander can effectively command in land operations while maintaining

tempo and momentum; this is known as the span of command. This number will

depend upon several factors including complexity of the task, geographical spread and

nature of the organisation. The number of external organisations, including agencies,

allies, coalition members and host nation force elements with which a commander

has to interact are also considerations. The British Armyâ€™s experience suggests that

for complex manoeuvre operations in contact with the enemy, a span of command

should not exceed five subordinate manoeuvre groupings. This rule is not absolute

but is a good principle for organising brigades, battlegroups and sub-units. Fewer

subordinate units or a smaller headquarters increases potential for tempo; but too few

subordinates or too small a headquarters can reduce the momentum or meaningful

outputs achievable.

b. Commanders and their headquarters must be flexible, energetic and agile.

Headquarters are scalable by design so that they can configure themselves (possibly

with augmentation) to adapt and undertake a number of different roles and tasks.

The size and shape of the force under command, the range of actors with which

the headquarters must interact, as well as the directed task will determine how a

headquarters will be configured. A headquarters generates one or more command

posts from which command is exercised.

c. Commanders of multinational land forces require political acumen, patience and

tact. Their challenges include interoperability, the application of Mission Command,

achieving unity of effort where unity of command does not exist, and fostering

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organisational agility. In addition, they need a detailed understanding of each national

contingentâ€™s strengths and weaknesses as well as their ethos, history and culture.

Initially, consensus and cooperation may be based on little more than an agreement on

the art of the possible.

The human components of command

9-06. The key human components of any command system are the commanders

and their staff. While these are essential, they do not describe the entirety

of a command system, which also requires a range of additional command

support measures, including infrastructure, CIS and processes.

Clausewitz described two indispensable qualities of command: â€œFirst, an intellect that,

even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to the

truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may go.â€ Churchillâ€™s

view was that â€œâ€¦there is required for the composition of a great commander not only

massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination but also an element of

legerdemain, an original, queer and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well

as beaten.â€

Commanders

9-07. The role of commanders at any level is to make things happen: to make decisions

on the actions of forces under command; to lead and control them; to judge and

accept risk. Commanders must do so at a pace that contributes to the generation

and maintenance of tempo relative to adversaries. It is also the role of commanders

to create and foster an effective command climate. By the nature of their personality,

leadership, command style and general behaviour, commanders have an enormous

influence on the morale, sense of direction and performance of their staff, subordinate

commanders and soldiers. Successful Mission Command depends on a climate of

command which encourages subordinate commanders at all levels to think independently,

to take the initiative and to be uninhibited in telling their superior accurate and

unwelcome information. It is the commanderâ€™s responsibility to foster such a climate.

9-08. To be effective, commanders require particular skills and qualities. There is no formula

for the right combination, but deficiencies in any one compromise the ability of the

commander to enforce their will. First, and of primary importance, are the functions

of command; the ability to lead, decide and control. To perform these functions,

commanders must understand the context and nature of the operation and direct their

staff accordingly. In addition, they must have vision, intellect and initiative to simplify

the complex and produce a battle-winning intent. However brilliant commandersâ€™

powers of analysis and decision-making may be, they are of no use if they cannot

express their intentions clearly to subordinates of all ranks. Finally, commanders must

have the ability to build relationships on many levels; both up and down the chain of

command and with a range of joint, inter-agency, and multinational actors. Whilst

robust leadership may be required, commanders must be empathetic and patient,

prepared to collaborate and compromise through persuasion and negotiation.

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9-09. Integrated Action and Mission Command focus commanders on seeking and exploiting

opportunities, while anticipating and managing risk. Risks to the force and risks to

the mission can be caused by adversaries, the environment and our own actions.

It is a commanderâ€™s responsibility, supported by the staff, to judge and accept risks

to the force or the mission, or both. This requires commanders to understand the

evolving risk appetite of their higher commanders, their partners, and to ensure that

their subordinates understand their own risk thresholds. This is fundamental to the

successful application of Mission Command. Annex 9A explores risk in more detail.

9-10. Commanders decide where they can best understand and influence events and

outcomes. They identify the best position to observe, assess and lead in relation to

their force, the means of command at their disposal and their mission. The enduring

moral requirement to lead from the front will influence this decision, particularly

at the tactical level. However, when positioned forward there is always a real risk

of being distracted by the immediate dangers and losing the ability to command.

The following factors, applicable to all levels of command, shape this decision.

a. The ability to assess the situation, including judging the condition and morale of

the force and being able to impose will upon it.

b. Access to other actors, including those in the task force, key agencies and the host

nation.

c. Secure and reliable communications to the points of command.

d. Access to staff support for planning and decision-making to maintain continuity.

e. Security, including physical and electronic protection and influencing decisions on the

size and signature of a command post and its constituent parts.

The commanders decided what must be achieved; the Services actually did the various jobs;

the Staff coordinated the whole and prepared the detailed instructions. So, if the chain of

command drove the Army, then the Staff might be defined as its lubrication.

John Masters, The Road Past Mandalay

Staff

9-11. The staff assists and support the commander in making and implementing decisions.

It has no authority by itself, but derives authority from and exercises it in the name

of the commander. All the activities of the staff are undertaken on behalf of a

commander. Regardless of the level of command, the staff has three main roles:

a. The staff has the duty to support, advise and caution the commander. The staff

supports by focusing on the two primary functions of control â€“ coordinating and

monitoring. Under the function of coordinating, the staff supports the commander by

gathering, processing, analysing and presenting information in a manner that helps

the commander to select a particular course of action. The staff is then responsible

for planning, preparing and disseminating control measures, normally promulgated

as orders. In the second and overlapping function of monitoring, the staff provides

part of the feedback mechanism essential for subsequent timely decision-making. The

staff needs to realise the commanderâ€™s intent and always strive to find opportunities to

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make it a reality. Nevertheless, the staff must not shy away from presenting considered,

accurate, cautionary advice that may be unwelcome, but critical to success.

b. The staff also needs to support subordinate formations and units, whose ability

to live, train and fight depends to a large extent on the actions of the staff of their

superior headquarters. In the eyes of both superior and subordinate commanders

and staff, the hallmark of a proficient headquarters is its staffâ€™s capacity to work

in a timely, efficient and co-operative manner. Staff must not sit on information. It

is the responsibility of the staff to ensure that all relevant information is passed to

subordinate and flanking formations and units. The staff need to have a two-down

mind-set; it is the staffâ€™s responsibility at all levels to put subordinate forces into action

to best advantage.

c. The third role of the staff is to inform the wider force, in particular higher, flanking,

agency, allied and partner headquarters. This is essential to delivering unity of effort,

mutual understanding and shared situational awareness.

9-12. The headquarters and its staff cells are organised so that the headquarters can

conduct planning and execution appropriate to its level of command. Functional

expertise is harnessed and integrated to provide support across all the horizons

required by the operation. This may, for example, see functional cells integrated

into future plans, plans and operations cells. This integration is led by the

chief of staff, who, as the principal staff officer in a headquarters, ensures

that the commanderâ€™s intent is turned into workable plans, communicated

to, and understood by, subordinate, superior and flanking formations.

9-13. Many of the qualities required by commanders also apply to staff officers. This is

particularly so for senior staff officers in national and multinational appointments.

They may have considerable delegated powers of command or management authority

and responsibility. In addition to the fundamental quality of leadership, shared by

all officers, good staff officers must have loyal and trustworthy characters with

independence of thought and judgement; the intellect to assess and communicate

with accuracy and precision, and to understand the broader context in which they

are operating; an appetite for hard work as well as team work; technical competence

on associated CIS; and high levels of cultural awareness and political sensitivity.

9-14. The effectiveness of the staff depends on human relationships. These

include those between the commander and the staff, the staff and

other levels of command, and amongst the staff themselves.

a. Although the opportunity for a close relationship with the commander will depend on

the size and level of headquarters and the role of the staff officer, the fundamentals of

the relationship between commander and staff endure. It should be characterised by a

climate of loyalty, respect and individual initiative rather than one that is sycophantic

and unquestioning; the independence of thought and timely action implicit in Mission

Command is vital.

b. How the staff interact with subordinates, flanks and superior headquarters is critical.

A staff should develop open and positive relationships with other staffs, based upon

mutual respect and developed through a conscientious, determined and helpful

approach to problem solving. Anything less will undermine confidence in the exercise

of command at all levels.

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c. The creation of an effective and closely knit staff team within the headquarters and

between the headquarters and units is essential. There must be no secrets between

branches and no avoidance of responsibilities. Team building is a command skill which

requires effort and practice.

Command relationships

9-15. States of command and control explain the relationships between land force

organisations. States of command are concerned primarily with the ability to assign an

independent mission, to reorganise a subordinate organisation to suit its task, or to direct

specific tasks within an agreed mission. They exist to allow a higher headquarters to

prioritise resources and effort, and to assist with task organisation when working with

limited resources. When assigning states of command, commanders balance the need to

maintain flexibility and generate tempo (which are best enabled by passing control to the

lower level) while ensuring that they retain the ability to concentrate force and rapidly

switch priorities (best achieved by commanding at a higher level). To establish the status

of units under command, a commander seeks answers to the following four questions.

a. Can the commander use the unit for any purpose; in other words, give it a mission?

b. If a mission cannot be assigned, can the commander give the unit tasks within the

given mission and so direct the missionâ€™s execution?

c. Can the commander break up a unit into smaller groupings?

d. Are there any caveats on the use of units, for example employment limited to use for a

specified duration?

9-16. Deputising command is not necessarily synonymous with appointing deputy

commanders. There is a requirement for deputising when one or more of the

following conditions apply: when there is a need to provide short term relief for the

commander (for example, when resting or temporarily absent); when succession

in the chain of command is necessary (for example, in the event that the original

commander is killed or wounded in action, or relieved of command); or when there

is a need to reduce the burden on a commander by delegating responsibilities.

a. In the absence of established deputy commanders, staff officers can provide reliefs

for commanders for short periods. Lack of sleep can have a significant effect on the

physical and cognitive performance of a commander. Attention lapses, reduced insight,

leading to reduced understanding and an over-estimation of oneâ€™s own abilities are

some of the common symptoms. Commanders have a duty to impose adequate sleep

routines on themselves and on their subordinates.

b. Seconds-in-command provide succession at the lower tactical levels and are normally

available to assume command at little or no notice if the original commander is no

longer available to exercise command. At formation level, procedures for alternate

command rest on nominating a subordinate commander to assume command.

c. Delegating command responsibilities allows the senior commander to concentrate on

particular areas or concerns, leaving a nominated assistant or deputy to concentrate on

others.

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d. Deputy commanders of multinational forces are appointed in the main to help

strengthen the collective command of an alliance or to bond coalition forces together,

giving a visible expression of national stake and representation in the higher command.

In these circumstances it is possible, although not ideal, to have more than one deputy

commander, each of whom must have clear functional roles.

e. The scale and complexity of operations, particularly at divisional level and above,

means that command cannot be exercised without the support of a deputy

commander who exercises command when the commander is absent from the

headquarters. The deputy commander may also be used to control a particular phase

or geographical area of the operation which requires forward command.

9-17. The command post (CP) is a location from which command is exercised,

consisting of

a physical structure, the staff and its associated CIS. A force elementâ€™s headquarters

may be able to create a number of command posts. A CP supports the commander

by presenting relevant information, and by providing the means of control and the

communications through which orders are passed and information is exchanged.

Depending on the level of command, a headquarters is organised to operate a

number of command posts. Possible types of command post include a Main CP; a

Forward CP to allow commanders to command in the forward areas of operations;

a Tactical CP to allow the commander and key staff to deploy to the point of battle

with a lower profile; and an alternate/step â€“ up CP, to assume control if or when the

main CP is unable to do so for tactical or administrative reasons. This combination

provides flexibility, reach and endurance but comes with a cost in terms of manpower,

protected mobility, infrastructure and communications equipment. In the same manner

that commanders reach back from a tactical CP to the main CP for intelligence analysis

and other outputs not practically deliverable forward, so too they may be able to reach

back for command support outside the theatre of operations. Command exercised

from a number of CPs is a distributed command system. Commanders also consider

the balance of command outputs to be delivered at subordinate levels and how much

the higher formation may need to support the subordinates, or vice versa. Factors

include CIS, CP infrastructure and manpower and the nature of the operation.

Control of operations

9-18. Control involves the oversight, direction and coordination of assigned forces

in accordance with the commanderâ€™s plan and intent. At the lowest tactical

levels, command and control are often vested in a single individual. At higher

levels, it is a key function of the staff to exercise control over certain aspects

of operations in accordance with the principle of Mission Command.

If it is necessary for a commander to interfere constantly with a subordinate, one or the

other should be relieved.

Field Marshal Carver

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9-19. Mission Command provides staff and subordinates with the opportunity to accomplish

the commanderâ€™s intent by using their initiative. Normally this approach takes place

through decentralised execution, where commanders increase the freedom of action

of subordinates, controlling only when absolutely necessary. However, there are

times when more centralised execution and tighter levels of control are required, for

example during complex operations that involve more than one subordinate operating

in close proximity to each other, such as during withdrawals, reliefs of troops, and

obstacle crossings. In such cases, commanders need to impose and exercise greater

levels of control to ensure the tempo of the operation is sustained and that the

possibility of fratricide is minimised. Mission Command is still exercised during these

operations but the control of individual elements is more coordinated. Control has

two basic forms which are not mutually exclusive and can be used simultaneously.

a. Procedural control relies on the implementation of commonly understood procedures

across a force for the regulation of activity within and between force elements.

Examples are standard operating procedures, boundaries and NATO standardised

procedures. Procedural control can, for example, be used to allocate a volume of

battlespace to individual elements for a period of time. Although sometimes perceived

as an air control technique, procedural control is applied across all environments. For

successful Mission Command, the commander always uses only the minimum essential

procedural control measures.

b. Positive control allows for active control of activities in real time. It is used when a

commander wishes to direct control in a particular place or on specific elements, for

specific periods of time. However, even where resolution of the position of friendly

forces is good, that of adversaries and the population is seldom sufficiently timely

nor accurate enough to support positive control as the sole means of battlespace

management.

