Regional Outlook
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION THIRD QUARTER 1999
FDIC
Atlanta
Region
Division of
Insurance
Jack M.W. Phelps,
Regional Manager
Scott C. Hughes,
Regional Economist
Pamela R. Stallings,
Senior Financial
Analyst
W. Brian Bowling,
Senior Financial
Analyst
In Focus This Quarter
Falling Prices in Commodities and Manufacturing Pose Continuing
Risks to Credit Quality—
Falling prices are causing problems for a wide range of
commodity industries—a collection of agricultural, mining, and manufacturing
industries that produce standardized products and face global competition, mostly
on the basis of price. Firms in these industries have experienced slow or negative
profit growth even as they reduce payrolls to cut costs. There are signs that these
trends are contributing to higher credit risk for insured institutions. The effects of
these problems on local economies and community banks could grow if low prices
persist. See page 3.
By Richard A. Brown and Alan Deaton
Shifting Funding Trends Pose Challenges for Community Banks—
Several long-term trends are making it more difficult for some institutions to eco-
nomically fund asset growth with deposits in today’s marketplace. As a result,
traditional measures of liquidity and liability composition for commercial banks
reflected record-low levels of deposit funding at year-end 1998. The need to augment
lagging deposit growth to meet loan demand has led many community banks to seek
more wholesale funding sources, particularly borrowings. If the trend toward greater
reliance on nondeposit funding continues, liability management may become more
important and more challenging for community banks that have historically relied
upon deposits for funding and net interest revenues for profitability. See page 11.
By Allen Puwalski and Brian Kenner
Regional Perspectives
Agricultural and industrial commodity price declines are adversely
affecting some Atlanta Region producers—
Hog, soybean, and cotton prices
have fallen sharply in recent years as a result of low inflationary expectations, excess
productive capacity, and weakened global demand. Lower prices have led to reduced
farm income and employment in some parts of the Region. Industrial commodities
such as steel, textiles and apparels, and pulp and paper also have been hurt by a
strong U.S. dollar and financial turmoil overseas. While the Region’s overall econo-
my remains strong, the troubled agricultural and manufacturing sectors are largely
concentrated in less diverse rural areas where economic growth has been much slow-
er. Persistent price stagnation could lead to further financial stress in these areas,
which could negatively affect credit quality at some insured institutions. See page 18.
Bank funding has changed considerably during this economic
expansion and differs from previous cycles—
Loan demand has outpaced
deposit growth at Atlanta Region commercial banks since the current economic
expansion began in 1992. This situation has led to an increase in noncore funding,
particularly borrowings, at both large and small banks.A more diverse funding mix
may offer advantages with regard to asset and liability management, but it also rais-
es some new potential risks. Many industry observers believe funding issues repre-
sent a major long-term challenge to the industry and one that is likely to affect
community banks more than large banks. See page 22.
By Atlanta Region Staff
A Publication of the Division of Insurance
The Regional Outlook is published quarterly by the Division of Insurance of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation for the following eight geographic regions:
Atlanta Region (AL, FL, GA, NC, SC, VA, WV)
Boston Region (CT
, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)
Chicago Region (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)
Dallas Region (CO, NM, OK, TX)
Kansas City Region (IA, KS, MN, MO, ND, NE, SD)
Memphis Region (AR, KY, LA, MS, TN)
New York Region (DC, DE, MD, NJ, NY, PA, PR, VI)
San Francisco Region (AK, AZ, CA, FJ, FM, GU, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY)
Single copy subscriptions of the Regional Outlook can be obtained by sending the subscription
form found on the back cover to the FDIC Public Information Center. Contact the Public Informa-
tion Center for current pricing on bulk orders.
The Regional Outlook is available on-line by visiting the FDIC’s website at www.fdic.gov/
publish/regout. For more information or to provide comments or suggestions about the Atlanta
Region’s Regional Outlook, please call Jack Phelps at (404) 817-2590 or send an e-mail to
jphelps@fdic.gov.
The views expressed in the Regional Outlook are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
official positions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Some of the information used in
the preparation of this publication was obtained from publicly available sources that are considered
reliable. However, the use of this information does not constitute an endorsement of its accuracy by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Chairman Donna Tanoue
Director, Division of Insurance Arthur J. Murton
Executive Editor George E. French
Editors Lynn A. Nejezchleb
Maureen E. Sweeney
Publications Manager Teresa J. Franks
In Focus This Quarter
Falling Prices in Commodities and Manufacturing
Pose Continuing Risks to Credit Quality
Prices have fallen sharply across a wide range of
commodities and manufactured goods.
Signs of stress are apparent in some industry
sectors.
These trends are contributing to rising credit risk
for insured institutions.
Effects on local economies and community banks
could grow if low prices persist.
The performance of the U.S. economy during the mid-
to late-1990s has been generally positive for banking.
Economic activity grew in 1998 at an inflation-adjusted
rate of 3.9 percent for the second consecutive year. Con-
tinued low inflation has helped to hold interest rates low
and extend the expansion into its ninth consecutive year.
However, one downside of low inflation has been that
firms in certain commodity industries have encountered
slow or negative growth in revenues because of the low
prices they receive for their products.
Commodity industries are defined in this article as a
collection of agricultural, mining, and manufacturing
industries that produce standardized products and face
global competition, mostly on the basis of price. Since
the beginning of 1997, price weakness has extended
across a wide range of commodity industries, from agri-
cultural products to oil, chemicals, textiles, paper, semi-
conductors, steel, and even some segments of the auto
industry. While many firms have retooled and restruc-
tured to cut costs, clear signs of financial stress have
become apparent.
The potential importance of problems in commodity
industries to the FDIC was illustrated by the banking
problems related to oil and agriculture during the 1980s
and early 1990s. As documented in a 1997 study by the
FDIC Division of Research and Statistics, regional
economic dislocations related to declining farmland
values and declining oil prices contributed to large
increases in credit losses and the eventual failure of
hundreds of federally insured banks and thrifts. The
analogy to the 1980s is far from perfect—for example,
oil and agriculture have not experienced booms compa-
rable to those that preceded their collapse in the
1980s—but exposures to commodity industries remain
impor
tant for many insured institutions.
This article summarizes recent adverse trends in com-
modity and manufacturing sectors and discusses why
industry-sector problems are important in banking. It
takes a high-level approach, emphasizing the economic
fundamentals that are driving prices across the economy
while ignoring many of the industry-specific factors
that are also driving the performance of individual sec-
tors. The goal is to evaluate the effects of these trends
on bank credit quality if they persist through 1999 and
beyond.
Prices Have Been Declining across a Range
of Commodities and Manufactured Goods
Low inflation has been a boon for consumer spending
and business investment during the economic expansion
of the 1990s. As of March 1999, the Consumer Price
Index had risen at an annualized rate of less than 2.0
percent for 8 consecutive quarters and at an annualized
rate of less than 4.0 percent for
33 consecutive quarters. The
prices of many popular and
essential consumer goods—
from computers to gasoline—
have generally fallen throughout
the decade, even as the prices of
most services continue to rise
steadily. Businesses, too, have
benefited from the ability to
purchase goods cheaply, as well as from the generally
low interest rates that have accompanied low inflation.
The declining average wholesale price of goods is
reflected in Chart 1 (next page), which shows changes
in the producer price index (PPI) and some of its key
components since the beginning of 1997. The PPI
focuses on goods, omitting changes in the price of ser-
vices. The decline of nearly 5 percent in the PPI since
the beginning of 1997 has been led by falling prices for
mining products, petroleum, and steel. Moreover, econ-
omy-wide price declines for wholesale goods have been
steady over time, with the PPI registering year-over-year
declines for 26 consecutive months through May 1999.
Atlanta Regional Outlook 3 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
CHART 1 CHART 2
Widespread Pricing Pressures Are Evident in the
Components of the Producer Price Index
Percent Change in Selected Components of the Producer Price
Index, January 1997 to May 1999
–45
–40
–35
–30
–25
–20
–15
–10
–5
0
Agricultural Prices Are Down Sharply Since 1997
Percent Change in Reported Price Between
January 1997 and May 1999
Source: Wall Street Journal (Haver Analytics)
Cotton
Corn
Hogs
Wheat
10
5
0
–5
–10
–15
–20
–25
–30
–35
–40
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (Haver Analytics)
All
Commodities
Lumber
& Wood
Chemicals
Textiles
Automobiles
Electrical
Machiner
y
Iron & Steel
Petroleum
Products
Mining
3.3
–4.0
0.6
–1.9
–2.5
–2.5
–10.0
–19.8
–33.2
Although they are only indirectly included in the PPI
numbers, the prices of several important agricultural
commodities have also fallen substantially. Chart 2
shows that the price of wheat has fallen by more than 35
percent since January 1997, with the price of corn,
hogs, and cotton also registering double-digit rates of
decline. While the price of hogs has rebounded signifi-
cantly since the end of 1998—more than doubling from
its low of less than 15 cents per pound—prices for corn,
wheat, and cotton continued to decline through May
1999.
Reasons for Broad-Based Commodity
Price Weakness
Pricing trends in disparate industries such as electronics
and agriculture, or oil and steel, are driven in part by
industry-specific factors. For example, weather patterns
heavily influence agricultural prices, while global poli-
tics tends to drive world oil price levels. In manufactur-
ing, technological developments can significantly alter
the demand for a product or its cost of production,
thereby influencing its market price. For example,
improvements in semiconductor manufacturing tech-
niques—from shrinking the size of chips to using larger
silicon wafers—have significantly increased production
yields in that industry during the 1990s.
1
However, the pervasiveness of recent price declines
across a wide range of commodities and manufactured
1
See “Semiconductor Industry Trends,Standard and Poor’s Industry
Surveys, May 27, 1999, p. 4.
goods suggests that a number of common factors are
driving prices lower:
Low inflationary expectations. Since 1980, infla-
tion rates have gradually declined worldwide as cen-
tral banks shifted their focus toward price stability.
Disinflation has profoundly altered the expectations
of investors, consumers, and businesses, and in the
process has altered the course of events in individ-
ual markets and in the economy as a whole. As a
result, commodities have lost much of their appeal
as a hedge against inflation. This has contributed to
a decline of more than 50 percent in the price of
gold since 1980. The expectations of many busi-
nesses have also changed, because with less pricing
power they must continually cut costs to remain
competitive.
Overcapacity because of large-scale investment.
Global investment in productive capacity accelerated
during the early to mid-1990s in a number of com-
modity and manufacturing industries. Many U.S.
firms have implemented new technologies and
moved their operations closer to their markets or to
areas where low-cost labor is available. For example,
major U.S. and foreign automakers have invested bil-
lions of dollars in recent years in new production
facilities in the emerging markets of Asia and Latin
America as part of a “build-where-you-sell” strate-
gy.
2
Because these additions to capacity largely have
not been offset by the closure of existing plants, ana-
lysts say that global productive capacity in autos
2
Barbara McClellan, “Asia Woes Worsen,Wa rd ’s Au t o Wo rl d ,
November 1998, pp. 28–31.
Atlanta Regional Outlook 4 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
could exceed demand by more than 20 million units
annually by 2000.