9-20. Land operations necessarily demand degrees of control over the activities of many

different groups, on the ground and in the air, within a given geographical area. Those

aspects of an area of operations that require active management are described as the

battlespace, and battlespace management refers to the adaptive means and measures

that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activity. Applying battlespace management

provides the control mechanisms for effective and efficient execution of Integrated

Action, synchronizing, integrating and coordinating battlespace activities with respect

to time, forces and capabilities. The key challenge for commanders and staff is enabling

maximum freedom of action for subordinates whilst maintaining control consistent with

the context and nature of the mission. Of note, tighter measures are typically required

as the density and complexity of the battlefield increases. At the tactical level, the

spectrum of battlespace management tools include commonly understood symbology

used to identify units, locations and functions, to fire support control measures, and

information exchange procedures and processes on CIS and targeting systems.

9-21. Command and control procedures must be simple, efficient and flexible to

enable timely and effective decision making. Standard operating procedures

(SOPs) (which are set by a higher authority or formation to its subordinates)

and standard operating instructions (how SOPs are implemented in a

given context) must be clearly written, understood, rehearsed and used.

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9-22. Headquarters must be adept at using information to exercise control effectively.

This requires appropriate procedures and communications systems.

a. At times of high tempo, it is vital to have robust, consistent and well-understood

methods. A headquarters requires proficiency in information management (integrated

processes and services to provide exploitable information); information exploitation

(use of information to gain advantage); information assurance (the confidence that

information is reliable, accurate and secure); and information superiority (possessing

better information and able to exploit it faster relative to an adversary).

b. These procedures all in turn depend on CIS. These enable control measures to be

speciï¬ed with a high degree of accuracy, allow for changes to be rapidly disseminated

across the command, and provide near real-time feedback on the progress of

operations to commanders and their staff. CIS capabilities and limitations, such as

range, bandwidth and security are factors of all plans.

9-23. Directives, plans and orders provide the principal means by which a commanderâ€™s

intentions are conveyed to subordinates as well as the control framework for the

operation. Directives, plans and orders must be concise, clear, accurate and timely.

a. A directive is used at the higher levels of command to initiate activity and to give both

general and specific guidance to subordinate commanders. It will be less formal, rigid

and prescriptive than an order.

b. Plans are mainly issued for contingency planning purposes and have no executive

authority until activated by an order. A â€˜planâ€™ is also the term used to describe the

output from the planning process prior to conversion into directives and orders by the

commander and staff.

c. Orders are written or oral communications that direct the conduct and synchronisation

of action. They are issued in whole or in part to subordinate forces for planning or

execution.

I have (had) published under my name a good many operational orders and a good many

directivesâ€¦but there is one paragraph in the order that I have always written myselfâ€¦the

intention paragraph.

Field Marshal Slim

The operations process

9-24. Commanders are responsible for making decisions. The primary outputs from

their decision-making are the plan, followed by its execution. The process by

which commanders and staff conduct planning and execute the plan is called

the operations process

, as illustrated in Figure 9-1. This is a decision-making

tool used by NATO tactical formations and by the United States Army up to corps

level. Activities within this process include assessment, planning, preparation

and execution. The outputs from this process are operations designed to

achieve the desired outcomes through objectives, effects and actions.

50 UK land forces previously used the PREE process (plan, reï¬ne, execute, and evaluate)

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Figure 9-1. The operations process

Commander

9-25. The way in which the operations process is approached depends on a range of

factors. These include the context, type of operation, time available, level of

headquarters and associated resources. The process is therefore scalable, requiring

commanders and staff to be flexible and to focus on the ends rather than be slaves

to the process. In all circumstances, commanders and staff must recognise that

planning is a command-led activity, and that the operations process is not necessarily

sequential. Assessment, which directly influences the other three activities, is

constantly refreshed, tested and refined; preparation and planning are continuous.

Assess

9-26. Assessment is the monitoring and evaluation of the current operational picture.

It is continuous throughout planning, preparation and execution. Effective

assessment is dependent on good situational awareness, to which it also

contributes, and provides the basis for the decision-making of commanders and

staff. It is a critical supporting activity in the constant fight for understanding.

As it surrounds and permeates the entirety of the process, specific discussion of

assessment within plan, prepare and execute activities is captured in the relevant

paragraphs below. Assessment after the operation is also a key contributor to

adaptation. Adaptation leads to the adjustment of doctrine (tactics, techniques and

procedures), and the generation of requirements for new or adjusted capability.

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Plan

9-27. Planning determines the commanderâ€™s initial balance of effort, within a framework

of available time, resources and freedom of action. However, in a dynamic operating

environment, pragmatic and flexible plans are more likely to be successful than

those that are prescriptive. The commander needs to develop contingency plans

to address other outcomes that could be foreseen, and must be poised to cope

with the unexpected. Military planning is based on an estimate process.

9-28. An estimate is a logical process of reasoning by which a commander, faced with

an ill-structured problem, arrives at a course of action to be taken to achieve the

mission. Commanders at all levels use estimates appropriate to the complexity of

the problems. The estimates used by the British Army all follow the same broad

approach: continuous understanding of the situation; identification of outcomes,

objectives and effects to be achieved; selection, resourcing and programming of

a particular course of action; and preparation of orders. Depending on the nature

of the problem, level of command and immediacy of execution, contingency

and branch plans may also be produced for subsequent refinement.

9-29. The British Army routinely uses three recognised planning processes. These are

compatible with those of other components and NATO land forces, who often

employ their own national decision-making processes particularly at the lower tactical

level. Interoperability depends more on making the right deductions and knowing

how different estimate processes relate to each other, than on adopting a single

approach across a joint or multinational force. The use of a particular planning

process is determined not by the level of the force, but by the nature of the problem,

the time available and the procedural interoperability requirements of the task.

a. Operational-level planning process. At the operational level, commander and their

staff use the operational-level planning process to produce a campaign or operational

plan. See AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning (with UK national

elements).

b. Tactical estimate. The tactical estimate, also known as the â€˜6-step estimateâ€™, is

designed for circumstances where military problems are complex and plans may be

longer term and involve significant sequencing. The tactical estimate is suitable where

there is an emphasis on detailed planning and understanding rather than high-tempo

decision-making. It can be used by division, brigade and battlegroup headquarters.

c. Combat estimate. The combat estimate, also known as the â€˜7 questionsâ€™, is derived

from the tactical estimate but presents the analysis, plan creation and decision-

making in a sequence of 7 questions. This is intended to make it easy to focus on

rapid understanding of the problem and decision-making as part of accelerated battle

procedure. It is used at formation level for similarly urgent situations. It can be adapted

for more complicated, deliberate actions. It assumes that the operating environment

and general tactical situation are already well understood. The combat estimate is

designed mainly for use at battlegroup and below to generate plans for single, urgent

tactical problems.

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9-30. Orders are used in all spheres of military activity and at all levels of command. They

follow standardised formats to enable swift delivery, comprehension, extraction and

execution. Orders are as comprehensive as time allows. An operation order and

its subsidiaries, for example, fragmentary orders, include the detail necessary for

subordinate commanders to be able to understand the context for the operation. They

also need to understand the intent, extracting what it means for them, and what it

means to others. Mission Command requires orders which concentrate on imparting

an understanding of the context of the operation and what needs to be done rather

than how. Attention to detail when producing orders is of paramount importance.

9-31. The means of delivering orders is contingent on the level of command, time available,

nature of operation, physical dispersion of forces and CIS. In combat operations

at battlegroup and below, verbal orders (either in person or via CIS) accompanied

by a one-page summary are sufficient. At higher levels of command and in more

complex scenarios, more detailed written orders will be required. At all levels, orders

can be accompanied by diagrams, overlays and schematics to show how dynamic

activity is intended to occur in time and space. Wherever possible, a commander

issues orders in person and so imbues subordinates with a common purpose and

understanding. Subordinates then back-brief their commander to clarify intent, confirm

understanding and, where appropriate, recommend further refinement to the plan.

9-32. Assessment during planning. Assessment is procedurally ingrained within UK

estimates, especially within intelligence preparation of the environment, mission

analysis and course of action evaluation. As the plan develops within the estimate

process, it is tested against the constantly changing situation to refine the decisions

made as well as identify and mitigate risks. Such refinement, drawing on tools of

red-teaming, wargaming and operational analysis, precedes the issuing of orders.

Of note, planning is typically the stage in the operations process where the staff

creates the initial common operating picture from which to achieve shared situation

awareness and identify opportunities, threats and information requirements. Assessment

during planning also identifies measurements of effectiveness and performance

that are used for subsequent assessment during preparation and execution.

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â€¢ Format of orders. Orders follow a standardised format of: situation; mission;

execution (including concept of operations, missions and tasks, coordinating

instructions); combat service support; and command and signal.

â€¢ Concepts of operations. The concept of operations describes how the commander

intends to achieve the mission. Where possible, the commander would conï¬rm it with

the superior commander through the backbrief process. The concept of operations

ï¬‚ows directly from his decision and has three elements to it:

â€¢ Intent. Intent is a concise and precise statement of what the commander intends to

do and why, expressed as effects to be created. It is as brief as possible and easy to

remember, so that subordinates can know it. It is formulated by the commander.

â€¢ Scheme of manoeuvre. The scheme of manoeuvre expands the intent to describe

how the commander sees the operation unfolding. It explains where, when, how

and with what, in relation to each other, the force is to achieve its purpose, so that

subordinates can understand their roles in the plan and the effects and actions that

they and others are to realise. A clear intent minimises the length of the scheme of

manoeuvre, where brevity is an important quality. Schemes of manoeuvre generally

use the doctrinal frameworks as a structure. Phases should be used with caution as

they can serve to over-control subordinate action.

â€¢ Main effort. The main effort is deï¬ned as: the concentration of forces or means

in a particular area and at a particular time to enable a commander to bring about

a decision. It is a conceptual tool by which a commander concentrates forces on

the activity considered crucial to the success of the mission and the achievement

of the higher commanderâ€™s intent. The commander gives it substance by allocating

sufï¬cient resources and focusing the task of the force element assigned to it. It is an

implied task for all other force elements to enable or support the main effort. The

main effort can change during an operation, but this can detract from the crucial

activity. It is expressed as an action together with the primary force undertaking it.

â€¢ Mission statement. A mission statement is a clear and direct order to a subordinate

and consists of actions to be taken and a unifying purpose (effect), proceeded by

the words â€˜in order toâ€™. There are three types of mission: a single statement with a

unifying purpose; a series of tasks with a unifying purpose; and for reserves, a series

of â€˜be prepared toâ€™ tasks, without a unifying purpose. Missions are listed in a logical

order of activity rather than in British Army precedence as this will aid the visualisation

of the operation. Tasks contained within mission statements are substantive. Lesser

tasks, such as conducting preliminary moves or establishing liaison will normally be

omitted from the mission, but may be included elsewhere in the orders, in coordinating

instructions for example. Depending on the level of command and circumstances,

mission statements are written or approved by the commander personally.

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Prepare

9-33. Preparation includes activities conducted by the formation or unit before execution.

These activities are designed to improve the formation or unitâ€™s ability to conduct

the operation and include, but are not limited to, plan refinement, back-briefs,

rehearsals, coordination, reconnaissance and preliminary movement. Preparation

of a formation or unit for a specific operation starts with receipt of a warning

order and ends when execution begins. Sound, efficient battle procedure is key

to making preparation fit the time available, in order to contribute to tempo.

9-34. Assessment during preparation. Assessment during preparation monitors the progress

of readiness to conduct the operation and assists in plan refinement. In relation to the

latter, commanders need the agility to adjust the plan based on new information and

changing circumstances. For example, the enemy will do the unexpected, unforeseen

opportunities may arise, assumptions on which the plan is based may be proven true or

false and friendly forces status may change. In any of these cases the change must be

assessed against the plan and the commander must decide if the new information:

a. validates the plan with no further changes;

b. requires minor adjustments to the plan;

c. requires major adjustments to the plan; or

d. invalidates the mission and so requires direction from the superior commander. If there

is not time to consult higher, then commanders act to support the one-up intent and

main effort whilst considering the context of the two-up intent.

9-35. The operations process places significant emphasis on the requirement to

continually assess, test and refine a plan. At corps and division level, there

may be a significant time gap between the initial preparation of a plan and its

execution, demanding a focused effort to refine and adjust the plan to reflect

the latest understanding of the requirement and context. At brigade level and

below during combat operations, planning may flow immediately into execution.

In all circumstances, commanders and staff continually monitor the situation and

must be prepared to refine a plan even after orders have been delivered.

Execute

9-36. The execution of an operation begins when committed assets physically enact

their issued orders. Overcoming friction, maintaining tempo and enabling Mission

Command relies heavily upon the personal involvement of the commander,

supported by the staff. Command is complemented by control which is further

sub-divided into two elements â€“ monitoring and coordination. The latter is a

function of the headquarters staff who implement the commanderâ€™s plan and

make adjustments when required. Maintaining accurate and timely situational

awareness across the span of command is fundamental to successful execution.

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9-37. Assessment during execution. During execution of an operation, assessment

considers the unfolding situation against that which was planned for and allows

refinements to be made to mitigate or exploit the identified change. The situation

may change for a wide variety of reasons. Friendly, enemy, neutral and environmental

activity and information will all have an impact and cause an under- or over- delivery

of the plan. At the lower tactical levels and during simple operations, the commander

may be able to conduct the assessment function with limited support. During more

complex operations, the commander will rely more heavily on the staff to analyse

the situation and so assist decision making. The two key measurements to inform

this analysis are measurement of performance (assessment of the performance

of a task and achievement of the associated purpose) and measurement of

effectiveness (assessment of change against intended progress). The way in which

performance and effect are measured are considered in the planning stage.

Post operational assessment

9-38. At every level in the force, after each operation or major event and continuously

during longer campaigns, commanders review the performance and capability of

the force to enable rapid and successful adaptation. To be genuine, this command-

led activity requires an appropriate command climate, and engaged, flexible and

objective participants. The aim is to identify experiences, examples and observations

that can contribute positively to future tasks and operations. It relies on commanders

at all levels to recognise that success on operations depends significantly on rapid

and relevant learning across the whole force, in competition with adversaries and

enemies. In the operations process, post-operational assessment informs planning

for the next cycle of operations. Post operational assessment is also central to deeper

institutional learning and capability development. Capability is improved only when

the lessons identified and observations are implemented by those in the home base

responsible for force development, equipment acquisition, doctrine and training.