3
A similar situation has developed
in the semiconductor industry, where capital invest-
ment in chipmaking equipment tripled between 1993
and 1996, contributing to a glut of memory chips and
plunging prices.
4
Curtailed global demand in the wake of emerging
market crises. The economic crises that have devel-
oped in Asia, Russia, and parts of Latin America
since 1997 have crimped global demand for com-
modities and manufactured goods. For example,
demand for new cars in Korea fell by 50 percent in
1998.
5
Asia received approximately 30 percent of
U.S. feed grain exports in 1996, but declining Asian
demand since then has contributed to a sharp decline
in global grain prices. The slowdown of economic
activity in crisis countries and the resulting decline
in their demand for imports is only one factor that
has hurt the pricing power of U.S. producers. Anoth-
er problem is the pricing advantage conferred on
countries that have experienced currency devalua-
tion. Firms operating in a country that has devalued
its currency experience a reduction in the price of
their exports in U.S. dollar terms. This process fur-
ther depresses the pricing power of U.S. farmers and
businesses that sell their goods in global markets.
Recently, there have been signs that some hard-hit Asian
economies may soon begin to recover. However, the
other factors cited above—low inflationary expecta-
tions and rapid investment in productive capacity—may
well be longer-term trends. In any event, U.S. farmers
and businesses that participate in commodity industries
must be prepared for the possibility that pricing pres-
sures will not dissipate in the near term.
Signs of Stress Are Showing
for Affected Industry Sectors
As commodity prices continue to stagnate, signs of
stress are emerging among firms in the commodity
industries. A long-term trend toward reduced levels of
employment in manufacturing has accelerated in the
midst of the current economic expansion. Chart 3 shows
that employment levels declined in a wide range of
commodity industries in the 24 months ending in May
3
“1997 Automotive Outlook,Automotive Industries. This report is
available at http://www.ai-online.com.
4
“Semiconductor Industry Trends” (1999), p. 3.
5
Barbara McClellan (1998).
CHART 3
Total Percent Change in Payroll Employment, May 1997 to May 1999
Employment Levels Have Declined across a Wide
Range of Commodity and Manufacturing Sectors
* Percent change between 1997 and 1998 based on county-level estimates
of payroll employment in agriculture and agricultural services
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics (Haver Analytics); WEFA
Electronics and Semiconductors
Textiles
Autos
Primary Metals/Iron and Steel
Chemicals
Oil and Gas
Mining
Lumber and Paper
Agriculture*
–20 –15 –10 –5 0
1999. The total manufacturing sector lost more than
420,000 jobs during that period, while another 64,000
jobs were lost in the mining sector, which includes oil
and gas extraction. The trend toward lower levels of
employment in mining and manufacturing not only
reflects pricing pressures but also attempts by firms in
these sectors to maintain profitability by investing in
labor-saving technologies.
The profit picture has begun to deteriorate as well for
firms operating in commodity industries. Four-quarter
trailing earnings through March 1999 for oil-sector
firms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 dropped by more
than 44 percent from a year ago (see Chart 4), while the
earnings of steel firms fell by almost 32 percent. The
losses experienced by firms in some of these industrial
sectors extended to the farm sector as well, where net
CHART 4
–50
–40
–30 –20 –10 0 10 20
Agriculture*
Year-over-Year Percent Change in Earnings from Continuing Operations
for S&P 500 Companies, by Sector, for the Year Ending in March 1999
Earnings Have Declined across a Wide Range
of Commodity and Manufacturing Sectors
Oil and Gas
* 1998 percent change in net farm income
Sources: Standard and Poor’s (Bloomberg); U.S. Department of Agriculture
Lumber and Paper
Mining
Chemicals
Primary Metals/Iron and Steel
Autos
Textiles
Electronics and Semiconductors
Atlanta Regional Outlook 5 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
incomes fell by more than 7 percent in 1998, according
to the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Affected Industries Have Found Ways to Cope
with Pricing Pressures Thus Far
Despite the signs of stress in industries where prices are
weak or declining, U.S. farmers and industrial firms
have shown themselves to be fairly resilient thus far in
their ability to cope with the situation. Agricultural pro-
ducers have been making greater use of carryover debt
to keep their operations running even if they were not
able to fully retire their operating loans during the pre-
vious crop year. The FDIC Report on Underwriting
Practices shows that 29 percent of FDIC-supervised
agricultural lenders reported at least a moderate
increase in carryover debt during the six-month period
ending in March 1999, compared with only 10 percent
in March 1998. Although the use of carryover debt is
not an uncommon practice in agriculture, it indicates
that low prices and declining subsidies have contributed
to financial stress for farmers.
Many industrial firms have found ways to increase pro-
ductivity and cut costs to offset declining revenues.
Chart 5 follows trends in annual total revenue and costs
for U.S. corporations operating in a selected group of
commodity industries. It shows that growth in revenue
and costs slowed noticeably in 1997. Both revenue and
costs in these sectors declined in 1998, illustrating that
firms in these sectors have needed to cut costs to pre-
serve profit margins. Cost cutting in the manufacturing
sector is further illustrated by a steady decline in the
index of unit labor costs for manufacturing, which start-
ed from a value of 100 in 1992 and fell to less than 96
CHART 5
U.S. Corporations Operating in
Commodity Industries Have Trimmed
Costs to Offset Falling Revenue*
* Totals represent a summation of revenues and costs for the following industry
sectors, as reported by the Bureau of the Census: textile mill products, paper and
allied products, chemicals and allied products, industrial chemicals and synthetics,
petroleum and coal products, lumber and wood products, iron and steel, electrical
and electronic equipment, motor vehicles and equipment, and mining.
Source: Bureau of the Census (Haver Analytics)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Billions of Dollars
Costs
Revenues
1,250
1,450
1,650
1,850
2,050
2,250
by the first quarter of 1999. Falling unit labor costs
means that the productivity of manufacturing workers is
rising faster than the cost of their services. This trend
demonstrates that manufacturing firms have been suc-
cessful at implementing new technologies and new cap-
ital equipment to cut production costs.
Cost savings and industry consolidation have been
accomplished in part through mergers. According to
Merger Stat, the dollar volume of merger and acquisi-
tion transactions involving U.S. firms exceeded $1.2
trillion in 1998, an increase of more than 80 percent
from 1997 levels. Both the number and dollar volume of
mergers announced in 1998 far exceeded the volumes
recorded during the “merger mania” of the 1980s. Some
of the largest mergers announced in 1998 involved
firms looking for ways to increase market share and cut
costs in markets characterized by overcapacity. Exam-
ples include the $39 billion Daimler-Chrysler transac-
tion announced in May 1998 and the $80 billion
Exxon-Mobil transaction announced in December
1998. Furthermore, merger activity recorded in early
1999 suggests that total merger volume for the year
could exceed the record pace of a year ago.
Industries plagued by oversupply and weak prices
require consolidation to reduce capacity and improve
profit margins. Mergers and acquisitions represent a
fairly orderly way for firms operating in a troubled
industry to consolidate on their own terms. Bankruptcy
filings are an alternative means for severely troubled
firms to reduce capacity and achieve consolidation
within an industry. Regardless of how industry consoli-
dation is achieved, it often results in reductions in
employment (such as those documented in Chart 3).
However, from a lender’s perspective, an orderly con-
solidation process through mergers and acquisitions is
preferable to a disorderly shakeout of firms through
bankruptcies.
Recent favorable capital market conditions have
allowed firms in troubled industries to consolidate
through mergers. Acquisitions are sometimes financed
through corporate borrowings or, more commonly, by
swapping equity shares that have been rising in value
during the bull market of the 1990s.
6
Recent consolida-
tion in commodity industries could be depicted as an
6
According to Loan Pricing Corporation’s Gold Sheets, syndicated
and leveraged lending related to mergers and acquisitions reached a
record high of $80 billion in the second quarter of 1998, which rep-
resents about 30 percent of the total syndicated and leveraged lending
market for that period.
Atlanta Regional Outlook 6 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
orderly process, associated with record-high merger and
acquisition activity, near-record-low business bankrupt-
cy filings, and low credit losses on commercial and
industrial (C&I) loans. However, a sudden change in
financial market conditions characterized by sharply
higher interest rates, lower stock values, or both could
inhibit the ability of businesses to restructure and retool
on their own. This could lead to a much more disorder-
ly shakeout of firms accompanied by a rise in business
bankruptcies and losses to lenders.
Signs Point to Rising Credit Risk
in the Commodity Industries
In dollar terms, the largest commercial bank exposures
to the commodity industries are in the portfolios of
large banks. Chart 6 provides an estimated breakdown
of the aggregate exposure of insured institutions to
commodity industries based on corporate balance sheet
information collected by the Bureau of the Census.
7
The
chart shows that the aggregate exposure of the bank and
thrift industries to these sectors is approximately $206
billion, or 26 percent of the total industry C&I portfo-
lio. The largest single industry exposure is to the chem-
ical industry, which represents approximately 9.5
7
Because of the limitations of the data, bank exposures to corpora-
tions engaged in agriculture are not broken out in Chart 6.
CHART 6
Commodity Industries Make Up
Over One-Quarter of Bank C&I Loans
to Corporate Borrowers
Total Loans
Mining
Lumber & P
aper*
3.2%
Outstanding
4.4%
as of 12/31/98=
Petroleum & Coal
$778.3 Billion**
1.2%
Electronics
4.2%
Chemicals*
9.5%
All Other
73.5%
Textiles
1.2%
Iron & Steel
1.1%
A
utomobiles
1.7%
* “Lumber & Paper” includes lumber and wood products and paper and allied
products as reported by the Bureau of the Census; "Chemicals" includes chemical
and allied products and industrial chemicals and synthetics as reported by the
Bureau of the Census.
** Total includes bank loans not elsewhere classified to the nonfarm nonfinancial
corporate business sector as reported in the Flow of Funds. Component loan
amounts represent short-term and long-term bank loans on corporate balance
sheets, by sector, as reported by the Bureau of the Census.
Sources: Bureau of the Census (Haver Analytics); Federal Reserve Board
percent of bank C&I loans. In the syndicated loan mar-
ket, where large U.S. banks dominate in terms of origi-
nations, about 25 percent of all loans made in 1998 were
to firms operating in the manufacturing sector.
A rough indicator of recent trends in the credit risk
associated with bank loans to commodity industries can
be found in expected default frequencies (EDFs) calcu-
lated by KMV Corporation. The EDF is an estimate of
the probability that a firm will default on its bond oblig-
ations within one year.
8
Chart 7 tracks the median EDF
for firms operating in commodity industries compared
with the median for all other firms rated by KMV. This
chart shows that while the median EDF for commodity
industries has consistently exceeded the median for all
other firms in the recent past, this difference has
widened appreciably since the middle of 1998. Over the
past year, the median EDF for commodity industries has
more than doubled, rising from 0.8 percent to 1.9 per-
cent, while the median EDF for all other firms has dou-
bled as well, from 0.6 percent to 1.2 percent. These data
indicate that the level of credit risk associated with cor-
porate borrowers has been increasing, led by an
increased probability of default among firms operating
in commodity industries.
8
KMV’s proprietary calculation for EDF is based on 1) the current
market value of the firm, 2) the structure of the firm’s current oblig-
ations, and 3) the vulnerability of the firm to large changes in market
value.
CHART 7
The Default Risk of Firms Operating
in Commodity Industries Has
Risen over the Past Year
Median Expected Default Frequency (EDF)*
(Probability that a Firm Will Default on Bond
Obligations within One Year)
KMV’s proprietary calculation for EDF is based on 1) the current market value of the firm,
2) the structure of the firm’s current obligations, and 3) the vulnerability of the firm to large
changes in market value.
* Sectors included in the calculation of EDF for commodity industries include
the following KMV aggregates: agriculture; automotive; chemicals; electrical
equipment; electronic equipment; lumber and forestry; mining; oil refining; oil,
gas, and coal exploration and production; paper; semiconductors; steel and metal
products; and textiles.
Source: KMV Corporation
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Firms in Other Industry Sectors
Firms in Commodity Industries
05/96
12/96
07/97
02/98
09/98
04/99
Atlanta Regional Outlook 7 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
Effects on Local Economies and
the Banks That Operate in Them
The economic effects of adversity in commodity indus-
tries tend to be most severe in local areas that depend
heavily on these sectors for employment and income. In
the 1980s, problems in the agricultural and oil sectors
kicked off a “rolling recession” that spread through the
Plains states and oil-producing regions of the south-
central and western states. In agricultural regions, farm-
land values began to decline around 1981, contributing
to the failure of hundreds of FDIC-insured banks
between 1984 and 1990.
9
Similarly, declining oil prices
in the mid-1980s contributed to the failure of federally
insured banks and thrifts in Texas, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, and other states, while the attempts of some
institutions to diversify into risky real estate invest-
ments resulted in still more failures. The FDIC’s analy-
sis of these episodes emphasizes how industry-sector
problems can affect local economies and bank credit
quality.
10
Moreover, the study shows that there can be a
significant lag between the onset of industry-sector
problems and the emergence of performance problems
9
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Research and
Statistics (1997). History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future,
Vol. 1, An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and
Early 1990s. pp. 275–276, http://www.fdic.gov/databank/hist80/
index.html.
10
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1997). See Chapters 8
and 9.
TABLE 1
in the banking industry. Although banks with direct
credit exposures to a troubled industry are likely to be
affected first, virtually all banks that operate in areas
that are heavily dependent on a troubled sector will
eventually have to contend with the indirect effects on
the local economy.
To evaluate the extent of local economic effects that
might have resulted from the recent adverse trends in
the commodity industries, we have conducted analysis
on 1,027 U.S. counties identified as particularly depen-
dent on at least one commodity industry (see Table 1 for
a list of the commodity industries studied).
11
The pur-
pose of this analysis is not to identify every county that
might be affected by these trends; instead, this analysis
focuses on the U.S. counties most concentrated in the
commodity industries and determines if these counties
and banks that operate in them are showing any symp-
toms of widespread distress.
Table 2 compares 1998 average job growth and unem-
ployment rates in these “most concentrated counties”
against the average for all U.S. counties. This compari-
son shows that the concentrated counties tended to have
moderately lower job growth and higher unemployment
than the U.S. average. However, further analysis shows
11
Counties identified as being highly dependent on one or more com-
modity industries had an average population of 36,250 in 1998 versus
86,055 for all U.S. counties.
U.S. Counties Most Concentrated in Commodity Industries
by 1998 Payroll Employment
NUMBER OF
PERCENT OF COUNTIES WITH
1998 COUNTY EMPLOYMENT
EMPLOYMENT IN CONCENTRATION STATES WITH THE MOST
THE
INDUSTRY IN 1998 DESIGNATED COUNTIES
AGRICULTURE >30 295 TX, NE, SD, KS, MO
L
UMBER AND PAPER >5 305 GA, AL, MS, AR
O
IL AND GAS >5 83 TX, OK, LA
C
HEMICALS >5 46 TN, IL, NC, TX
S
TEEL >5 70 KY, OH, AR, IN
A
UTOS >5 118 MI, IN, OH, KY, TN
T
EXTILES >5 156 GA, NC, SC, VA, AL
E
LECTRONICS AND SEMICONDUCTORS >5 33 TX, NY, IN, IA
Any Commodity Industry N/A 1,027 TX, GA, NC, TN, AL
All U.S. Counties N/A 3,142 N/A
Source: WEFA, based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Atlanta Regional Outlook 8 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
TABLE 2
Relative Economic Performance of Counties
Most Concentrated in Commodity Industries
1998 AVERAGE 1998 AVERAGE
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (%) UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (%)
AGRICULTURE 1.1 4.8
L
UMBER AND PAPER 1.3 6.9
O
IL AND GAS 1.4 5.6
C
HEMICALS 1.3 6.0
S
TEEL 1.7 5.6
A
UTOS 1.8 4.4
T
EXTILES 0.9 5.1
E
LECTRONICS AND SEMICONDUCTORS 1.9 3.7
Any Commodity Industry 1.3 5.5
All U.S. Counties 1.6 5.1
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Household Survey (Haver Analytics)
that the current situation is not unusual in that job mar-
kets in concentrated counties have tended to consistent-
ly underperform other U.S. counties over the past two
decades. On the whole, the economic picture did not
noticeably deteriorate in 1998 for the concentrated
counties. Average unemployment declined in 1998 for
every group of concentrated counties except oil coun-
ties, and average job growth increased in every group of
counties except textile counties. These data indicate that
while recent problems in the commodity industries
might be having severe effects in specific areas, these
problems had not translated into a broader weakening of
economic performance through the end of 1998.
The financial performance of insured institutions oper-
ating in concentrated counties is evaluated in Table 3
(next page). The table provides average C&I loan per-
formance and profitability ratios for 1,915 banks and
thrifts identified as having at least 25 percent of their
deposits in at least one of the concentrated counties as
of June 1998.
12
The average C&I loan charge-off ratio
for concentrated counties overall was higher than the
U.S. average, driven largely by higher average charge-
12
This analysis identifies the location of deposits by county through
the Summary of Deposits report for June 1998, the most recent report
available. The analysis is limited to institutions reporting at least $1
million in C&I loans as of December 31, 1998. Institutions operating
in one or more concentrated counties and meeting all the selection
criteria averaged $195 million in total assets as of December 31,
1998, compared with an average of $733 million in assets for institu-
tions operating in any U.S. county.
offs in both agricultural and oil and gas counties. Com-
parisons of past-due and noncurrent C&I loans also
indicate that institutions operating in agricultural and
oil and gas counties tend to have more problem credits
than the U.S. average.
13
During the 12 months ending in
December 1998, the average noncurrent loan ratio
jumped from 4.8 percent to 6.1 percent for institutions
operating in agricultural counties, while the average
ratio rose from 2.7 percent to 3.8 percent for institutions
operating in oil and gas counties.
These results indicate that while profitability in 1998
remained solid for the average bank operating in con-
centrated counties, credit losses appeared to be on the
rise in agricultural and oil and gas counties. However,
because this analysis relies on annual data that extend
only through 1998, it is by design a backward-looking
test for the local effects of problems in the commodity
industries. There is every reason to expect these credit
problems to intensify over time if commodity prices
remain low.
14
These considerations suggest that bankers
in commodity-dependent counties should continually
13
Past-due loans are defined as loans that have been past due for 30
to 89 days. Noncurrent loans are defined as loans that have been past
due for 90 or more days plus loans placed in nonaccrual status.
14
For more information on how the agricultural outlook could affect
FDIC-insured institutions, see the statement of FDIC Chairman
Donna Tanoue to the Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of
Representatives, February 12, 1999, http://www.fdic.gov/publish/
speeches/99spchs/spc13apr.html.
Atlanta Regional Outlook 9 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
TABLE 3
Relative Financial Performance of Insured Institutions Operating in Counties
Most Concentrated in Commodity Industries
NUMBER OF AVERAGE C&I AVERAGE AVERAGE NET
BANKS WITH AT LOANS PAST DUE NONCURRENT C&I LOAN
INCLUDES ONLY INSURED LEAST 25% OF 30 TO 89 DAYS, C&I LOANS,CHARGE-OFFS, AVERAGE
INSTITUTIONS WITH DEPOSITS IN A AS PERCENT AS PERCENT AS PERCENT OF RETURN ON
AT
LEAST $1 MILLION DESIGNATED OF LOANS, OF LOANS,AVERAGE LOANS, ASSETS,
IN C&I LOANS COUNTY 12/31/98 12/31/98 1998 1998
AGRICULTURE 416 5.08 6.12 1.58 1.16
L
UMBER AND PAPER 465 3.38 1.89 0.78 1.21
O
IL AND GAS 163 3.44 3.78 1.18 1.29
C
HEMICALS 81 2.47 2.97 0.79 1.18
S
TEEL 186 2.53 2.06 0.59 1.08
A
UTOS 341 2.64 2.05 0.66 1.12
T
EXTILES 264 2.91 1.92 0.70 1.10
E
LECTRONICS AND
SEMICONDUCTORS 107 2.71 2.36 0.68 0.87
Any Commodity
Industry 1,915 3.39 3.03 0.93 1.13
All U.S. Counties 8,485 2.91 2.50 0.76 1.05
Noncurrent loans include loans past due 90 or more days plus loans placed on nonaccrual status.
C&I = Commercial and industrial.
Sources: Summary of Deposits, Division of Research and Statistics, FDIC; Bank and Thrift Call Reports (Research
Information System)
monitor their local economy for signs of stress related
to problems in the commodity industries.
Conclusion
Businesses operating in a range of commodity and man-
ufacturing industries continue to grapple with weak or
declining prices. This problem is not solely the result of
industry-specific factors; it is part of long-term eco-
nomic trends that may continue for some time. Signs of
stress among firms in these industries are apparent in
the form of declining levels of employment and slow or
negative profit growth. However, there are few signs to
date of any disorderly industry shakeouts involving
widespread business bankruptcies and losses to lenders.
Thus far, most firms have managed to cope with
the situation by cutting costs and consolidating opera-
tions through mergers. At the same time, more forward-
looking indicators show that the level of credit risk
associated with commodity industries may be on the
rise. An analysis of the U.S. counties most heavily
dependent on these industries showed few signs of a
widespread deterioration in the performance of their
economies or in the profitability of their local deposito-
ry institutions through the end of 1998. However, there
are signs of rising credit losses among local depository
institutions in counties with the highest concentrations
of agriculture and oil and gas extraction. A continuation
of today’s weak pricing picture in these industries has
the potential to result in higher credit losses for insured
institutions during the next few years.
Richard A. Brown, Chief,
Economic and Market Trends Section
Alan Deaton, Economic Analyst
Atlanta Regional Outlook 10 Thir
d Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
Shifting Funding Trends Pose Challenges
for Community Banks
Several long-term trends are making it more dif-
ficult for some institutions to economically fund
asset growth with deposits in today’s marketplace.
Lagging deposit growth in recent years has result-
ed in greater reliance on alternative funding
sources to meet loan demand.