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ANNEX 9A

Understanding risk

Warâ€¦is in its nature hazardous, and an option of difficulties.

Major General Wolfe

9A-01. Land operations require commanders at all levels to identify and seize opportunities.

But they also necessarily involve significant and often fatal risks. Understanding risk

is therefore essential. Military organisations broadly understand risk as: potentially

damaging; made up of cause, effect and consequence; explained in terms of likelihood

or probability and impact; and something that has to be accepted on the route to

success. Distinction is also made between operational and operating risks. Clarity

of communication within the land force and with NATO allies is imperative and so

this doctrine uses the term risk as it is commonly understood and defined by the

Concise Oxford English Dictionary: â€œthe possibility that something unpleasant may

happenâ€. Risks, therefore, are described as the possibility of negative outcomes in

relation to the force or the mission.

The events or conditions that lead to those

negative outcomes are causes. The interplay between cause and effect is inherently

uncertain and requires commanders and staff to manage risk. Risk management is

the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational

factors, and making informed decisions that balance risk with mission beneï¬ts.

9A-02. To achieve success, commanders have to judge and accept risks. Taking risk is

inherent in effectiveî€military operations, in which commanders at all levels achieve

their intent byî€seeking opportunities then vigorously seizing and exploiting them.

But adversary and enemy actions and the difficulty of overcoming friction mean that

operations are not guaranteed to succeed and the force may incur losses. Enemies and

adversaries aimî€to defeat or destroy the force or elements of it, or in other waysî€to

prevent the mission from being achieved. Many military activities are inherently

dangerous even without enemy involvement; friction compounds the difficulty. Even

when a mission or task is successful, equipment may be lost and casualties taken.

The nature of conflict means thatî€military activity is seldom, if ever, risk-free.

9A-03. Risk has different implications at different levels of operations, with actions taken

at one level potentially incurring risk at another. Many contemporary operationsî€are

conducted in a context where there is a low tolerance of casualties. At the

tactical level, to judge what is appropriate, commanders need to understand the

risk appetite at the higher levels of command. For example, if there is little

political appetite for casualties in an operation, then tactical actions that incur

casualties can cause strategic risk. Conversely, if strategic risk might be caused

by the failure of a particular mission, then tactical commanders may have to

51 Note that JDP 0-01 deï¬nes risk as having positive or negative consequences.

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accept the risk of a greater loss of life to achieve it. Risk appetite is not fixed; it

is contextually dependent and differs from one operation to another, as well as

within a single operation. It will also differ between allied and coalition partners.

9A-04. There are two different types of operational risk that a land force and its commander

face: risk to force, comprising its loss or damage to its Fighting Power; and risk to

mission. These risks are not mutually exclusive; for example loss of Fighting Power

can prevent achievement of the mission. Multiple, compound risks, where as one

risk materialises it exposes a force to the others, are the most dangerous.

a. Risk to force.

(1) The risk of loss of the force, or elements of it, is often associated with

warfighting, but at low level in stability operations, the loss of a patrol or a sub-

unit can be a risk (a risk with strategic consequences). There are many famous

historical examples of this risk being accepted; the expedition to recover the

Falkland Islands in 1982, and the Battle of Goose Green during that campaign

are two examples. Of course acceptance of the risk does not guarantee

operational success; at the Battle of Arnhem in 1944 a British airborne division

which dropped behind German lines was destroyed as the corps due to link-up

with it failed in its mission, with the result that a crossing over the Rhine was not

achieved for several months. It is rare to knowingly accept a high risk of loss of

part the force, unless it is the best or only way to achieve the overall mission and

the context is such that the risk is tolerable.

(2) The second risk to the force is that of damage to Fighting Power. In isolation

this risk is the chance of casualties or loss of equipment and materiel with little

risk to the overall force or the outcome of the operation. In combat, theî€riskî€of

casualties is often high, even unavoidable. The degree to which this risk is

acceptable depends on the circumstances. At a purely practical level, loss of

equipment, materiel and personnel reduces the physical and moral components

of the forceâ€™s Fighting Power and damages the forceâ€™s reputation. However,

even if these losses are tolerable at the tactical level, they may be intolerable at

the strategic level. Such situations require very acute judgementî€of appropriate

risksî€by commanders and staff. They must fully understand the strategic context

and risk appetite and ensure that operations are conducted accordingly. At the

same time, they must not allow the force to develop such a protective mind-set

that it cannot achieve the mission. Operational design must seek to protect this

strategic vulnerability from attack at the tactical level.

b. Risk to mission. On its own, this risk is the possibility that the mission will not

succeed, but there is no significant risk to the force. The risk might range in severity

from the risk to a single task, to the risk that an entire campaign may fail. In these

cases if the mission is imperative then the risk can only be mitigated by, for example,

finding a different course of action, applying more resources, or finding some

other way of changing the risk equation. If the mission or task is not imperative to

achieving intent then it may not be worth carrying out the task or mission.

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9A-05. Some risks can be foreseen and so planned against; others cannot and arise

through chance and friction, intrinsic to the nature of conflict. By thinking

laterally and constantly updating their situational understanding, land forces

will be better prepared when managing emergent risks. Foreseen or unforeseen,

the causes of military risk fall into three broad groups â€“ adversary actions,

environmental factors and our own actions. These groups are not exclusive.

a. In conflict, forces are in a contest with their adversaries and enemies; each side is

seeking to create, identify and exploit weaknesses in the other side. All enemies and

adversaries are intelligent, dynamic actors, directed by their command and control

authorities and systems. They can be the cause of both types of risk: threatening the

cohesion or even existence of the force or elements of it; or preventing achievement

of tasks, missions or wider objectives.

b. Terrain, distance, climate,î€weather, disease and darkness are examples of

environmental factors that cause friction. These factors can increase the probability of

mission failure and attrition of the force.

c. Inappropriate actions can cause the force or elements of it to fail to achieve their

objectives, or can increase its vulnerability to enemy action or environmental factors.

These can be, for example, errors of judgement, planning, execution and resourcing,

either independent of the enemy threat or environmental factors, or in relation to

those threats. In some cases it may simply be bad luck, for example, an equipment

failure, but more often the cause is either incompetence or a misreading of the

situation.

8A-06. Risk management. Ultimately the commander of any force, supported where

applicable by the staff, is responsible for judging and accepting risk. This involves

understanding in each case the potential causes, the likelihood or probability of the

risks, their impacts and the context of operations. The key is to recognise the risks,

mitigate the causes where possible, knowingly accept the residual risk, and where

possible prepare contingency plans to deal with the causes and their consequences

if required. Three factors warrant particular consideration when managing risk.

a. First, human beings can easily misjudge risk. They can over- or under-estimate it

or fail to notice it altogether, depending on the operational situation, group context

and dynamics (for example, informed by unit culture) and individual personalities.

Objective guides can be very useful, allowing the staff to identify, assess and track

risks to act as a â€˜handrailâ€™ for commandersâ€™ decisions. At formation level, risk

management tools, supported by operational analysis, can provide a useful, objective

measure of risk; these are described in joint and lower-level Army doctrine. At the

lower tactical levels, certainly at unit level and below, risk management is usually

straightforward. Units usually operate in a formation context, so much of the risk

management is done for them. In that context, units and sub-units identify and

plan mitigation by using the combat estimate process, including wargaming and

rehearsals. This allows concurrent considerations of risks and opportunities.

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b. Second, the least controllable cause of risk is other actors, particularly enemies.

Environmental factors may be hard to overcome, but they do not fight back. Friendly

causes involve the complication of human actions but the threat from this source can

be mitigated. Mitigation measures include selection of appropriate commanders and

staff, training and allocation of adequate resources. The enemy, however, actively

seeks to cause casualties, prevent us achieving the mission, and if they can, to defeat

or even destroy us. Aî€passive, reactive approach cannot succeed in fully eliminating

the enemy threat. The risk that the enemy presents can ultimately only be overcome

by active measures. The Manoeuvrist Approach emphasises offensive action to seize

and retain the initiative, compelling enemies and adversaries to respond to our

actions. Stability operations also require us to take the initiative. Whenever there is

a human threat, it is usually best to act to make the threat respond to our actions,

rather than the other way round.

c. Operating some capabilities (including, for example, helicopters) involves complex

technical risks to life that can only be fully understood by qualified and experienced

specialists. Defence places a personal duty on specific individuals to manage these

operating risks, both in training and during operations. The commander must

seek the advice of the duty holder or the delegated representative if the capability

is to be employed in a way that increases the risk to life above the level that would

be tolerated in routine activities. On operations, the commander judges whether

the operational risk to the mission warrants acceptance of increased operating risk.

Exceptionally, a commander may also decide to employ the capability without specialist

advice if urgency precludes consultation.

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ADP Land Ops

Chapter 10

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Sustaining operations

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CHAPTER 10

Sustaining operations

Introduction

10-01. Sustainment is the business of maintaining the

force. Through logistic and administrative support,

it seeks to enhance the forceâ€™s resilience and

enable it to endure for as long as operationally

necessary. It is hugely important to military

success, as only forces that are adequately

sustained can succeed. Sustainment is a key

factor underpinning the concept of culmination.

A force that over-reaches itself will become

increasingly unsustainable, and its tactical options will be reduced to the point of being

ineffective. Throughout military history successful commanders have recognised this

significance. As a divisional commander during the 1991 Gulf War, General Rupert

Smith put it simply: â€œâ€¦ a commander [should] only fight the battle he can sustain.â€

10-02. Before conducting operations commanders must ensure that they are able to

deploy, sustain and regenerate their forces. They must understand the freedoms

and constraints that sustainment provides including considering the implications of

casualties and the consumption of materiel. They then plan, allocate and balance

resources accordingly. Commanders also evaluate the risks to their sustainment assets

and infrastructure, and then adapt their plans to reduce the impact of sustainment

constraints while exploiting the tactical freedoms sustainment provides.

10-03. Sustaining a land force depends on strategic and joint operational level systems,

processes and resources, but within the land environment at the tactical level

it is fundamentally a land component responsibility. This chapter defines key

terminology, and describes the philosophy and principles of land sustainment. It

then introduces the functional groupings that sustain tactical land forces, before

explaining how sustainment is planned and executed in the land environment.

Terminology

10-04. Given the inherently joint context of sustainment, adherence to

joint and NATO terminology is important. See AAP-06 and JDP

4-00, Logistics for Joint Operations for further detail.

a. Sustainability is the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power

for the duration required to achieve its objectives without culmination. It is a Principle

of War.

b. Sustainment describes those logistic and administrative activities and resources

necessary to sustain a force. It is a tactical function.

Sustaining operations

â€¢ Introduction

â€¢ Terminology

â€¢ Philosophy and principles

â€¢ Functional groupings

â€¢ Planning

â€¢ Execution

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(1) Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and

maintenance of forces. Logistics comprises the development, acquisition, storage,

movement, distribution, maintenance, recovery and disposal of materiel; transport

of personnel, acquisition and construction; maintenance, operation and disposal

of facilities; acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health services.

(2) Administration is the provision and implementation of regulations and

procedures related to the management of an organisation in support of the

accomplishment of the mission.

c. Combat service support is the support provided to the force, primarily in the fields of

administration and logistics. This term is usually used in reference to functional groups

of logistic, health service, equipment, infrastructure and administrative support.

Philosophy and principles

10-05. At the tactical level in the land environment, the British Army is guided by the

philosophy of land sustainment. First, sustainment is central to Fighting Power; the

capability of a land force depends on its sustainability. Second, sustainment is a means

to an end. Sustainment should always support the mission, although there may be

occasions where it is the mission, for example, in humanitarian assistance operations.

Third, sustainment is everyoneâ€™s responsibility; all members of the land force have an

individual and collective responsibility for sustainment. Fourth, the agility of the force

depends on agile sustainment, which in turn requires a support network rather than

just linear supply chains. Finally, while sustainment requires specialist skills, those

military personnel who provide sustainment are soldiers first and specialists second.

10-06. The principles of logistics inform the planning and execution of sustainment by land

forces. The descriptions of each principle reflect the context of tactical land forces, and

so have been adapted from those of NATO which focus on operational level sustainment.

NATO, joint and lower-level land doctrine describe complementary functional principles,

relevant to specific forms of sustainment (for example, AJP-4.10, Allied Doctrine

for Medical Support describes the fundamental principles of medical support.)

I told my staff that G2 existed to tell me what I should do to the enemy and when, G4

existed to tell what was possible given my constraints in supply and transportation. And

then, when I had made my decision, G3 did it.

General Omar Bradley

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The principles of logistics

â€¢ Collective responsibility. Collective responsibility requires all elements of the land

force to share logistic information, capabilities and resources to support the force.

Such cooperation combined with robust sustainment command and control provides

the foundation for the ï¬‚exible and efï¬cient use of sustainment capabilities thereby

contributing to operational success.

â€¢ Authority. When responsibility is assigned for the sustainment of forces, it must be

accompanied with the appropriate level of authority to direct and control activities to

achieve the sustainment required.

â€¢ Primacy of operational requirement. Sustainment effort is focused to meet the

requirements necessary to support operational activity. Although prioritisation may be

required, for example when preparing forces for theatre exit, the needs of operational

activity come ï¬rst.

â€¢ Coordination and cooperation. Cooperation and coordination in all sustainment

activities including between civilian and military providers, will contribute to the best

use of limited resources. Cooperation is best engendered through shared training,

developing interoperability, team spirit and cohesion. It relies upon: mutual trust

and goodwill; unity of purpose, if not command; and agreed understanding of

responsibilities, freedoms and limitations.

â€¢ Assured provision. Commanders at all levels ensure the provision of sustainment

resources to support the forces and capabilities allocated to them.

â€¢ Sufï¬ciency. Sustainment is available in the necessary quantity and quality, when and

where it is required throughout all types of operations and tactical activities.

â€¢ Efï¬ciency. Efï¬ciency involves achieving the maximum level of support for the least

sustainment effort to make the best use of ï¬nite resources, the supply network and

lines of communication. Logistic and administrative efï¬ciency will ultimately determine

the most appropriate operational structures and resources to support an operation.

â€¢ Simplicity. The complexity of sustainment activity demands a robust plan that is

widely understood and that absorbs friction. Simplicity enables plans, systems and

organisations to react well to the unforeseen.

â€¢ Flexibility. Sustainment must be adaptive and ï¬‚exible to be effective. Adequate

planning allows force elements to react in a timely manner to changes in the

operational situation.