Liability management may become more impor-
tant and more challenging for community banks
that have historically relied upon deposits for
funding and net interest revenues for profitability.
For the past few years, assets have been expanding
faster than deposits at many commercial banks. The
result is an increased reliance on equity and borrowings
for funding. Since 1992, commercial bank assets have
grown at an average annual rate of 6.3 percent com-
pared with a 3.9 percent average annual growth rate for
deposits. Traditional measures of liquidity and funding
for commercial banks reflected record-low levels of
deposit funding at year-end 1998. Large commercial
banks have traditionally made greater use of nondeposit
funding alternatives. However, many community
banks,
1
which have typically relied more on deposit
funding, may face liability management challenges as a
result of shifting funding trends. This article surveys the
factors influencing the ability of banks to fund loan
growth with deposits, discusses community bank fund-
ing trends, and considers the implications of these
trends for community banks.
Factors Influencing Deposit Funding Trends
The percentage of commercial bank assets, particularly
loans, funded with deposits has declined steadily in the
1990s. As shown in Chart 1, the industry’s ratios of
deposits to assets and loans to deposits reflect a longer-
term shift away from deposit funding. Although the
level of these industry ratios is heavily influenced by
larger banks, the trend toward lower deposit funding
exists for both large banks and community banks and
points to secular factors that are affecting banks’ ability
to raise deposits in step with asset growth.
Trends in Household Wealth Accumulation
One factor affecting the ability of banks to attract
deposits is the recent trend in the way households are
amassing wealth. While the total wealth of U.S. house-
holds has soared in recent years because of unrealized
capital gains on housing and investments, annual net
purchases of new financial assets
2
by households as a
percentage of disposable income have actually trended
downward since the mid-1980s (see Chart 2, next page).
A falling personal savings rate and fewer purchases of
financial assets may suggest that households are more
comfortable consuming a higher percentage of current
income as long as capital gains are adding to their accu-
mulated wealth. However, because households have
been setting aside less of their current income for sav-
ings, the pool of new funds available to purchase bank
deposits has been growing more slowly.
Higher-Yielding Investment Alternatives
At the same time that households have been setting
aside less of their current income for savings, the share
of total new household savings flowing into bank
deposits has declined in the 1990s as competition from
higher-yielding alternatives has increased. During the
1980s, over 30 percent of the cumulative net increase in
2
Financial assets are defined as deposits, money market and mutual
fund shares, credit market instruments, corporate equities, life insur-
ance reserves, pension fund reserves, and trust reserves.
CHART 1
The Deposit-to-Asset and Loan-to-Deposit
Ratios Reflect Reduced Deposit
Funding for Commercial Banks
Recession
Ratio (%)
Deposit-to-Asset Ratio
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
Loan-to-Deposit Ratio
’70 ’74 ’78 ’82 ’86 ’90 ’94 ’98
Sources: FDIC Historical Statistics on Banking; Research Information System
1
Defined here as banks with total assets of $1 billion or less.
Atlanta Regional Outlook 11 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
CHART 2
Total Annual Additions* to Financial Assets
of Households and Nonprofit Organizations
Have Declined with Personal Savings Rate
Percentage of Disposable
Personal Income
Net Acquisition
15
10
5
0
20
of Financial Assets
Personal Savings
’80 ’82 ’84 ’86 ’88 ’90 ’92 ’94 ’96 ’98
* Excludes capital gains
Sources: Federal Reserve Board; Flow of Funds
financial assets by households and nonprofit organiza-
tions flowed into deposits. In contrast, less than 15 per-
cent of the cumulative net increase in financial assets
has flowed into deposits during the 1990s, although an
increasing proportion has been allocated to deposits in
recent years.
Not only do banks face intensifying competition from
other banks and thrifts, as indicated by 66 percent of the
respondents in Grant Thornton’s 1999 Sixth Annual
Survey of Community Bank Executives,
3
but they also
3
Grant Thornton’s 1999 Sixth Annual Survey of Community Bank
Executives, “Community Banks: A Competitive Force,” http://www.
grantthornton.com/resources/finance/banksurvey99/survey99w.html.
CHART 3
face increasing competition from mutual funds and
other nonbank financial service providers, such as cred-
it unions.
Mutual Funds. Increasingly, consumers are pursuing
higher yields by investing in mutual funds. Beyond
yields, however, many mutual fund companies also are
competing effectively with banks on the basis of conve-
nience by offering money market accounts that allow
check writing, automated teller machine cards, and
check cards. Chart 3 shows the changes in the composi-
tion of household liquid assets during the 1990s. In
1990, bank deposits constituted 38 percent of house-
holds’ liquid assets versus 11 percent for mutual funds
and money market funds; at year-end 1998, the shares
were nearly even. While some of the change in compo-
sition can be explained by rising mutual fund share
prices, other measures indicate a shifting preference for
mutual funds as a savings vehicle. For example, data
from the Investment Company Institute show that net
inflows into mutual funds have exceeded net increases
in insured institution deposit accounts in all but three
quarters during this economic expansion. Moreover, the
first quarter of 1999 marked the seventeenth consecu-
tive quarter that mutual fund inflows outstripped
increases in deposits for all FDIC-insured institutions.
Credit Unions. In addition to mutual funds, credit
unions also are formidable competitors for consumer
savings. Membership in credit unions has increased
more than 20 percent over the past decade, while
deposits and share accounts have risen by over 90 per-
Households Are Holding a Greater Share of Liquid Assets in Mutual Funds
1990 1998
U.S. Government
Securities
7%
Equities, Bonds,
and
Commercial
Paper 44%
Money Market
Fund Shares
5%
Mutual Fund
Shares
6%
Bank Deposits
(excl. Foreign)
38%
Money Market
Mutual Fund
Fund Shares
Shares
7%
22%
Equities, Bonds,
Bank Deposits
and Commercial
(excl. Foreign)
Paper 35%
30%
U.S. Government
Securities
6%
Source: Federal Reserve Board
Atlanta Regional Outlook 12 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
cent.
4
Credit unions also offer federal insurance on share
accounts as well as competitive rates on comparable
deposit-type vehicles relative to other types of financial
institutions. For example, according to information from
the National Credit Union Association, on average,
credit unions have offered rates on one-year share cer-
tificates in excess of one-year bank certificates of
deposit in nine of the past ten years. As shown in Chart
4, average rates paid by credit unions on one-year share
certificates over the 12 months ending May 1999 were
consistently higher than rates offered by banks or thrifts
and approached retail rates offered by brokerages.
Demographic Shifts
Some analysts maintain that rural community banks
face additional funding challenges as a result of demo-
graphic shifts. According to the Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City, rural bankers perceive that sluggish
deposit growth is at least partially attributable to the
migration of deposits to cities as urban-dwelling heirs
of rural depositors relocate funds. While evidence for
this deposit migration remains anecdotal, economists at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City indicate that
the demographic shift is still in process, and its full
effect may not be felt for some time. Further challeng-
ing deposit growth for banks, additional evidence sug-
gests that urban dwellers tend to place less of their
4
Center for Credit Union Research, “Credit Union FAQ,” http://
wiscinfo.doit.wisc.edu/bschool/cu/cufaq.html.
CHART 4
Bank One-Year CD Rates Have Recently Lagged
Those Offered by Competitors
Average Retail Rates Offered for
One-Year Certificates (%)
6.0
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
Thrifts
Credit Unions
Banks
Brokerages
Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May
’98 ’98 ’98 ’98 ’98 ’98 ’98 ’99 ’99 ’99 ’99 ’99
Sources: BanxQuote and Bank Rate Monitor
savings in banks than their rural counterparts do.
5
This
trend poses additional consequences for bank deposits
as rural populations migrate to suburban areas.
Community Bank Funding Trends
Community banks traditionally rely more heavily upon
core deposit funding than larger banks do. For example,
Chart 5 (next page) shows that 72 percent of aggregate
community bank assets were funded with core deposits
at year-end 1998. In contrast, 43 percent of aggregate
large bank assets at year-end 1998 were funded with core
deposits. This difference in liability structures reflects
large banks’ broader use of wholesale funding alterna-
tives and greater access to capital markets instruments.
While large banks have respond-
ed to factors influencing deposit
growth by making greater use of
alternative funding sources,
funding options for community
banks tend to be more limited.
Because of high fixed costs, community banks may find
it more difficult than larger institutions to make cost-
effective use of capital market instruments such as secu-
ritizations or public debt and equity offerings (see
“Industry Consolidation Presents Unique Risks and
Challenges for Community Banks,” Regional Outlook,
Fourth Quarter 1998, for a discussion of additional non-
deposit funding sources for community banks).
The need to augment lagging deposit growth to meet
loan demand has led many community banks to acquire
more noncore funds. These funds include time deposits
greater than $100,000, borrowings, foreign deposits,
brokered deposits, and demand notes. At year-end 1998,
nearly 75 percent of community banks held noncore lia-
bilities representing 10 percent or more of total liabili-
ties. As recently as 1993, only 42 percent of community
banks exceeded that threshold. Moreover, over the same
five-year period, the ratio of core deposits (defined here
as total deposits less time deposits greater than
$100,000 and brokered deposits) to total deposits for all
community banks declined each quarter.
5
William R. Keeton, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. “Are
Rural Banks Facing Increased Funding Pressures? Evidence from
Tenth District States.Economic Review, Second Quarter 1998, p. 56.
Also see “Regional Banking,Regional Outlook, Kansas City Edi-
tion, Second Quarter 1998, p. 24.
Atlanta Regional Outlook 13 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
CHART 5
Community Banks Relied More Heavily than Large Banks on Core Deposits* at Year-End 1998
Large Banks Community Banks
(total assets over $1 billion)
(total assets under $1 billion)
* Core deposits include total domestic deposits less time deposits greater than $100,000 and brokered deposits issued in denominations of less than $100,000.
Source: Bank Call Reports (Research Information System)
Other
Domestic
Deposits
7%
Borrowings
16%
Other
Liabilities
12%
Equity and
Subordinated
Debt
9%
Core
Deposits
43%
Foreign
Deposits
13%
Other Domestic
Deposits
11%
Borrowings
6%
Other
Liabilities
1%
Equity and
Subordinated Debt
10%
Core
Deposits
72%
As community banks’ use of noncore funds has
increased, they are relying more on federal funds pur-
chased, repurchase agreements, other borrowings,
demand notes, and mortgages (collectively referred to
as borrowings). After adjusting for mergers, borrowings
funded 12 percent of new community bank asset growth
from 1992 through 1998—three times more than the
percentage of new asset growth funded by borrowings
from 1985 to 1990. Possibly reflecting a shift toward
greater acceptance of wholesale funding by community
bankers, growth in borrowings has been largely driven
by increased use of nonovernight borrowings,
6
which
have become the dominant form of borrowings at com-
munity banks. As shown in Chart 6, the proportion of
community banks reporting nonovernight borrowings
has doubled in the 1990s. This trend coincides with
growing community bank membership in the Federal
Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system and increasing use of
FHLB borrowings.