â€¢ Visibility. Commanders require timely, accurate and relevant information to make

effective decisions and to plan and coordinate sustainment activity. Visibility of the

wider forceâ€™s support arrangements (for example, lines of communication and transit

areas) will assist commanders in the planning and execution of operations.

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Functional groupings

10-07. There are five main combat service support functional groupings: logistic support,

health service support, equipment support, infrastructure support and administration.

a. Logistic support links a deployed force to its sustaining nodes using four echelons:

unit, formation, force or theatre, and the strategic base. The activities of logistic

support groupings include the provision of materiel which includes the procurement,

storage, management and configuration, assurance and distribution of supplies; the

provision of movement to deploy a force and provide movement within a theatre;

and a wide range of logistic support services which include enabling, health, safety,

sanitation and other services directly in support of the maintenance of morale.

b. Health service support contributes to the physical and moral components of

Fighting Power through maximising, protecting and restoring the health of the force.

It provides effective and timely treatment and, where necessary, evacuation of those

who become ill and injured. When deployed, it provides the capability to manage

casualties from the point of injury (or onset of illness) to definitive treatment. Health

service support has logistic and administrative aspects and, apart from the furthest

forward units, is usually planned and conducted as a joint capability.

c. Equipment support seeks to keep the required quantity of operational equipment

available to the force. This is achieved by the active management and maintenance

of equipment and equipment components. Maintenance is organised into four levels

which are determined by the complexity and engineering requirements of the task.

d. Infrastructure support provides the operational estate which consists of operational

and host nation infrastructure. Infrastructure includes fixed installations, fabrications,

physical structures and facilities, including utilities. Infrastructure is built and

sustained through engineering. This engineering is provided by a combination of a

military construction force and contractors.

e. Administrative support is the management and execution of all non-tactical

military preparation and activity. It includes staff and personnel support; medical

force preparation and preventative health service support; welfare support; provost

support, including military police and investigative services; budget and financial

advice; and civil and policy affairs advice.

10-08. Within the tactical land environment, the force is sustained by a support network. This

network has two features. First, it interconnects the primary lines of communication,

making the supply chain more efficient and responsive. Logistic movement in a network

is lateral as well as forward and back. Materiel and people are moved to and from points

of need through a network of nodes and links. This requires an imaginative approach,

exploiting alternative routes and unconventional means. This is only possible with

shared understanding enabled by logistic information systems. Second, the support

network is resourced through all available means, harnessing contracted, joint, allied

and host nation capabilities alongside those of land forces as part of the whole force

approach. The network will then be adaptive (able to adjust quickly to the loss of key

nodes or routes) and agile (able to cope with rapidly changing demands). Early and

comprehensive logistic planning, especially when operating over extended distances,

is essential. It informs the likely logistic requirements, appropriate development of

the support network and signiï¬cantly inï¬‚uences the design of the entire operation.

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Planning

10-09. The sustainment estimate considers the logistic and the administrative requirements

of an operational plan, including the requirements and structure of the support

network. It is undertaken concurrently and in collaboration with the main estimate

process and needs to be delivered in time for operational commanders to assess

whether they need to adjust their plans. Guided by the philosophy of sustainment

and principles of logistics, the sustainment estimate should include consideration of

sustainment planning factors, sustainment reach and risks, and contractor support.

10-10. Sustainment activity often has long lead times. An understanding of four

key sustainment planning factors helps to predict requirements in order

to meet them on time. These are known as the â€˜four Dsâ€™ â€“ destination,

distance, demand and duration. They apply to both troops and materiel.

Fighting Power, freedom of action and operational success rest on the sustainability of the

force through every stage of a campaign, from force preparation through to redeployment

and recuperation. A rigorous assessment of logistic realities is essential to operational

planning; indeed, it is often the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility of an operational

choice.

Principle of War â€“ Sustainability

a. Destination refers to the physical environment of the operation, including the

degree of dispersion of the force. How the environment might affect equipment and

personnel informs appropriate preventative measures.

b. Distance refers to strategic, operational and tactical lines of communication,

including the threats to them, their capacity and topography. These factors affect

how troops and resources are deployed, and guide the design of the resupply and

evacuation aspects of the support network.

c. Demand is influenced by the type and grouping of the force requiring support,

and its corresponding rates and amounts of consumption. Demand stems from the

commanderâ€™s intent and the tactical activities that it leads to. It has three elements.

(1) Steady-state demand represents daily sustainment needs that have little

variation, such as predictable non-battle injuries or the consumption of rations.

(2) Cyclical demand represents additional needs to the steady state, caused, for

example, by seasonal conditions.

(3) Surge demand is driven by increases in activity. It is the least easy to predict

and the most susceptible to variation. Surge demand requires a network of

responsive command systems, reserve stocks and a delivery capability able to

switch between priorities.

d. Duration refers to the length of the operation. This and the rate of demand inform

the quantities of personnel and materiel required, and the need to rotate or replace

them. Commanders must balance the risks of a rapid, lightly-supported operation

against those of a better-resourced, more deliberate operation that takes longer to

mount.

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Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and

tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to the point.

Antoine-Henri Jomini

10-11. Commanders and staff must also consider sustainment reach. This defines the

limit at which a force can assure sustainment. It requires an assessment of the

optimum design for the support network required and the balance between

directed logistics and stockpiling forward. Beyond this reach, a force may

culminate, be cut off or become fixed, unless stockpiles are created. Reach is

affected by the availability of stocks and movement assets as well as by the â€˜four

Dsâ€™: destination by terrain, obstacles, and climate; distance by the length of the

re-supply loop, dispersal of force elements and timeliness of casualty evacuation;

demand by the type of operation; and duration by stock consumption. Reach

starts in the sustaining base or node and ends where the item is used.

10-12. In effective sustainment, concentration of resources at critical points is informed

by a commanderâ€™s designation of the main effort and may require risk to be taken

elsewhere. In planning, two aspects of sustainment risk should be considered:

a. Sustainment planning should assess where risks may be taken so as to achieve

adaptability and agility while enhancing freedom of manoeuvre. This is done by

expressing sustainment reach in terms of options available to the commander, with

resulting constraints or freedoms. Excessive pessimism or attempting to over-insure

should be avoided.

b. Reduction in the volume of stocks increases the vulnerability of supply to unforeseen

circumstances. Sustainment assets have an easily identifiable signature and they

operate along obvious lines of communication between potentially obvious nodes,

so they need to be protected against detection and attack. They can be protected

by enhancing their integral defence capability; using deception and camouflage;

integrating them into a scheme of manoeuvre; or by allocating other forces to their

defence.

52 Note that while the Geneva Conventions offer certain protection to medical facilities, this limits the level to which they can be camou-

ï¬‚aged.

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10-13. Contractors and Defence agency personnel in the strategic base and on deployed

operations are elements of the whole force approach. They can significantly enhance

the ability to provide sustainment to the force. Their involvement releases finite military

logistic resources and provides niche capabilities beyond military functional skills.

Although the employment of deployed contractors will depend on the permissiveness

of the environment, contractors will feature in the battlespace even during combat.

To maximise the benefits of contractors and to minimise the risks inherent in their

use, it is essential that they are integrated into the force at the earliest opportunity

and under a clear commercial strategy. However, there will be constraints, such as

contractual limitations; requirements to provide force protection; ability to coordinate

contractor activities and influence their behaviour in the battlespace; and dealing

with the risks of using them, not least that they might withdraw from operations.

The history of war proves that nine out of ten times an army has been destroyed because

its supply lines have been cut off.

General MacArthur

Sustainment execution

10-14. Sustainment execution consists of synchronised activity covering the overlapping

stages of prepare, project, sustain and the restoration of combat power.

10-15. Prepare. Sustainment preparation and pre-deployment activities include defining

the requirements for lines of communication, developing a sustainability statement,

preparing a force administratively and medically, and determining theatre and logistic

command structures. The identification, acquisition and integration of urgent capability

requirements and establishing the theatre entry standards of equipment is undertaken as

early as possible. Early logistic planning allows the assessment of potential deployment

areas, including infrastructure such as ports of disembarkation, road, rail and inland

waterways, materiel and resources. It will indicate the potential for using host nation

capability to support the force. Stocks are checked, configured and prepared for out-

loading, including those required for reception, staging and onward integration (RSOI).

10-16. Project. Projecting forces into a theatre establishes the lines of communication

and the initial support network to receive and prepare incoming forces. It

includes mounting, strategic deployment and RSOI. Enabling capabilities, such as

reconnaissance, and movement teams, are among the first into theatre with the

joint theatre entry operation. Stocks can be moved by air, sea or land to sustain

the force. RSOI is normally provided by a joint force logistic organisation, another

formation headquarters or the headquarters of one of its units. The land force

commander is responsible for ensuring that RSOI is conducted effectively.

10-17. Sustain. The type, range and scale of sustainment tasks will naturally differ depending

on the nature of the force being sustained. However, the size of a force will not always

be directly reflected by the scale and complexity of the support required, for example

sustaining a small team operating in isolation and at reach can require considerable

sustainment effort relative to its size. In general terms, establishing and operating the

support network to sustain the deployed force involves a number of key activities.

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a. Sources of supply are located to support tactical activities and so ensure the supply

and distribution of materiel, and the management of casualties. Assistance may also

be required to support, for example, the redeployment of formations.

b. Infrastructure and facilities are created to sustain the force in theatre. Their purpose is

to link incoming units and formations with their equipment; carry out modifications;

and deploy the force to its training, acclimatisation or operational locations.

Infrastructure and facilities can then be used to sustain the force during operations.

Logistic expertise is required to coordinate port, maritime, movements, supply, local

purchase, fuel handling, catering, water, sanitation and engineering and construction

tasks. These activities all contribute to Integrated Action: local employment may be

created; resources are injected into the economy; and infrastructure improvements

that benefit the force, should be designed to also benefit the local population

wherever possible.

c. Legal tasks include advice to the commander on International Humanitarian Law, ROE

and targeting, the Regulatory and Investigatory Powers Act and detention. Finance

tasks include the provision of civil secretariat assistance to funding and accounting.

d. Interruption of operational sustainment by adversaries or the impact of the actions

by actors should be expected. Dedicated forces may be required to protect nodes,

installations and lines of communication.

10-18. Following combat, or at the conclusion of an operation,

restoring combat power is enabled through the rehabilitation,

reconstitution, redeployment and recuperation of the force.

a. The rehabilitation of personnel and equipment and the reconstitution of units and

formations may be required during and after combat or other types of operation.

Rehabilitation and reconstitution usually take place in-theatre and the resources for

rehabilitation are usually controlled at the operational level.

b. When an operation has been concluded, the force (personnel, equipment and stocks)

are redeployed back to the home base. Redeployment of the force is planned at the

strategic level. Redeployment can be as simple as executing the deployment Force

Element Table in reverse, or it can be a highly complex process. Regardless of the level

of complexity, it is vital that redeployment is planned and correctly synchronised, with

planning undertaken as part of the initial deployment process. Redeployment from

operations includes recovery into a port of embarkation; clean-up and rehabilitation

of equipment; repackaging of unused materiel; environmental clean-up; and

movement back to a home base. An explicit theatre closure phase may be required,

requiring additional logistic units to be deployed and an additional logistic unit

headquarters to provide command and control for the theatre drawdown. Specific

capabilities may deploy to help close locations, assist with drawing down support

activities and provide specialist assets, skills and advice to redeploy personnel and

materiel. Contractors may deliver this function when enabled through early planning

and integration.

c. Recuperation mainly takes place in the strategic base and is designed to bring

force elements and materiel back to their pre-operational readiness level. It has two

components:

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(1) Recuperation of people needs to be planned in detail during the operation

and includes the rest, care and employment of casualties and care of the families

of casualties. Recuperation also involves remembrance; recovery of the training

foundation, particularly for those units who were deployed in new roles and

need to revert to others; learning lessons from operations; and education and

personal career development. Recuperation of people is an essential part of

restoring the moral component of Fighting Power.

(2) Recuperation is also the process by which unused stocks are inspected and

returned for storage or disposal, depleted stocks are replenished, and materiel

and equipment is returned to pre-operation standards and levels of availability.

Recuperation of materiel is a complex activity that is likely to involve lengthy,

in-depth planning, a considerable amount of time to execute and significant

force elements and other resources to conduct. An attitude must be fostered

across the force that the equipment that has served it on operations should be

made ready immediately, before the force stands down, for future operations.

Whole force responsibility

10-19. Sustainment not just a matter for specialists: it is the business of everyone in the

force. All professional soldiers should understand the nature of sustainment

and the freedoms and constraints it provides so their operational intentions

can become actionable plans, actions and effects. Two general requirements

for individuals, teams and the chain of command flow from this.

a. Every member of a land force requires sufficient awareness of how the force is

sustained, logistically and administratively, to be able to contribute positively to

both. At an individual level, this includes: doctrinal understanding; flexibility and

pragmatism; anticipating needs; expressing requirements clearly; and sufficient

familiarity with equipment and materiel to use them responsibly and efficiently.

b. Diligence requires a consistent, conscientious level of attention to detail and care. It

requires a professional attitude of mind that abhors waste, conscientiously maintains

equipment, infrastructure and materiel, and is meticulous in administration.

Gentlemen, the officer who doesnâ€™t know his communications and supply as well as his

tactics is totally useless

General George S Patton

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Sustainment - Marlboroughâ€™s March to the Danube 1704

The Duke of Marlborough is perhaps best remembered for his great victory at

Blenheim in 1704 during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1715). But

this victory was only possible because of the care given by Marlborough to the

sustainment of his forces in the manoeuvres leading up to the battle.

In May 1704 a possible Franco-Bavarian invasion threatened to knock Austria out of the

Grand Alliance against France. In a decisive move Marlborough led his army (one third British,

two thirds German and Danish) on a surprise march down the Rhine from the Netherlands,

so that with the Austrians he could pre-emptively defeat the invaders in Bavaria. He had

to move his army of over 40,000 men more than 250 miles. In the 18th century, such

long marches were seldom attempted, as they were so hard to sustain. Armies of that

period typically used a system of wagon-based supply tied to static magazines. This made

it difficult to sustain forces beyond about 60 miles from their depots. But Marlboroughâ€™s

march was superbly organised. One of his officers noted that â€œnever was such a march

carried on with more order and regularity, and with less fatigue to both man and horse.â€

The Duke unshackled his army from the limitations of the existing supply system by utilising

river supply, local contractors and political leverage. Supply officers preceded his army

and organised the positioning ahead of the army of the necessary logistic support at key

points along the march. These supplies were obtained by local contractors, who were

well paid for their services, and through arrangements with local political authorities.