Federal Home Loan Bank Membership
Over the past five years, community banks have sub-
stantially increased their membership and participation
in the FHLB system. According to data from the Feder-
al Housing Finance Board, for the five-year period
ending in 1998, the percentage of FDIC-insured com-
munity banks that were members of the FHLB more
than doubled to 50 percent. Over the same period, FHLB
advances outstanding for community banks grew by
more than 50 percent to $47 billion. At year-end 1998,
6
Nonovernight borrowings are defined here as all borrowings other
than federal funds purchased and repurchase agreements.
FHLB advances represented approximately 80 percent
of all nonovernight borrowings for community banks.
Analysts have cited a number of reasons why communi-
ty banks are joining the FHLB system. Community
banks are using FHLB advances to meet contingent li-
quidity needs, manage interest rate risk, fund new asset
growth, and leverage capital to maintain or boost
returns on equity. Recent surveys indicate that FHLB
advances will continue to have a role in community
bank liability management. Almost one-half of respon-
dents to Grant Thornton’s 1999 Annual Survey of
Community Bank Executives considered FHLB bor-
rowings an important funding source over the next three
years, and 43 percent plan to increase the use of FHLB
advances in 1999. Similarly, the American Bankers
Association’s 1999 Community Bank Competitiveness
CHART 6
’97
0
10
20
30
40
’84 ’85 ’86 ’87 ’88 ’89 ’90 ’91 ’92 ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’98
The Percentage of Community Banks Reporting
Nonovernight Borrowings* Is Rising
Community Banks
Reporting Nonovernight
Borrowings (%)
* Includes all borrowings other than federal funds purchased and repurchase
agreements
Source: Bank Call Reports (FDIC Research Information System)
Atlanta Regional Outlook 14 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
Survey
7
reported that FHLB advances are the preferred
nontraditional funding product. In addition, legislative
changes enacted in third-quarter 1998 have eased mem-
bership requirements for banks with assets less than
$500 million, significantly increasing access to FHLB
advances for smaller banks in rural areas.
Implications of Funding Trends
for Community Banks
According to community banker opinion surveys, the
trend toward greater reliance on noncore or alternative
funding sources appears likely to continue. Grant
Thornton’s 1999 Annual Survey of Community Bank
Executives found that 75 percent of community bankers
expect funding with core deposits to be more difficult in
three years than it is today. Moreover, more than 20 per-
cent of community bankers responding to the American
Bankers Association’s 1999 Community Bank Compet-
itiveness Survey do not expect to derive the bulk of their
funding from deposits five years from now. Liability
management is an important aspect of a bank’s opera-
tions and a key driver of interest expense. Responses to
funding challenges will likely influence strategic busi-
ness decisions that shape the risk profiles of insured
institutions, particularly community banks that histori-
cally have relied more heavily upon core deposits to fund
asset growth and net interest income for profitability.
A fundamental challenge that confronts bank manage-
ment is the strategic response to the increased costs
associated with wholesale funding sources. As shown in
Chart 7, the reported interest costs of nondeposit fund-
ing alternatives, such as federal funds purchased and
repurchase agreements, subordinated notes, and FHLB
advances, have traditionally exceeded the interest cost
of core deposits for commercial banks. Therefore, as
institutions that have typically relied upon core deposits
increase the use of nondeposit sources, funding costs
will likely rise relative to asset yields. As a result, net
interest margins (NIMs) may be pressured.
To some extent bank managers may be able to offset the
higher interest costs of wholesale funding strategy by
improving efficiency through greater management of
overhead expenses and increases in noninterest income.
However, community banks face challenges to their
ability to increase noninterest income (see “Industry
Consolidation Presents Unique Risks and Challenges
CHART 7
Subordinated Debt
FHLB Advances
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98
Reported Interest Cost for Commercial Banks (%)
Nondeposit Alternatives Have Typically Cost
More than Core Deposits
Federal Funds
Core Deposits*
* Core deposit costs equal interest expense on total deposits minus time deposits
greater than $100,000 divided by average total deposits minus average time
deposits greater than $100,000.
Sources: Bank Call Reports (FDIC Research Information System) and Federal
Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System Annual Reports
for Community Banks,” Regional Outlook, Fourth
Quarter 1998), and there are limits to cost cutting. If
banks are unable to fully offset higher funding costs
with increases in noninterest income or reductions in
noninterest expenses, overall profitability could suffer.
Community bankers in the upper Midwest expressed
this concern in a 1998 survey conducted by The Feder-
al Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, which found that 57
percent of respondents expect the shift away from
deposit funding to decrease bank profitability.
8
As bank
managers search for additional ways to offset the rela-
tive rise in funding costs, they may be tempted to
increase asset yields by pursuing additional portfolio
risk, in the form of credit or market risk, to generate
higher asset yields.
Funding challenges also could alter the liquidity and
interest rate risk positions of community banks. The rel-
ative complexity and volatility of some nondeposit
sources require greater expertise and attention to asset-
liability policies and practices to avoid unexpected
liquidity strains or exposures to changing interest rate
environments. Strategies that result in the pledging of
liquid assets, overreliance on purchased funds, or con-
centrations in price-sensitive long-term assets could
adversely affect a bank’s relative liquidity or interest
rate risk position. Moreover, interest rate risk manage-
ment can be further challenged by the complexity of
nondeposit funding sources. For instance, some FHLB
advances may contain embedded options that required
greater expertise and attention to policies and practices
that, if not managed properly, could lead to undesirable
outcomes if interest rates change adversely.
7
ABA Banking Journal, February 1999, p. 30.
8
Fedgazette, July 1998, p. 2.
Atlanta Regional Outlook 15 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
Differences between Community Banks with
High and Low Levels of Core Deposit Funding
To evaluate how a shift from a core deposit funding
strategy might change the profile of a community bank,
TABLE 1
performance and condition measures for community
banks that rely most heavily on core deposits were con-
trasted with those that are least reliant on core deposit
funding. Table 1 compares 1998 funding, earnings, and
asset performance measures for these community bank
Comparison of Banks with High and Low Levels of Core Deposit Funding
ALL COMMUNITY BANK COMMUNITY BANK
COMMUNITY BANKS
1
AGRICULTURAL LENDERS
2
COMMERCIAL LENDERS
3
HIGH CORE LOW CORE HIGH CORE LOW CORE HIGH CORE LOW CORE
DEPOSIT DEPOSIT DEPOSIT DEPOSIT DEPOSIT DEPOSIT
FUNDING
4
FUNDING
4
FUNDING
FUNDING FUNDING FUNDING
Selected Aggregate Measures
NUMBER OF
BANKS IN GROUP 405 405 106 51 126 185
M
EDIAN TOTAL ASSETS ($000S) 46,244 118,358 23,274 58,223 69,479 130,923
M
EMBERS OF FHLB (%) 32.10 49.38 17.92 47.06 38.89 50.81
H
AVE OUTSTANDING FHLB ADVANCES (%) 7.65 40.25 6.60 45.10 7.14 38.38
Selected Median Liquidity and Funding Measures (%)
1998 GROWTH IN TOTAL ASSETS 9.02 11.16 5.96 6.42 12.75 18.50
1998 G
ROWTH IN TOTAL DEPOSITS 9.74 8.79 6.40 5.31 13.56 11.93
1998 G
ROWTH IN BORROWINGS (50.00) 28.62 (64.49) 31.85 (51.87) 42.87
1998 G
ROWTH IN TOTAL EQUITY CAPITAL 5.93 7.53 3.46 5.39 9.94 8.85
T
OTAL DEPOSITS-TO-TOTAL ASSETS RATIO 91.04 75.68 90.35 80.22 91.23 77.94
C
ORE DEPOSITS-TO-TOTAL ASSETS RATI O 87.29 53.87 87.10 55.81 87.21 54.03
B
ORROWINGS TO TOTAL ASSETS RATIO 0 9.58 0 4.15 0 8.55
T
OTAL EQUITY CAPITAL TO TOTAL ASSETS RATIO 8.25 10.24 9.00 10.09 7.74 10.16
Selected Median Performance Ratios (%)
RETURN ON EQUITY 12.65 10.19 11.10 10.93 14.49 9.52
R
ETURN ON ASSETS 1.07 1.04 1.01 1.19 1.10 0.92
N
ET INTEREST MARGIN 4.76 4.03 4.51 3.98 5.25 4.22
G
ROSS EARNING ASSET YIELD
5
8.17 8.02 8.24 7.89 8.45 8.26
C
OST OF FUNDING EARNING ASSETS
6
3.33 4.07 3.74 4.05 3.21 4.05
N
ONINTEREST INCOME TO AVERAGE ASSETS 0.76 0.61 0.59 0.44 1.01 0.64
N
ONINTEREST EXPENSE TO AVERAGE ASSETS 3.49 2.90 3.23 2.40 3.99 3.12
E
FFICIENCY RATIO
7
69.01 63.68 68.59 57.48 68.99 67.00
Selected Median Credit Quality Measures (%)
NONPERFORMING ASSETS TO TOTAL ASSETS RATIO 0.39 0.44 0.40 0.51 0.46 0.61
N
ONCURRENT LOANS TO TOTAL LOANS RATIO 0.53 0.72 0.53 1.02 0.52 0.77
N
ET LOAN CHARGE-OFF RATIO 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.14 0.11
1998 G
ROWTH IN NONPERFORMING ASSETS (9.10) 7.50 10.57 11.79 (17.32) 23.97
1998 G
ROWTH IN NET LOAN LOSSES 6.09 10.24 (3.90) 23.73 9.59 30.64
1
Community banks are banks with $1 billion or less in total assets.
2
Agricultural lenders are banks with 25 percent or more of assets in agricultural real estate loans or agricul-
tural production loans.
3
Commercial lenders are banks with 25 percent or more of assets in commercial and commercial real estate loans.
4
High core deposit funding group is composed of community banks with core deposits-to-assets ratios in the top 5
percent of all community banks, excluding those with equity-to-assets ratios in excess of 25 percent. The low core
deposit funding group is composed of community banks with core deposits-to-assets ratios in the bottom 5 percent
of all community banks.
5
Gross earning asset yield equals interest income divided by average earning assets.
6
Cost of funding earning assets equals interest expense divided by average earning assets.
7
Efficiency ratio equals noninterest expense divided by the sum of net interest and noninterest income.
FHLB = Federal Home Loan Bank
Sources: Bank Call Reports (Research Information System); Federal Housing Finance Board
Atlanta Regional Outlook 16 Third Quarter 1999
In Focus This Quarter
groups. High core deposit funders are defined as those
community banks with core deposit-to-asset ratios in
the top 5 percent of all community banks at year-end
1998. Low core deposit funders are those community
banks with a core deposit-to-asset ratio in the bottom 5
percent.
9
A similar comparison is included for agricul-
tural banks and commercial lending specialists, which
combined make up roughly 60 percent of each of the
total community bank funding groups.
This comparison reveals several differences. First, a
tradeoff between heavy reliance on core funding and
asset growth is evident. Median measures for the groups
indicate that the typical bank that relies less on core
deposit funding is larger and growing faster than the
typical bank in the high core funding group. Second,
less core deposit funding appears to be associated with
a lower NIM, primarily the result of higher funding
costs. However, overall profitability
is similar between the groups
mainly because of a lower ratio
of overhead expenses to aver-
age assets for the low core
funders. These characteris-
tics are also evident across
the agricultural and com-
mercial specialists groups.
Asset quality indicators suggest that the low core fund-
ing groups may exhibit greater credit risk. Although
higher asset yields resulting from increased portfolio
risk are not evident, median measures for each low core
funding group reflect higher levels of noncurrent loans
and higher growth in nonperforming assets and net loan
losses relative to its high core funding group counter-
9
These groups exclude community banks with equity-to-asset ratios
greater than 25 percent.
part. For example, the median growth in nonperforming
assets for commercial lending specialists with less
reliance upon core deposits was nearly 24 percent in
1998 versus a 17 percent decline for the high core fund-
ing group.
Summary and Conclusions
Commercial banks have been experiencing a long-term
trend toward lower deposit funding of loans and assets.
Increasing competition among banks and from thrifts,
nonbanks, and higher-yielding investment alternatives
has made it more difficult and expensive for some
banks to attract deposits in step with asset growth.
While some nondeposit funding alternatives may pro-
vide a stable source of funds for insured institutions
(especially those located in areas characterized by
aggressive competition and slow deposit growth), better
matching of asset cash flows, and greater flexibility in
asset-liability management, they also may pose certain
risks. To some extent community banks may be able to
manage noninterest expense and noninterest income to
offset the relative increase in interest expense incurred
to acquire nondeposit funding sources. However, if
overall profitability suffers, banks may be tempted to
pursue additional portfolio risk to generate higher off-
setting asset yields. As a result, liability management
may become more challenging for community banks
that have historically relied upon deposits for funding
and net interest revenues for profitability. In addition,
the complexity of some nondeposit funding sources
requires greater expertise and attention to policies and
practices to avoid unexpected liquidity strains or expo-
sures to changing interest rate environments.
Allen Puwalski, Senior Financial Analyst
Brian Kenner, Financial Analyst
Atlanta Regional Outlook 17 Third Quarter 1999
Regional Perspectives
Regional Perspectives
Sustained agricultural and industrial commodity price weakness could adversely affect the Atlanta Region.
Hogs, soybeans, and cotton are among the Region’s farm commodities that have witnessed significant price
pressures in recent years.
In the industrial markets, steel, textiles and apparel, and pulp and paper producers experienced the effects
of increased imports and weak export demand because of the strength of the dollar and the Asian economic
crisis.
The disparity between loan and deposit growth during this economic expansion has resulted in an increase
in borrowings at banks in the Region. Longer-term trends suggest that factors other than the business cycle
may be affecting bank funding.
Commodity Price Weakness Could Affect the Atlanta Region’s Economy
Price weakness in agricultural and industrial commodi-
ties markets is due to a number of factors, including low
inflationary expectations, overcapacity resulting from
excess investment, and curtailed global demand in the
wake of emerging-market crises. For further analysis, see
Falling Prices in Commodities and Manufacturing Pose
Continuing Risks to Credit Quality, page 3. If sustained,
commodity price weakness could adversely affect the
Atlanta Region’s economy, given the importance of agri-
culture and manufacturing in the Region.
Overall economic growth in the Atlanta Region remains
strong. In April 1999, employment in the Region was up
3.0 percent compared to the national increase of 2.3 per-
cent. However, most gains were occurring in larger met-
ropolitan areas, which have greater economic diversity.
Rural and smaller metropolitan areas—where many of
the industries facing price pressures are located—saw
less pronounced growth. Persistent price stagnation
could lead to further layoffs in manufacturing and
financial stress on the Region’s farmers, and could ulti-
mately affect credit quality.
that in the fourth quarter of 1998, nominal farm income
did rise, but this likely was the result of the approval of
an additional $6 billion in federal farm aid in October
1998.) Declines in agriculture income can have a ripple
effect on rural communities as farmers scale back con-
sumption and purchases of farm equipment. Long-term
price declines also could affect farmers’ ability to ser-
vice loans and ultimately could pressure farmland val-
ues, which are often used as collateral for loans. In the
Atlanta Region, hog farming, soybeans, and cotton, all
economically important sectors of agriculture, have
experienced price declines.
Hog farming has seen dramatic growth in the Atlanta
Region in recent years, with every state in the Region
CHART 1
The Nation’s Farm Income and Agriculture Prices
Have Moved Together in Recent Years
50
120
Farm Price Index (1990–92=100)
Farm Proprietors’ Income with
Inventory Valuation Adjustment
and Capital Consumption Adjustment
(Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate), right axis
Prices Received by Farmers:
All Farm Products, left axis
1Q
40
110
Farm Income ($ Billions)
45
115
Agricultural Prices Continue to Decline
Agriculture commodity prices have been declining
since 1996. In the first quarter of 1999, prices for all
farm products were down 5.2 percent from one year ear-
lier and were 21 percent below their peak in the third
105
100
95
90
2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q
4Q
1Q
2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q
quarter of 1996. According to Bureau of Economic
’96 ’96 ’96 ’96 ’97 ’97 ’97
’97
’98 ’98 ’98 ’98 ’99
Analysis data, this decline in agriculture prices has been
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Economic Analysis (Haver
Analytics)
paralleled by a drop in farm income (Chart 1). (Note
Atlanta Regional Outlook 18 Third Quarter 1999
35
30
25
20
Regional Perspectives
now engaged in the industry. The industry is most heav-
ily concentrated in North Carolina, which accounted
for 15.7 percent of the nation’s hog and pig inventory in
1997; North Carolina inventories have tripled over the
past 10 years, according to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA).
Considerable media attention was given to the dramatic
hog price declines in late 1998. In December, hog prices
stood at $13.79/cwt,
1
less than half the level at the end
of the third quarter of 1998 and the lowest level in more
than three decades. Most analysts give hog farmers a
break-even price of around $35/cwt. The dip has been
transitory, however, as prices rebounded to nearly
$37/cwt by May 1999. The recent volatility in hog
prices likely was an aberration, as the pork industry was
coming off a period of high production while slaughter-
house capacity was at low levels and thus unable to
process pigs quickly. In that case, the recent sharp drop
and recovery in prices, though causing short-term pain
for the industry, may not affect hog farmers in the
future.
Despite the recent rebound, hog prices remain well
below the year-ago level and below the long-term trend
(Chart 2). According to data from the Wall Street Jour-
nal, since July 1988, the trend in hog prices has been
slightly negative. Many analysts attribute the downward
trend to structural changes in the industry. Technologi-
cal and organizational (vertical integration and con-
tracting) changes have resulted in a trend toward larger
farms and greater specialization. Economies of scale
1
cwt = 100 pounds.
CHART 2
Hog Prices Rebound but Remain
that the larger farms enjoy have placed downward pres-
sure on hog prices over the long term and may make it
increasingly difficult for smaller producers to compete.
Recent short-term price declines may have exacerbated
competitive pressures on smaller producers.
In recent years, supply and demand shifts have resulted
in downward pressure on soybean prices. The United
States and other nations, such as Brazil, have seen
bumper crops, while the crisis in Asia has crimped
demand. In May 1999, soybean prices fell to
$4.53/bushel (Chart 3), down nearly 30 percent from
one year earlier to their lowest level in more than 20
years. According to the USDA, U.S. soybean production
in 1999 may reach record levels, which may offset any
improvement in Asian demand and lead to continued
price weakness. The USDA forecasts soybean prices to
level off at $4.35/bushel in 2000. In the longer term,
U.S. farmers may face further global competition as for-
eign acreage and yields climb. In April 1999, a buyers’
group in North Carolina contracted to purchase 75,000
tons of soybeans from Brazil for use as feed. According
to a recent Wall Street Journal article, Brazil, seeing
surging agricultural exports because of its recently
devalued currency, may be able to open several million
acres of land for soybean farming in its western savan-
na. The Atlanta Region’s soybean production is concen-
trated near coastal areas, particularly in eastern portions
of the Carolinas.
Price weakness persists in the cotton market. In May
1999, the price of cotton was 56 cents/lb., down nearly 14
percent from one year earlier and down nearly 50 percent
from its previous peak in the summer of 1995 (Chart 3).
CHART 3
Soybean and Cotton Prices Continue to Decline
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
$50
$60
$70
Hog Price: Iowa–South Minnesota Avg
($/cwt)
Hog Price
Trend: 1988–1999
May
’99
Jul
’88
Jul
’89
Jul
’90
Jul
’91
Jul
’92
Jul
’93
Jul
’94
Jul
’95
Jul
’96
Jul
’97
Jul
’98
Below Long-Term Trend
Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan May
’95 ’95 ’96 ’96 ’97 ’97 ’98 ’98 ’99 ’99
Cotton Price (cents/lb)
Soybean Price ($/bu)
Price: Cotton, 1-1/16", Avg 7 Mkts (cents/lb)
Price: Soybeans, #1 Yellow: Central IL ($/bu)
120
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Source: Wall Street Journal (Haver Analytics)
Source: Wall Street Journal, Journal of Commerce (Haver Analytics)
Atlanta Regional Outlook 19 Third Quarter 1999
Regional Perspectives
Despite weak prices that are near or at the break-even
CHART 4
point, the USDA anticipates that farmers nationwide will
Industrial Commodity Prices Remain Below 1995
continue to shift into cotton as competing crops are
Peaks, Particularly in the Steel Industry
expected to bring lower prices. Cotton farming in the
120
Atlanta Region exists in all states except West Virginia,
with production concentrated in Alabama, Georgia, and
North Carolina. In 1998, poor weather and low prices
aggravated the financial situation of many farmers in the
Region, particularly in South Georgia.
Potential implications for insured institutions will
Price Index, 1995/01=100
110
100
90
80
70
60
Paper and Allied Products
Textiles
Scrap Steel
depend on the magnitude and duration of the price
declines in agriculture. If recent price declines prove to
be transitory, many farmers may be able to meet current
obligations by placing crops under marketing loans or
having lenders capitalize interest on debt, according to
a recent report from the College of Agricultural, Con-
sumer, and Environmental Sciences at the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. However, if the
nation’s agricultural sector has entered a prolonged peri-
od of price stagnation, especially if it is accompanied by
declines in farm property values, farm credit quality
could deteriorate. In the Atlanta Region, agricultural
credit risk is most heavily concentrated in Georgia,
where 28 of the Region’s 39 agriculture banks, with
$1.6 billion in assets, are located. (For a detailed dis-
cussion of agriculture in the Atlanta Region, see Atlanta
Regional Outlook, First Quarter 1998.)
Industrial Commodity Prices Are Also Declining
A strong U.S. dollar and economic and financial turmoil
overseas have depressed prices for several key industrial
commodities produced in the Atlanta Region. Many
Asian and Latin American nations are in a lingering
recession that has depressed con-
sumption and may have created a
dependence on export trade as a
means of recovery. The U.S. econo-
my is among the few displaying
strong growth, resulting in a severe
and growing imbalance between
imports and exports in the steel, tex-
tile and apparel, and paper and allied products markets.
The American steel industry was restructured in the
1980s, and as a result of major capital investments, pro-
ductivity was enhanced, but thousands of jobs were lost.