Marlboroughâ€™s meticulous planning provided a series of wagon convoys which included

nails, ropes, saddlery, medical supplies, bricks to make bread ovens, along with

hundreds of ammunition wagons. Given the primitive transport systems of the time,

the Duke and his staff worked wonders. Apart from the menâ€™s needs, Marlborough

had to provide for 14,000 cavalry horses, 5,000 artillery horses and 4,000 draft

animals. The horses alone needed 100 tons of oats a day to remain in good health.

Nothing escaped Marlboroughâ€™s methodical eye. When the army arrived in

Heidelberg, the infantry found fresh boots waiting for them. Weeks before, the

Dukeâ€™s funds had set local cobblers to work, resulting in 14 battalions being newly

shod. In 35 days Marlboroughâ€™s army had covered over 250 miles and linked

up with EugÃ¨neâ€™s Austrians. Two weeks later they fought and won the battle of

Blenheim forcing Bavaria to withdraw from the war and saving Vienna.

10-10 | 10-10 |

Contents

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Page 3

Accountability

6-04, 6-05

Actions

1-42, 10-45, 2-05, 2-08, 2-11, 3-08, 3-25, 3-26, 3-28,

3-43, 4-01, 4-02, 4-04, 4-05-4-09, 4-10, 4-13, 4-14,

4-17, 5-01, 5-05, 5-09, 5-15, 5-16, 5-19, 6-04, 6-05,

6-08, 6-12, 6-17, 7-04, 7-10, 7-15, 7-26, 7-31, 7-44,

7-49, 7-50, 7-51, 8-01-8-03, 8-05-8-08, 8-13, 8-21,

8-24, 8-28, 8-31, 8-33, 8-37, 8-39, 8-40, 8-42, 8-44-

8-48, 8-50, 8-52, 8-61, 8-69, 8-73, 8-74, 8-75, 8C-13,

8C-14, 8C-17, 9-07, 9-09, 9-10, 9-24, 9A-02, 9A-05,

10-17, 10-19, G1

Actor(s)

P-1, 1-06, 1-10, 1-12, 1-18, 1-19, 1-26, 1-32, 1-34,

1-40, 2-12, 2-21, 2-24, 2-31, 2-35, 3-04, 3-36, 3-38,

4-01, 4-05, 4-06, 4-08, 4-09, 4-10, 4-13, 4-15, 4-16,

6-06, 7-07, 7-10, 7-30, 7-45, 7-47, 7-49, 7-50, 8-03,

8-05-8-07, 8-13, 8-16, 8-20, 8-26, 8-28-8-30, 8-41,

8-45-8-47, 8-55, 8A-02, 8A-04, 8A-05, 8A-09, 8A-10,

8B-01, 8B-02, 8C-01, 8C-02, 8C-14, 8C-15, 8C-16,

9-05, 9-08, 9-10, 9A-5, 9A-6, 10-17, G1

Adaptability

1-20, 1-21, 3-16, 3-39, 10-12

Administration

7-08, 10-04, 10-07, 10-19

Advance to contact

Fig 1-2, 8-70

Adversarial

1-01, 1-05, 3-23, P2, 4-05, 6-02, 8-14, 8-46, 8-47, 8A-

04, 8C-07

Adversary

1-07, 1A-01, Fig 4-1, 4-05, 5-09, 6-03, 7-25a, 7-26,

7-27, 8-41, 8-45, 8-47a, 8-54a, 8-56, 8-57, 8-58b,

8-61a, 8-61c, 8-73, 8-75, 9-22, 9A-02, 9A-05, G1

Air attack

7-17c

Air, Control of the

7-15, 7-17

Air component

2-22, 7-18, 7-19

Air manoeuvre

5-09, 7-10, 7-19, 8-18, 8-72

Air mobility

7-17, 7-23

Air power

1-30, 7-10b, 7-15, 7-18, 7-20

Air-land integration

7-15, 7-18

Alliance

2-04, 2-09, 2-11, 2-12, 2-18, 2-20, 2-27-2-28, 2-35,

7-07, 8B-01, 8C-03, 9-04c, 9-16d

INDEX

10-10 | | 11-110-10 |

Contents

Page 2

Page 3

Ambush

Fig 2-1, 7-35, 8-58d, 8-58h

Amphibious operations

7-10c, 7-19, 7-24, 7-25, 7-27

Area Defence

8-06

Armed conflict

1-05, 1-07c, 1-45, 2-08c, 4-05c, 7-50e, 8C-14a

Army leadership

framework

3-24

Assessment

1-48, 3-04, 3-33, 4-13, 6-06, 7-35, 8-21, 8-26, 8-47,

8B-02, 9-02, 9-24-9-26, 9-32, 9-34, 9-37, 9-38, 10-11,

10-15

Attributes

1-02, 1-16, 1-17, 1-19, 1-20, 1-33, 7-15, 7-16, 7-21,

7-22, G1

Attack

1-13, 1-27, 1-39, 2-02, 2-08d(3), Fig 2-1, 4-14, 5-02,

5-05, 5-06, 5-09a, 5-12, 5-15, 5-16, 5-18, 5-19, 6-03,

7-08a, 7-10b, 7-17, 7-50a, 8-19, 8-33, 8-47, 8-55, 8-56,

8-58, 8-60, 8-61, 8-70, 8-73, 8C-20, 9A-04a(2), 10-12b

Attitude

3-23b, 5-03, 5-04, 8A-09, 10-18c(2), 10-19b

Audience

1-26, 1-34b, 1-38, 1-42, 1-45, 2-06, 2-07, 2-11c, 3-25,

3-38, 4-01, 4-02a, 4-03, 4-05, Fig 4-1, 4-06-4-08, 4-10,

4-11, 4-16, 5-01, 5-19d, 6-06, 7-30, 7-44e, 8-04, 8-05,

Fig 8-1, 8-13, 8-23-8-26, 8-42, 8-45, 8-46, G1

Authority

1-45, 2-01, 2-06, 2-08, 2-11c, 2-16, 2-22, 3-23, 3-25,

6-01, 6-04-6-06, 6-13d, 7-03, 8-12, 8C-02, 8C-19,

9-02, 9-04, 9-11, 9-13, 9-21, 9-23b

Battlegroup

2-10, 5-18c, 7-04, 7-07c-7-07e, 7-13, 8-04, 8-10,

8-13b, 8-22, 8-26, 8-43, 8-49, 9-05, 9-29b, 9-29c, 9-31

Battlespace management

7-24, 8-12a, 9-19b, 9-20

Behaviour

1-07, 1-18, 1-39, 1-40, 1-42, 2-35, 3-23b, 3-24c, 4-02,

4-05, 4-06, 4-11, 4-13a, 5-06, 5-15, 8-05, 8-13, 8-23,

8-26, 8-29, 8-36, 8-46, 8-47a, 8-63, 8A-01d, 8A-02,

8A-07, Fig 8B-1, 9-07, 10-13

Break out of encircled

forces

Fig 2-1, 8-58i

Brigade

2-10, 4-04, 7-07, 7-09, 7-42, 8-01, 9-05

Campaign authority

2-01, 2-06, 2-08, 2-11c, 3-23c, 3-25,

Centre of gravity

2-04b, 5-05, 8-05, 8-32, Fig 8B-01, 8B-02, Annex 8B

11-2 |

Contents

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Page 3

Chain of command

2-08d(4), 2-28a, 3-21, 9-04c, 9-08, 9-16, 10-19

Character of conflict

1-01-1-04, 1-22, 1-33, 1-47, 1-48, 2-04

Civil-military

2-24, 7-35

Capacity building

1-35, 1-46, 2-16, Fig 2-1, 2-30, 2-35, 4-04a, 4-13c,

4-16, 5-13, 7-05, 7-07b, 7-10, 7-31, 7-35, 8-07, 8-10,

8-11, 8-24, 8-28-8-30, 8-64, 8B-04, 8C-04, 8C-11,

8C-17, G3

Close (geographical

framework)

8-54

Coalition

2-09, 2-11a, 2-12, 2-18-2-20, 2-27-2-28, 2-30, 2-35,

7-07a, 9-04c, 9-05a, 9-16d, 9-A-3

Combat (operation)

1-07d, 1-35, 1-39, 2-16, Fig 2-1, 2-21, 3-04a, 3-16,

5-09, 5-13, 5-18, 7-07b, 8-16, 8-17, 8-28, 8-36, 8-43,

8-45, 8-46a, 8-47a, 8-49, 8-50, 8-52a, 8-58e, 8-59, 8B-

05, 8C-01, 8C-02, 8C-05, 8C-07-8C-11, 8C-13, 9-31,

9-35, 10-18

Combat power

3-04, 3-30, 5-11, 5-14, 8-31, 8-35, 8-58a(1), 10-04a,

10-14, 10-18

Combat forces

3-16, 5-18, 7-07c, 7-08a, 7-10a, 7-13, 7-19a, 7-35

Combined arms

2-31, 3-34, 3-37, 4-02c, 7-02-7-04, 7-06, 7-09-7-10,

7-11-7-13, 8-08, 8-10, 8-18, 8-54c, 8A-10

Combat support

3-16, 7-04, 7-07b-7-07e, 7-08, 7-10

Combat service support

3-16, 5-18, 7-04, 7-07b 7-07e, 7-08, 7-10a, 8-46b(3),

8B-04, 8B-05, 10-04c, 10-07

Command

1-19a, 1-41, 2-10, 2-15, 2-19, 2-21, 2-29, 3-14, 3-22,

3-23b, 3-24, 4-04, 5-12, 5-17, 5-18, 6-01, Fig 6-1, 6-06,

6-16, 7-07, 7-23, 7-26, 7-30, 8-10-8-12, Fig 8-2, 8-17,

8-19, 8-27, 8-33, 8-36, 8-37, 8-39, 8-44, 8-61c, 8A-08,

8-C-8, 9-01, 9-02, 9-03-9-08, 9-10, 9-12-9-19, 9-21,

9-22b,9-23a, 9-30-9-31, 9-36, 9-38, 9A-05, 10-15,

10-18b

Commanders

1-37, 1-41, 2-08c, 2-08e, 2-12, 2-15, 2-22, 2-28, 3-11,

3-20c, 3-21, 3-24a, 3-29, 3-36, 3-37, 4-01, 4-02d, 4-06,

4-08, 4-11, 4-14-4-16, 5-05, 5-09, 5-11, 6-02, 6-04,

6-05-6-17, 7-05b, 7-12, 7-17a, 7-19, 7-27, 7-32, 7-36,

7-47, 8-04, 8-06, 8-08, 8-09, 8-10, 8-13, 8-14, 8-22,

8-25, 8-26, 8-37, 8-39, 8-42, 8-45, 8-46a, 8-47, 8-52a,

8-53, 8-57, 8-61c, 8-71, 8-74, 8A-03, 8A-06, 8A-09,

9-02, 9-05a-c, 9-06, 9-07-9-17, 9-19-9-20, 9-23-9-28,

9-29a, 9-30-9-31, 9-34-9-38, 9A-01-9A-04, 9A-06, 10-

01-02, 10-09-10-12, 10-16, 10-17c

Command post

2-26, 5-17, 8-12a, 9-05b, 9-10, 9-17

11-2 | | 11-3

Contents

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Page 3

Command relationships

6-04a, 9-03, 9-15-09-16

Communications

1-22, 1-30-1-31, 1-40, 3-20f, 5-17, 6-03, 7-08b, 7-23,

7-30, 8-76, 9-10, 9-17, 9-22

Compatible

7-04, 7-12, 9-29

Component (force)

2-18, 2-19, 2-21-2-22

Comradeship

3-20b-d

Comprehensive approach

2-24, 2-25, 2-30, 8-62, 8-64, 8C-17, G1

Concentration of force

Annex A, 8-22, 8-61b

Conflict (nature of)

1-01-1-08, 1-10, 1-12, 1-17, 1-19a, 1-20-1-24, 1-29,

1-32-1-36, 1-38, 1-40-1-41, 1-43, 1-46-1-48, 2-02,

2-04, 2-08c, 2-15-2-17, 2-30, 2-35, 3-07, 3-11, 3-17,

3-20, 3-23, 3-26, 3-33, 3-38, 3-39, 4-02a, 4-05, 4-08,

6-02, 6-03, 6-13, 7-44, 8-13a, 8-64, 8C-04, 8C-09,

8C-13c, 8C-14, 8C-15, 9A-02, 9A-05

Conflict prevention

1-34b, 2-35i, 8C-10, 8C-14

Contractor support

2-32, 7-43, 10-09,

Contemporary skills

1-36

Contest of will

1-06, 1-23

Context

Chapter 1, 2-35, 3-24a, 9A-06,

Control

1-15, 1-18, 2-10, 2-21, 3-21, 4-15, 6-01, 6-02, 6-06, Fig

6-1, 6-08, 6-09, 6-13b, 6-17, 7-15, 7-17, 7-20, 7-26,

7-30, 7-43, 7-47, 8-09, 8-12, 8-27, 8-39, 8-61c, 8-63,

8-73, 8C-08, 9-02, 9-03, 9-07, 9-08, 9-11, 9-15, 9-17,

9-18, 9-19, 9-20-9-23, 9-36, 9A-05a, 10-18b

Cooperation

Annex A, 2-18, 2-21, 2-24, 2-25, 2-28, 4-02c, 6-12a,

7-02, 7-05b, 7-19, 7-29, 7-31-7-32, 7-35, 7-41, 8-29,

8-62, 8C-17, 9-05c

Corps

2-10, 4-04a, 7-04, 7-07, 8-01, 8-10, 8-19, 8-38, 8-54a,

9-24, 9-35, 9A-04a(1)

Culture

2-24, 2-25, 2-30, 3-14, 3-15a, 3-23b, 3-26, 4-02b,

7-05c, 8-13a, 8A-03, 8A-7, 9-05c, 9A-06a

Cyber

1-18, 1-27, 1-31, 1-32, 1-36, 2-02, 2-32, 5-09a, 7-45,

7-47, 7-48, 7-50, 7-51

Cyber and electromagnetic

activities

7-10a, 8-19, Fig 7-2,

Cyberspace

7-45, 7-46, 7-49-7-51, 8-68, G1

11-4 |

Contents

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Page 3

Data

7-46, 7-49, 7-50a, 8A-01, 8A-04, 8A-08, 8A-09

Decentralised command

1-19a, 1-41, 3-14

Deception

2-08d, 5-09, 5-15, 5-19a, 8-16, 8-23, 8-25, 8-26, 8-48,

8-51, 8-54b,8-56, 8A-04, 10-12b

Decision-making

4-06, 4-13a, 5-08, 9-09c, 5-12, 6-06, 6-13d, 6-16, 7-34,

8-13c, 8-36, 8A-10, 9-08, 9-10d, 9-11a, 9-24, 9-26,

9-29

Decisive

1-07c, 1-11, 1-37, 2-11c, 2-26, 5-19c, 8-18, 8-38, 8-44-

8-48, Fig 8-3, 8-52, 8-59, 8-73

De-conflicted

7-04, 7-41

Deep

5-19a, 8-54

Defensive activities

Fig 2-1, 8-54c, 8-59, 8-60, 8-67, 8-77, 8C-02, 8C-03,

Defence engagement

2-15, Fig 2-1, 2-30, 7-05, 8C-04, 8C-11, 8C-14a

Delay

Fig 2-1, 7-17c, 8-61

Delegation

6-04, 6-05, 6-06, 6-13b

Demand (logistic)

7-09, 8-21, 8-36, 10-10, 10-11, 10-13

Demonstration

Fig 2-1, 5-09b, 7-25d, 8-58f

Destination

10-10, 10-11

Destruction

1-07c, 1-39, 2-08d(2), 3-21, 5-04, 5-19, 8-54b, 8C-08

Doctrine

1-03, 1-17, 1-33, 2-04a, 2-11-2-14, 2-16, 2-24, 3-02,

3-05, 3-07, 3-08-3-11, Fig 3-2, 3-13-3-15, 3-23, 3-24,

3-33, 4-02, 4-04, 4-17, 5-01, 6-06b, 6-12, 6-15, 7-05,

7-12, 7-18, 7-32, 7-44, 7-46, 8C-13a, 8C-15, 8C-20,

9-04, 9-26, 9-29a, 9-38, 9A-01, 9A-06a, 10-06

Directive

2-08a-e, 7-36, 9-23

Discipline

2-10, 3-20c, 3-28, 8A-09

Dislocation

5-19

Disruption

5-19, 8-56, 8-58, 8-65, 8C-03

Distance

1-19c, 7-16, 7-42, 8C-07, 8C-19, 9A-05, 10-08, 10-10,

10-11

Distinction

1-45, 2-08d, 2-10, 2-33, 9A-01

Division

2-04b, 2-10, 4-04a, 7-04, 7-07, 7-49, 8-01, 8-08, 8-10,

8-11, 8-19, 8-26, 8-27, 8-38, 8-54a, 9-16e, 9-29b,

9-35, 9A-04a(10)

Duration

1-19c, 1-23, 3-03, 7-10a, 8-35, 8-47, 8C-15, 9-15d,

10-04a, 10-10, 10-11

Dynamics

1-07, 2-15, 9A-06a

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Contents

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Page 3

Economy of effort

Annex 1A, 2-28a, 6-12b, 8-55, 8-61c

Education

1-03, 1-19a, 3-07, 3-09, 3-14, 3-17, 3-36, 3-39, 6-06a,

8A-01, 10-18c(1)

Effects

1-07, 1-46, 2-08e, 2-35, 3-22, 4-01, 4-02c, 4-08-4-10,

4-11, 4-13-4-14, 4-16-4-17, 5-01, 5-05-5-06, 5-09c.

5-13, 5-15, 5-17, 5-19c, 6-07, 7-07c, 7-16, 7-17c, 7-23,

7-25, 7-28, 7-35, 7-49, 7-50d, 7-51, 8-01-8-03, 8-07,

8-10-8-11, 8-16, 8-19-8-20, 8-23-8-24, 8-26, 8-29,

8-34, 8-36, 8-40, 8-42, 8-46b(3), 8-52b, 8-57, 8-58f,

8-61b, 9-01, 9-24, 9-28, 10-19

Enabling

1-35, 1-41, 2-17, Fig 2-1, 3-15, 3-43, 8-06, 8-55, 8-67,

8-73, 8-77, 10-16

Enemy

1-39, 2-08d(1), 2-17, 2-35, 3-04, Fig 4-1, 4-05, 4-13,

4-17, 5-01, 5-03-5-16, 5-18-5-19, 6-07, 6-12b, 7-08,

7-10, 7-20, 7-23, 7-25d, 7-42, 8-07, 8-15, 8-18-8-20,

8-26, 8-33, 8-34, 8-41, 8-45, 8-46, 8-49-8-52, 8-55-8-

58, 8-59, 8-60-8-62, 8-67, 8-70, 8-71, 8-73, 8-74-8-76,

8B-02, 8B-03, 8C-01, 8C-07, 9-02, 9-05, 9-34, 9-37,

9A-02, 9A-05c, 9A-06b, G2

Engage(ment)

1-08, 1-19c, 1-34, 1-35, 1-46,2-13, 2-21, 2-30, 2-35i,

3-04, 3-15, 3-26, 7-08, 7-10c, 1-17c, 7-20, 8-23, 8-25,

8-47, 8-52, 8-54, 8A-07, 8C-01

Environment

1-02, 1-04, 1-07, 1-09, 1-12-1-14, 1-16, 1-18, 1-19,

1-33-1-36, 1-42, 2-15, 2-35a, Fig 3-1, 3-04c, 3-10b,

3-38, 4-02b, 4-03, 4-04-4-06, 5-13, 5-14, 6-06, 6-10,

7-06, 7-10, 7-15, 7-17, 7-20, 7-21, 7-23-26, 7-28, 7-33,

7-36, 7-39, 7-40, 7-42, 7-44-7-50, 8-04, 8-05, 8-13,

8-26, 8-32, 8-38-8-39, Fig 8-3, 8-45, 8-46a, 8-50, 8-54,

8-65, 8-73, 8A-03, Fig 8B-1, 8C-03, 8C-08, 9-01, 9-09,

9-19a,9-27, 9-32, 9-37, 9A-05, 9A-06, 10-03, 10-05,

10-08, 10-10a, 10-13

Equipment

1-13, 1-39, Fig 3-1, 3-02, 3-20f, 3-30, 3-32-3-34, 3-40,

4-13b, 6-13b, 7-05, 7-19c, 7-25a, 7-43, 7-50c, 8-19,

8-31, 8-33, 8C-19b, 9-17, 9-38, 9A-02, 9A-04a(2),

9A-05c, 10-04c, 10-10a, 10-15, 10-17b, 10-18, 10-19

Equipment support

7-08, 7-16, 10-07

Estimate

8-45, 9-27-9-29, 9-32, 9A-06a, 10-09

Evacuation

Fig 2-1, 4-04, 7-17d, 7-25, 8C-18, 10-07b, 10-10b,

10-11

Execution

2-11, 4-04, 4-10, 6-06, 6-13b, 7-03, 7-18, 1-19, 7-37,

7-39, 8-12a, 8-38, 8-41, 8-67, 9-12, 9-19, 9-20, 9-24,

9-26, 9-30, 9-32, 9-33, 93-5-9-37, 9A-05c, 10-06, 10-

07e, 10-14

11-6 |

Contents

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Exploitation

Annex1A, Fig 2-1, 3-15b, 5-07, 5-11, 5-13, 6-03, 6-06a,

7-16, 7-50, 8-12b, 8-16, 8-18, 8-47, 8-58c, 8A-08, Fig

8B-1, 8C-08

Exploit

1-12, 1-25, 1-28, 1-41, 3-16, 3-20b, 5-04-5-06, 5-09c,

5-10, 6-08, 7-10, 7-11, 7-15, 7-22, 7-25, 7-45, 8-17,

8-24, Fig 8-3, 8-49, 8-52, 8-53, 8-57, 8-60, 8C-01,

9-09, 9-22, 9-37, 9A-02, 10-02, 10-08

Feint

Fig 2-1, 8-16, 8-58e

Fight

1-07, 1-16, 1-25, 1-34, 1-35, 3-02, 3-04c, 3-05, 3-18-

3-20, 3-30, 3-38, 5-01, 5-04, 5-17, 5-18, 6-02, 7-08a,

8-34, Fig 8-3, 8-48, 8B-01, 8C-07, 9-11b, 9A-06b,

10-01

Fighting power

1-16, 3-01-3-05, Fig 3-1, 3-12, 3-18, 3-20, 3-22, 3-30,

3-31, 3-34, 3-36, 3-39, 3-41, 3-42, 5-19b, 6-06, 6-12b,

8-29, 8-31, 9-55, 8-60, 8-74, 9A-04, 10-05, 10-07b,

10-18c(1)

Fighting spirit

Annex 1A, 3-20a

Find

5-05, 7-08, 7-11, 7-17b, Fig 8-3, 8-49, 8-50

Fires

1-29, 1-30, 2-12, 4-07, 4-16, 7-10a, 7-15, 7-18, 7-23,

7-27, 8-07, 8-10-8-12, Fig 8-1, Fig 8-2, 8-17, 8-19-8-22,

8-24, 8-29, 8-36, 8-46a, 8-47, 8-54a, 8-58, 8-69, 8B-04

Fix

7-11, 7-17c, Fig 8-3, 8-46b, 8-49, 8-51, 8-60

Flexibility

Annex 1A, 2-34, Fig 3-1, 3-05, 3-06, 3-12-3-14, 3-16,

7-12, 7-16a, 7-17b, 9-15, 9-17, 10-19

Frameworks

2-01, 2-08-2-10, 3-10a, 3-24, 4-17, 6-12, 7-11, 7-41,

8-02, 8-03, 8-42-8-44, Fig 8-3, 8-49, 8-51, 8-52, 8-54,

8-65, 8A-10, 8C-14, 9-23, 9-27,

Freedom of action

Annex 1A, 5-18, 6-03, 6-07, 6-08, 6-13, 7-27, 8-31,

8-35, 8-46, 8-51, 8-54c, 8-73, 8B-01, 8C-01, 9-19,

9-20, 9-27

Full spectrum approach

2-24-2-26, 8-29, 8-65, 8C-04, 8C-05, 8C-11

Functions (tactical)

1-34, 2-13, 2-15, 4-15-4-17, 6-06, Fig 6-1, 6-08, 7-06,

8-02, 8-03, 8-07, 8-10-8-34, Fig 8-2, 8-45, 8-46-8-49,

8-54, 8C-17, G3

Geographic framework

4-17, 8-42, 8-54

Governance tasks

Fig 2-1, 8-66

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Page 3

Health

2-02, 7-08c, 7-43, 10-04b(1), 10-07

Host nation

2-08b, 2-18, 2-23, 2-27, 2-30, 4-02c, 7-05c, 7-10d,

7-44c, 8-28, 8-29, 8-36, 8-48, 8-54c. 8-62, 8-64, 8C-04,

8C-14, 9-05a, 9-10b, 10-07d, 10-08, 10-15

Human

1-01, 1-05, 1-07, 1-09, 1-12, 1-14, 1-19, 1-42, 1-48,

2-26, 2-32, 3-18, 3-23, 3-26, 4-03, 4-05, 7-05, 7-06,

7-10a, 8-04, 8-05, 8-68, 8A-03, 8A-07, 8A-09, 9-03,

9-06, 9-14, 9A-06

Humanity

2-08

Humanitarian assistance

1-19d, 1-35, Fig 2-1, 7-25d, 7-44e, 8C-15, 10-05,

Hybrid warfare

1-32, G

Information

1-07b, 1-09, 1-12, 1-08, 1-24, 1-25-1-27, 1-42, 2-03,

3-15b, 3-36, 4-05-4-07, 4-09, 6-06a, 6-13a, 6-16, 7-05,

7-08a, 7-10a, 7-17b, 7-25a, 7-33, 7-50c, 8-04, 8-13,

8-14, 8-31-8-34, 8-45, 8-58b, 8-60, 8-61c, 8-68, 8A-01,

8A-04, 8A-05, 8A-08-8A-10, 8C-08, 9-02, 9-07, 9-11,

9-17, 9-20, 9-22, 9-32, 9-34, 9-37, 10-08

Information activities

2-12, 4-16, 5-13, 5-15, 7-08b, 8-06, 8-07, 8-10, 8-11,

Fig 8-1, Fig 8-2, 8-12, 8-17, 8-21, 8-23-8-27, 8-29,

8-31, 8-36, 8-46a, 8-47, 8-54a

Integrate(d)