The steel industry is now experiencing a challenge from
foreign imports. Recently, steel imports reached record
levels, and prices have declined sharply (see Chart 4).
U.S. manufacturers claim profits have suffered as they
50
Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan May
’95 ’95 ’96 ’96 ’97 ’97 ’98 ’98 ’99 ’99
Source: Journal of Commerce, Department of Labor (Haver Analytics)
compete with imports sold at prices well below the cost
of production. According to Curtis H. Barnette, presi-
dent and chief executive officer of Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, the surge in steel imports has caused over
10,000 layoffs and an increase in the number of steel
laborers working reduced hours or receiving reduced
pay incentives. The growing trade imbalance within the
industry has resulted in substantial production cuts, lost
or cancelled orders, and significant price declines.
Although the volume of imported steel has dropped
slightly in recent months, the levels remain well above
those prior to the collapse of many Asian economies,
and industry recovery is expected to be slow.
Weirton Steel, West Virginia’s second largest private
employer, laid off about 25 percent of its workforce
(1,000 workers) last Christmas as a result of increasing
losses. The company has sustained $41.5 million in
losses since steel imports began flooding U.S. markets.
However, the Associated Press reported that increased
demand for tin-plated steel in recent months has
brought about the recall of nearly half the displaced
workers. Some steel producers in Alabama and North
Carolina have adopted “no layoff ” policies to preserve
loyalty and motivate their workforce; however, such
practices may have resulted in lower wages through the
reduction or elimination of bonuses and overtime.
Weekly wage rates generally have declined in Alabama,
Georgia, Virginia, and West Virginia over year-ago lev-
els, and average weekly work hours of steelworkers in
the Atlanta Region have declined in all states, with the
sharpest declines occurring in Virginia and West Vir-
ginia. Fewer work hours and lower wages may increase
the likelihood that consumer credit quality in these
areas will deteriorate.
Foreign economic turmoil has hastened the ongoing
secular decline in the textile and apparel industries. The
Atlanta Regional Outlook 20 Thir
d Quarter 1999
Regional Perspectives
Asian crisis has been particularly troublesome for
apparel producers, as lower incomes and currency
depreciation have left Asian consumers with less money
to purchase U.S. merchandise. Currency depreciation
also has led to deep discounting by Asian producers in
an effort to keep their factories operating. The Journal
of Commerce reported that U.S. exporters expected
sales to Japan to exceed $1 billion in 1998, but instead
sales declined nearly 30 percent to $675 million, of
which $424 million was attributed to the apparel indus-
try. The U.S. Department of Labor reported that appar-
el prices fell 1.5 percent last year, leading U.S.
manufacturers to move some operations to Mexico and
the Caribbean, where labor is less expensive.
The Atlanta Region produces nearly 23 percent of all
apparel manufactured in the United States, with North
Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama having the largest
concentration of apparel-related employment. (For a
detailed discussion of the textiles and apparel industries
in the Atlanta Region, see Atlanta Regional Outlook,
Second Quarter 1998.) Apparel jobs are leaving Geor-
gia faster than any other state in the South, according to
the Atlanta Business Chronicle. Within the past year,
plant closings and layoffs have cost nearly 1,500 jobs in
both Georgia and Alabama, as well as several hundred
in North Carolina. Displaced workers throughout the
Region are increasingly seeking public assistance, as
their efforts to find work have resulted in lower paying
jobs, according to Harris Ryanor, southern regional
director of the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and
Textile Employees in Union City, Georgia.
While the Asian crisis has resulted in decreased exports
for most commodities, strong domestic demand has
provided some measure of stability to certain sectors of
the textile industry. Textile manufacturers in the Atlanta
Region account for over 72 percent of all textile jobs in
the nation. A strong housing market has increased sales
for carpet and fabrics used in home furnishings and has
kept prices relatively stable. A slowdown in home sales
and construction could disrupt this demand, however.
Since 1995, nearly 44,000 jobs in the Atlanta Region
have been eliminated in the textile industry. North Car-
olina, Georgia, and South Carolina have the highest
concentration of industry workers. Textile job losses
have been especially high in the production of synthet-
ic fabrics, where Asian competition has been strongest.
Prices of some fabric categories have declined by as
much as 40 percent. All states within the Region have
seen an increase in job losses in the textile industry;
however, the Carolinas have experienced the greatest
number of layoffs.
Weakness in the Asian and Latin American economies
has reduced demand for paper and allied products, which
has driven down prices.
Exports of pulp and paper
to Asia have deteriorated in
recent years, partly because
of weaker currencies rela-
tive to the U.S. dollar but
also because of structural
changes brought about by
increased automation and
modernization of paper mills throughout the world.
Greater efficiency and lower demand have resulted in
moderately high pulp inventory levels. Low-cost paper
mills, particularly in Asian countries, are reducing over-
capacity by offering products in U.S. markets at reduced
prices, making it difficult for U.S. companies to compete.
The U.S. Industry and Trade Outlook ’99 reports that
pulp exports represented slightly less than 55 percent of
the volume of all U.S. market pulp shipments in 1998—
the lowest market share this decade. The pulp and paper
industry is vital to many areas of the Atlanta Region, with
Georgia and Alabama having the highest exposure. As a
result of global pressures, plant shutdowns and layoffs
have become common throughout the Region. (For a
detailed discussion of the pulp and paper industry in the
Atlanta Region, see Atlanta Regional Outlook, Third
Quarter 1998.) Some analysts expect the pulp market to
start rebounding soon because of the slow improvement
in economic conditions in Asia.
Atlanta Regional Outlook 21 Third Quarter 1999
Regional Perspectives
Funding Issues Affect Commercial Banks in the Atlanta Region
Bank funding has changed considerably in the 1990s
(see Shifting Funding Trends Pose Challenges for
Community Banks, page 11). Change has been driven,
in part, by cyclical factors since the current economic
expansion began in 1992, but there are differences in
the way the industry is funded when compared with pre-
vious expansions. Most notably, loan growth has
increased relative to deposit growth more than in past
cycles. This situation has contributed to a shift away
from traditional core
2
deposits toward alternative fund-
ing sources such as noncore
3
deposits and borrowings.
4
This analysis examines funding changes at banks in the
Atlanta Region, the factors driving those changes, and
potential risks.
Deposits have declined steadily as a percentage of
assets at commercial banks in the Atlanta Region since
the current economic expansion began in 1992 (see
Chart 5). This trend has been consistent across large and
small banks. It is not uncommon for loan demand to
outstrip deposit growth during cyclical expansions, but,
as Chart 5 shows, such a sharp and sustained decline in
2
Core deposits include all transaction, savings, and money market
deposits, as well as time deposits less than $100,000. Core deposits typ-
ically are viewed as a stable source of funding for insured institutions.
3
Noncore deposits include time deposits over $100,000, foreign
deposits, and deposits placed through a broker. These are considered
more volatile than core deposits.
4
Borrowings include federal funds purchased, securities sold under
agreements to repurchase, demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury,
mortgages and capitalized lease obligations, and any other borrowed
money.
CHART 5
Deposit Funding at Atlanta Region Commercial
Banks Has Fallen during This Economic
Expansion
Deposits to Assets
Source: Bank Call Reports
60%
70%
80%
90%
Commercial Banks
with Assets over
$1 Billion
Down 4
Percentage Points
Down 14
Percentage Points
’84 ’86 ’88 ’90 ’92 ’94 ’96 ’98
Commercial Banks
with Assets under
$1 Billion
Recession
deposits relative to assets did not occur during the pre-
vious expansion in the 1980s. This shift suggests that
factors other than the business cycle are influencing
bank funding decisions. As discussed below, the move
from deposits to borrowings appears to be occurring
both from necessity, as competition from nonbank
financial services providers has slowed bank deposit
growth, and opportunity, as funding alternatives avail-
able to banks have increased.
Competition from Nonbank Financial Services
Providers Is Affecting Insured Institution
Deposit Growth
The slowdown in bank deposit growth has resulted, in
part, from increased competition from nonbank finan-
cial services providers, such as mutual funds and, to a
lesser extent, credit unions. Unquestionably, high
returns in the financial markets have helped the mutual
fund industry garner a substantial and growing share of
each household dollar in the 1990s. Fund flow data sug-
gest that there has been a demographic shift from a
“saver” to an “investor” focus in recent years, as indi-
viduals are placing a larger share of their financial
assets in the capital markets rather than in insured bank
deposits.
The Investment Company Institute
5
(ICI) reports that
net new cash flow into mutual funds (equity, bond, and
money market funds) reached a record $477 billion in
1998, surpassing the previous record of $374 billion set
in 1997. Moreover, during the five-year period from
1994 to 1998, nearly $1.5 trillion of new money flowed
into mutual funds, compared with only $300 billion a
decade earlier from 1984 to 1988 (a 400 percent
increase). Mutual fund penetration also has grown
steadily, as 44 percent of all U.S. households held mutu-
al fund investments in 1998 compared with 24 percent
10 years earlier. It is likely that growth in the mutual
fund sector, to some extent, is coming at the expense of
the banking industry. Banks in the Atlanta Region may
face even stronger competition with mutual funds rela-
tive to their out-of-region peers, as ICI demographic
statistics show the nation’s highest concentration of
mutual fund ownership to be in the southern states.
5
The Investment Company Institute, based in Washington, D.C., is
the national association of the mutual fund investment industry.
Atlanta Regional Outlook 22 Third Quarter 1999
Regional Perspectives
Nonbank financial services providers have been suc-
cessful in capturing market share during the 1990s.
Chart 6 shows, at the national level, the growth in total
funds held by various financial services providers
(banks and thrifts, mutual funds, and credit unions)
from 1991 to 1998, as reported in the Federal Reserve
Board’s Flow of Funds data. The chart illustrates how
successful insured institution competitors have been in
increasing their share of the nation’s financial assets.
Equity and bond mutual funds have been the big win-
ners; their asset volume has grown nearly fivefold since
1991. Meanwhile, money market mutual fund assets
(perhaps the closest substitute to insured institution core
deposits) have risen by 150 percent since 1991. In fact,
money market funds took in more new investment dol-
lars ($235 billion) than bond and equity funds com-
bined in 1998. (The increased flow into money market
mutual funds in 1998 may have been a “flight to quali-
ty” surrounding the equity and bond market declines
that occurred in the third quarter.)
Credit union deposits also have grown at a faster rate
than bank deposits in the 1990s. Chart 6 shows that
credit union deposits grew nearly 60 percent from 1991
to 1998, compared with only 14 percent for bank and
thrift deposits. As indicated by the bold line on Chart 6,
slow deposit growth has led insured institutions to rely
increasingly on borrowings to meet funding needs since
1992. Regional Flow of Funds data are not available,
but Call Report data suggest that deposit and borrow-
ing trends at insured institutions in the Atlanta Region
are similar to the national trends.