1-40, 2-23, 2-24-2-26, 2-29-2-23, 2-35, 3-02, 4-14,

4-16, 5-13, 6-12b, 7-04, 7-07a, 7-10b, 7-17b, 7-18,

7-37,7-49, 8-25, 8-54, 9-04d, 9-12,9-22a, 10-13

Integrated Action

4-01-4-05, 4-09, 4-10, 4-13, 4-17, 5-01, 6-07, 7-02,

7-07b, 7-44e, 7-45, 7-50, 8-01-8-03, 8-07, 8-12, 8-16,

8-23, 8-36, 8-38, 8-40, 9-09, 9-18, 10-17b, G2

Intelligence

1-07, 1-30, 2-23, 3-20c, 4-16, 6-13d, 7-07b, 7-08c,

7-10a, 7-15, 7-16, 7-17, 7-23, 7-30, 7-34, 7-38, 7-48,

7-50a, 8-10-8-13,8-14, Fig 8-1, Fig 8-2, 8-17, 8-21,

8-26, 8-36, 8-45, 8-47b, 8-54a, 8A-01c, 8A-05f, 8A-09,

9-17, 9-32

Intelligence, Surveillance

and Reconnaissance

7-07b, 7-48, Fig 7-2, 8-13b, 8-47

Interagency

4-04a

Interoperability

1-43, 2-14, 2-28, 2-29, 3-04d, 3-34, 4-02c, 6-10, 6-15,

7-01-7-05, Fig 7-1, 7-06, 7-11, 7-12, 7-14, 7-18, 7-19,

7-44, 7-51, 8-62, 8A-02, 8A-05f, 9-05c, 9-29, G2

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Page 3

Joint

2-02, 2-11c, 2-12, 2-18, 2-19, 2-20-2-22, 2-30, 2-31,

2-34, 2-35, 3-09, 3-10a,3-43, 4-01, 4-04, 4-15, 4-17,

7-01-7-03, 7-07, 7-10c, 7-18, 7-23, 7-27, 7-30, 7-36,

7-37, 7-39, 7-43, 7-44b, 7-46, 8-01, 8-37, 8-38,

8A-05e, 8A-10, 8C-13a, 8C-15, 8C-20, 9-01, 9-04,

9-05, 9-08, 9-29, 9A-06a, 10-03, 10-04, 10-06, 10-07b,

10-16

Joint Action

2-12, 7-10c

Knowledge

1-36, 2-31, 3-02, 3-07, 3-08, 3-15a, 3-31, 3-39, 5-04,

6-15, 7-01, 7-03, 7-05d, 8-25, 8-62, 8A-01-8A-05, Fig

8A-01, 8A-09

Land forces

1-04, 1-08, 1-11, 1-13, 1-14, 1-16-1-21, 1-33-1-35,

1-37, 1-40-1-43, 1-45-1-47, 2-01, 2-04, 2-07-2-09,

2-11, 2-17-2-18, 2-21-2-22, 2-28, 2-30-2-32, 2-35,

3-04, 3-07, 3-09-3-10, 3-13-3-15, 3-17-3-18, 3-20-3-

23, 3-26, 3-28, 3-31-3-32, 3-39, 4-01, 4-02, 4-04-4-06,

4-08, 4-11, 4-13c, 6-01, 6-02, 7-01-7-03, 7-05-7-06,

7-08-7-10, 7-14-7-15, 7-17, 7-19-21, 7-23-7-24,

7-27,7-29-7-31, 7-37, 7-39, 7-44c, 7-45, 7-49-7-50,

8-12, 8-26, 8-30, 8-35, 8-46a, 8-48, 8-54a, 8-64, 8A-

03, 8B-01, 8C-02, 8C-03, 8C-05-8C-06, 8C-13, 8C-14,

8C-18, 8C-19, 9-05c, 9-29, 9A-05, 10-03, 10-06, 10-08

Land power

1-17, 1-18, 1-30, 1-34, 2-15, 4-10, 7-19, G2

Law and policy

2-08a

Lawful

2-05, 2-07, 2-08, 3-26, 3-28,

Law of Armed Conflict

2-08d

Leadership

1-07, 1-19a, 1-37, Fig3-1, 3-02, 3-18-3-24, 3-29, 3-42,

5-16, 6-06, Fig 6-1, 6-08, 8-12, 9-07, 9-08, 9-13, G2

Legitimacy

1-32, 2-01, 2-06-2-08, 2-28, 2-30, 3-20

Lessons

3-11, 3-13-3-15, 3-17, 3-33, 7-05, 8A-03, 9-38

Levels of warfare

2-10

Link-up

Fig 2-1, 8-72, 9A-04

Logistics

7-08c, 7-20, 7-44d, 8-04, 8-35, 8C-01, 9-02, 10-04, 10-

06, 10-07b, 10-09, 10-11

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Page 2

Page 3

Manoeuvre

1-19b, 2-12, 4-07, 4-16, 5-09a, 5-13, 7-08-7-10, 7-15-

7-18, 7-23, 7-25, 8-07, 8-09-8-11, Fig 8-1, Fig 8-2,

8-15-8-19, 8-21-8-22, 8-24, 8-28, 8-36, 8-39, 8-46,

8-47, 8-52, 8-54

Manoeuvrist approach

4-17, 5-01-5-05, 5-15, 5-18, 6-12b, 8-16, 8-34, 8-49,

8-56, 9A-06b, G2

March

Fig 2-1, 8-76

Maintenance Of Morale

Annex 1A, 3-20, 10-07a

Maritime

1-16, 1-18, 1-20, 1-43, 2-18, 2-19, 2-21, 7-16, 7-21-7-

27, 7-30, 7-39, 7-45, 8-19, 10-17b

Meeting engagement

8-71

Military contribution

2-11b, Fig 2-1, 8C-14, Fig 8C-1, 8C-15, 8C-16

Military necessity

2-08d

Mission command

3-14, 3-22, 3-23, 5-03, 5-04, 5-08, 5-13, 6-01, 6-02,

6-04b, 6-07-6-14, 6-17, 8-25, 9-04e, 9-05c, 9-07, 9-09,

9-14, 9-18-9-19, 9-30, 9-36

Mobile Defence

8-61

Momentum

5-01, 5-07, 5-11, 5-13, 8-61c, 8C-10, 9-05a

Moral cohesion

3-20, Annex1A, 5-17

Moral component

Fig 3-1, 3-02, 3-04d, 3-05, 3-18-3-22, 3-25, 3-31, 8-34,

9A-04a(2), 10-07b, 10-18c(1)

Morale

1-37, Annex 1A, Fig 3-1, 3-02, 3-18-3-21, 3-23b, 3-28,

3-42, 4-13c, 5-09c, 8-20, 8-50, 8B-04, 9-02, 9-07, 9-10,

10-07a

Mosaic of conflict

1-35, 2-14, 2-16, 2-17, Fig 2-2, 8-55, 8C-04, 8C-17

Mutual understanding

2-34, 3-22, 6-14, 6-15, 7-05, 7-51, 9-11c

Nationality

2-29

National strategy

2-11a

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Page 3

Objectives

1-08, 2-16, 1-39, 2-09, 2-11-2-13, 2-16, 2-18, 2-20-

2-22, 2-25, 2-35, 3-08, 3-29, 3-37, 4-01, 4-02, 4-05,

4-10, 4-12-4-13, 5-01, 6-07, 7-02, 8-02, 8-03, 8-05,

8-08, 8-13a, 8-33, 8-35, 8-37, 8-39, 8-40-8-42, 8B-05,

8C-01, 9-04d, 9-24, 9-28, 9A-05a, 10-04a

Obstacle crossing

(breaching)

Fig 2-1, 8-77, 9-19

Offensive action

Annex 1A, 7-35, 8-49, 8-56, 8-58, 8-59, 8-69, 9A-06b

Offensive activities

Fig 2-1, 8-55-8-60, 8-77

Operation

1-20, 1-35, 2-08c, 2-14-2-17, Fig 2-1, 2-19, 2-20,

2-28a, 2-33, 3-03, 3-04, 3-15, 3-42, 4-01, 4-04, 4-05,

4-15, 4-17, 5-01, 5-11, 5-14, 6-06b, 7-07b, 7-23, 7-25,

7-26, 7-29, 7-36, 7-41, 7-42, 8-01, 8-05, 8-06, 8-09,

8-11, Fig 8-1, 8-26, 8-30, 8-37, 8-39, 8-41, 8-44-8-47,

8-50, 8-62, 8-64, 8-73, 8A-03-8C-06, 8C-10, 8C-17,

9-02, 9-08, 9-12, 9-17, 9-19, 9-23, 9-25, 9-26, 9-30,

9-31, 9-33, 9-34, 9-36-9-38, 9A-03, 10-04b(1), 10-08,

10-10, 10-11, 10-16, 10-18, G3

Operational art

8-02, 8-03, 8-07, 8-08, 8-37

Operational framework

8-43, 8-44, Fig 8-3, 8-49, 8-51, 8-52

Operational level

2-12, 2-21, 2-23, 4-04a, 7-07a, 7-30, 7-36, 7-39-7-41,

8-06, 8-37, 8-73, 9-29a, 10-03, 10-06, 10-18a

Operations themes

2-14-2-16, Fig 2-1, 8-09, 8C-05, 8C-11

Orchestrate (ing)

4-01, 4-15, 7-07, 7-50, 8-01, 8-12

Order (s)

9-23, 9-30, 9-33

Outcomes

1-38, 2-23, 2-28a, 4-01, 4-02, 4-10, 4-11, 4-13, 6-17c,

8-05, 8-11, Fig 8-1, 8-42, Fig 8B-1, 9-02, 9A-04a(2)

Partnership

2-04, 2-27, 2-30,

Patience

7-05e, 8-62, 9-05c,

Peace building

8C-03

Peace enforcement

8C-03, 8C-14

Peacekeeping

2-08c, 8C-03, 8C-14

Peace support

2-15, Fig 2-1, 2-29, 8-26, 8C-03, 8C-05, 8C-11, 8C-14,

Fig 8C-1

Principles of Stability

operations

8C-12

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Page 3

Procedural control

9-19a

Proportionality

2-08d

Protection

1-15, 1-19c, 2-15, 3-22, 4-16, 7-09, 7-50, 8-10, 8-11,

Fig 8-1, Fig 8-2, 8-12, 8-17, 8-21, 8-31-8-34, 8-48,

8-54c, 8-63, 8-66, 8-75, 8C-08, 8C-14, 9-10e, 10-13

Pursuit

Fig 2-1, 8-58d

People

1-09-1-14, 1-16, 1-19, 1-24-1-25, 1-29, 1-34, 1-39,

1-45, 2-31, 2-32, 3-02, 3-24, 3-26, 3-31, 3-36, 3-39,

4-02, 4-05, 4-06-4-08, 4-10, 6-06, 8-31, 8-63, 8A-07-

8A-09, 8C-05, 8C-09, 8C-14e, 10-08, 10-18c(1)

Persistence

1-19c, 7-16a

Physical (domain)

7-50c

Physical component

Fig 3-1, 3-02, 3-04a, 3-20f, 3-30, 3-41

Planning

2-11, 2-16, 2-19, 3-16, 3-24b, 6-02, 7-03, 7-07b, 7-19,

7-29, 7-32, 7-34-7-37, 7-39, 7-50a, 8-02, 8-03, 8-05,

8-06, 8-08, 8-09, 8-12a, 8-43, 8-55, 8-67, 8-73, 8-77,

8A-02, 9-04, 9-10-9-12, 9-23-9-29, Fig 9-1, 9-32, 9-35,

9-37, 9-38, A-05c, 10-04b(1), 10-06, 10-08-10-12, 10-

15, 10-18

Political

1-01, 1-02, 1-05, 1-08, 1-09, 1-11, 1-19c, 1-22, 1-26,

1-39, 1-40, 2-02, 2-04-2-08, 2-15, 2-18, 2-30, 2-35f,

3-25, 4-08, 7-22, 7-23, 7-33, 7-44e, 8-29, 8A-10, 8C-

02, 8C-12, 8C-13-8C-15, 9-05c, 9-13, 9A-03

Positive control

9-19

Precision

7-16a, 7-28, 7-33, 9-13

Pre-emption

5-07, 5-10, 5-13, 5-19, 8-56

Preparation

3-01, 3-04c, 3-13, 3-17, 3-34, 3-40, 7-25c, 7-44a, 7-48,

8-58, 8-70, 9-24-9-26, 9-28, 9-32-9-35, 10-07e, 10-15

Pride

Annex 1A, 3-20

Principles of War

1-04, 1-48, Annex 1A,

Principles

1-03, 1-07, 2-08d(4), 3-08, 3-10, 3-15, 3-26, 3-35,

6-01, 6-11, 6-17, 7-32, 7-34, 7-44d, 8A-05, 8A-09, 8C-

14, 9-03-9-05, 10-03, 10-06

Principles of logistics

7-44d, 10-06, 10-09

Principles of stability

operations

8C-12

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Page 3

Qualitative

3-04a

Qualities

1-17, 1-20, 6-14, 9-08, 9-13

Quantitative

3-04a

Raid

Fig 2-1, 7-25a, 7-35, 8-16, 8-58b

Reach

7-10b, 7-15, 7-16, 7-19, 7-22, 7-28, 7-33, 9-17, 10-09,

10-11, 10-17

Readiness

1-44, 2-04c, 2-33, 3-02, 3-03, 3-42, 3-43, 7-33, 8C-06,

9-34, 10-18c

Rear

5-09a, 8-54

Reconnaissance

1-30, Fig 2-1, 7-07b, 7-08, 7-10, 7-13, 7-35, 7-48, 8-04,

8-13b, 8-47, 8-68, 8-74, 8-76, 9-33, 10-16

Reconnaissance in force

Fig 2-1, 8-58g

Reconstitution

10-18

Reconstruction

1-34c, Fig 2-1, 8C-16

Recuperation

10-18

Rehabilitation

10-18

Relief of troops

Fig 2-1, 7-17d, 8-73, 8-76

Reputation

3-23c, 3-28, 6-14, 9A-04a(2)

Responsibility

2-08e, 2-22, 2-24, 2-28b, 3-11, 3-24a, 3-32, 3-39,

6-04-6-06, 6-11, 6-17, 7-05, 7-44b, 7-45, 8-06, 8-25,

8-64, 8C-15, 8C-16, 9-07, 9-09, 9-11b, 9-13, 10-03,

10-05

Restoration of services

Fig 2-1, 8-65

Retirement

Fig 2-1, 8-75

Risk

2-15, 2-25, 2-28, 2-29, 3-16, 3-27, 5-04, 5-05, 6-06a,

6-14, 6-16, 7-33, 8-09, 8-26, 8-32, 9A-03, 8A-08, 8C-

08, 9-07, 9-09, 9-10, 9-32, Annex 9a, 10-02, 10-09,

10-12, 10-13, G-3

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Page 3

Secrecy

5-09c, 7-33

Security

1-10, 1-34c, 1-40, 1-45, 1-46, Annex 1A, 2-02, 2-04,

2-08e, 2-11, 2-15, Fig 2-1, 2-30, 2-32, 2-34, 2-35,

5-09c, 5-15, 7-09b, 7-10d, 7-22, 7-34, 7-35, 7-44e,

8-10, 8-16, 8-28, 8-29, 8-33, 8-48, 8-55, 8-63, 8-65-

8-66, 8-69, 8-73, 8-77, 8C-02, 8C-04, 8C-05, 8C-11,

8C-15, 8C-16, 8C-19, 9-10e, 9-22b,

Security and control

Fig 2-1, 8-63

Security sector reform

Fig 2-1, 8-64

Selection and

maintenance of the aim

Annex 1A

Shaping

1-12, 1-29, 4-08, 5-01, 5-06, 5-15, 7-27, 8-06, 8-21,

8-44, Fig 8-3, 8-45-8-48, 8-51, 8A-07

Simultaneity

5-07, 5-12, 5-13, 8-57

Situational awareness

7-17, 8A-01c, 8C-08, 9-11c, 9-26, 9-36

Special forces

2-18, 2-19, 2-21, 7-10a, 7-28-7-38, 8C-13b

Stability

1-19d, 1-35, 2-02, 2-04c, 2-16, Fig 2-1, 2-17, 2-25,

8-16, 8-54c, 8-55

Stability activities

Fig 2-1, 8-54c, 8-55, 8-62, 8-67, 8C-02, 8C-03

Standard Operating

Procedures

3-10b, 9-19a, 9-21

Staff

2-28, 3-15b, 3-37, 4-01, 4-15, 5-09b, 6-04a, 6-06,

6-09, 6-10, 7-18, 7-32, 8-04, 8-06, 8-08, 8-12a,

8-13, 8-26, 8-39, 8-44, 8A-06, 9-02, 9-03, 9-06-9-14,

9-16-9-20, 9-22-9-26, 9-29, 9-32, 9-35-9-37, 9A-01,

9A-04a(2), 9A-06, 10-11

Strategic

1-14, 1-46, 2-03, 2-10, 2-11, 2-12, 2-13, 2-15, 2-24,

2-29, 3-11, 7-02, 7-09, 7-17c, 7-28, 7-29, 7-31, 7-33,

7-34, 7-35, 7-37, 8-03, 8-25, 8-37, 8-38, 8-59, 8-66,

8B-01, 8C-14, 9A-03, 9A-04, 10-03, 10-07a, 10-10, 10-

13, 10-16, 10-18b

Strike

7-11, 7-23, 7-35, Fig 8-3, 8-49, 8-52, 8B-03

Sub-unit

3-34, 4-04, 6-06c, 7-07, 7-13, 8-08, 8-11, 9-05a,

9A-04a(1), 9A-06a

Support (s)

1-09, 1-18, 1-19d, 1-23, 1-34, 1-35, 1-45, 2-11c, Fig

2-1, 2-29, 2-30, 2-35, 3-02, 3-08, 4-06, 4-13, 4-14,

6-12b, 6-14, 7-01, 7-10a, 7-14, 7-17, 7-19, 7-21, 7-23,

7-35, 7-36, 7-40, 7-41, 7-44a, 8-24, 8-35, 8-46a, 8-49,

8C-02, 8C-13c, 8C-15

Supported

2-18, 2-22, 7-01, 7-09a, 7-17, 7-27, 8-30, 8-54a, 8A-09

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Supporting

2-04c, 2-18, 2-22, 3-20, 6-07, 6-13a, 7-10c, 7-20, 7-27,

7-30, 8-39, 8-47, 8C-14, 8C-18a

Surprise

1-15, 1-21, 1-36, Annex 1A, 5-01, 5-07, 5-09, 5-15,

5-19, 7-09b, 8-16, 8-17, 8-46, 8-57, 8-58, 8-60, 8-71,

8-75, 9-02

Sustainability

Annex 1A, Fig 3-1, 3-02, 3-30, 3-40, 10-04, 10-05,

10-15

Sustainment

1-19c, 1-30, 3-20f, 3-40, 4-16, 5-17, 7-05, 7-17d, 7-18,

7-21, 7-23, 7-30, 7-38-7-42, 7-44, 8-10, 8-11, Fig 8-1,

Fig 8-2, 8-17, 8-21, 8-36-8-36, 8-46b(3), 8-48, 8-54a,

10-01-10-06, 10-09-10-15, 10-17, 10-19

Tactical activities

1-35, 2-13, 2-14, 2-16, 2-17, Fig 2-1, Fig 2-2, 4-10,

8-02, 8-03, 8-08, 8-12a, 8-37, 8-38, 8-39, 8-47a, 8-55,

8-67, 10-10c, 10-17a, G3

Tactical framework

4-17, 7-11, 8-42, 8-43, 8-49, 8-54, G3

Tactical functions

2-13, 4-15-4-17, 7-50d, 8-02, 8-03, 8-07, 8-10, 8-12,

Fig 8-1, Fig 8-2, 8-17, 8-21, 8-30, 8-46a, 8-48, 8-54, G3

Task force

2-20, 7-07, 7-13, 9-10b.

Task organisation

7-07c, 7-12, 9-04d, 9-15

Technical

1-36, 2-08b, 3-04d, 3-13, 3-24a, 7-05, 7-06, Fig 7-1,

7-10, 8-13c, 8C-15, 8C-20, 9-13, 9A-06c

Tempo

3-34, 5-01, 5-06-5-09, 5-13, 6-06a, 6-07, 6-13a, 6-14,

7-12, 7-33, 8-14, 8-57, 8-76, 8-77, 8C-08, 9-05a, 9-07,

9-15, 9-19, 9-22a, 9-29b, 9-33, 9-36

Training

1-03, 1-19, 1-45, 2-08, 2-28, 2-34, Fig 3-1, 3-02, 3-09,

3-11, 3-14, 3-15a, 3-17, 3-20, 3-30, 3-32, 3-34, 3-35-

3-41, 6-06a, 6-08, 6-12, 7-02, 7-05, 7-12, 7-14, 7-18,

7-19c, 7-44, 8-07, 8-28, 8-64, 8-67, 8A-05c, 8B-04,

8C-04, 8C-05, 8C-08, 8C-19, 9-38, 9A-06, 10-17b,

10-18c(1)

Trust

3-14, 3-15, 3-20, 3-22, 5-17, 6-14, 6-15, 7-05, 7-05e,

8-05e

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Understanding

1-12, 1-19, 1-26, 1-34, 1-42, 1-46, 2-11, 2-12, 2-14,

2-15, 2-24, 2-30, 2-34, 3-02, 3-04, 3-06, 3-07, 3-11,

3-14, 3-15, 3-22, 3-24, 3-28, 3-33, 3-42, 4-02, 4-05,

4-07, 4-09-4-11, 4-13, 5-03, 5-05, 5-06, 5-13-5-15,

6-06, 6-08, 6-12, 6-14-6-16, 7-05, 7-05, 7-10, 7-14,

7-17, 7-20, 7-21, 7-32, 7-51, 8-03-8-07, 8-13, 8-16,

8-23, 8-26, 8-32, 8-37, 8-42, 8-44, Fig 8-3, 8-45, 8-47-

8-50, 8-52b, 8-54-8-56, 8-68, 8A-01-8A-10, Fig 8A-1,

8B-02, 8C-04, 8C-05, 8C-13, 9-02, 9-05c, 9-11b, 9-16,

9-26, 9-28-9-31, 9-35, 9A-01, 9A-05, 9A-06, 10-08,

10-09, 10-19, G-3

Unit

2-29, 3-20, 3-23b, 3-34, 6-02, 7-07, 7-13, 7-42, 8-04,

8-08, 8-10, 8-37, 8-49, 8-73, 9-15, 9-33, 9A-06, 10-07,

10-18

Unity of effort

2-26, 6-12, 8-29, 9-04c, 9-05c, 9-11c

Use of force

1-28, 1-40, 2-08, 2-23, 8-47, 8C-03

Values and standards

3-20, 3-23, 3-24, 3-27, 3-28

Versatility

1-19d, 3-12, 7-22

Warfighting

1-19d, 1-48, 2-04b, 2-15, Fig 2-1, 2-29, 3-38, 7-11, 07-

22, 8C-01, 8C-09, 9A-04a(1)

Weapons

1-04, 1-2, 1-24, 1-28, 1-29, 7-08, 7-17, 8-19

Whole force approach

2-18, 2-31-2-34, 3-16, 7-43, 7-44, 10-08, 10-13, G3

Will (and cohesion)

1-06, 1-07, 1-32, 1-37, 1-39, 2-04, 2-12, 3-18, 3-20,

4-10, 4-13, 4-17, 5-01, 5-02, 5-04, 5-06, 5-15, 5-18,

5-19, 6-02, 6-04, 6-13, 7-17, 8-07, 8-16, 8-20, 8-34,

8-52, 8-54-8-57, 8-63, 8B-01, 8C-04, 9-02, 9-08, 9-10

Withdrawal

Fig 2-1, 5-09a, 7-25, 8-58, 8-74, 8C-18

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Glossary of terms

This glossary deï¬nes or describes key doctrinal terms used in ADP Land Operations. The

sources of deï¬nitions are shown in brackets. Where the source is the Concise Oxford English

Dictionary, the abbreviation COED is used.

For other terms used in this doctrine, readers should consult Allied Administrative Publication

(AAP) 06, NATO Glossary of Terms and Deï¬nitions, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1, UK

Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database and the Staff Ofï¬cersâ€™ Handbook.

Action. A task performed by land forces to create a particular effect. (ADP)

Note: all actions have intended and unintended consequences.

Actor. A group or person that takes action or directly exerts inï¬‚uence. (ADP)

Adaptability. The ability to learn quickly, to adjust to changes in a dynamic situation, and to

amend plans that, in the light of experience, seem unlikely to lead to a suitable outcome. (ADP)

Adversary. A group or person that seeks to prevent us from achieving our objectives. (ADP)

Note: this is consistent with the NATO deï¬nition of a party acknowledged as potentially hostile

and against which the legal used of force may be envisaged. (AAP-06)

Attributes of land forces. An attribute is a quality or feature regarded as characteristic or

inherent. (COED)

Note: Land forces have four attributes: people, presence, persistence and versatility. To be

effective, land forces require additional qualities, of which adaptability is key.

Audience. All those relevant to the attainment of our objectives. (ADP)

Full spectrum approach. This term describes the coordinated actions of military and non-

military actors in a NATO context, where the high level of integration achievable in a national

operations may not be possible. For more information, see AJP 01 and JDP 05.

Cyber electromagnetic activities. This term describes the integration of activities in

cyberspace and the electromagnetic environment, including cyberspace operations, electronic

warfare and spectrum management operations. For more information, see JDP 0-50.

Cyberspace. An operating environment consisting of the interdependent network of digital

technology infrastructures (including platforms, the Internet, telecommunication networks,

computer systems, as well as embedded processors and controllers), and the data therein

spanning the physical, virtual and cognitive domains. (JDP 0-50)

Domain. A sphere of activity or knowledge. (COED)

Note: UK joint doctrine describes three domainsâ€“ physical, virtual and cognitive. Domain is

not a NATO term. In US Army doctrine, domain refers to what NATO and UK describe as an

environment.

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Effect. A change which is a result or consequence of an action or other cause. (COED)

Enemy. A group or person that seeks to defeat us through armed lethal means. (ADP)

Environment. The surroundings in which an organisation operates, including air, water, land,

natural resources, ï¬‚ora, fauna humans and their inter-relations. (AAP-06)

Note: from a military perspective, environments include maritime, land, air and space, and

cyberspace.

Full spectrum approach. The approach taken by UK government departments to ensure

that that the UKâ€™s national power is coherently applied. The term â€˜full spectrumâ€™ (as opposed

to NATOâ€™s â€˜comprehensiveâ€™) implies a greater level of collaboration which may not always be

possible during coalition operations. For more information, see JDP 0-01.

Functions of land power. This doctrine describes four functions of land power: ï¬ght,

engage, secure and support. These functions can be exercised independently or in

combinations. They are broadly aligned with the NATO operations themes.

Hybrid warfare. The application of conventional and unconventional forms of conï¬‚ict, using

both attributable and non-attributable means. (ADP)

Integrated Action. The Armyâ€™s unifying doctrine. For more information, see Chapter 4.

Interoperability. The ability to act together coherently, effectively and efï¬ciently to achieve

tactical, operational and strategic objectives. (AAP-06)

Joint action. The deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to

affect actorsâ€™ will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them to achieve

inï¬‚uence. (JDP 3-00)

Land power. The ability to exert control within the land environment and to inï¬‚uence the

behaviour of actors and the course of events. (ADP)

Leadership. A combination of character, knowledge and action that inspires others to

succeed. (Army Leadership Doctrine)

Manoeuvrist Approach. The Armyâ€™s ï¬ghting doctrine for the tactical level. For more

information, see Chapter 5.

Mission Command. The Armyâ€™s command philosophy. For more information, see Chapter 6.

Objective. A clearly deï¬ned and attainable goal for a military operation. (AAP-06)

Operations process. The process by which commanders and staff conduct planning and

execute the plan. (ADP)

Note: activities within the process include: assessment, planning, preparation and execution.

Operations themes. The general conditions of the operating environment and the main

activities which the force will be required to conduct. (AJP-01)

Note: there are four themes â€“ warï¬ghting, security, peace support and defence engagement.

This doctrine uses the term defence engagement instead of NATOâ€™s peacetime military

engagement.

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Outcome. Joint doctrine deï¬nes a desired outcome as a favourable and enduring situation,

consistent with political direction, reached through intervention or as a result of some other

form of inï¬‚uence. (JDP 01)

Note: in land operations, where appropriate to the tasks assigned and the resources available,

outcomes are described in terms of changed or maintained behaviours. NATO does not deï¬ne

the term outcome.

Risk. A possibility of a negative outcome in relation to the force or mission. (ADP)

Tactical activities. There are four groups of tactical activities â€“ offensive, defensive, stability

and enabling. Tactical activities were formerly described as tactical actions.

Tactical functions. These describe the full breadth of a land forceâ€™s activities when

conducting operations. They are: command, intelligence, manoeuvre, ï¬res, information

activities, capacity building, protection and sustainment.

Types of operation. A sequence of coordinated actions with a deï¬ned purpose. (AAP-06)

Note: there are a number of types of operation. This doctrine categorises combat, stability,

and military aid to the civil authority as types of operation. Stability operations (which NATO

describes as crisis response operations) and military aid to the civil authority are UK terms.

Types of operation were formerly described as military activities.

Understanding. In the context of decision-making, understanding is the perception and

interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight

required for effective decision-making. (JDP 04)

Whole force approach. UK Defence places human capability at the heart of its decision-

making and ensures that Defence outputs are delivered by the right mix of capable and

motivated people. For more information, see JDP 0-01.

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AC 71940

The sponsor of this publication is:

Warfare Branch Editor,

Headquarters Field Army, Waterloo Lines,

Land Warfare Development Centre,

Imber Road, Warminster,

Wiltshire, BA12 ODJ

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