The mutual fund industry now holds the largest share of
financial assets. Chart 7 presents the Federal Reserve
CHART 6
Growth of Insured Institution Deposits Lags
Competition and Leads to Increased Borrowings
Index
500
450
471
Bond & Equity
Mutual Funds
400
350
Insured Institution
328
Borrowings
300
Mone
y Market
249
250
Mutual Funds
200
Credit Union
150
158
Deposits
114
Insured Institution
100
Domestic Deposits
50
Note: Insured institutions include U.S.-chartered commercial banks, savings and
loan associations, mutual savings banks, and federal savings banks
Source: FRB Board of Governors, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States
1991 Stock = 100
’91 ’92 ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98
Board’s Flow of Funds data in dollars rather than as an
index. As seen in the chart, insured institutions were
losing deposit volume to competitors from 1991 until
about 1994 (consistent with the 14 percent increase in
total deposits from 1991 to 1998 shown in the previous
chart). That equates to an average annual growth of 1.85
percent, which was less than the average interest being
credited on deposits over that period. Chart 7 also shows
that dollars held by the mutual fund industry actually
eclipsed total bank and thrift deposits in 1996 and that
the gap has continued to widen. Finally, it is important
to note that credit union deposits, despite their strong
growth in recent years, remain nominal relative to total
deposits held by banks and thrifts.
Bank Funding Has Diversified as More
Alternatives Have Become Available
Consistent with the national trend, banks in the Atlanta
Region are relying more on borrowings to meet their
funding needs. Chart 8 (next page) breaks down each
new dollar of funding raised by commercial banks in the
Region in 1998 into its components—core deposits,
noncore deposits, borrowings, and equity—and com-
pares that to the composition of new funds in 1988. Bor-
rowings represented a much larger share of new funds
in 1998 than in 1988 at both large and small banks in the
Region. The increase in borrowings primarily offset a
decline in large time deposits at both groups of banks,
although large time deposits still make up the bulk of
community bank noncore funding in the Region. Both
groups, meanwhile, funded a larger portion of their
asset growth with equity rather than interest-bearing lia-
bilities in 1998 than in 1988, which is consistent with
CHART 7
Note: Insured institutions include U.S.-chartered commercial banks, savings
and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and federal savings banks.
Source: FRB Board of Governors, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States
Mutual Fund Dollars Outstrip
Insured Institution Deposits
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
$ Billions
1991
Insured Institution Domestic Deposits
Bond &
Equity Mutual Funds
Money Market Mutual Funds
All Mutual Funds
Credit Union Deposits
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Atlanta Regional Outlook 23 Third Quarter 1999
Regional Perspectives
CHART 8
Borrowings Increase as a Share of New Dollar
Funding at Atlanta Region Commercial Banks
Commercial Banks Commercial Banks
under $1 Billion over $1 Billion
1988
1998
1988
1998
Percent of New Funds
100
75
50
25
0
–25
Basis Points
Collapses; Long-Term Capital
Management Meltdown
Persian Gulf
War Begins
Mexican Peso Devaluation
Orange County Bankruptcy
Southeast Asian Economic
Crisis Begins
Recession
Trend
Negotiable 6-Month Bank CD Rate (Secondary Market)
Less 6-Month T-Bill Yield (Constant Maturity)
Equity
63% 61%
23%
10%
6%
19%
8% 10%
71% 71%
18% 13%
4%
8%
8% 9%
Borrowings
Noncore Deposits
Core Deposits
Source: Bank Call Reports
generally higher equity levels across the industry in the
1990s. It is important to note that, while core deposits
were essentially unchanged as a percent of new funding
in 1998 compared with 1988, core deposits have
declined relative to assets at both large and small banks
in the Region over the past 10 years.
The shift from large time deposits to borrowings seen in
Chart 8 may be related to an increase in the relative cost
of large time deposits over the past few years. Chart 9
shows that, at the national level, the spread between nego-
tiable (over $100,000) bank certificates of deposit and a
benchmark six-month U.S. Treasury bill has increased
since 1994. This is notable in that, according to a 1990
report by Citicorp entitled Interest Rate Spreads Analy-
sis: Managing and Reducing Rate Exposures, this
spread normally narrows during periods of recovery and
economic stability. As seen in the chart, the spread has
widened as expected during periods of economic uncer-
tainty, such as the recession in 1990 and the Russian bond
market collapse last year. But the fact that the spread has
been increasing despite stable economic growth may sig-
nal that banks relying on this type of noncore funding
must pay higher rates in response to increased competi-
tion from within the banking industry and from nonbank
financial services providers.
In addition to competitive factors, the industry’s shift
from deposits to borrowings may be a result of greater
access to borrowed funds. The increase in borrowings
by both large and small banks in the Atlanta Region has
coincided with commercial banks gaining access to the
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system with the pas-
sage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989. As shown in Chart 10, mem-
CHART 9
The Cost of Bank Certificates of Deposit Has
Increased Relative to Treasury Bill Yields during
This Economic Expansion
Russian Bond Market
’90 ’91 ’92 ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99
January
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data
(Monthly Averages)
bership in and advances from the FHLB system have
been popular among Atlanta Region banks. From 1993
(earliest available data) to 1998, the number of com-
mercial banks in the Atlanta Region that were members
of the FHLB system more than doubled, from 310 to
725. Moreover, outstanding advances increased more
than tenfold, from $2 billion to $23 billion, over that
period. FHLB penetration within the Region has grown
steadily as well, as membership has increased from one
in five banks (21 percent) in 1993 to nearly two of every
three banks (63 percent) in 1998. As of year-end 1998,
72 percent of banks in the Region with assets over $1
billion were FHLB members, with advances totaling
$20 billion. Community bank membership stood at 63
percent at year-end, and advances totaled $3.3 billion.
Community bank membership is likely to continue to
CHART 10
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) Membership
and Borrowings Have Increased at Atlanta Region
Commercial Banks
2,000
1,750
1,500
1,250
1,000
750
500
250
0
199519941993
FHLB Borrowings (Billions)
1996 1997 1998
Number and Percentage of Commercial
Banks in the Region That Are FHLB Members
Number of Commercial
Banks in the Region
$25
$20
$15
$10
$5
$0
21% 32% 39% 47% 55% 63%
Source: Bank Call Reports, Federal Housing Finance Board
Atlanta Regional Outlook 24 Third Quarter 1999
Regional Perspectives
grow, as the Federal Housing Finance Board amended
its membership requirements in 1998 to allow rural
banks with assets under $500 million to use combina-
tion business or farm properties on which a residence is
located to qualify for FHLB membership.
As the Region’s overall funding mix has diversified to
include more borrowings, the composition of core
deposits also has changed. Chart 11 compares the com-
position of new core deposits raised by community
banks in the Atlanta Region in 1998 with that of 1988.
Small time deposits, normally a staple of community
bank funding, fell sharply from 71 percent of new core
funds in 1988 to 27 percent in 1998. This decrease is
consistent with balance sheet data for community
banks in the Region, which show that small time
deposits have declined as a percentage of assets since
the late 1980s. This decline may be related to strong
growth in the mutual fund sector, as some consumers
might view mutual funds and small time deposits as
interchangeable products. Also, the fact that savings
and money market deposit accounts represent a larger
share of new core funds now than in 1988 may imply a
“liquidity preference” on the part of depositors to hold
nonmaturity deposits rather than time deposits, given
today’s low interest rate environment. Large banks
exhibit trends similar to those shown in Chart 11, the
only exception being that transaction accounts have
declined at large banks while representing a higher per-
CHART 11
New Core Funding Has Shifted away from
Small Time Deposits over the Past Decade
at Atlanta Region Community Banks
1988 1998
Small Time
Transaction
T
ransaction
(37%)
Deposits (27%)
(23%)
Savings and
Money Market
Deposit Accounts
Savings and
Small Time
(6%)
Money Market
Deposit Accounts
(36%)
Deposits (71%)
Note: Pie represents the composition of new core deposit flows during
the year and not the existing balance sheet composition. Community
banks are defined as insured commercial banks with assets less than
$1 billion and in operation at least three years. Large banks exhibit
similar trends.
Source: Bank Call Reports
centage of small bank core funding. Transaction
accounts, while free of interest costs, can be expensive
to maintain depending on transaction frequency, aver-
age account balance, and the channel (electronic, auto-
mated teller machine, or teller window) customers use
to make transactions.
The Community Bank Funding Challenge
Community banks may face greater funding challenges
than their larger counterparts. A 1998 survey conducted
by the American Bankers Association found that 4 of 10
community bankers reported core deposit growth lagging
loan demand. In addition, a 1999 Grant Thornton survey
showed that three of four community bankers believe
core funding will be a greater challenge three years from
now. Factors that could constrain community bank fund-
ing relative to large banks include limited access to the
capital markets, a smaller geographic presence from
which to solicit deposits, and slower rural population
growth. According to an article in the June 7, 1999,
American Banker, some small banks are soliciting out-
of-market deposits to meet loan demand because core
deposit growth is insufficient. This strategy could
increase interest costs, however, and because many com-
munity banks have limited fee income opportunities, they
are structurally more reliant than larger banks on spread
income from taking deposits and making loans.
Other factors that might affect community banks over the
longer term include convergence toward national, rather
than local, market pricing as a result of advances in tech-
nology. A number of community banks enjoy some pric-
ing power in their local markets, but consumers’ ability to
shop markets nationally and move money more quickly
at lower costs could pressure pricing spreads at certain
institutions. Ultimately, this could lead to more volatility
in core deposits, which currently fund 72 percent of the
Region’s community bank assets (compared with 54 per-
cent for large banks). A less stable core deposit base
would heighten the need for alternative funding sources,
which are limited for many small banks. In a recent issue
of SNL Securities’ Bank Investor, L. Bud Baker, CEO of
Wachovia Corporation, alluded to these concerns:
“…there is no such thing any longer as a core deposit…
you are going to be able to go on the Internet and find the
best price for your money…and you can move your
money with the punch of a button.
Atlanta Regional Outlook 25 Third Quarter 1999
Regional Perspectives
Risk Implications of Funding Changes
A more diverse funding mix can offer benefits with
regard to pricing and balance sheet management, but a
shift from core to noncore funding is not without new
potential risks. With net interest margins already pres-
sured by pricing competition and a flattened yield
curve, there is some concern that the higher interest
costs normally associated with noncore funding could
lead to more risk taking (credit risk or interest rate risk)
in search of higher asset yields. That risk may be tem-
pered somewhat by the fact that the noninterest cost of
gathering wholesale funds can be less than that of retail
funds. The move from core to noncore funding also may
have liability-side liquidity implications. As banks turn
more attention to alternative funding, there may be less
focus on retail deposit gathering. This raises the ques-
tion of whether banks could recapture deposit share lost
to competitors, such as mutual funds or credit unions, in
the e
vent that financial market turmoil or credit quality
concerns unexpectedly diminish alternative funding.
Many industry observers believe that the funding chal-
lenges facing banks are long term rather than cyclical.
Thus, the issues discussed here will only add to the
complexity of asset and liability management going for-
ward. Maintaining a cost structure consistent with the
mix of retail and wholesale funding will be critical for
banks to continue to grow without sacrificing prof-
itability. Regardless of how funds are acquired in the
future, insured institution managers must allocate those
funds in a manner that can achieve earnings and growth
objectives without subjecting institutions to undue cred-
it, interest rate, or liquidity risks.
Atlanta Region Staff
Atlanta Regional Outlook 26 Thir
d Quarter 1999
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